17 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hertgreen2 sentences2002Additionally, exigent circumstances “analysis requires an objective determination; that is, ‘[w]hile “exigent circumstances” have multiple characteristics, the guiding principle is reasonableness, and each ease must be examined in the light of facts known to officers at the time they acted.’ ” City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (quoting State v. Hert, 220 Neb. 447 , 370 N.W.2d 166, 170 (1985)). 2002Additionally, exigent circumstances “analysis requires an objective determination; that is, ‘[w]hile “exigent circumstances” have multiple characteristics, the guiding principle is reasonableness, and each ease must be examined in the light of facts known to officers at the time they acted.’ ” City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (quoting State v. Hert, 220 Neb. 447 , 370 N.W.2d 166, 170 (1985)). | 2 | 2 |
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co.green2 sentences2007"The wisdom of the zoning plan, its necessity, [and] the nature and boundaries of the district to be zoned are matters which lie solely within [the] discretion [of the municipality]." Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976). 2003Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n, 545 P.2d at 1152 . | 1 | 2 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003While a search of a home is generally unreasonable absent a warrant based on probable cause, "[t]here are other contexts... where the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required." Id. at 331 , 110 S.Ct. at 1097 ; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process ... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."); State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("`Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they fall within a recognized excepti 2003While a search of a home is generally unreasonable absent a warrant based on probable cause, "[t]here are other contexts... where the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required." Id. at 331 , 110 S.Ct. at 1097 ; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process ... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."); State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("`Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they fall within a recognized excepti | 1 | 1 |
State v. Holmesgreen2 sentences2003While a search of a home is generally unreasonable absent a warrant based on probable cause, "[t]here are other contexts... where the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required." Id. at 331 , 110 S.Ct. at 1097 ; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process ... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."); State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("`Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they fall within a recognized excepti 2003While a search of a home is generally unreasonable absent a warrant based on probable cause, "[tlhere are other contexts . where the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required." Id. at 331 , 110 S.Ct. at 1097 ; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ("Slearches conducted outside the judicial process ... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."); State v. Gallegos, 967 P2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (" Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they fall within a recognized exception | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gallegosgreen2 sentences2003While a search of a home is generally unreasonable absent a warrant based on probable cause, "[t]here are other contexts... where the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required." Id. at 331 , 110 S.Ct. at 1097 ; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process ... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."); State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("`Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they fall within a recognized excepti 2003While a search of a home is generally unreasonable absent a warrant based on probable cause, "[tlhere are other contexts . where the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required." Id. at 331 , 110 S.Ct. at 1097 ; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ("Slearches conducted outside the judicial process ... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."); State v. Gallegos, 967 P2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (" Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they fall within a recognized exception | 1 | 1 |
