guiding principle in Texas

2015B & Sons Failed to Meet Craddock, No Abuse of Discretion: The Texas Supreme Court in Craddock v Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., set forth the guiding rule or principle for trial courts to follow in determining whether to grant a motion for a new trial: “A default judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered in any case in which the failure of defendant to answer before judgment was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on his part, but was due to a mistake or accident; provided the motion for a new trial sets up a meritorious defense and is filed at a time when the grantin

2015B & Sons Failed to Meet Craddock, No Abuse of Discretion: The Texas Supreme Court in Craddock v Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., set forth the guiding rule or principle for trial courts to follow in determining whether to grant a motion for a new trial: “A default judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered in any case in which the failure of defendant to answer before judgment was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on his part, but was due to a mistake or accident; provided the motion for a new trial sets up a meritorious defense and is filed at a time when the grantin

2008Williams v. Castleman, 112 Tex. 193 , 247 S.W. 263, 265 (1922); Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426 , 150 S.W. 1149, 1151 (1912).

2008Williams v. Castleman, 112 *202 Tex. 193, 247 S.W. 263, 265 (1922); Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426 , 150 S.W. 1149, 1151 (1912).

2000Morter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).

1998See Morter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).

1999Exxon Corp. v. Roberts , 724 S.W.2d 863, 869 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); City of Amarillo v. Reid , 510 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex. Civ.

1999Exxon Corp. v. Roberts, 724 S.W.2d 863, 869 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); City of Amarillo v. Reid, 510 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex. Civ.

1999Exxon Corp. v. Roberts , 724 S.W.2d 863, 869 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); City of Amarillo v. Reid , 510 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex. Civ.

1999Exxon Corp. v. Roberts, 724 S.W.2d 863, 869 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); City of Amarillo v. Reid, 510 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex. Civ.

2011Wheeler v. Green , 157 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2005); In re Rozelle , 229 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2007) ("[Due process] is the guiding rule and principle that applies when requests for admissions are not used as intended, and when a party uses deemed admissions to try to preclude presentation of the merits of a case." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2011Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex.2005); In re Rozelle, 229 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007) (“[Due process] is the guiding rule and principle that applies when requests for admissions are not used as intended, and when a party uses deemed admissions to try to preclude presentation of the merits of a case.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2011Wheeler v. Green , 157 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2005); In re Rozelle , 229 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2007) ("[Due process] is the guiding rule and principle that applies when requests for admissions are not used as intended, and when a party uses deemed admissions to try to preclude presentation of the merits of a case." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2011Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex.2005); In re Rozelle, 229 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007) (“[Due process] is the guiding rule and principle that applies when requests for admissions are not used as intended, and when a party uses deemed admissions to try to preclude presentation of the merits of a case.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2008Williams v. Castleman, 112 Tex. 193 , 247 S.W. 263, 265 (1922); Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426 , 150 S.W. 1149, 1151 (1912).

2008Williams v. Castleman, 112 Tex. 193 , 247 S.W. 263, 265 (1922); Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426 , 150 S.W. 1149, 1151 (1912).

2007Because the guiding principle in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship is the best interest of the child, the exclusion of evidence under rule 403 should be done “sparingly.” In re J.W. , 113 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied).

2007Because the guiding principle in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship is the best interest of the child, the exclusion of evidence under rule 403 should be done “sparingly.” In re J.W., 113 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).

1998Co. v. Operating Eng’rs, 425 U.S. 800, 806 , 96 S.Ct. 1842 , 48 L.Ed.2d 382 (1976) (citation omitted).

1998Co. v. Operating Eng’rs, 425 U.S. 800, 806 , 96 S.Ct. 1842 , 48 L.Ed.2d 382 (1976) (citation omitted).

2025See Navasota, 249 S.W.3d at 534–37 (holding that the right of first refusal was triggered by a “package deal” involving the burdened property and 7 The parties dispute whether the application of West Texas Transmission was preserved for appellate review.

2025See Navasota, 249 S.W.3d at 534–37 (holding that the right of first refusal was triggered by a “package deal” involving the burdened property and 7 The parties dispute whether the application of West Texas Transmission was preserved for appellate review.

2023See Turner v. Ward, 910 S.W.2d 500 , 503 n.4 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ) (noting that the guiding rule is that motions be treated as to their substance, not their form); 16 Mercer v. Band, 454 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ) (“A motion’s substance is to be gleaned from the body of the instrument and its prayer for relief.”).

