presumption claim in Nebraska

2020GROUP Cite as 307 Neb. 599 the business judgment rule is a rebuttable presumption, it places an initial burden on the party challenging a corporate decision to demonstrate the decisionmaker’s self-dealing or other disabling factor; and if a challenger sustains that initial burden, then the presumption of the rule is rebutted, and the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to show that the trans- action was, in fact, fair to the company. 89 For example, in Anderson v. Clemens Mobile Homes, 90 the plaintiff proved that an officer had realized a personal profit on the sale of land and business

2020GROUP Cite as 307 Neb. 599 the business judgment rule is a rebuttable presumption, it places an initial burden on the party challenging a corporate decision to demonstrate the decisionmaker’s self-dealing or other disabling factor; and if a challenger sustains that initial burden, then the presumption of the rule is rebutted, and the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to show that the trans- action was, in fact, fair to the company. 89 For example, in Anderson v. Clemens Mobile Homes, 90 the plaintiff proved that an officer had realized a personal profit on the sale of land and business

2004In the instant case, the district court, relying on our opinions in Reeder v. Reeder, 217 Neb. 120 , 348 N.W.2d 832 (1984), and Jindra, supra, determined that such a presumption applied.

2004In the instant case, the district court, relying on our opinions in Reeder v. Reeder, 217 Neb. 120 , 348 N.W.2d 832 (1984), and Jindra, supra, determined that such a presumption applied.

2004Because the right of subrogation cannot arise in *123 favor of an insurer against its own insured, see Jindra v. Clayton, 247 Neb. 597 , 529 N.W.2d 523 (1995), such a presumption would bar insurers from bringing a subrogation action against tenants who cause damage to their landlords’ insured premises.

2004Because the right of subrogation cannot arise in *123 favor of an insurer against its own insured, see Jindra v. Clayton, 247 Neb. 597 , 529 N.W.2d 523 (1995), such a presumption would bar insurers from bringing a subrogation action against tenants who cause damage to their landlords’ insured premises.

1978Milligan asserts that if this principle is properly applied in this case we must come to the conclusion that the possession was hostile or under a claim of ownership. *455 Milligan’s position rests upon statements of this court in Fischer v. Grinsbergs, 198 Neb. 329 , 252 N. W. 2d 619 , and the discussion in III American Law of Property, § 15.2, pp. 759 to 761, in which the text writer points out that when statutes of limitation bar the claim the record title is extinguished.

1978Milligan asserts that if this principle is properly applied in this case we must come to the conclusion that the possession was hostile or under a claim of ownership. *455 Milligan’s position rests upon statements of this court in Fischer v. Grinsbergs, 198 Neb. 329 , 252 N. W. 2d 619 , and the discussion in III American Law of Property, § 15.2, pp. 759 to 761, in which the text writer points out that when statutes of limitation bar the claim the record title is extinguished.

1929In Rushart v. Crippen, 99 Neb. 682 , we held: “In a suit to test the constitutionality of a legislative act, the presumption that an exception to general provisions is justified by facts within the knowledge of the lawmakers can only be overthrown by pleading and proof to the contrary, unless an unreasonable or arbitrary classification appears on the face of the act or is disclosed by facts of which the court will take judicial notice.” Giving full force to the presumption above noted, we are constrained to hold invalid that portion of the act in question relating to public dancing on Sunday a

1928Co., 184 Mass. 156, 163 .

1912The court said: “At common law the long enjoyment of an easement gave the right to the easement, and the use continuing uninterrupted for 20 years or longer, when unexplained, created the presumption that the claim or use was adverse; * * * and it was not necessary to show, by positive testimony, that the appellant had claimed this use as a matter of right, and so proclaimed to his neighbors.” In Talbott v. Thorn, 91 Ky. 417 , 16 S. W. 88 , the court said: “Where the grantee of such way has used it for 15 years, the agreement may be used to rebut the idea of such use being permissive, and as e

1912The court said: “At common law the long enjoyment of an easement gave the right to the easement, and the use continuing uninterrupted for 20 years or longer, when unexplained, created the presumption that the claim or use was adverse; * * * and it was not necessary to show, by positive testimony, that the appellant had claimed this use as a matter of right, and so proclaimed to his neighbors.” In Talbott v. Thorn, 91 Ky. 417 , 16 S. W. 88 , the court said: “Where the grantee of such way has used it for 15 years, the agreement may be used to rebut the idea of such use being permissive, and as e

1912The court said: “At common law the long enjoyment of an easement gave the right to the easement, and the use continuing uninterrupted for 20 years or longer, when unexplained, created the presumption that the claim or use was adverse; * * * and it was not necessary to show, by positive testimony, that the appellant had claimed this use as a matter of right, and so proclaimed to his neighbors.” In Talbott v. Thorn, 91 Ky. 417 , 16 S. W. 88 , the court said: “Where the grantee of such way has used it for 15 years, the agreement may be used to rebut the idea of such use being permissive, and as e

1906Adopting this construction, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to charge that the defendant had assigned the claim to Leudtke, or that his title thereto was traceable to the defendant, because the fact that suit had been instituted thereon in another state whereby the exempt wages of the plaintiff had been seized raises a presumption of a violation of the act, and, as was said in Bishop v. Middleton, supra,, “It is not necessary to plead what the law presumes.” The fourth criticism, namely, that the petition contains no allegation that the justice of the peace in Missouri had jurisdiction