83 Washington opinions name it 3 courts 1937–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2019The experience and logic test determines whether the proceeding at issue implicates the public trial right.41 "The guiding principle is 'whether openness will enhance[ ] both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.'"42 In State v. Smith,43 our Supreme Court held that "sidebars do not implicate the public trial right." The court reasoned that sidebars "have not historically been open to the public 87 State v. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1, 16 , 288 P.3d 1113 (2012). 88 State v. Armstrong, 188 Wn.2d 333 , 339, 394 P.3d 373 (201 2019The experience and logic test determines whether the proceeding at issue implicates the public trial right.41 "The guiding principle is 'whether openness will enhance[ ] both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.'"42 In State v. Smith,43 our Supreme Court held that "sidebars do not implicate the public trial right." The court reasoned that sidebars "have not historically been open to the public 87 State v. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1, 16 , 288 P.3d 1113 (2012). 88 State v. Armstrong, 188 Wn.2d 333 , 339, 394 P.3d 373 (201 | 2 | 4 |
State v. Butlergreen2 sentences2021See State v. Butler, 53 Wn. 2020See State v. Butler, 53 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Stannardgreen2 sentences2010See Stannard, 109 Wash.2d at 36 , 742 P.2d 1244 . 2010See Stannard, 109 Wn.2d at 36 . | 2 | 2 |
Combined Properties/Greenbriar Ltd. Partnership v. Morrowgreen2 sentences2002CI. 29, 39 (2000) ("[N]o part of the plurality's reasoning constitutes binding precedent."); Morrow, 58 F.Supp.2d at 681 ("[N]o single theory of law was adopted by a majority of the Court, and Eastern Enterprises is not entitled to any precedential weight."); Franklin County, 240 F.3d at 552 ("We conclude that Eastern Enterprises has no precedential effect on this case because no single rationale was agreed upon by the Court."); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658 (3d Cir.1999) (finding that the "splintered decision" in Eastern Enterprises "makes it difficult to distill a guidin 2002Cl. 29, 39 (2000) (“[N]o part of the plurality’s reasoning constitutes binding precedent.”); Morrow, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (“[N]o single theory of law was adopted by a majority of the Court, and Eastern Enterprises is not entitled to any precedential weight.”); Franklin County, 240 F.3d at 552 (“We conclude that Eastern Enterprises has no precedential effect on this case because no single rationale was agreed upon by the Court.”); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the “splintered” decision in Eastern Enterprises “makes it difficult to distill a gui | 2 | 2 |
cluster 764421green2 sentences2002CI. 29, 39 (2000) ("[N]o part of the plurality's reasoning constitutes binding precedent."); Morrow, 58 F.Supp.2d at 681 ("[N]o single theory of law was adopted by a majority of the Court, and Eastern Enterprises is not entitled to any precedential weight."); Franklin County, 240 F.3d at 552 ("We conclude that Eastern Enterprises has no precedential effect on this case because no single rationale was agreed upon by the Court."); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658 (3d Cir.1999) (finding that the "splintered decision" in Eastern Enterprises "makes it difficult to distill a guidin 2002Cl. 29, 39 (2000) (“[N]o part of the plurality’s reasoning constitutes binding precedent.”); Morrow, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (“[N]o single theory of law was adopted by a majority of the Court, and Eastern Enterprises is not entitled to any precedential weight.”); Franklin County, 240 F.3d at 552 (“We conclude that Eastern Enterprises has no precedential effect on this case because no single rationale was agreed upon by the Court.”); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the “splintered” decision in Eastern Enterprises “makes it difficult to distill a gui | 2 | 2 |
cluster 772101green2 sentences2002CI. 29, 39 (2000) ("[N]o part of the plurality's reasoning constitutes binding precedent."); Morrow, 58 F.Supp.2d at 681 ("[N]o single theory of law was adopted by a majority of the Court, and Eastern Enterprises is not entitled to any precedential weight."); Franklin County, 240 F.3d at 552 ("We conclude that Eastern Enterprises has no precedential effect on this case because no single rationale was agreed upon by the Court."); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658 (3d Cir.1999) (finding that the "splintered decision" in Eastern Enterprises "makes it difficult to distill a guidin 2002Cl. 29, 39 (2000) (“[N]o part of the plurality’s reasoning constitutes binding precedent.”); Morrow, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (“[N]o single theory of law was adopted by a majority of the Court, and Eastern Enterprises is not entitled to any precedential weight.”); Franklin County, 240 F.3d at 552 (“We conclude that Eastern Enterprises has no precedential effect on this case because no single rationale was agreed upon by the Court.”); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the “splintered” decision in Eastern Enterprises “makes it difficult to distill a gui | 2 | 2 |
Muncie v. Westcraft Corp.green2 sentences1996See Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., 58 Wash.2d 36, 38 , 360 P.2d 744 (1961). 1996See Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., 58 Wash.2d 36, 38 , 360 P.2d 744 (1961). | 2 | 2 |
