guiding principle in Michigan

2022Generally, we locate the common understanding of constitutional text by determining the plain meaning of the text as it was understood at the time of ratification . . . .”) (cleaned up); People v Cain, 498 Mich 108, 132 ; 869 NW2d 829 (2015) (VIVIANO, J., dissenting, joined by MCCORMACK, C.J.) (“In interpreting the constitutional phrase ‘trial by jury,’ the guiding principle is to give the text the meaning it was understood to have at the time of its adoption by the people.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022Generally, we locate the common understanding of constitutional text by determining the plain meaning of the text as it was understood at the time of ratification . . . .”) (cleaned up); People v Cain, 498 Mich 108, 132 ; 869 NW2d 829 (2015) (VIVIANO, J., dissenting, joined by MCCORMACK, C.J.) (“In interpreting the constitutional phrase ‘trial by jury,’ the guiding principle is to give the text the meaning it was understood to have at the time of its adoption by the people.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

1988Charpentier v Canteen Corp, 105 Mich App 700, 704 ; 307 NW2d 704 (1981).

1988Charpentier v Canteen Corp, 105 Mich App 700, 704 ; 307 NW2d 704 (1981).

2025Nevertheless, in that opinion, we reaffirmed that LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC, 496 Mich 26 ; 852 NW2d 78 (2014), remains the guiding framework for assessing whether a modified statute applies retroactively.

2025Nevertheless, in that opinion, we reaffirmed that LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC, 496 Mich 26 ; 852 NW2d 78 (2014), remains the guiding framework for assessing whether a modified statute applies retroactively.

2020Wilcoxon v Wayne Co Neighborhood Legal Servs, 252 Mich App 549, 553 ; 652 NW2d 851 (2002).

2020Wilcoxon v Wayne Co Neighborhood Legal Servs, 252 Mich App 549, 553 ; 652 NW2d 851 (2002).

2018Id., citing Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 308-308 ; 240 NW2d 206 (1976).

2018Id., citing Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 308-308 ; 240 NW2d 206 (1976).

2018Id., citing Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 308-308 ; 240 NW2d 206 (1976).

2018Id., citing Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 308-308 ; 240 NW2d 206 (1976).

2017And to the extent that defendants argue that they essentially had plaintiff “over a barrel” because of the lack of other suitable properties and the time limit established by the previous consent order, and thus should have been able to obtain a higher price for the property than they may have from other buyers, “a guiding principle when awarding just compensation in a condemnation suit is to neither enrich the individual at the expense of the public nor the public at the expense of the individual but to leave him in as good a position as if his lands had not been taken.” Mich Dep’t of Transp

2017And to the extent that defendants argue that they essentially had plaintiff “over a barrel” because of the lack of other suitable properties and the time limit established by the previous consent order, and thus should have been able to obtain a higher price for the property than they may have from other buyers, “a guiding principle when awarding just compensation in a condemnation suit is to neither enrich the individual at the expense of the public nor the public at the expense of the individual but to leave him in as good a position as if his lands had not been taken.” Mich Dep’t of Transp

1972At that point the matter once more goes to the commission for reconsideration.” See also Federal Communications Commission v Pottsville Broadcasting Co, 309 US 134 ; 60 S Ct 437 ; 84 L Ed 656 [1940], In the instant case, the defendants did commit an error of law and we find that the agency should be permitted to apply the correct standard in passing upon the plaintiffs’ application.

1972At that point the matter once more goes to the commission for reconsideration.” See also Federal Communications Commission v Pottsville Broadcasting Co, 309 US 134 ; 60 S Ct 437 ; 84 L Ed 656 [1940], In the instant case, the defendants did commit an error of law and we find that the agency should be permitted to apply the correct standard in passing upon the plaintiffs’ application.

1971See PA 1970, No 91 (MCLA § 722.25; Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp §25-.312[5]) ;Hentz v. Hentz (1963), 371 Mich 33 5; Sweet v. Sweet (1950), 329 Mich 251 ; Tarr v. Pollock (1970), 25 Mich App 437 ; Lamky v. Lamky (1970), 29 Mich App 17 .

