guiding principle in Florida

2022Co., 899 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Auto-Owners Ins.

2017As explained by the Florida Supreme Court in Fayad v. Clarendon National Insurance Co., 899 So.2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 2005), “[w]e begin with the guiding principle that insurance contracts are construed in accordance with ‘the plain language of the policfy] as bargained for by the parties.’”.(Citations omitted).

2013Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29, 33 (Fla.2000) (quoting Prudential Prop. & Cas.

2013Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29, 33 (Fla.2000) (quoting Prudential Prop. & Cas.

1994We agree with Judge Warner’s recent pronouncement in Grau v. Branham, 626 So .2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), that in all but the most exceptional cases “the lawyers have a right to expect that once a trial commences, discovery and examinations must cease.” We find that view consistent with the guiding principle underlying the rules of discovery — that all relevant facts should be obtainable by the litigants in advance of a proceeding so as to “render surprise at the trial a practical impossibility.” Bowen v. Manuel, 144 So.2d 341, 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); see also, Binger v. King Pest Contr

1985The guiding principle, applicable in workers’ compensation litigation as in civil litigation before a circuit court, is stated in Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1981): [A] trial court can properly exclude the testimony of a witness whose name has not been disclosed in accordance with a pretrial order.

2019Id. at 283 (distinguishing Sas, 112 So. 3d 778 , and Kelsey v. 10As the North Carolina Supreme Court once remarked, " '[e]x nihilo nihil fit' is a maxim that admits no exceptions." Virginia-Carolina Chem.

2018Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So. 3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013).

2015This Court has stated that “the best interest of the ehild[ ] is the guiding principle in any proceeding to determine child support.” Cross v. Cross, 490 So.2d 958, 960 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

2010Co., 913 So.2d 528, 532 (Fla.2005).

2010Co., 913 So.2d 528, 532 (Fla.2005).

2009See Nielsen, 117 So.2d at 734 . [5] As a necessary precondition to discounting the guiding principle of stare decisis, we have traditionally asked the following questions, each of which merits a negative response in this context: (1) whether the prior precedent has proven unworkable due to its reliance upon an erroneous legal fiction; (2) whether the rule of law could be reversed without serious disruption in legal doctrine and injustice to those relying upon the law; and (3) whether the underlying premise of the prior precedent has changed so dramatically that it lacks legal justification.

2009See, e.g., N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 637 (Fla.2003). [6] See, e.g., Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1254 (Fla.2006) (identifying misapplication of our precedent as one means of supplying conflict jurisdiction); Aguilera v. Inservs., Inc., 905 So.2d 84, 86 (Fla.2005) (same); Knowles v. State, 848 So.2d 1055, 1056 (Fla.2003) (same); Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901 , 904 (Fla.2002) (same); Vest v. Travelers Ins.

2009See, e.g., N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 637 (Fla.2003). [6] See, e.g., Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1254 (Fla.2006) (identifying misapplication of our precedent as one means of supplying conflict jurisdiction); Aguilera v. Inservs., Inc., 905 So.2d 84, 86 (Fla.2005) (same); Knowles v. State, 848 So.2d 1055, 1056 (Fla.2003) (same); Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901 , 904 (Fla.2002) (same); Vest v. Travelers Ins.

2009See, e.g., N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 637 (Fla.2003). [6] See, e.g., Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1254 (Fla.2006) (identifying misapplication of our precedent as one means of supplying conflict jurisdiction); Aguilera v. Inservs., Inc., 905 So.2d 84, 86 (Fla.2005) (same); Knowles v. State, 848 So.2d 1055, 1056 (Fla.2003) (same); Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901 , 904 (Fla.2002) (same); Vest v. Travelers Ins.

2009See, e.g., N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 637 (Fla.2003). [6] See, e.g., Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1254 (Fla.2006) (identifying misapplication of our precedent as one means of supplying conflict jurisdiction); Aguilera v. Inservs., Inc., 905 So.2d 84, 86 (Fla.2005) (same); Knowles v. State, 848 So.2d 1055, 1056 (Fla.2003) (same); Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901 , 904 (Fla.2002) (same); Vest v. Travelers Ins.

2009See, e.g., N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 637 (Fla.2003). .

2003The defendant's unreasonable delay after receiving actual notice justifies the court in refusing to set aside the default judgment.") (citations omitted); Plushner v. Mills, 429 A.2d 444, 446 (R.I.1981) ("What does concern us is that actual notice was received by both defendant and his attorney shortly after the original service and that defendant was not prejudiced by this method of service."); Sheldon v. Fettig, 129 Wash.2d 601 , 919 P.2d 1209, 1211-12 (1996) ("In interpreting substitute service of process statutes, strict construction was once the guiding principle of statutory construction

2003The defendant's unreasonable delay after receiving actual notice justifies the court in refusing to set aside the default judgment.") (citations omitted); Plushner v. Mills, 429 A.2d 444, 446 (R.I.1981) ("What does concern us is that actual notice was received by both defendant and his attorney shortly after the original service and that defendant was not prejudiced by this method of service."); Sheldon v. Fettig, 129 Wash.2d 601 , 919 P.2d 1209, 1211-12 (1996) ("In interpreting substitute service of process statutes, strict construction was once the guiding principle of statutory construction

2002North Shore Hospital, Inc. v. Barber, 143 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla.1962).

1994We agree with Judge Warner’s recent pronouncement in Grau v. Branham, 626 So .2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), that in all but the most exceptional cases “the lawyers have a right to expect that once a trial commences, discovery and examinations must cease.” We find that view consistent with the guiding principle underlying the rules of discovery — that all relevant facts should be obtainable by the litigants in advance of a proceeding so as to “render surprise at the trial a practical impossibility.” Bowen v. Manuel, 144 So.2d 341, 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); see also, Binger v. King Pest Contr

1986See, State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1981); Ervin v. Peninsular Telephone Co., 53 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1951) (legislative intent is polestar which must guide the interpretation and application of statutory provisions, and intent must be given effect even though it may appear to contradict the strict letter of the statute).

1985Fla.R.App.P. 9.310(c)(2)." Dice v. Cameron, 424 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 3d DCA), appeal dism., 434 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1983). *191 As noted in Dice and other cases, the guiding principle in setting a supersedeas bond is to protect the party in whose favor judgment was entered by assuring its payment in the event the judgment is affirmed on appeal.

1981The guiding principle for this case was set down by the Supreme Court in White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So.2d 346, 350 (Fla. 1979), when it held that "a condominium restriction or limitation ... may be enforced if it serves a legitimate purpose and is reasonably applied." Here the restriction is one which requires condominium board approval of all unit sales.