presumption defense in Illinois

2026There is a presumption that defense counsel will pursue “sound trial strategies.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 .

1984Ed. 2d 674, 694-95 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065-66 .) Under the circumstances of this case, I am not persuaded that defendant has overcome this presumption when defense counsel’s conduct is viewed as of the time he allowed defendant to testify.

2025This presumption and the presumption that property acquired during the marriage is marital property “cancel each other out, and the trial court is free to determine the issue of whether the asset in question is marital or non-marital without resort to either presumption.” Id.

2023Where property is subject both to this presumption and the presumption that it is marital property because it was acquired during the marriage, the presumptions “cancel each other out, and the trial court is free to determine the issue of whether the asset in question is marital or nonmarital without resort to either presumption.” Id. ¶ 55 Any doubts concerning the character of property are to be resolved in favor of finding it to be marital.

2003People v. Faulkner, 292 Ill.

2003People v. Faulkner , 292 Ill.

2002Stewart, 958 F.2d at 1386 , citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 436-37 , 74 L.

2002Stewart, 958 F.2d at 1386 , citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 436-37 , 103 S.Ct. 843, 852 , 74 L.Ed.2d 646, 660 (1983); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 , 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2258 , 49 L.Ed.2d 108, 115-16 (1976).

1962(Hartung v. Village of Skokie, 22 Ill.2d 485 ; La Salle Nat.

1962(Hartung v. Village of Skokie, 22 Ill.2d 485 ; La Salle National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill.2d 40 .) Furthermore, minimum lot area limitations have been recognized as proper by this court.

1942Ives v. Hulce, 17 Ill.

1890Ives v. Hulse, 17 Ill.

2025Turcol, 359 Ill.

2025Regardless of the reason, the decision was one for trial counsel to make and, therefore, the allegation is insufficient to rebut the presumption that defense counsel’s trial strategy included not using the video. 35 ¶ 89 “The only exception to [the trial strategy] rule is when counsel’s chosen trial strategy is so unsound that ‘counsel entirely fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing.’ ” Id. at 432-33 (quoting People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1995)).

2023Although the presumption, if properly invoked, could be rebutted, resulting in the issue being a factual question for the trier of fact (see Carrasco, 2018 IL App (1st) 172535, ¶ 17 ), we need not decide whether defendant’s mere denial of receipt is sufficient to rebut the presumption because the presumption was not properly invoked. ¶ 26 Pursuant to the mortgage, to invoke the presumption, plaintiff needed to present proof that the notice was properly mailed to defendant by first class mail.

2023Heroy, 385 Ill.

2020Thus, we assume for purposes of our review that a gift presumption arose upon the transfer of the funds to Zachary and that the onus was on him to rebut the presumption at hearing by clear and convincing evidence. - 12 - 2020 IL App (2d) 180851-U Lindman, 356 Ill.

2020However, this presumption has an exception: “[w]e ordinarily presume the trial judge knows and follows the law unless the record indicates otherwise.” (Emphasis added.) Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d, at 420 .

2020I submit that the record indicates otherwise. - 19 - 2020 IL App (2d) 170978-U ¶ 65 Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d, at 420 , stands for the proposition that the presumption that the trial court knows and follows the law ends if the presumption is inconsistent with the record.

2013Defendant’s citation to People v. Lee, 185 Ill.

2012In order to preclude the presumption under this rule, “the land not only must be unenclosed, but also must be vacant and unoccupied.” Id.

2009App.3d 644, 651-52 , 323 Ill.Dec. 579 , 894 N.E.2d 138 (2008), appeal allowed, 229 Ill.2d 646 , 325 Ill.Dec. 12 , 897 N.E.2d 260 (2008) (table)) —have been interpreted so as to apply only in situations where "extraneous materials are brought into the jury room" or there is a "third-party contact" with a juror or jurors.

2009App.3d 644, 651-52 , 323 Ill.Dec. 579 , 894 N.E.2d 138 (2008), appeal allowed, 229 Ill.2d 646 , 325 Ill.Dec. 12 , 897 N.E.2d 260 (2008) (table)) —have been interpreted so as to apply only in situations where "extraneous materials are brought into the jury room" or there is a "third-party contact" with a juror or jurors.

