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14 Delaware opinions name it 3 courts 1956–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Dollar Thrifty Shareholder Litigationgreen2 sentences2020Ch. 2014) (observing that owning material amounts of stock “aligns [fiduciaries’] interests with other stockholders by giving them a ‘motivation to seek the highest price’ and the ‘personal incentive as stockholders to think about the trade off between selling now and the risks of not doing so’” (quoting In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 600 (Del. 2020Ch. 2014) (observing that owning material amounts of stock “aligns [fiduciaries’] interests with other stockholders by giving them a ‘motivation to seek the highest price’ and the ‘personal incentive as stockholders to think about the trade off between selling now and the risks of not doing so’” (quoting In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 600 (Del. | 2 | 2 |
Sisson v. Stategreen1 sentence2023C. § 2306. 8 Hyland, 2020 WL 1847475 , at *2 (citing Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 296 (Del. 2006)). 9 338 A.2d 571 (Del. 1975). 4 Supreme Court limited probable cause review of a challenged search to the four corners of the search warrant affidavit.10 Pierson explained that the Delaware criminal code “contemplate[s] a ‘four-corners’ test for probable cause; sufficient facts must appear on the face of the affidavit so that a magistrate’s personal knowledge notwithstanding, a reviewing Court can verify the existence of probable cause.”11 The Pierson Court cautioned that, in applying the test, | 1 | 1 |
In re Synthes, Inc. Shareholder Litigationgreen1 sentence2022Oct. 2, 2020) (“It is a guiding principle of Delaware law that material amounts of stock ownership can serve to align the interests of fiduciaries with the interests of other stockholders.”); In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1035 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Investors Bancorp, Inc. Stockholder Litigationgreen1 sentence2021See also In re Investors Bancorp, Inc., 177 A.3d 1208, 1222 (Del. 2017) (holding that fiduciary conduct is always “twice-tested, first for legal authorization, and second by equity”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 39 equity for relief by proving there are “compelling circumstances” that justify a finding of inequitable conduct.155 B. | 1 | 1 |
Dutra De Amorim v. Normentgreen2 sentences2021The guiding principle of trust interpretation is well established: the Court’s mandate is to discern and honor the settlor’s intent.15 When construing a trust, this Court attempts to discern the settlor’s intent as expressed by the instrument, read as a whole, in light of the circumstances surrounding its creation.16 With that in mind, “[t]he words used in the [trust] generally are given their ordinary meaning and the Court will not consider extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict express provisions of a trust instrument that are clear, unambiguous and susceptible 11 D.I. 26. 12 D.I. 28. 13 D 2021The guiding principle of trust interpretation is well established: the Court’s mandate is to discern and honor the settlor’s intent.15 When construing a trust, this Court attempts to discern the settlor’s intent as expressed by the instrument, read as a whole, in light of the circumstances surrounding its creation.16 With that in mind, “[t]he words used in the [trust] generally are given their ordinary meaning and the Court will not consider extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict express provisions of a trust instrument that are clear, unambiguous and susceptible 11 D.I. 26. 12 D.I. 28. 13 D | 1 | 1 |
Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P.green1 sentence2021The guiding principle of trust interpretation is well established: the Court’s mandate is to discern and honor the settlor’s intent.15 When construing a trust, this Court attempts to discern the settlor’s intent as expressed by the instrument, read as a whole, in light of the circumstances surrounding its creation.16 With that in mind, “[t]he words used in the [trust] generally are given their ordinary meaning and the Court will not consider extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict express provisions of a trust instrument that are clear, unambiguous and susceptible 11 D.I. 26. 12 D.I. 28. 13 D | 1 | 1 |
MacIey v. Woodsgreen1 sentence2017That is the narrow scope of my decision, and, as a result, I am tasked with deciding which chain of title more plausibly includes Parcel 46, solely as between the State and Sweetwater. 69 Smith, 622 A.2d at 646 (“The fundamental rule in construing a deed is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties as reflected in the language they selected.”) (citation omitted); Maciey v. Woods, 154 A.2d 901, 904 (Del. 1959) (“[T]he fundamental function of rules of construction is to determine the intention of the parties.”). 70 See, e.g., 4 Tiffany Real Prop. § 993 (3d ed.). 71 Id. 72 Id. 20 | 1 | 1 |
GMG Capital Investments, LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners Igreen1 sentence2017P’rs L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 360 (Del. 2013) (citing GMG Capital Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture P’rs I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 779 (Del. 2012)). 42 [] material to, the operation and conduct of the business of the Acquired Companies as currently conducted.”190 Reading these two sections together, the SPA provides for a guiding principle in determining which domain names should be transferred to Penthouse—only those domains that were associated with, used in, or material to the Penthouse business at the time of closing.191 B. | 1 | 1 |
