17 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1940–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of Minnesota v. Kemen Lavatos Taylor, IIgreen2 sentences2016“A delay that exceeds 60 days from the date of [a speedy-trial] demand [made after entry of a plea other than guilty] raises a presumption that a violation has occurred, and [appellate courts] must apply the remaining factors of the test.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 ; see Minn. R. 2016“A delay that exceeds 60 days from the date of [a speedy-trial] demand [made after entry of a plea other than guilty] raises a presumption that a violation has occurred, and [appellate courts] must apply the remaining factors of the test.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 ; see Minn. R. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Friberggreen2 sentences1991Id. at 513 . [Djelays beyond the 60-day limit simply raise the presumption that a violation has occurred and require the trial court to conduct a further inquiry to determine if there has been a violation of the defendant’s right to trial. 1989However, State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509 (Minn.1989), decided after the trial of this case, holds that the 60-day limit in Rule 11.10 simply raises a presumption that a violation has occurred. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2024And “[i]n Minnesota, delays beyond 60 days from the date of demand raise a presumption that a violation has occurred.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315-16 ; see also State v. Johnson, 811 N.W.2d 136, 144 (Minn. App. 2012) (“Under Minnesota law, a delay of more than 60 days from the date of the speedy-trial demand is presumptively prejudicial, triggering review of the remaining three factors.”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Hubachek v. Estate of Browngreen2 sentences1999See Brown’s Estate, 126 Minn. at 364 , 148 N.W. at 121 (concluding that the presumption of waiver that arises after conveyance of the deed should be treated as “prima facie only”). 1999See Brown’s Estate, 126 Minn. at 364 , 148 N.W. at 121 (concluding that the presumption of waiver that arises after conveyance of the deed should be treated as “prima facie only”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kellygreen2 sentences1985See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 , 96 S.Ct. 249 , 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) (conclusive presumption in state statute that pregnant women are ineligible for unemployment benefits for period extend ing from 12 weeks before the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks after childbirth); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (conclusive presumption contained in Pood Stamp Act providing that any household which includes a member who has reached his 18th birthday and who is claimed as a dependen 1985See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 , 96 S.Ct. 249 , 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) (conclusive presumption in state statute that pregnant women are ineligible for unemployment benefits for period extend ing from 12 weeks before the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks after childbirth); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (conclusive presumption contained in Pood Stamp Act providing that any household which includes a member who has reached his 18th birthday and who is claimed as a dependen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Nimerickgreen1 sentence1985IX Wigmore on Evidence, § 2511 (3d Ed.1940); See U.S. v. Nimerick, 118 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 313 U.S. 592 , 61 S.Ct. 1117 , 85 L.Ed. 1546 (1941) (presumption of innocence is not “evidence” in favor of defendant); see generally, U.S. v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir.1974). | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Department of Employment Security of Utahgreen2 sentences1985See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 , 96 S.Ct. 249 , 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) (conclusive presumption in state statute that pregnant women are ineligible for unemployment benefits for period extend ing from 12 weeks before the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks after childbirth); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (conclusive presumption contained in Pood Stamp Act providing that any household which includes a member who has reached his 18th birthday and who is claimed as a dependen 1985See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 , 96 S.Ct. 249 , 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) (conclusive presumption in state statute that pregnant women are ineligible for unemployment benefits for period extend ing from 12 weeks before the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks after childbirth); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (conclusive presumption contained in Pood Stamp Act providing that any household which includes a member who has reached his 18th birthday and who is claimed as a dependen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Miguel Luis Alba Fernandezgreen1 sentence1985IX Wigmore on Evidence, § 2511 (3d Ed.1940); See U.S. v. Nimerick, 118 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 313 U.S. 592 , 61 S.Ct. 1117 , 85 L.Ed. 1546 (1941) (presumption of innocence is not “evidence” in favor of defendant); see generally, U.S. v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir.1974). | 1 | 1 |
B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellisgreen1 sentence1985IX Wigmore on Evidence, § 2511 (3d Ed.1940); See U.S. v. Nimerick, 118 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 313 U.S. 592 , 61 S.Ct. 1117 , 85 L.Ed. 1546 (1941) (presumption of innocence is not “evidence” in favor of defendant); see generally, U.S. v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir.1974). | 1 | 1 |
Netzel v. Michigangreen1 sentence1985IX Wigmore on Evidence, § 2511 (3d Ed.1940); See U.S. v. Nimerick, 118 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 313 U.S. 592 , 61 S.Ct. 1117 , 85 L.Ed. 1546 (1941) (presumption of innocence is not “evidence” in favor of defendant); see generally, U.S. v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir.1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Windish
green
