guiding principle (Alaska) · Go Syfert
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guiding principle in Alaska

11 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
Millman v. Stategreen
alaskactapp · 1992 · cited in 3 Alaska opinions naming this issue, 1996–2022
2 sentences

2022See AS 47.30.915(9).) 7 See Peters v. State, 943 P.2d 418, 420 (Alaska App. 1997): “ ‘The guiding principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and implement the intent of the legislature ... .’ Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App. 1992).

1997“The guiding principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and implement the intent of the legislature.... ” Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App.1992).

33
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Avco Corp.green
alaska · 1993 · cited in 2 Alaska opinions naming this issue, 1997–2022
2 sentences

2022To that end, statutes dealing with the same or related subject matter should be construed ‘as harmoniously as possible.’ Borg–Warner Corp. v. Avco Corp., 850 P.2d 628 , 633-34 (Alaska 1993).

1997To that end, statutes dealing with the same or related subject matter should be construed “as harmoniously as possible.” Borg-Warner Corp. v. Avco Corp., 850 P.2d 628, 633-34 (Alaska 1993).

12
Native Village of Elim v. Stategreen
alaska · 1999 · cited in 1 Alaska opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024In Native Village of Elim v. State, for example, we analyzed the sustained yield clause in the Constitution by looking to the intent of the delegates of the Constitutional Convention, and we concluded that “the primary emphasis of the framers’ discussions and the glossary’s definition of sustained yield is on the flexibility of the sustained yield requirement and its status as a guiding principle rather than a concrete, predefined process.” 46 We decided that “[t]he plain language of the provision requires resource managers to apply sustained yield principles; it does not mandate the use of a

11
Peters v. Stategreen
alaskactapp · 1997 · cited in 1 Alaska opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022See AS 47.30.915(9).) 7 See Peters v. State, 943 P.2d 418, 420 (Alaska App. 1997): “ ‘The guiding principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and implement the intent of the legislature ... .’ Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App. 1992).

11
Brown v. Burchgreen
vactapp · 1999 · cited in 1 Alaska opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012This is especially true where the only inquiry is into the child's custodial or visitation preference, where the court informs the parties of the contents of the interview, or where the attorneys are present during the interview."); Brown v. Burch, 30 Va.App. 670 , 519 S.E.2d 403, 408 (1999) ("[Wle recognized that a parent must be accorded the benefits of due process in a custody dispute.... [but] in any child custody decision, the lodestar for the court is the best interest of the child, and the due process rights of the parents must be tempered by this guiding principle.") (internal citation

2012This is especially true where the only inquiry is into the child's custodial or visitation preference, where the court informs the parties of the contents of the interview, or where the attorneys are present during the interview."); Brown v. Burch, 30 Va.App. 670 , 519 S.E.2d 403, 408 (1999) ("[Wle recognized that a parent must be accorded the benefits of due process in a custody dispute.... [but] in any child custody decision, the lodestar for the court is the best interest of the child, and the due process rights of the parents must be tempered by this guiding principle.") (internal citation

11
Hosier v. Stategreen
alaskactapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Alaska opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011And when courts exercise this common-law power to declare the law, "the guiding principle is that they should not exercise this authority in disregard of existing constitutional and statutory provisions." Dayton v. State, 120 P.3d 1073, 1080 (Alaska App.2005), quoting Hosier v. State, 957 P.2d 1360, 1364-65 (Alaska App.1998).

11
Dayton v. Stategreen
alaskactapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Alaska opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011And when courts exercise this common-law power to declare the law, "the guiding principle is that they should not exercise this authority in disregard of existing constitutional and statutory provisions." Dayton v. State, 120 P.3d 1073, 1080 (Alaska App.2005), quoting Hosier v. State, 957 P.2d 1360, 1364-65 (Alaska App.1998).

11
Alaska Public Employees Ass'n v. City of Fairbanksgreen
alaska · 1988 · cited in 1 Alaska opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
1 sentence

1999Alaska Public Employees Assoc. v. Fairbanks, 753 P.2d 725, 727 (Alaska 1988).

11
Wettanen v. Cowpergreen
alaska · 1988 · cited in 1 Alaska opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
1 sentence

1996We stated in the context of a legal malpractice suit that “the guiding principle is that the statute of limitations commences to run when one is actually damaged as a result of the alleged malpractice, and that the commencement of the statute will not be put off until one learns the full extent of his damages.” Wettanen v. Cowper, 749 P.2d 362, 365 (Alaska 1988).

11
Brown v. Babcockgreen
or · 1975 · cited in 1 Alaska opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
2 sentences

1988See also Brown v. Babcock, 273 Or. 351 , 540 P.2d 1402, 1404-05 (1975) (suggesting “some damage” or “appreciable harm” is sufficient to commence statute of limitations in attorney malpractice actions).