Norton v. K-Sea Transportation Partners L.P.green1 sentence2017P’rs L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 360 (Del. 2013) (citing GMG Capital Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture P’rs I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 779 (Del. 2012)). 42 [] material to, the operation and conduct of the business of the Acquired Companies as currently conducted.”190 Reading these two sections together, the SPA provides for a guiding principle in determining which domain names should be transferred to Penthouse—only those domains that were associated with, used in, or material to the Penthouse business at the time of closing.191 B. | 1 | 1 |
ONE-PIE INVESTMENTS, LLC v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2016In Delaware, it is well established that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for statutory interpretation18 lt is also well established that the primary purpose when applying methods of statutory interpretation is “to determine and give effect to legislative intent.”19 This intent must prevail even if preserving legislative intent results in “an interpretation not consistent with the strict letter of the statute.”20 When construing a statute, “literal or perceived interpretations which yield mischievous or absurd results are to be avoided.”21 To ensure legislative intent | 1 | 1 |
Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.green1 sentence2000Ch., 728 A.2d 25, 40 ("the guiding principle is reasonableness, not perfection”), aff'd sub nom., Del.Supr., Quicktum Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (1998). 80 .Although not argued by the defendants at this stage, see note 32, supra, I note that the Supreme Court has stated that "[a] Unocal analysis should be used only when a board unilaterally (i.e., without stockholder approval) adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived threat.” Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d at 1377 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 ). | 1 | 1 |
McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospitalgreen2 sentences1963I am of opinion that the statement found in McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital, 16 A.D.2d 374 , 228 N.Y.S.2d 143, 147 (1962) correctly state what I consider should be the guiding rule of law which should be followed in this jurisdiction : *75 “* * * An expert subpoenaed as a witness has a right to refuse "to give his opinion or to answer any question connected with, his experience and judgment as an expert. * * * A professional witness’ is [only] obligated to testify to facts within his knowledge, the same as any other witness. * *• *” Such expert’s “right to refuse to give his 1963I am of opinion that the statement found in McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital, 16 A.D.2d 374 , 228 N.Y.S.2d 143, 147 (1962) correctly state what I consider should be the guiding rule of law which should be followed in this jurisdiction : *75 “* * * An expert subpoenaed as a witness has a right to refuse "to give his opinion or to answer any question connected with, his experience and judgment as an expert. * * * A professional witness’ is [only] obligated to testify to facts within his knowledge, the same as any other witness. * *• *” Such expert’s “right to refuse to give his | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chen v. Howard-Anderson
green
2 sentences2020It is a guiding principle of Delaware law that material amounts of stock ownership can serve to align the interests of fiduciaries with the interests of other stockholders.116 Defendants invoke this principle to argue that Stollmeyer’s interests 116 Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 , 670–71 (Del. 2020It is a guiding principle of Delaware law that material amounts of stock ownership can serve to align the interests of fiduciaries with the interests of other stockholders.116 Defendants invoke this principle to argue that Stollmeyer’s interests 116 Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 , 670–71 (Del. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Pierson v. State
green
1 sentence2023C. § 2306. 8 Hyland, 2020 WL 1847475 , at *2 (citing Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 296 (Del. 2006)). 9 338 A.2d 571 (Del. 1975). 4 Supreme Court limited probable cause review of a challenged search to the four corners of the search warrant affidavit.10 Pierson explained that the Delaware criminal code “contemplate[s] a ‘four-corners’ test for probable cause; sufficient facts must appear on the face of the affidavit so that a magistrate’s personal knowledge notwithstanding, a reviewing Court can verify the existence of probable cause.”11 The Pierson Court cautioned that, in applying the test, | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro
green
