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9 Kansas opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnson-Howellgreen2 sentences1998See State v. Johnson-Howell, 255 Kan. 928, 944-45 , 881 P.2d 1288 (1994). 1998See State v. Johnson-Howell, 255 Kan. 928, 944-45 , 881 P.2d 1288 (1994). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Sergio Duran Badillagreen1 sentence2013He first states that “for a permissive presumption [instruction] to be justified, the facts of a particular case must be examined.” (Emphasis added.) But he then cites to a passage in United States v. Badilla, 383 F.3d 1137, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004): “ ‘A permissive inference instruction is valid if there is a rational connection between the fact that the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed.’ ” (Emphasis added.) As stated, we are concerned with an inference instruction, not a presumption instruction. | 1 | 1 |
In Re PSE & G Shareholder Litigationgreen1 sentence2010In re PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 173 N.J. at 277. “ ‘The threshold inquiry in assessing whether a director violated his duty of loyalty is whether the director has a conflicting interest in the transaction. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Aguirre
green
1 sentence2024In his second and final argument, Drake claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to overcome the statutory presumption that his use of deadly force was reasonable under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5224. "'When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Aguirre, 313 Kan. 189 , 209, 485 P.3d 576 (2021). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Benson
green
1 sentence2020Other courts hold their statute constitutional because the presumption is a rule of law and not a true presumption." 125 Misc. 2d at 848 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Zimmerman v. Board of County Commissioners
green
2 sentences2011Simply stated, "`[i]n the absence of express preemption in a federal law, there is a strong presumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.' [Citation omitted.]" Zimmerman, 289 Kan. at 975 , 218 P.3d 400 . 2011Simply stated, "`[i]n the absence of express preemption in a federal law, there is a strong presumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.' [Citation omitted.]" Zimmerman, 289 Kan. at 975 , 218 P.3d 400 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences1997Williams restates the rule prohibiting the stacking of inferences in a way particularly appropriate to our discussion here: "`Another way, perhaps, of verbalizing the rule prohibiting an inference on an inference and a presumption on a presumption is the rule, as stated by some courts, that where reliance is placed upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances in question must themselves be proved and cannot be inferred or presumed from other circumstances.'" 229 Kan. at 649 (quoting 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 91, pp. 150-51 [13th ed. 1972]). 1997Williams restates the rule prohibiting the stacking of inferences in a way particularly appropriate to our discussion here: “ ‘Another way, perhaps, of verbalizing the rule prohibiting an inference on an inference and a presumption on a presumption is the rule, as stated by some courts, that where reliance is placed upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances in question must themselves be proved and cannot be inferred or presumed from other circumstances.’ ” 229 Kan. at 649 (quoting 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 91, pp. 150-51 [13th ed. 1972]). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Powell
green
1 sentence1994Kansas v. Powell , 220 Kan. 168 (1976). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People's Gas Co. v. Fletcher
green
2 sentences1979Gas Co. v. Fletcher, 81 Kan. 76 , 105 Pac. 34 (1909), and Felaine v. Welch, 126 Kan. 435 , 268 Pac. 821 (1928), are authority for the rule that a notary’s certificate of acknowledgment gives rise to the presumption of execution of the instrument and where execution is denied, the presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. 1979Gas Co. v. Fletcher, 81 Kan. 76 , 105 Pac. 34 (1909), and Felaine v. Welch, 126 Kan. 435 , 268 Pac. 821 (1928), are authority for the rule that a notary’s certificate of acknowledgment gives rise to the presumption of execution of the instrument and where execution is denied, the presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Felaine v. Welch
neutral
2 sentences1979Gas Co. v. Fletcher, 81 Kan. 76 , 105 Pac. 34 (1909), and Felaine v. Welch, 126 Kan. 435 , 268 Pac. 821 (1928), are authority for the rule that a notary’s certificate of acknowledgment gives rise to the presumption of execution of the instrument and where execution is denied, the presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. 1979Gas Co. v. Fletcher, 81 Kan. 76 , 105 Pac. 34 (1909), and Felaine v. Welch, 126 Kan. 435 , 268 Pac. 821 (1928), are authority for the rule that a notary’s certificate of acknowledgment gives rise to the presumption of execution of the instrument and where execution is denied, the presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.