presumption waiver in Pennsylvania

1978See the Post Conviction Hearing Act, supra, n. 1, § 4, 19 P.S. § 1180-4(b) and (c); Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95 , 331 A.2d 435 (1975).

1978See the Post Conviction Hearing Act, supra, n. 1, § 4, 19 P.S. § 1180-4(b) and (c); Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95 , 331 A.2d 435 (1975).

1930Unlike the statute of limitations, it is merely a rule of evidence affecting the burden of proof, but no new promise is required as the basis of an action: Eby v. Eby’s Assignee, supra. Within twenty years the burden of proving payment is on the debtor, after that time it shifts to the creditors; Reed v. Reed, 46 Pa. 239 .

1917Unlike the statute of limitations, it is merely a rule of evidence affecting the burden of proof, but no new promise is required as the basis of an action: Eby v. Eby’s Assignee, supra. Within twenty years the burden of proving payment is on the debtor, after that time it shifts to the creditor: Reed v. Reed, 46 Pa. 239 .

1930Unlike the statute of limitations, it is merely a rule of evidence affecting the burden of proof, but no new promise is required as the basis of an action: Eby v. Eby’s Assignee, supra. Within twenty years the burden of proving payment is on the debtor, after that time it shifts to the creditors; Reed v. Reed, 46 Pa. 239 .

1917Unlike the statute of limitations, it is merely a rule of evidence affecting the burden of proof, but no new promise is required as the basis of an action: Eby v. Eby’s Assignee, supra. Within twenty years the burden of proving payment is on the debtor, after that time it shifts to the creditor: Reed v. Reed, 46 Pa. 239 .

2025(Agency’s Br. at 16, 18.) Citing our decisions in C.E. v. Department of Public Welfare, 917 A.2d 348 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), and J.W. v. Department of Public Welfare, 9 A.3d 270 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), Agency asserts that, the application of the presumption is waived only if the moving party does not raise the presumption at the hearing.

2025(Agency’s Br. at 16, 18.) Citing our decisions in C.E. v. Department of Public Welfare, 917 A.2d 348 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), and J.W. v. Department of Public Welfare, 9 A.3d 270 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), Agency asserts that, the application of the presumption is waived only if the moving party does not raise the presumption at the hearing.

2025However, However, "the "the inferences inferences must must flow flow from from facts and and 7 7 circumstances circumstances proven proven in in the the record, and must record, and must be quality as be of such volume and quality as to to overcome the presumption presumption of of innocence and satisfy innocence and the jury satisfy the jury of of an an accused's accused's guilt guilt beyond beyond aareasonable doubt." reasonable doubt." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 409 Pa.Super.

2016However, the court ultimately rejected the argument, holding that Strickland’s approach “is expressly premised on the supposition that the fundamental underlying right to representation under Gideon has been enabled by the State in a manner that- would justify the presumption that the standard of objective reasonableness will ordinarily be satisfied.” Id. 904 N.Y.S.2d 296 , 930 N.E.2d at 221 , The Court of Appeals explained that the crux of a prospective cause of action is not rooted in whether counsel, individually or systematically, are ineffective under Strickland, but “rather [in] whether

2016However, the court ultimately rejected the argument, holding that Strickland’s approach “is expressly premised on the supposition that the fundamental underlying right to representation under Gideon has been enabled by the State in a manner that- would justify the presumption that the standard of objective reasonableness will ordinarily be satisfied.” Id. 904 N.Y.S.2d 296 , 930 N.E.2d at 221 , The Court of Appeals explained that the crux of a prospective cause of action is not rooted in whether counsel, individually or systematically, are ineffective under Strickland, but “rather [in] whether

2015In tax sales it is particularly suitable.” Pickwick, 936 A.2d at 1213 (citations and quotations’ omitted.) Tracing back even further, the Supreme Court in Hughes cited Beacom v. Robison, 157 Pa.Super. 515 , 43 A.2d 640 (1945), to support the presumption rule.

2015In tax sales it is particularly suitable.” Pickwick, 936 A.2d at 1213 (citations and quotations’ omitted.) Tracing back even further, the Supreme Court in Hughes cited Beacom v. Robison, 157 Pa.Super. 515 , 43 A.2d 640 (1945), to support the presumption rule.

2004It is ironic, to say the least, that the lead opinion adverts to this Court's recent attempts to make some sense of our capital PCRA jurisprudence in Commonwealth v. Rush, 576 Pa. 3 , 838 A.2d 651 (2003) and Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574 , 832 A.2d 1014 (2003) in the same case in which it would reintroduce the arbitrariness occasioned by the wrongful application of this Court's relaxed waiver rule on capital PCRA matters, and that the lead opinion takes this backwards step sua sponte.

