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10 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.green2 sentences1998Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 , 17 S.Ct. 198 , [205] 41 L.Ed. 560 (1896) (A rate is too low if it is “so unjust as to destroy the value of [the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired,” and in so doing “practically deprivets] the owner of property without due process of law”); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 , 62 S.Ct. 736 , [742], 86 L.Ed. 1037 (1942) (“By long standing usage in the field of rate regula tion, the ‘lowest reasonable rate’ is one which is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense”); FPC v. Texaco In 1998Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 , 17 S.Ct. 198 , [205] 41 L.Ed. 560 (1896) (A rate is too low if it is “so unjust as to destroy the value of [the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired,” and in so doing “practically deprivets] the owner of property without due process of law”); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 , 62 S.Ct. 736 , [742], 86 L.Ed. 1037 (1942) (“By long standing usage in the field of rate regula tion, the ‘lowest reasonable rate’ is one which is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense”); FPC v. Texaco In | 2 | 2 |
Federal Power Commission v. Texaco Inc.green2 sentences1998Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 , 17 S.Ct. 198 , [205] 41 L.Ed. 560 (1896) (A rate is too low if it is “so unjust as to destroy the value of [the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired,” and in so doing “practically deprivets] the owner of property without due process of law”); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 , 62 S.Ct. 736 , [742], 86 L.Ed. 1037 (1942) (“By long standing usage in the field of rate regula tion, the ‘lowest reasonable rate’ is one which is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense”); FPC v. Texaco In 1998Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 , 17 S.Ct. 198 , [205] 41 L.Ed. 560 (1896) (A rate is too low if it is “so unjust as to destroy the value of [the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired,” and in so doing “practically deprivets] the owner of property without due process of law”); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 , 62 S.Ct. 736 , [742], 86 L.Ed. 1037 (1942) (“By long standing usage in the field of rate regula tion, the ‘lowest reasonable rate’ is one which is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense”); FPC v. Texaco In | 2 | 2 |
Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandfordgreen2 sentences1998Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 , 17 S.Ct. 198 , [205] 41 L.Ed. 560 (1896) (A rate is too low if it is “so unjust as to destroy the value of [the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired,” and in so doing “practically deprivets] the owner of property without due process of law”); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 , 62 S.Ct. 736 , [742], 86 L.Ed. 1037 (1942) (“By long standing usage in the field of rate regula tion, the ‘lowest reasonable rate’ is one which is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense”); FPC v. Texaco In 1998Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 , 17 S.Ct. 198 , [205] 41 L.Ed. 560 (1896) (A rate is too low if it is “so unjust as to destroy the value of [the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired,” and in so doing “practically deprivets] the owner of property without due process of law”); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 , 62 S.Ct. 736 , [742], 86 L.Ed. 1037 (1942) (“By long standing usage in the field of rate regula tion, the ‘lowest reasonable rate’ is one which is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense”); FPC v. Texaco In | 1 | 2 |
Gowdy v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Id. at 544-46 (¶¶ 15-24). | 1 | 1 |
Pearson v. Pearsongreen1 sentence2003Pearson v. Pearson, 458 So.2d 711, 713 (Miss.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo, Inc., Azcal, Inc. And Robert Zollergreen1 sentence2000What we find to be an accurate and quite relevant statement of the guiding principle is this "when a nonresident defendant takes purposeful and affirmative action, the effect of which is to *552 cause business activity, foreseeable by the defendant in the forum state, such action by the defendant is considered a minimum contact for jurisdictional purposes." Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo, Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Louisianagreen2 sentences1995However, such an instruction should not be indiscriminately or automatically given, as was condemned in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 at 3007 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 at 982 (1976), but should only be given after the trial court has *886 carefully considered the evidence and is of the opinion that such an instruction is justified by the evidence. ( 337 So.2d at 1255 ). 539 So.2d at 1329 . 1995However, such an instruction should not be indiscriminately or automatically given, as was condemned in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 at 3007 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 at 982 (1976), but should only be given after the trial court has *886 carefully considered the evidence and is of the opinion that such an instruction is justified by the evidence. ( 337 So.2d at 1255 ). 539 So.2d at 1329 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2023An attorney’s duty of loyalty to a client is “perhaps the most basic” responsibility of counsel, but “it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 . ¶50. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Robert Louis Porter v. United States
green
1 sentence2023“Undivided loyalty and fidelity of commitment is therefore the guiding principle in 27 this important area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Albright v. Albright
green
1 sentence2007The guiding factors for the chancellor, in reviewing the evidence related to child custody and determining which parent should have custody, is articulated in Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003 (Miss.1983). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Mease v. State
green
2 sentences1995In Mease v. State, 539 So.2d 1324 (Miss. 1989), we reiterated the guiding principle regarding lesser included offense instructions by quoting Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss. 1976), as follows: [W]hen warranted by the evidence, the trial court may instruct the jury with reference to lesser included offenses. 1995However, such an instruction should not be indiscriminately or automatically given, as was condemned in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 at 3007 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 at 982 (1976), but should only be given after the trial court has *886 carefully considered the evidence and is of the opinion that such an instruction is justified by the evidence. ( 337 So.2d at 1255 ). 539 So.2d at 1329 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences1995In Mease v. State, 539 So.2d 1324 (Miss. 1989), we reiterated the guiding principle regarding lesser included offense instructions by quoting Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss. 1976), as follows: [W]hen warranted by the evidence, the trial court may instruct the jury with reference to lesser included offenses. 1995However, such an instruction should not be indiscriminately or automatically given, as was condemned in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 at 3007 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 at 982 (1976), but should only be given after the trial court has *886 carefully considered the evidence and is of the opinion that such an instruction is justified by the evidence. ( 337 So.2d at 1255 ). 539 So.2d at 1329 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Mazzilli v. Acc. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Winterthur
green
1 sentence1993Wrigley, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 325 ; Mazzilli, 170 A.2d at 804 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Wrigley v. Potomac Insurance
green
1 sentence1993Wrigley, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 325 ; Mazzilli, 170 A.2d at 804 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Hart v. First National Bank
green
2 sentences1969The “intention” of the testator is thus recognized as the guiding rule in determining this issue. 2 Scott, the Law of Trust, § 128.7, page 1031 (1967); Annotation 109 A.L.R. 717 , 718 (1937) ; Hart v. First National Bank of Jackson, 233 Miss. 766 , 103 So.2d 406 (1958). 1969The “intention” of the testator is thus recognized as the guiding rule in determining this issue. 2 Scott, the Law of Trust, § 128.7, page 1031 (1967); Annotation 109 A.L.R. 717 , 718 (1937) ; Hart v. First National Bank of Jackson, 233 Miss. 766 , 103 So.2d 406 (1958). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.