guiding principle in New Jersey

2026"The guiding principle of the [TCA] is that 'immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception . . . .'" Coyne v. State, Dep't of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 488 (2005) (quoting Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 286 (1998)).

2025"The guiding principle of the Tort Claims Act is that 'immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception.'" Coyne v. State, Dep't of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 488 (2005) (quoting Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 286 (1998)).

2026"The guiding principle of the [TCA] is that 'immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception . . . .'" Coyne v. State, Dep't of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 488 (2005) (quoting Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 286 (1998)).

2025"The guiding principle of the Tort Claims Act is that 'immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception.'" Coyne v. State, Dep't of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 488 (2005) (quoting Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 286 (1998)).

2024While this second inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 475-76 (quoting Silver, 387 N.J.

2022While the second inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29[(]a[)](1) to - 29[(]a[)](6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 ; see also J.D., 207 N.J. at 475-76 .

2024"When the movant is seeking modification of child support, the guiding principle is the 'best interests of the child[].'" Id. at 157 (quoting Hallberg v. Hallberg, 113 N.J.

2021Also, "[w]hen the movant is seeking modification of child support, the guiding principle is the 'best interests of the children.'" Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157 (citing Hallberg v. Hallberg, 113 N.J.

2025"The guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J.

2017Although the latter determination "is most often perfunctory and self- evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. [2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6)], to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J.

2026While the second prong inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29[(a)](1) to -29[(a)][(7)], to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 . "[T]he Legislature did not intend that the commission of one of the enumerated predicate acts of domestic violence automatically mandates the entry of a domestic violence restraining order." Id. at 126-27 .

2026In determining whether an FRO should issue pursuant to the second prong, "the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a(1) to -29a(6) [now (7)], to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver, 387 N.J.

2021In doing so, we recognize that a guiding principle of comparative fault is "to distribute the loss in proportion to the respective faults of the parties causing that loss," Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90, 107 (1991), and that our comparative fault scheme implements a "fair apportionment of damages among plaintiff and defendan ts, 7 The language of subsection (d) preserves joint and several liability in an environmental tort action in certain circumstances.

2016The percentage of negligence or fault of each party shall be based on 100% and the total of all percentages of negligence or fault of all the parties to a suit shall be 100%. [N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a).] "The guiding principle of our State's comparative fault system has been the distribution of loss 'in proportion to the respective faults of the parties causing that loss.'" Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 114 (2004) (quoting Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90, 107 (1991)).

2024The fact that the MSA made no provision for child support is of no moment. "[U]nlike modification of an alimony award, '[w]hen the movant is seeking modification of child support, the guiding principle is the "best interests of the children."'" Dolce, 383 N.J.

2017"When the movant is seeking a modification of child support, the guiding principle is the best interests of the children." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J.

2002Although in Balsamides the Court found a 35% marketability discount appropriate, whereas in Lawson the Court disallowed any discount, the Court enunciated its application of "the same guiding principle" in both cases—"a marketability discount cannot be used unfairly by controlling or oppressing shareholders to benefit themselves to the detriment of the minority or oppressed shareholders." Lawson, 160 N.J. at 407-08 , 734 A. 2d 738 ; accord Balsamides, 160 N.J. at 378-79 , 734 A. 2d 721 .

2000The guiding principle we apply in this case and in Lawson Mardon Wheaton is that a marketability discount cannot be used unfairly by the controlling or oppressing shareholders to benefit themselves to the detriment of the minority or oppressed shareholders. [ Balsamides, supra, 160 N.J. at 382-83, 734 A. 2d 721 (emphasis added).] Unlike in Balsamides and Lawson Mardon Wheaton , the issue of a marketability discount, or any other discount, does not arise in this case; nor was the valuation date an issue in either of the Supreme Court cases.

2022"The moving party has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of changed circumstances before discovery of the opposing spouse's finances will be ordered." Stamberg v. Stamberg, 302 N.J.

2022"The moving party has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of changed circumstances before discovery of the opposing spouse's finances will be ordered." Stamberg v. Stamberg, 302 N.J.

2022The second Silver prong "ensure[s] that the protective purposes of the Act are served, while limiting the possibility that the Act, or the 3 The six non-exclusive factors include: (1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse; (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property; (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; (4) The best interests of the victim and any child; (5) In determining custody and parenting time the protection of the victim's safety; and (6) The existence of

2022The second Silver prong "ensure[s] that the protective purposes of the Act are served, while limiting the possibility that the Act, or the courts, will become inappropriate weapons in domestic warfare," J.D., 207 N.J. at 488 , "trivializ[ing] the plight of true victims." Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J.