2004It is ironic, to say the least, that the lead opinion adverts to this Court's recent attempts to make some sense of our capital PCRA jurisprudence in Commonwealth v. Rush, 576 Pa. 3 , 838 A.2d 651 (2003) and Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574 , 832 A.2d 1014 (2003) in the same case in which it would reintroduce the arbitrariness occasioned by the wrongful application of this Court's relaxed waiver rule on capital PCRA matters, and that the lead opinion takes this backwards step sua sponte.

2004It is ironic, to say the least, that the lead opinion adverts to this Court's recent attempts to make some sense of our capital PCRA jurisprudence in Commonwealth v. Rush, 576 Pa. 3 , 838 A.2d 651 (2003) and Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574 , 832 A.2d 1014 (2003) in the same case in which it would reintroduce the arbitrariness occasioned by the wrongful application of this Court's relaxed waiver rule on capital PCRA matters, and that the lead opinion takes this backwards step sua sponte.

2004It is ironic, to say the least, that the lead opinion adverts to this Court's recent attempts to make some sense of our capital PCRA jurisprudence in Commonwealth v. Rush, 576 Pa. 3 , 838 A.2d 651 (2003) and Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574 , 832 A.2d 1014 (2003) in the same case in which it would reintroduce the arbitrariness occasioned by the wrongful application of this Court's relaxed waiver rule on capital PCRA matters, and that the lead opinion takes this backwards step sua sponte.

1983The presumption of such a waiver 1 can be rebutted if the petitioner can prove the existence of extraordinary-circumstances justifying his failure to raise the issue. 2 In Commonwealth v. Seachrist, 478 Pa. 621 , 387 A.2d 661 (1978), appellate counsel raised the ineffectiveness of trial counsel.

1983The presumption of such a waiver 1 can be rebutted if the petitioner can prove the existence of extraordinary-circumstances justifying his failure to raise the issue. 2 In Commonwealth v. Seachrist, 478 Pa. 621 , 387 A.2d 661 (1978), appellate counsel raised the ineffectiveness of trial counsel.

1982The leading Pennsylvania case in this area is Commonwealth v. Turner, 456 Pa. 116 , 317 A.2d 298 (1974).

1982The leading Pennsylvania case in this area is Commonwealth v. Turner, 456 Pa. 116 , 317 A.2d 298 (1974).

1981Poole v. Great American Insurance Company, 407 Pa. 652 , 182 A.2d 509 (1962), Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 236, Blocker v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 232 Pa.Super. 111 , 332 A.2d 476 (1975).

1981Poole v. Great American Insurance Company, 407 Pa. 652 , 182 A.2d 509 (1962), Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 236, Blocker v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 232 Pa.Super. 111 , 332 A.2d 476 (1975).

1981Poole v. Great American Insurance Company, 407 Pa. 652 , 182 A.2d 509 (1962), Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 236, Blocker v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 232 Pa.Super. 111 , 332 A.2d 476 (1975).

1981Poole v. Great American Insurance Company, 407 Pa. 652 , 182 A.2d 509 (1962), Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 236, Blocker v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 232 Pa.Super. 111 , 332 A.2d 476 (1975).

1978Any such claim has been waived by appellant’s failure to raise it on direct appeal, Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418 , 326 A.2d 272 (1974); Commonwealth v. Piper, 458 Pa. 307 , 328 A.2d 845 (1974), and by a failure, in his PCHA attack, to rebut the presumption that the waiver at the appeal stage was knowing and intelligent.

1978Any such claim has been waived by appellant’s failure to raise it on direct appeal, Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418 , 326 A.2d 272 (1974); Commonwealth v. Piper, 458 Pa. 307 , 328 A.2d 845 (1974), and by a failure, in his PCHA attack, to rebut the presumption that the waiver at the appeal stage was knowing and intelligent.

1978Any such claim has been waived by appellant’s failure to raise it on direct appeal, Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418 , 326 A.2d 272 (1974); Commonwealth v. Piper, 458 Pa. 307 , 328 A.2d 845 (1974), and by a failure, in his PCHA attack, to rebut the presumption that the waiver at the appeal stage was knowing and intelligent.

1978Any such claim has been waived by appellant’s failure to raise it on direct appeal, Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418 , 326 A.2d 272 (1974); Commonwealth v. Piper, 458 Pa. 307 , 328 A.2d 845 (1974), and by a failure, in his PCHA attack, to rebut the presumption that the waiver at the appeal stage was knowing and intelligent.

1970“As used in criminal law, a presumption’ is a rule of law attaching definite probative value to a specific fact, as distinguished from an ‘inference,’ which is a permissive conclusion by a trier of the fact, unaided by any rule or theory of law directly applied”: People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397 .