2023See Turner v. Ward, 910 S.W.2d 500 , 503 n.4 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ) (noting that the guiding rule is that motions be treated as to their substance, not their form); Mercer v. Band, 454 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ) (“A motion’s substance is to be gleaned from the body of the instrument and its prayer for relief.”).

2023See Turner v. Ward, 910 S.W.2d 500 , 503 n.4 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ) (noting that the guiding rule is that motions be treated as to their substance, not their form); 16 Mercer v. Band, 454 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ) (“A motion’s substance is to be gleaned from the body of the instrument and its prayer for relief.”).

2023See Turner v. Ward, 910 S.W.2d 500 , 503 n.4 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ) (noting that the guiding rule is that motions be treated as to their substance, not their form); Mercer v. Band, 454 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ) (“A motion’s substance is to be gleaned from the body of the instrument and its prayer for relief.”).

2020See Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 4 .

2018See Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2016).

2019See Iliff, 339 S.W.3d at 81 . • The more specific purpose of child support also must be kept in mind: “to help a custodial parent maintain an adequate standard of living for the child.” Williams, 821 S.W.2d at 145 . • The Chapter 154 guidelines and the other Chapter 154 factors may be consulted in a modification proceeding and may be relevant to the child’s best interest and thus to the propriety of the trial court’s child-support modification order.

2019See Iliff, 339 S.W.3d at 81 . • The more specific purpose of child support also must be kept in mind: “to help a custodial parent maintain an adequate standard of living for the child.” Williams, 821 S.W.2d at 145 . • The Chapter 154 guidelines and the other Chapter 154 factors may be consulted in a modification proceeding and may be relevant to the child’s best interest and thus to the propriety of the trial court’s child-support modification order.

2012We explained in State v. Balli: Any distinction that can be drawn between the alluvion of rivers and accretions cast up by the sea must arise out of the law of the seashore rather than that of accession and be based ... upon the ancient maxim that the seashore is common property and never passes to private hands.... [This] remains as a guiding principle in all or nearly all jurisdictions which acknowledge the common law.... 144 Tex. 195 , 190 S.W.2d 71, 100 (1945).

2012We explained in State v. Balli: Any distinction that can be drawn between the alluvion of rivers and accretions cast up by the sea must arise out of the law of the seashore rather than that of accession and be based ... upon the ancient maxim that the seashore is common property and never passes to private hands.... [This] remains as a guiding principle in all or nearly all jurisdictions which acknowledge the common law.... 144 Tex. 195 , 190 S.W.2d 71, 100 (1945).

2009See In re C.R.T. , 61 S.W.3d at 65; see also Holley , 864 S.W.2d at 706 .

2009See In re C.R.T., 61 S.W.3d at 65; see also Holley, 864 S.W.2d at 706 .

2009See In re C.R.T. , 61 S.W.3d at 65; see also Holley , 864 S.W.2d at 706 .

2009See In re C.R.T., 61 S.W.3d at 65; see also Holley, 864 S.W.2d at 706 .

2008In Cantrell v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that an “arbitrary” restitution award was permissible so long as it was applied in reference to a guiding rule or principle. 75 S.W.3d 503, 512 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d.).

2008In Cantrell v. State , the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that an "arbitrary" restitution award was permissible so long as it was applied in reference to a guiding rule or principle. 75 S.W.3d 503, 512 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd.).

2008First, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, chapter 149 "treats both intrastate and interstate trade of horsemeat equally by way of a blanket prohibition," does not evidence "economic protectionism," and "does not favor in-state actors over out-of-state actors." Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo , *Page 11 476 F.3d at 335 ; see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey , 437 U.S. 617 , 623-24 (1978) (stating that the guiding principle in determining whether a state regulation discriminates against interstate or foreign commerce is whether the purpose or the effect of the regulation is e

2008First, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, chapter 149 "treats both intrastate and interstate trade ofhorsemeat equally by way ofa blanket prohibition," does not evidence "economic protectionism," and "does not favor in-state actors over out-of-state actors." Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, The Honorable Warren Chisum - Page 11 (GA-0623) 476 F.3d at 335 ; see also City ofPhiladelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,623-24 (1978) (stating that the guiding principle in determining whether a state regulation discriminates against interstate or foreign commerce is whether the purpose or t

1980The considerations that led the Supreme Court to protect against interception of a telephone conversation in a booth were drawn from “the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room,” the guiding principle being: “Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 , 88 S.Ct. at 515 .

1980The considerations that led the Supreme Court to protect against interception of a telephone conversation in a booth were drawn from “the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room,” the guiding principle being: “Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 , 88 S.Ct. at 515 .