2009Thus, the presumption and hearing requirements announced in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 , 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 98 L.Ed. 654, 656 (1954)—to the extent they survive (compare People v. Ward, 371 Ill.App.3d 382, 402-05 , 308 Ill.Dec. 899 , 862 N.E.2d 1102 (2007), with People v. McLaurin, 382 Ill.

2009App.3d 644, 651-52 , 323 Ill.Dec. 579 , 894 N.E.2d 138 (2008), appeal allowed, 229 Ill.2d 646 , 325 Ill.Dec. 12 , 897 N.E.2d 260 (2008) (table)) —have been interpreted so as to apply only in situations where "extraneous materials are brought into the jury room" or there is a "third-party contact" with a juror or jurors.

1993People v. Bowman (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 131, 141 , 561 N.E.2d 633 . "[T]he record need not always affirmatively show that when an attorney requests or agrees to a continuance, he has consulted with and received the advice of the accused, because such a rule would intolerably burden the trial courts.” (Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d at 142 .) Therefore, a defendant is bound by his counsel’s request for a continuance, even if the request is made in the accused’s absence, unless defendant overcomes the presumption that defense counsel acted on defendant’s authorization.

1993People v. Bowman (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 131, 141 , 561 N.E.2d 633 . "[T]he record need not always affirmatively show that when an attorney requests or agrees to a continuance, he has consulted with and received the advice of the accused, because such a rule would intolerably burden the trial courts.” (Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d at 142 .) Therefore, a defendant is bound by his counsel’s request for a continuance, even if the request is made in the accused’s absence, unless defendant overcomes the presumption that defense counsel acted on defendant’s authorization.

1991Rule 3-120 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of California. [8] Lawyers disciplined for sexual advances to their clients: In re Stanton (1985), 103 N.M. 413 , 708 P.2d 325 ; State v. Heilprin (1973), 59 Wis.2d 312 , 207 N.W.2d 878 ; Cincinnati Bar Association v. Fettner (1983), 8 Ohio St.3d 17 , 455 N.E.2d 1288 ; State of Michigan Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Gold, File No. DP 18/81 (June 30, 1981); In re Adams 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind.1981); In re Merrifield, before the Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W.Va.

1991Rule 3-120 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of California. [8] Lawyers disciplined for sexual advances to their clients: In re Stanton (1985), 103 N.M. 413 , 708 P.2d 325 ; State v. Heilprin (1973), 59 Wis.2d 312 , 207 N.W.2d 878 ; Cincinnati Bar Association v. Fettner (1983), 8 Ohio St.3d 17 , 455 N.E.2d 1288 ; State of Michigan Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Gold, File No. DP 18/81 (June 30, 1981); In re Adams 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind.1981); In re Merrifield, before the Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W.Va.

1991Rule 3-120 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of California. [8] Lawyers disciplined for sexual advances to their clients: In re Stanton (1985), 103 N.M. 413 , 708 P.2d 325 ; State v. Heilprin (1973), 59 Wis.2d 312 , 207 N.W.2d 878 ; Cincinnati Bar Association v. Fettner (1983), 8 Ohio St.3d 17 , 455 N.E.2d 1288 ; State of Michigan Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Gold, File No. DP 18/81 (June 30, 1981); In re Adams 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind.1981); In re Merrifield, before the Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W.Va.

1991Rule 3-120 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of California. [8] Lawyers disciplined for sexual advances to their clients: In re Stanton (1985), 103 N.M. 413 , 708 P.2d 325 ; State v. Heilprin (1973), 59 Wis.2d 312 , 207 N.W.2d 878 ; Cincinnati Bar Association v. Fettner (1983), 8 Ohio St.3d 17 , 455 N.E.2d 1288 ; State of Michigan Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Gold, File No. DP 18/81 (June 30, 1981); In re Adams 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind.1981); In re Merrifield, before the Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W.Va.