presumption error in Indiana

1974Robbins v. State (1971), [257] Ind. [273], 274 N.E.2d 255 .” State v. Irvin (1973), 259 Ind. 610 , 291 N.E.2d 70, 73 .

1973Robbins v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 273 , 274 N. E. 2d 255 .

2018This presumption exception is strict, applying when "Congress has legislated in the field from the earliest days of the Republic, creating an extensive federal statutory and regulatory scheme." Id. (finding the presumption inapplicable in the maritime trade context).

2018This presumption exception is strict, applying when “Congress has legislated in the field from the earliest days of the Republic, creating an extensive federal statutory and regulatory scheme.” Id. (finding the presumption inapplicable in the maritime trade context).

2018Mannix v. State , 54 N.E.3d 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). [34] Among the cases that Corbin cites to is Mordacq v. State , 585 N.E.2d 22 , 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), where this court discussed whether the chemical breath test can "presumptively relate back to an act of operating a vehicle that occurred before an officer encountered the defendant ...." Analyzing this issue, we determined that [I]n a case where the officer did not observe the defendant operating the vehicle, the statutes could be read to impose no limit on the relation back test, provided the test was performed within three hours of t

2018Mannix v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

2001Grey, 553 N.E.2d at 1198 .

1998Grey, 553 N.E.2d at 1198 .

1977State v. Irvin (1973), 259 Ind. 610 , 291 N.E.2d 70 .

1977State v. Irvin (1973), 259 Ind. 610 , 291 N.E.2d 70 .

2025Our Supreme Court has encouraged “trial courts to employ other and creative approaches to assist and enable juries to resolve difficulties.” Id. at 1223 . [64] An ex parte communication between the trial court and the jury, however, “creates a presumption of error.” Minor v. State, 252 N.E.3d 979 , 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Bouye v. State, 699 N.E.2d 620, 628 (Ind. 1998)), trans. denied. “[S]uch presumption is rebuttable and does not constitute per se grounds for reversal.” Id. “‘In deciding whether the presumption of harm has Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-198 | December

2020Therefore, the second note was an Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2256 | June 18, 2020 Page 28 of 31 ex parte communication, which created a presumption of error.7 See Dickenson, 835 N.E.2d at 551 .

2020Moore, 723 N.E.2d at 446 . [11] K.P. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that he did not rebut the presumption of waiver.

2018Id. at 661, 663-64, 668 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 .

2018Mannix v. State , 54 N.E.3d 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). [34] Among the cases that Corbin cites to is Mordacq v. State , 585 N.E.2d 22 , 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), where this court discussed whether the chemical breath test can "presumptively relate back to an act of operating a vehicle that occurred before an officer encountered the defendant ...." Analyzing this issue, we determined that [I]n a case where the officer did not observe the defendant operating the vehicle, the statutes could be read to impose no limit on the relation back test, provided the test was performed within three hours of t

2012Stevens, 689 N.E.2d at 490 .

2012Thus, the Court concluded that “it was possible that had Vance been granted a continuance, he might have *712 gathered evidence to overcome the presumption of waiver.” Id.

2012The Court also highlighted the statutory requirement that “the juvenile court may not waive jurisdiction until ‘after full investigation and hearing,’ ” and noted: Summers instructs that the record “should be sufficient to demonstrate unequivocally that the strict statutory requirement of a full investigation and hearing has been met and that a conscientious determination of the question of waiver has been made.” 248 Ind. at 559-60 , 280 N.E.2d at 325.

2003MeBride argues that the above italicized language created a presumption in violation of the case law contained in Seay v. State, 698 N.E.2d 732 (Ind.1998).

2001“When the basic sentence is imposed, this Court will presume the trial court considered the alternatives.” Id. (citations omitted). 4 [17,18] To the extent that Anderson attempts to rebut this presumption with his claim that the trial court “was required *1280 to at least identify ... remorse as a mitigating factor," Brief of Appellant at 20, his claim fails.

1998Such a presumption is in violation of due process, * * *.' [ State v. Shaw,] 106 Ariz. 103 , 471 P.2d [715,] 724 [ (1970) ].

1998Such a presumption is in violation of due process, * * *.’ [State v. Shaw,] 106 Ariz. 103 , 471 P.2d [715,] 724 [ (1970) ].

1997Id. at 25 .

1993In Bond, 273 Ind. at 237 , 403 N.E.2d at 819 , we held that the presumption of error resulting from the defendant's absence from the courtroom may be overcome where defense counsel failed to make a timely objection. ("It is apparent that no harm could come from the incident, hence [defense counsel] sought neither the declaration of a mistrial nor the substitution of an alternate for the exposed juror, and the error was, thereby, waived.") Here, although defense counsel was aware of the trial court's intention to allow the jury to view evidence outside of James' presence, defense counsel made n

1993In Bond, 273 Ind. at 237 , 403 N.E.2d at 819 , we held that the presumption of error resulting from the defendant's absence from the courtroom may be overcome where defense counsel failed to make a timely objection. ("It is apparent that no harm could come from the incident, hence [defense counsel] sought neither the declaration of a mistrial nor the substitution of an alternate for the exposed juror, and the error was, thereby, waived.") Here, although defense counsel was aware of the trial court's intention to allow the jury to view evidence outside of James' presence, defense counsel made n

1984Partlow v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 259 , 266 cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 983 , 79 L.Ed.2d 219 (1984); Gerrick v. State (1983), Ind., 451 N.E.2d 327, 330 ; Trotter v. State (1981), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 637, 642 ; see generally IC 31-6-2-4. 4 Once these prerequisites are met, however, the juvenile court still retains discretion to keep the child in the juvenile system.