1971See PA 1970, No 91 (MOLA §722.25; Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 25.312[5]); Sweet v. Sweet (1950), 329 Mich 251 ; Tarr v. Pollock (1970), 25 Mich App 437 ; Lamky v. Lamky (1970), 29 Mich App 17 .

1971See PA 1970, No 91 (MCLA § 722.25; Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp §25-.312[5]) ;Hentz v. Hentz (1963), 371 Mich 33 5; Sweet v. Sweet (1950), 329 Mich 251 ; Tarr v. Pollock (1970), 25 Mich App 437 ; Lamky v. Lamky (1970), 29 Mich App 17 .

1971See PA 1970, No 91 (MOLA §722.25; Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 25.312[5]); Sweet v. Sweet (1950), 329 Mich 251 ; Tarr v. Pollock (1970), 25 Mich App 437 ; Lamky v. Lamky (1970), 29 Mich App 17 .

1971See PA 1970, No 91 (MCLA § 722.25; Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp §25-.312[5]) ;Hentz v. Hentz (1963), 371 Mich 33 5; Sweet v. Sweet (1950), 329 Mich 251 ; Tarr v. Pollock (1970), 25 Mich App 437 ; Lamky v. Lamky (1970), 29 Mich App 17 .

1971See PA 1970, No 91 (MOLA §722.25; Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 25.312[5]); Sweet v. Sweet (1950), 329 Mich 251 ; Tarr v. Pollock (1970), 25 Mich App 437 ; Lamky v. Lamky (1970), 29 Mich App 17 .

2025Damages awarded in promissory estoppel actions may include an award of lost profits, and out-of-pocket expenses incurred in preparation for performance or in the performing of the work that was induced by the promisor. [Joerger v Gordon Food Serv, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 173-174 ; 568 NW2d 365 (1997) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] On the other hand, damages recoverable for breach of contract arise naturally from the breach or . . . were in contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made.

2025Damages awarded in promissory estoppel actions may include an award of lost profits, and out-of-pocket expenses incurred in preparation for performance or in the performing of the work that was induced by the promisor. [Joerger v Gordon Food Serv, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 173-174 ; 568 NW2d 365 (1997) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] On the other hand, damages recoverable for breach of contract arise naturally from the breach or . . . were in contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made.

2024Id. at 650-654 .

2020Other cases featuring this reconciliation approach include Apsey, 477 Mich 120 , and Stenzel v Best Buy Co, 503 Mich 199 ; 931 NW2d 554 (2019) (harmonizing a statute and a court rule).

2020With this purpose in view therefore it is proper to consider, not only acts passed at the same session of legislature, but also acts passed at prior and subsequent sessions. [Id. at 543-544 (cleaned up).] Our Supreme Court recently reembraced the Rathbun approach in Int’l Business Machines Corp, 496 Mich at 652-653 .4 See also Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 569, 577 ; 548 NW2d 900 (1996) (“The guiding principle is, to be sure, that we are obliged to determine the will of the Legislature; but where the intent of the Legislature is claimed to be unclear, it is our duty to p

2020With this purpose in view therefore it is proper to consider, not only acts passed at the same session of legislature, but also acts passed at prior and subsequent sessions. [Id. at 543-544 (cleaned up).] Our Supreme Court recently reembraced the Rathbun approach in Int’l Business Machines Corp, 496 Mich at 652-653 .4 See also Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 569, 577 ; 548 NW2d 900 (1996) (“The guiding principle is, to be sure, that we are obliged to determine the will of the Legislature; but where the intent of the Legislature is claimed to be unclear, it is our duty to p

2020Other cases featuring this reconciliation approach include Apsey, 477 Mich 120 , and Stenzel v Best Buy Co, 503 Mich 199 ; 931 NW2d 554 (2019) (harmonizing a statute and a court rule).

2020Other cases featuring this reconciliation approach include Apsey, 477 Mich 120 , and Stenzel v Best Buy Co, 503 Mich 199 ; 931 NW2d 554 (2019) (harmonizing a statute and a court rule).

