presumption doctrine in Montana

2025Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, ¶ 21 , 343 Mont. 90 , 183 P.3d 861 (citations omitted). ¶10 In the instant case, Sullivan has not provided evidence to rebut the presumption that his defense counsel operated within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance.

2025Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, ¶ 21 , 343 Mont. 90 , 183 P.3d 861 (citations omitted). ¶10 In the instant case, Sullivan has not provided evidence to rebut the presumption that his defense counsel operated within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance.

2000The Seventh Circuit held: "We will not indulge in the presumption that a defense attorney who is being considered for a position as United States Attorney is unable to represent a defendant in federal court to the best of his ability and with the defendant's best interests in mind." Horton, 845 F.2d at 1419 . ¶ 48 The fact that Forsythe was a candidate for district court judge and county attorney during his representation of Petitioner does not establish an actual conflict without further support in the record.

2000The Seventh Circuit held: “We will not indulge in the presumption that a defense attorney who is being considered for a position as United States Attorney is unable to represent a defendant in federal court to the best of his ability and with the defendant’s best interests in mind.” Horton, 845 F.2d at 1419 . ¶48 The fact that Forsythe was a candidate for district court judge and county attorney during his representation of Petitioner does not establish an actual conflict without further support in the record.

1993Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (Kan. 1984), 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 .

1993Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (Kan. 1984), 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 .

1952Co., 181 Mass. 3 , 62 N. E. 955 , and similar cases, there is, of course, no room for the application of the doctrine of presumption.

1952Co., 181 Mass. 3 , 62 N. E. 955 , and similar cases, there is, of course, no room for the application of the doctrine of presumption.

1937(In re Wray’s Estate, 93 Mont. 525 , 19 Pac. (2d) 1051 .) Although in some instances there may be conflicting presumptions (McMahon v. Cooney, 95 Mont. 138 , 25 Pac. (2d) 131 ), more often these presumptions prescribe the duty of production of testimony on a party at a given time, and when it is removed by his producing evidence, then the presumption as a rule of law is satisfied and disappears, and he may then by his evidence succeed in creating another presumption which then puts the same duty upon the other party (5 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2493.) At the outset of this case, before

1937(In re Wray’s Estate, 93 Mont. 525 , 19 Pac. (2d) 1051 .) Although in some instances there may be conflicting presumptions (McMahon v. Cooney, 95 Mont. 138 , 25 Pac. (2d) 131 ), more often these presumptions prescribe the duty of production of testimony on a party at a given time, and when it is removed by his producing evidence, then the presumption as a rule of law is satisfied and disappears, and he may then by his evidence succeed in creating another presumption which then puts the same duty upon the other party (5 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2493.) At the outset of this case, before

1937(In re Wray’s Estate, 93 Mont. 525 , 19 Pac. (2d) 1051 .) Although in some instances there may be conflicting presumptions (McMahon v. Cooney, 95 Mont. 138 , 25 Pac. (2d) 131 ), more often these presumptions prescribe the duty of production of testimony on a party at a given time, and when it is removed by his producing evidence, then the presumption as a rule of law is satisfied and disappears, and he may then by his evidence succeed in creating another presumption which then puts the same duty upon the other party (5 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2493.) At the outset of this case, before

1937(In re Wray’s Estate, 93 Mont. 525 , 19 Pac. (2d) 1051 .) Although in some instances there may be conflicting presumptions (McMahon v. Cooney, 95 Mont. 138 , 25 Pac. (2d) 131 ), more often these presumptions prescribe the duty of production of testimony on a party at a given time, and when it is removed by his producing evidence, then the presumption as a rule of law is satisfied and disappears, and he may then by his evidence succeed in creating another presumption which then puts the same duty upon the other party (5 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2493.) At the outset of this case, before

1932In other words, the circumstances afford reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant. (1 Thompson on Negligence, sec. 16; 4 Randall on Instructions, 4405; Soto v. Spring Valley Water Co. , 39 Cal.App. 187 , 178 P. 305 ; Hardesty v. Largey Lumber Co. , 34 Mont. 151 , 86 P. 29 ; Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , 173 Cal. 156 , 159 P. 436 .) The case of Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , supra, is practically on all-fours with the facts in the instant case.