Dennis v. Department of Labor & Industriesgreen2 sentences2020“If a statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be primarily derived from the language itself.” Cockle, 142 Wn.2d at 807 . “‘The guiding principle in construing provisions of the [IIA] is that the Act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker.’” Cockle, 142 Wn.2d at 811 (quoting Dennis v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 467, 470 , 745 P.2d 1295 (1987)). 2020“If a statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be primarily derived from the language itself.” Cockle, 142 Wn.2d at 807 . “‘The guiding principle in construing provisions of the [IIA] is that the Act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker.’” Cockle, 142 Wn.2d at 811 (quoting Dennis v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 467, 470 , 745 P.2d 1295 (1987)). | 1 | 15 |
Pugel v. Monheimergreen2 sentences2005Allen, Washington Practice: Tort Law and Practice § 5.1, at 124 (2d ed. 2000) (“ 'The guiding principle of tort law is to make the injured party as whole as possible through pecuniary com pensation.’ ” (quoting Pugel v. Monheimer, 83 Wn. 2005ALLEN, 16 WASHINGTON PRACTICE, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.1, at 124 (2000) ("`The guiding principle of tort law is to make the injured party as whole as possible through pecuniary compensation.'" (quoting Pugel v. Monheimer, 83 Wash.App. 688, 692 , 922 P.2d 1377 (1996))). [2] ¶ 35 Other states have recognized these differing purposes. | 1 | 2 |
Guimont v. Clarkegreen2 sentences2002CI. 29, 39 (2000) ("[N]o part of the plurality's reasoning constitutes binding precedent."); Morrow, 58 F.Supp.2d at 681 ("[N]o single theory of law was adopted by a majority of the Court, and Eastern Enterprises is not entitled to any precedential weight."); Franklin County, 240 F.3d at 552 ("We conclude that Eastern Enterprises has no precedential effect on this case because no single rationale was agreed upon by the Court."); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658 (3d Cir.1999) (finding that the "splintered decision" in Eastern Enterprises "makes it difficult to distill a guidin 2002CI. 29, 39 (2000) ("[N]o part of the plurality's reasoning constitutes binding precedent."); Morrow, 58 F.Supp.2d at 681 ("[N]o single theory of law was adopted by a majority of the Court, and Eastern Enterprises is not entitled to any precedential weight."); Franklin County, 240 F.3d at 552 ("We conclude that Eastern Enterprises has no precedential effect on this case because no single rationale was agreed upon by the Court."); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658 (3d Cir.1999) (finding that the "splintered decision" in Eastern Enterprises "makes it difficult to distill a guidin | 1 | 2 |
Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.green1 sentence2024Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 645 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
| In the Matter of Marriage of Greenleegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riversidegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Power v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Adoption of Baby Girl K.green | 1 | 1 |
| Amburn v. Dalygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Capital Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Conveygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sublett
green
2 sentences2019The experience and logic test determines whether the proceeding at issue implicates the public trial right.41 "The guiding principle is 'whether openness will enhance[ ] both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.'"42 In State v. Smith,43 our Supreme Court held that "sidebars do not implicate the public trial right." The court reasoned that sidebars "have not historically been open to the public 87 State v. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1, 16 , 288 P.3d 1113 (2012). 88 State v. Armstrong, 188 Wn.2d 333 , 339, 394 P.3d 373 (201 2019The experience and logic test determines whether the proceeding at issue implicates the public trial right.41 "The guiding principle is 'whether openness will enhance[ ] both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.'"42 In State v. Smith,43 our Supreme Court held that "sidebars do not implicate the public trial right." The court reasoned that sidebars "have not historically been open to the public 87 State v. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1, 16 , 288 P.3d 1113 (2012). 88 State v. Armstrong, 188 Wn.2d 333 , 339, 394 P.3d 373 (201 | 8 | 2014–2019 |
Godinez v. Moran
green
2 sentences2017The guiding principle is to allow the trial court wide discretion to consider the evidence that best illuminates whether the defendant has the mental capacity to make the "sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial." Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398 . 2017The guiding principle is to allow the trial court wide discretion to consider the evidence that best illuminates whether the defendant has the mental capacity to make the “sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial.” Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398 . ¶16 The question in this case is whether the trial court correctly applied this capacity-based standard, or instead departed from it by considering Ortiz-Abrego’s actual understanding of his trial and by blending competency and disability accommodation law. | 3 | 2017–2017 |
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty.