1 sentence2000Ch., 728 A.2d 25, 40 ("the guiding principle is reasonableness, not perfection”), aff'd sub nom., Del.Supr., Quicktum Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (1998). 80 .Although not argued by the defendants at this stage, see note 32, supra, I note that the Supreme Court has stated that "[a] Unocal analysis should be used only when a board unilaterally (i.e., without stockholder approval) adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived threat.” Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d at 1377 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Williams v. Geier
green
1 sentence2000Ch., 728 A.2d 25, 40 ("the guiding principle is reasonableness, not perfection”), aff'd sub nom., Del.Supr., Quicktum Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (1998). 80 .Although not argued by the defendants at this stage, see note 32, supra, I note that the Supreme Court has stated that "[a] Unocal analysis should be used only when a board unilaterally (i.e., without stockholder approval) adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived threat.” Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d at 1377 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
green
1 sentence2000Ch., 728 A.2d 25, 40 ("the guiding principle is reasonableness, not perfection”), aff'd sub nom., Del.Supr., Quicktum Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (1998). 80 .Although not argued by the defendants at this stage, see note 32, supra, I note that the Supreme Court has stated that "[a] Unocal analysis should be used only when a board unilaterally (i.e., without stockholder approval) adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived threat.” Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d at 1377 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Idaho v. Wright
green
2 sentences1999The United States Supreme Court has declined to endorse a “mechanical test” for determining “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” under the Confrontation Clause, stating that courts have leeway in that determination, with the guiding principle being whether the child declarant was “particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.” Wright, 497 U.S. at 822 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 . 1999The United States Supreme Court has declined to endorse a “mechanical test” for determining “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” under the Confrontation Clause, stating that courts have leeway in that determination, with the guiding principle being whether the child declarant was “particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.” Wright, 497 U.S. at 822 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware
green
2 sentences1975The guiding principle was restated by the Supreme Court in Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 94 S.Ct. 383 , 38 L.Ed.2d 348 (1973), when it considered the extent to which authority delegated under a Federal regulatory statute (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f preempts state (labor) law; the Court quoted from an earlier opinion by Justice Brennan, thus: “The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a *579 field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reas 1975The guiding principle was restated by the Supreme Court in Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 94 S.Ct. 383 , 38 L.Ed.2d 348 (1973), when it considered the extent to which authority delegated under a Federal regulatory statute (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f preempts state (labor) law; the Court quoted from an earlier opinion by Justice Brennan, thus: “The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a *579 field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reas | 1 | 1975–1975 |
cluster 250578
green
1 sentence1975The guiding principle was restated by the Supreme Court in Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 94 S.Ct. 383 , 38 L.Ed.2d 348 (1973), when it considered the extent to which authority delegated under a Federal regulatory statute (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f preempts state (labor) law; the Court quoted from an earlier opinion by Justice Brennan, thus: “The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a *579 field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reas | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Brock v. Hall
green
2 sentences1956Beyond this, we think there are none of the implications that are deemed to arise in cases of wills." But the court also said: "The guiding principle must be, to seek the intention of the settlor. * * * Not, What did he intend to say? but, What did he intend by what he did say? must be the test." And in the dissenting opinion in Brock v. Hall, supra [ 33 Cal.2d 885 , 206 P.2d 367 ], relied upon by appellants, it is said: "Clearly, the settled rules of construction of particular language are equally applicable to a will and to an inter vivos trust." On principle, we see no reason why the rule o 1956Beyond this, we think there are none of the implications that are deemed to arise in cases of wills.” But the court also said: “The guiding principle must be, to seek the intention of the settlor. * * * Not, What did he intend to say? but, What did he intend by what he did say ? must be the test.” And in the dissenting opinion in Brock v. Hall, supra [ 33 Cal.2d 885 , 206 P.2d 367 ], relied upon by appellants, it is said: “Clearly, the settled rules of construction of particular language are equally applicable to a will and to an inter vivos trust.” On principle, we see no reason why the rule | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.