2 sentences2024And “[i]n Minnesota, delays beyond 60 days from the date of demand raise a presumption that a violation has occurred.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315-16 ; see also State v. Johnson, 811 N.W.2d 136, 144 (Minn. App. 2012) (“Under Minnesota law, a delay of more than 60 days from the date of the speedy-trial demand is presumptively prejudicial, triggering review of the remaining three factors.”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2012). 2016P. 11.09(b) (2014).3 “In Minnesota, delays beyond 60 days from the date of demand raise a presumption that a violation [of the right to a speedy trial] has occurred.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315-16 . | 2 | 2016–2024 |
Wender Presses, Inc. v. The United States
green
2 sentences1986Wender Presses, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 961, 963 , 170 Ct.Cl. 483 (1965). 1986Wender Presses, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 961, 963 , 170 Ct.Cl. 483 (1965). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Kobluk v. University of Minnesota
green
1 sentence2024The presumption of privilege is contrary to the general rule that “the party resisting disclosure bears the burden of presenting facts to establish the privilege’s existence.” Kobluk, 574 N.W.2d at 440 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Ray
green
2 sentences2006This improper shift in burden is inconsistent with our precedent on prosecutorial misconduct, and it ignores the concerns we expressed in State v. Ray , that defendants might deliberately pass on an objection at trial. 659 N.W.2d 736 , 747 n. 4 (Minn.2003). 2006This improper shift in burden is inconsistent with our precedent on prosecutorial misconduct, and it ignores the concerns we expressed in State v. Ray, that defendants might deliberately pass on an objection at trial. 659 N.W.2d 736 , 747 n. 4 (Minn.2003). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1989The presumption may be rebutted under an analysis of the factors cited in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). 1989The presumption may be rebutted under an analysis of the factors cited in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Heiner v. Donnan
green
2 sentences1985See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 , 96 S.Ct. 249 , 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) (conclusive presumption in state statute that pregnant women are ineligible for unemployment benefits for period extend ing from 12 weeks before the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks after childbirth); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (conclusive presumption contained in Pood Stamp Act providing that any household which includes a member who has reached his 18th birthday and who is claimed as a dependen 1985See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 , 96 S.Ct. 249 , 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) (conclusive presumption in state statute that pregnant women are ineligible for unemployment benefits for period extend ing from 12 weeks before the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks after childbirth); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (conclusive presumption contained in Pood Stamp Act providing that any household which includes a member who has reached his 18th birthday and who is claimed as a dependen | 1 | 1985–1985 |
United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry
green
2 sentences1985See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 , 96 S.Ct. 249 , 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) (conclusive presumption in state statute that pregnant women are ineligible for unemployment benefits for period extend ing from 12 weeks before the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks after childbirth); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (conclusive presumption contained in Pood Stamp Act providing that any household which includes a member who has reached his 18th birthday and who is claimed as a dependen 1985See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 , 96 S.Ct. 249 , 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) (conclusive presumption in state statute that pregnant women are ineligible for unemployment benefits for period extend ing from 12 weeks before the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks after childbirth); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (conclusive presumption contained in Pood Stamp Act providing that any household which includes a member who has reached his 18th birthday and who is claimed as a dependen | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Vlandis v. Kline
green
2 sentences1985See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 , 96 S.Ct. 249 , 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) (conclusive presumption in state statute that pregnant women are ineligible for unemployment benefits for period extend ing from 12 weeks before the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks after childbirth); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (conclusive presumption contained in Pood Stamp Act providing that any household which includes a member who has reached his 18th birthday and who is claimed as a dependen 1985See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 , 96 S.Ct. 249 , 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) (conclusive presumption in state statute that pregnant women are ineligible for unemployment benefits for period extend ing from 12 weeks before the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks after childbirth); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (conclusive presumption contained in Pood Stamp Act providing that any household which includes a member who has reached his 18th birthday and who is claimed as a dependen | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Olney, for an Opinion
yellow
1 sentence1940The texts which lay down the presumption rule indicate that under statutes conferring the status of a natural child upon the adopted one the terms "issue" and "children" include an adopted child, citing Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644 , and In re Olney, 27 R.I. 495 ; 70 A.L.R. 629 ; 69 C. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Hartwell v. Tefft
neutral
1 sentence1940The texts which lay down the presumption rule indicate that under statutes conferring the status of a natural child upon the adopted one the terms "issue" and "children" include an adopted child, citing Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644 , and In re Olney, 27 R.I. 495 ; 70 A.L.R. 629 ; 69 C. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.