City of Orem v. Henriegreen1 sentence2002Additionally, exigent circumstances “analysis requires an objective determination; that is, ‘[w]hile “exigent circumstances” have multiple characteristics, the guiding principle is reasonableness, and each ease must be examined in the light of facts known to officers at the time they acted.’ ” City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (quoting State v. Hert, 220 Neb. 447 , 370 N.W.2d 166, 170 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Aragongreen2 sentences2002See State v. Aragon, 123 N.M. 803 , 945 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Ct.App.1997). ¶ 25 While this is admittedly a close ease, we conclude that the facts known to the officers at the time they entered the Comers’ residence establish exigent circumstances. 2002See State v. Aragon, 123 N.M. 803 , 945 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Ct.App.1997). ¶ 25 While this is admittedly a close ease, we conclude that the facts known to the officers at the time they entered the Comers’ residence establish exigent circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Canbygreen2 sentences1994Courts have emphasized that the analysis requires an objective determination; that is, “[w]hile ‘exigent circumstances’ have multiple characteristics, the guiding principle is reasonableness, and each case must be examined in the light of facts known to officers at the time they acted.” State v. Hert, 220 Neb. 447 , 370 N.W.2d 166, 170 (1985); accord State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 118 (N.D. 1979); State v. Canby, 162 W.Va. 666 , 252 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1979). 1994Courts have emphasized that the analysis requires an objective determination; that is, “[w]hile ‘exigent circumstances’ have multiple characteristics, the guiding principle is reasonableness, and each case must be examined in the light of facts known to officers at the time they acted.” State v. Hert, 220 Neb. 447 , 370 N.W.2d 166, 170 (1985); accord State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 118 (N.D. 1979); State v. Canby, 162 W.Va. 666 , 252 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pagegreen1 sentence1994Courts have emphasized that the analysis requires an objective determination; that is, “[w]hile ‘exigent circumstances’ have multiple characteristics, the guiding principle is reasonableness, and each case must be examined in the light of facts known to officers at the time they acted.” State v. Hert, 220 Neb. 447 , 370 N.W.2d 166, 170 (1985); accord State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 118 (N.D. 1979); State v. Canby, 162 W.Va. 666 , 252 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission of Utahgreen1 sentence1984See, e.g., Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 693, 696 (1980); Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511 , 20 P.2d 618, 620 (1933). | 1 | 1 |
Spencer v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1984See, e.g., Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 693, 696 (1980); Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511 , 20 P.2d 618, 620 (1933). 1984See, e.g., Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 693, 696 (1980); Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511 , 20 P.2d 618, 620 (1933). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Spencer v. Glover
green
1 sentence2023“The guiding principle in determining whether a statement is defamatory is the statement’s tendency to injure a reputation in the eyes of its audience.” Id. (cleaned up). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
RainFocus v. Cvent
green
2 sentences2023This is because “at its core, an action for defamation is intended 20210611-CA 7 2023 UT App 32 RainFocus v. Cvent to protect an individual’s interest in maintaining a good reputation.” Id. (cleaned up). 2023This is because “at its core, an action for defamation is intended 20210611-CA 7 2023 UT App 32 RainFocus v. Cvent to protect an individual’s interest in maintaining a good reputation.” Id. (cleaned up). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Anderson v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2014The Juvenile Court Act and the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure are also designed to ensure that proceedings involving children are done expeditiously so that children do not languish in “legal limbo.” 9 The legislature has “determined that the best interests of children and families in abuse, neglect, and dependency cases are served when judges follow strict time limits.” 10 Indeed, the policy “underlying” the Child Welfare Reform Act is “one of swift permanency.” 11 And “[t]he only way to accomplish this goal is for courts to adhere to the time restrictions imposed by law.” 12 ¶45 Part three | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Huang v. North Carolina State University
green
1 sentence2014State Univ., 421 S.E.2d 812 , 815–16 (N.C. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Salt Lake City Mission v. Salt Lake City
green
1 sentence2014We agree with URS that the guiding inquiry for adequacy of the remedy is whether the party can be made whole by the administrative remedies available. 27 In this case, 25 Salt Lake City Mission, 2008 UT 31, ¶ 11 . 26 In the context of an injunction, a “legal remedy is inadequate when [a party] is unlikely to be made whole by an award of monetary damages or some other legal . . . remedy[.]” Mack v. Utah State Dep’t of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, ¶ 23 , 221 P.3d 194 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 27 See Huang v. N.C. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
MacK v. Utah State Department of Commerce
green