1932In other words, the circumstances afford reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant. (1 Thompson on Negligence, sec. 16; 4 Randall on Instructions, 4405; Soto v. Spring Valley Water Co. , 39 Cal.App. 187 , 178 P. 305 ; Hardesty v. Largey Lumber Co. , 34 Mont. 151 , 86 P. 29 ; Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , 173 Cal. 156 , 159 P. 436 .) The case of Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , supra, is practically on all-fours with the facts in the instant case.

1932In other words, the circumstances afford reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant. (1 Thompson on Negligence, sec. 16; 4 Randall on Instructions, 4405; Soto v. Spring Valley Water Co. , 39 Cal.App. 187 , 178 P. 305 ; Hardesty v. Largey Lumber Co. , 34 Mont. 151 , 86 P. 29 ; Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , 173 Cal. 156 , 159 P. 436 .) The case of Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , supra, is practically on all-fours with the facts in the instant case.

1932In other words, the circumstances afford reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant. (1 Thompson on Negligence, sec. 16; 4 Randall on Instructions, 4405; Soto v. Spring Valley Water Co. , 39 Cal.App. 187 , 178 P. 305 ; Hardesty v. Largey Lumber Co. , 34 Mont. 151 , 86 P. 29 ; Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , 173 Cal. 156 , 159 P. 436 .) The case of Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , supra, is practically on all-fours with the facts in the instant case.

1932In other words, the circumstances afford reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant. (1 Thompson on Negligence, sec. 16; 4 Randall on Instructions, 4405; Soto v. Spring Valley Water Co. , 39 Cal.App. 187 , 178 P. 305 ; Hardesty v. Largey Lumber Co. , 34 Mont. 151 , 86 P. 29 ; Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , 173 Cal. 156 , 159 P. 436 .) The case of Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , supra, is practically on all-fours with the facts in the instant case.

1932In other words, the circumstances afford reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant. (1 Thompson on Negligence, sec. 16; 4 Randall on Instructions, 4405; Soto v. Spring Valley Water Co. , 39 Cal.App. 187 , 178 P. 305 ; Hardesty v. Largey Lumber Co. , 34 Mont. 151 , 86 P. 29 ; Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , 173 Cal. 156 , 159 P. 436 .) The case of Meyer v. McNutt Hospital , supra, is practically on all-fours with the facts in the instant case.

1899(Dillon v. Bayliss, 11 Mont. 171 , 27 Pac. 725 ; Metcalf v. Prescott, 10 Mont. 283 ; 25 Pac. 1037 , and the other authorities cited.) Even upon the presumption that this claim was not well known, still there is reference to marked stakes and trees upon the Black-tail claim itself, which the jury, under the authority of the cases cited, and under the proof so far given, might find to be permanent monuments.

1899(Dillon v. Bayliss, 11 Mont. 171 , 27 Pac. 725 ; Metcalf v. Prescott, 10 Mont. 283 ; 25 Pac. 1037 , and the other authorities cited.) Even upon the presumption that this claim was not well known, still there is reference to marked stakes and trees upon the Black-tail claim itself, which the jury, under the authority of the cases cited, and under the proof so far given, might find to be permanent monuments.

1899(Dillon v. Bayliss, 11 Mont. 171 , 27 Pac. 725 ; Metcalf v. Prescott, 10 Mont. 283 ; 25 Pac. 1037 , and the other authorities cited.) Even upon the presumption that this claim was not well known, still there is reference to marked stakes and trees upon the Black-tail claim itself, which the jury, under the authority of the cases cited, and under the proof so far given, might find to be permanent monuments.

1896In Bohn Manufacturing Co. v. Harrison, 13 Mont. 293 , this court held that “parol evidence of an agreement that the acceptance of a bill of„ exchange should not be a waiver of counterclaims which the acceptor then held against the drawer is admissible in an action on the bill, as such evidence contradicts, not the instrument, but merely the presumption of waiver which arises from the fact of its acceptance.” We think this case is directly in point, and decisive of the case at bar.