green
2 sentences2017Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 , 104 S. Ct. 819 , 78 L. 2017Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 , 104 S. Ct. 819 , 78 L. | 3 | 2014–2017 |
AKER VERDAL A/S v. Neil F. Lampson, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010Simply stated, a plaintiff is entitled to that sum of money that will place him in as good a position as he would have been but for the defendant’s tortious act.” 16 DeWolf & Keller, supra, § 5.1, at 172 (footnote omitted) (quoting Aker Verdal A/S v. Neil F. Lampson, Inc., 65 Wn. 1994App. 177, 183 , 828 P.2d 610 (1992) (the guiding principle of tort law is to make the injured party as whole as possible through pecuniary compensation) (citing DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wn.2d 357, 371 , 418 P.2d 1010 , 422 P.2d 328 (1966)). | 3 | 1994–2010 |
DeNike v. Mowery
green
2 sentences1994App. 177, 183 , 828 P.2d 610 (1992) (the guiding principle of tort law is to make the injured party as whole as possible through pecuniary compensation) (citing DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wn.2d 357, 371 , 418 P.2d 1010 , 422 P.2d 328 (1966)). 1994App. 177, 183 , 828 P.2d 610 (1992) (the guiding principle of tort law is to make the injured party as whole as possible through pecuniary compensation) (citing DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wn.2d 357, 371 , 418 P.2d 1010 , 422 P.2d 328 (1966)). | 3 | 1992–1994 |
In Re the Personal Restraint of Smiley
green
2 sentences1987In In re Smiley, 96 Wn.2d 950, 953 , 640 P.2d 7 (1982), the Supreme Court listed the following two fundamental purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977: The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, RCW 13.40, abandoned the doctrine of parens patriae as the single guiding principle of juvenile justice and replaced it with twin *232 principles of rehabilitation and punishment. 1987In In re Smiley, 96 Wn.2d 950, 953 , 640 P.2d 7 (1982), the Supreme Court listed the following two fundamental purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977: The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, RCW 13.40, abandoned the doctrine of parens patriae as the single guiding principle of juvenile justice and replaced it with twin *232 principles of rehabilitation and punishment. | 3 | 1982–1987 |
Avery v. Department of Social & Health Services
green
2 sentences2019“The guiding principle behind the adoption process is to determine what is in the best interest of the child.” Id. at 417 . 2019The Miniums’ argument overlooks the guiding principle behind the adoption process, which “is to determine what is in the best interest of the child.” B.T., 150 Wn.2d at 417 . | 2 | 2012–2019 |
State v. Sanchez
green
2 sentences2015ANALYSIS ¶50 The guiding inquiry is one of “[b]asic agency principles and simple fairness.” State v. Sanchez, 146 Wn.2d 339, 359 , 46 P.3d 774 (2002) (Madsen, J., dissenting); see also id. at 356 (Chambers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (deciding the issues in light of “principles of fairness and agency”). 2015ANALYSIS The guiding inquiry is one of "[b ]asic agency principles and simple fairness." State v. Sanchez, 146 Wn.2d 339, 359 , 46 P.3d 774 (2002) (Madsen, J., dissenting); see also id. at 356 (Chambers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (deciding the issues in light of"principles of fairness and agency"). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Sanchez
green
2 sentences2015ANALYSIS ¶50 The guiding inquiry is one of “[b]asic agency principles and simple fairness.” State v. Sanchez, 146 Wn.2d 339, 359 , 46 P.3d 774 (2002) (Madsen, J., dissenting); see also id. at 356 (Chambers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (deciding the issues in light of “principles of fairness and agency”). 2015ANALYSIS The guiding inquiry is one of "[b ]asic agency principles and simple fairness." State v. Sanchez, 146 Wn.2d 339, 359 , 46 P.3d 774 (2002) (Madsen, J., dissenting); see also id. at 356 (Chambers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (deciding the issues in light of"principles of fairness and agency"). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Martinez v. Metabolife International., Inc.