2 sentences2014We agree with URS that the guiding inquiry for adequacy of the remedy is whether the party can be made whole by the administrative remedies available. 27 In this case, 25 Salt Lake City Mission, 2008 UT 31, ¶ 11 . 26 In the context of an injunction, a “legal remedy is inadequate when [a party] is unlikely to be made whole by an award of monetary damages or some other legal . . . remedy[.]” Mack v. Utah State Dep’t of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, ¶ 23 , 221 P.3d 194 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 27 See Huang v. N.C. 2014We agree with URS that the guiding inquiry for adequacy of the remedy is whether the party can be made whole by the administrative remedies available. 27 In this case, 25 Salt Lake City Mission, 2008 UT 31, ¶ 11 . 26 In the context of an injunction, a “legal remedy is inadequate when [a party] is unlikely to be made whole by an award of monetary damages or some other legal . . . remedy[.]” Mack v. Utah State Dep’t of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, ¶ 23 , 221 P.3d 194 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 27 See Huang v. N.C. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City
green
1 sentence2007"The guiding principle behind our interpretation of legislative zoning decisions is that we will not substitute our judgment for that of the municipality." Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Grannis v. Ordean
green
1 sentence2003Consequently, we construe the technical requirements of Rule 4 in light of this guiding principle. 129 While technical accuracy is preferred, the United States Supreme Court long ago held that "even in names, 'due process of law' does not require ideal accuracy." Grannis v. Ordean, 284 U.S. 385, 895 , 34 S.Ct. 779 , 58 L.Ed. 1863 (1914). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Maryland v. Buie
green
2 sentences2003A protective sweep is one such exception. ¶ 15 While reasonableness is indeed a guiding principle in search and seizure questions, it is not, as the State suggests, the test we apply. "[I]n determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 , 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1096 , 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). 2003A protective sweep is one such exception. ¶ 15 While reasonableness is indeed a guiding principle in search and seizure questions, it is not, as the State suggests, the test we apply. "[I]n determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 , 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1096 , 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
West v. Thomson Newspapers
green
1 sentence1998West, 872 P.2d at 1008-09 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Cox v. Hatch
green
1 sentence1994Cox, 761 P.2d at 561 ; Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 111, at 773; Smolla, supra, § 4.01. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ellis v. Mihelis
green
2 sentences1980The standard for determining the proper compensation to the parties was stated in Ellis v. Mihelis, 32 Cal. Rptr. 415 , 60 Cal.2d 206 , 384 P.2d 7 (1963), as follows: The guiding principle with respect to the calculation of the damages incident to the decree of specific performance ... is to relate the performance back to the date set in the contract. 1980The standard for determining the proper compensation to the parties was stated in Ellis v. Mihelis, 32 Cal. Rptr. 415 , 60 Cal.2d 206 , 384 P.2d 7 (1963), as follows: The guiding principle with respect to the calculation of the damages incident to the decree of specific performance ... is to relate the performance back to the date set in the contract. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
green
2 sentences1951Emphasis in the opinions has varied, but the guiding principle is still that set out in the first in the series of immediately relevant cases: whether ‘the state system of regulation, as construed and applied here, can be reconciled with the federal Act * * * and since the two as focused in this case can consistently stand together * * *.’ Allen-Bradley Local [No. 1111] v. Wisconsin [Employment Relations] Board, supra, 315 U. S. [740,] at page 751, 62 S. Ct. [820], at page 826 [ 86 L. 1951Emphasis in the opinions has varied, but the guiding principle is still that set out in the first in the series of immediately relevant cases: whether `the state system of regulation, as construed and applied here, can be reconciled with the federal Act * * * and since the two as focused in this case can consistently stand together * * *.' Allen-Bradley Local [ No. 1111 ] v. Wisconsin [ Employment Relations ] Board, supra, 315 U.S. [740,] at page 751, 62 S.Ct. [820], at page 826 [ 86 L.Ed. 1154 ]. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Kelly v. Washington Ex Rel. Foss Co.
green
2 sentences1951Foss Co., 302 U. S. 1, 10 , 58 S. Ct. 87, 92 , 82 L. 1951Foss Co., 302 U. S. 1, 10 , 58 S. Ct. 87, 92 , 82 L. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.
green
2 sentences1939Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.” Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 , 57 S. Ct. 868, 872 , 81 L. 1939Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.” Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 , 57 S. Ct. 868, 872 , 81 L. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Raleigh v. Wells
green
2 sentences1930Raleigh v. Wells, 29 Utah 217 , 81 P. 908 , 110 Am. 1930Raleigh v. Wells, 29 Utah 217 , 81 P. 908 , 110 Am. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Stanford v. Gray
green
2 sentences1919Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah, 228 , 129 Pac. 423 , Ann. 1919Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah, 228 , 129 Pac. 423 , Ann. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.