2020The guiding framework for an examination of the constitutionality of a statute begins with the presumption that statutes are constitutional, and “courts have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” Taylor v Smithkline Beecham Corp, 468 Mich 1, 6 ; 658 NW2d 127 (2003).

2020The guiding framework for an examination of the constitutionality of a statute begins with the presumption that statutes are constitutional, and “courts have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” Taylor v Smithkline Beecham Corp, 468 Mich 1, 6 ; 658 NW2d 127 (2003).

2020With this purpose in view therefore it is proper to consider, not only acts passed at the same session of legislature, but also acts passed at prior and subsequent sessions. [Id. at 543-544 (cleaned up).] Our Supreme Court recently reembraced the Rathbun approach in Int’l Business Machines Corp, 496 Mich at 652-653 .4 See also Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 569, 577 ; 548 NW2d 900 (1996) (“The guiding principle is, to be sure, that we are obliged to determine the will of the Legislature; but where the intent of the Legislature is claimed to be unclear, it is our duty to p

2016In evaluating whether a witness is unavailable as contemplated by MRE 804(a)(5), the guiding standard is “that the prosecution must have made a diligent good-faith effort in its attempt to locate a witness for trial.” People v Bean, 457 Mich 677, 684 ; 580 NW2d 390 (1998).

2016In evaluating whether a witness is unavailable as contemplated by MRE 804(a)(5), the guiding standard is “that the prosecution must have made a diligent good-faith effort in its attempt to locate a witness for trial.” People v Bean, 457 Mich 677, 684 ; 580 NW2d 390 (1998).

2015Oaths were already a deeply embedded custom in civic society when the jury trial emerged as the accepted mode of criminal trial. 18 When that happened, “[the 14 See, e.g., Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 188; 6 L Ed 23 (1824) (“[T]he enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.”). 15 Dist of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 576 ; 128 S Ct 2783 ; 171 L Ed 2d 637 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 Smith v Alabama, 124 US 465, 478 ; 8 S C

2015Oaths were already a deeply embedded custom in civic society when the jury trial emerged as the accepted mode of criminal trial. 18 When that happened, “[the 14 See, e.g., Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 188; 6 L Ed 23 (1824) (“[T]he enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.”). 15 Dist of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 576 ; 128 S Ct 2783 ; 171 L Ed 2d 637 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 Smith v Alabama, 124 US 465, 478 ; 8 S C

2015In Allan, 9 the Court of Appeals relied on an earlier Court of Appeals case, People v Pribble, which held that “[t]he oath is designed to protect the fundamental right of trial by an impartial jury.” 10 Neither Pribble nor Allan provided an extended constitutional analysis, but they present an important issue not yet squarely addressed by this Court or the United States Supreme Court: whether the juror’s oath is constitutionally required as part of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a trial by jury. 11 The language of the Sixth Amendment reads, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

2015In Allan, 9 the Court of Appeals relied on an earlier Court of Appeals case, People v Pribble, which held that “[t]he oath is designed to protect the fundamental right of trial by an impartial jury.” 10 Neither Pribble nor Allan provided an extended constitutional analysis, but they present an important issue not yet squarely addressed by this Court or the United States Supreme Court: whether the juror’s oath is constitutionally required as part of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a trial by jury. 11 The language of the Sixth Amendment reads, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

2015Oaths were already a deeply embedded custom in civic society when the jury trial emerged as the accepted mode of criminal trial. 18 When that happened, “[the 14 See, e.g., Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 188; 6 L Ed 23 (1824) (“[T]he enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.”). 15 Dist of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 576 ; 128 S Ct 2783 ; 171 L Ed 2d 637 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 Smith v Alabama, 124 US 465, 478 ; 8 S C

2015Oaths were already a deeply embedded custom in civic society when the jury trial emerged as the accepted mode of criminal trial. 18 When that happened, “[the 14 See, e.g., Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 188; 6 L Ed 23 (1824) (“[T]he enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.”). 15 Dist of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 576 ; 128 S Ct 2783 ; 171 L Ed 2d 637 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 Smith v Alabama, 124 US 465, 478 ; 8 S C