1988See also Brown v. Babcock, 273 Or. 351 , 540 P.2d 1402, 1404-05 (1975) (suggesting “some damage” or “appreciable harm” is sufficient to commence statute of limitations in attorney malpractice actions).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

2015The guiding principle here is that, if a court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a particular category of case, the court is required to adjudicate all such cases that are properly brought to it. "[I]t is a time-honored maxim of the Anglo-American common-law tradition that a court possessed of jurisdiction generally must exercise it." Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-97 , 91 S.Ct. 1005, 1009 , 28 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971).

2015The guiding principle here is that, if a court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a particular category of case, the court is required to adjudicate all such cases that are properly brought to it. "[I]t is a time-honored maxim of the Anglo-American common-law tradition that a court possessed of jurisdiction generally must exercise it." Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-97 , 91 S.Ct. 1005, 1009 , 28 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971).

12015–2015
Nixon v. FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICHIGAN green
mich · 2010
1 sentence

2012H.R.C., 781 NW.2d at 112 . .

12012–2012
Smith v. State green
alaskactapp · 1985
1 sentence

2011In Smith, we concluded that it was proper for us to create a non-statutory mitigating factor based on a defendant's extraordinary potential for rehabilitation because this factor was "integrally related to the Chaney [ 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970) ] sentencing criteria" (i.e., the sentencing criteria codified in AS 12.55.005), and because, if a sentencing court ignored a defendant's demonstrated uncommon potential for rehabilitation, there would be "a tremendous risk ... that [the defendant's] sentence [would] be imposed without appropriate regard for the [sentence ing] goal of rehabilitation."

12011–2011
State v. Chaney green
alaska · 1970
1 sentence

2011In Smith, we concluded that it was proper for us to create a non-statutory mitigating factor based on a defendant's extraordinary potential for rehabilitation because this factor was "integrally related to the Chaney [ 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970) ] sentencing criteria" (i.e., the sentencing criteria codified in AS 12.55.005), and because, if a sentencing court ignored a defendant's demonstrated uncommon potential for rehabilitation, there would be "a tremendous risk ... that [the defendant's] sentence [would] be imposed without appropriate regard for the [sentence ing] goal of rehabilitation."

12011–2011
State v. De Simone green
nj · 1972
1 sentence

1996The guiding principle here, as in other areas of search and seizure law, is probable cause; the rule in such cases has been succinctly stated as follows: “So long as there is good reason to suspect or believe that anyone present at the anticipated scene will probably be a participant, presence becomes the descriptive fact satisfying the aim of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

11996–1996
Beesley v. Van Doren green
alaska · 1994
2 sentences

1996This rule was extended in Beesley v. Van Doren, 873 P.2d 1280 (Alaska 1994), where we rejected the “exhaustion of appeals rule,” and stated that the “statute of limitations begins running when a client discovers or reasonably should have discovered all the elements of the cause of action, and suffers actual damages.” Id. at 1282-83 .

1996This rule was extended in Beesley v. Van Doren, 873 P.2d 1280 (Alaska 1994), where we rejected the “exhaustion of appeals rule,” and stated that the “statute of limitations begins running when a client discovers or reasonably should have discovered all the elements of the cause of action, and suffers actual damages.” Id. at 1282-83 .

11996–1996

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AK § Alaska Stat. § 12.55.155 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NJ 220 (1953–2026) CA 173 (1941–2026) NY 164 (1887–2026) TX 137 (1947–2025) IL 126 (1960–2026) PA 112 (1919–2025) WA 85 (1937–2025) MA 79 (1930–2024) TN 70 (1984–2024) CT 53 (1946–2024) MI 51 (1957–2026) FL 44 (1915–2026) DC 43 (1971–2024) NM 42 (1937–2024) OH 39 (1965–2026) WV 37 (1895–2022) MO 36 (1913–2018) AR 36 (1948–2026) MN 35 (1940–2023) KS 33 (1937–2026) MD 33 (1926–2026) VA 32 (1932–2024) CO 32 (1914–2026) AL 31 (1929–2013) NC 31 (1969–2025) WI 29 (1959–2025) IN 28 (1924–2024) LA 27 (1908–2017) AZ 23 (1964–2025) IA 20 (1927–2026) OR 18 (1931–2018) KY 18 (1921–2026) UT 17 (1919–2023) RI 15 (1979–2024) MT 15 (1937–2025) DE 14 (1956–2023) NH 13 (1974–2024) ME 13 (1948–2021) HI 11 (1960–2024) AK 11 (1988–2024) MS 10 (1969–2023) SC 10 (1998–2025) VT 9 (1974–2020) OK 9 (1906–2024) WY 8 (1951–2025) GA 8 (1938–2023) ID 7 (1990–2023) NE 7 (1927–2013) ND 5 (1918–1992) NV 5 (1952–2011) SD 4 (1974–2015) VI 2 (2006–2010)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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