green
2 sentences2014App. at 72 (quoting Martinez v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 181, 188 , 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494 (2003)). 2014App. at 72 (quoting Martinez v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 181, 188 , 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494 (2003)). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Seagull
green
2 sentences2001Seagull, 95 Wn.2d at 902 . 2001Seagull, 95 Wash.2d at 902 , 632 P.2d 44 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Clauson v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
2 sentences2000Clauson, 130 Wn.2d at 584 ; Dennis, 109 Wn.2d at 470 ; RCW 51.12.010. 2000Clauson, 130 Wash.2d at 584 , 925 P.2d 624 ; Dennis, 109 Wash.2d at 470 , 745 P.2d 1295 ; RCW 51.12.010. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors
green
2 sentences1999This result is not surprising given that the court's guiding principle was to protect against "[t]he probability of injurious consequences from the acts of the unskilled." WSBA v. WAR, 41 Wash.2d at 699 , 251 P.2d 619 . 1999This result is not surprising given that the court's guiding principle was to protect against "[t]he probability of injurious consequences from the acts of the unskilled." WSBA v. WAR, 41 Wash.2d at 699 , 251 P.2d 619 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch
green
2 sentences1997Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 , 109 S. Ct. 609 , 102 L. 1997Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 , 109 S. Ct. 609 , 102 L. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Krystad v. Lau
green
2 sentences1982"The guiding rule and our major goal in an inquiry of this sort is to seek out, ascertain and give effect to the [legislative] intentions ..." Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wn.2d 827, 844 , 400 P.2d 72 (1965). 1982"The guiding rule and our major goal in an inquiry of this sort is to seek out, ascertain and give effect to the [legislative] intentions ..." Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wn.2d 827, 844 , 400 P.2d 72 (1965). | 2 | 1969–1982 |
Lynch v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
2 sentences1978In interpreting the act, we must remember that: The guiding rule and our major goal in an inquiry of this sort is to seek out, ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intentions (Lynch v. Department of Labor & Industries, 19 Wn. (2d) 802, 145 P. (2d) 265 ; Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wn. (2d) 390, 191 P. (2d) 858 ); and the process of attaining this goal evokes a number of familiar principles concerning problems of interpretation. 1965The employees would have had no free choice as to whether they wished to organize or what union would be their representative. *844 "The public policy of Washington relied upon by the courts below to sustain this injunction is an important and widely accepted one...." In Ostroff , we referred directly to and quoted from Gazzam to emphasize the declaration of policy by setting forth, verbatim, § 2 of the act, RCW 49.32.020, saying: "This testimony must be considered in the light of the public policy of the state of Washington, as declared by the legislature in ... [RCW 49.32.020] reading as fol | 2 | 1965–1978 |
Graffell v. Honeysuckle
green
2 sentences1978In interpreting the act, we must remember that: The guiding rule and our major goal in an inquiry of this sort is to seek out, ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intentions (Lynch v. Department of Labor & Industries, 19 Wn. (2d) 802, 145 P. (2d) 265 ; Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wn. (2d) 390, 191 P. (2d) 858 ); and the process of attaining this goal evokes a number of familiar principles concerning problems of interpretation. 1965The employees would have had no free choice as to whether they wished to organize or what union would be their representative. *844 "The public policy of Washington relied upon by the courts below to sustain this injunction is an important and widely accepted one...." In Ostroff , we referred directly to and quoted from Gazzam to emphasize the declaration of policy by setting forth, verbatim, § 2 of the act, RCW 49.32.020, saying: "This testimony must be considered in the light of the public policy of the state of Washington, as declared by the legislature in ... [RCW 49.32.020] reading as fol | 2 | 1965–1978 |
Fisher Broadcasting-Seattle TV LLC v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences2025See LAWS OF 1973, ch. 1, §§ 26, 31; Fisher Broad.–Seattle TV LLC v. City of Seattle, 180 Wn.2d 515, 521 , 326 P.3d 688 (2014) (quoting Sargent v. Seattle Police Dep’t, 179 Wn.2d 376, 385 , 314 P.3d 1093 (2013)). 2025See LAWS OF 1973, ch. 1, §§ 26, 31; Fisher Broad.–Seattle TV LLC v. City of Seattle, 180 Wn.2d 515, 521 , 326 P.3d 688 (2014) (quoting Sargent v. Seattle Police Dep’t, 179 Wn.2d 376, 385 , 314 P.3d 1093 (2013)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Sargent v. Seattle Police Dept.
green
2 sentences2025See LAWS OF 1973, ch. 1, §§ 26, 31; Fisher Broad.–Seattle TV LLC v. City of Seattle, 180 Wn.2d 515, 521 , 326 P.3d 688 (2014) (quoting Sargent v. Seattle Police Dep’t, 179 Wn.2d 376, 385 , 314 P.3d 1093 (2013)). 2025See LAWS OF 1973, ch. 1, §§ 26, 31; Fisher Broad.–Seattle TV LLC v. City of Seattle, 180 Wn.2d 515, 521 , 326 P.3d 688 (2014) (quoting Sargent v. Seattle Police Dep’t, 179 Wn.2d 376, 385 , 314 P.3d 1093 (2013)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| United States v. Branden Holena green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Cockle v. Department of Labor & Industries green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Lilyblad green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Budget Rent A Car Corp. v. Department of Licensing green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Lilyblad green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Shoemake v. Ferrer green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Evans green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| In re the Marriage of Freeman green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Tingey v. Haisch green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Love green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Wise green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Henry Industries, Inc. v. Department Of Labor & Industries green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Tingey v. Haisch green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Budget Rent a Car Corp. v. STATE, DOL green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Ashbaugh green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In re the Marriage of Watson green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Lantzsch green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Byrd green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Doe v. Cahill green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Dillon v. Seattle Deposition Reporters, LLC green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Romo v. Department of Labor & Industries green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.