2009New Jersey v. Murphy, 384 N.J.Super. *894 136, 139, 894 A. 2d 72 (App.Div.) (noting "the guiding principle set by the statute [is] that a fee should reflect the actual cost of duplication"), certif. granted and remanded on other grounds, 188 N.J. 487 , 909 A. 2d 723 (2006); see also Dugan, supra, 376 N.J.Super. at 279 , 870 A. 2d 624 (holding "the fees allowable under the common law doctrine are consistent with those allowable under OPRA").

2009New Jersey v. Murphy, 384 N.J.Super. *894 136, 139, 894 A. 2d 72 (App.Div.) (noting "the guiding principle set by the statute [is] that a fee should reflect the actual cost of duplication"), certif. granted and remanded on other grounds, 188 N.J. 487 , 909 A. 2d 723 (2006); see also Dugan, supra, 376 N.J.Super. at 279 , 870 A. 2d 624 (holding "the fees allowable under the common law doctrine are consistent with those allowable under OPRA").

2009Baylass, supra, 114 N.J. at 180, 553 A.2d 326 ; Yarbough, supra, 100 N.J. at 643-44 , 498 A.2d 1239 . 3 Assuming the Yarbough criteria apply to indeterminate sentences, consecutive sentences were appropriate, if not mandated, under those criteria.

2009Baylass, supra, 114 N.J. at 180, 553 A.2d 326 ; Yarbough, supra, 100 N.J. at 643-44 , 498 A.2d 1239 . 3 Assuming the Yarbough criteria apply to indeterminate sentences, consecutive sentences were appropriate, if not mandated, under those criteria.

2004In re M.F., supra, 169 N.J. at 54-55, 776 A.2d 780 .

2004In re M.F., supra, 169 N.J. at 54-55, 776 A.2d 780 .

1986See Mueller v. Seaboard Commercial Corp., 5 N.J. 28, 34 , 73 A. 2d 905 (1950); Seaview Demolition, etc. v. Taxation Div. Director, 4 N.J.

1986See Mueller v. Seaboard Commercial Corp., 5 N.J. 28, 34 , 73 A. 2d 905 (1950); Seaview Demolition, etc. v. Taxation Div. Director, 4 N.J.

2024"When the movant is seeking modification of child support, the guiding principle is the 'best interests of the children.'" Ibid.

2022"When the movant is seeking modification of child support, the guiding principle is the 'best interests of the children.'" Id. at 157 .

2026While the second prong inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the [applicable] factors . . . to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)).

2017We found such clarification necessary for this reasons: Although it might be inferred from the conclusion of dismissal reached by the trial judge that he did not believe plaintiff was in immediate danger and that a restraining order was not necessary to prevent further abuse, the judge appears to have based his finding that "domestic violence" had not 13 A-2583-15T4 occurred on his determination that the record did not support a finding that there had been "a pattern of abuse and a pattern of controlling behavior." [Id. at 128.] In our discussion about the second prong, we observed: Although t

2025As to the first prong, a court "must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the harassment statute has been violated." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 404 (citing State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584-85 (1997)).

2021To be left alone is, in essence, the basic protection the law seeks to assure these victims." Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 584 .

2016The percentage of negligence or fault of each party shall be based on 100% and the total of all percentages of negligence or fault of all the parties to a suit shall be 100%. [N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a).] "The guiding principle of our State's comparative fault system has been the distribution of loss 'in proportion to the respective faults of the parties causing that loss.'" Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 114 (2004) (quoting Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90, 107 (1991)).

2006"The guiding principle of our State's comparative fault system has been the distribution of loss `in proportion to the respective faults of the parties causing that loss.'" Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 114 , 853 A. 2d 940 (2004) (quoting Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90, 107 , 590 A. 2d 222 (1991).

2012The doctrine's guiding principle is judicial fairness, id. at 74 , 800 A. 2d 861 ; see also Cont'l Ins.

2012The doctrine's guiding principle is judicial fairness, id. at 74 , 800 A. 2d 861 ; see also Cont'l Ins.

1961Instances are legion where the judiciary has pronounced the guiding principle to be followed: "Where fair minded men might honestly differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the proofs, the questions at issue should be submitted to the jury." Scarano v. Lindale, 121 N.J.L. 549, 550 ( E. & A. 1938); Gindin v. Baron, 11 N.J.

1953Scarano v. Lindale, 121 N.J.L. 549 ( E. & A. 1939); McKinney v. Public Service Interstate Transp.

2026See Finamore, 382 N.J.