guiding principle in Indiana

2012The court reasoned that Corr did not overrule Sanders and that, reading those decisions together, the guiding principle, as stated in Sanders , is that “the [UM/UIM] statute’s focus is on placing the insured in the position he would have occupied if the tortfea-sor had liability coverage equal to [the insured’s] underinsured motorist limits.” Id. at 601 (second alteration in original) (quoting Sanders, 644 N.E.2d at 887 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2011Indeed, this comports with the statutory definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” which “includes an insured motor vehicle where the limits of coverage available for payment to the insured under all bodily injury liability policies covering persons liable to the insured are less than the limits for the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage at the time of the aecident[.]” Id. (internal citations omitted).

2023The guiding principle in interpreting trust documents is to “ascertain and give effect to the settlor’s intention.” Univ. of S. Ind. Found. v. Baker, 843 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. 2006).

2023A trust document is not ambiguous “merely because [the] parties disagree about a term’s meaning.” Id.

2013“Term of Imprisonment” Does Not Include Suspended Time In 1993, we established a guiding principle for misdemeanor sentencing, holding that “a combined term of probation and imprisonment exceeding one year is inconsistent with the maximum term for conviction for a misdemeanor.” Smith v. State, 621 N.E.2d 325, 326 (Ind.1993).

2013We often cite the intent of the framers of our founding documents as a guiding principle of our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 772 (Ind. 2011), Spickermon v. Goddard, 182 Ind. 523, 525 , 107 N.E. 2, 3 (1914), State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 458 , 21 N.E. 274, 276 (1889), but rarely are we afforded the benefit of knowing exactly what the framers of our constitution were thinking when they penned the words to a specific provision.

2013We often cite the intent of the framers of our founding documents as a guiding principle of our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 772 (Ind.2011), Spickermon v. Goddard, 182 Ind. 523, 525 , 107 N.E. 2, 3 (1914), State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 458 , 21 N.E. 274, 276 (1889), but rarely are we afforded the benefit of knowing exactly what the framers of our constitution were thinking when they penned the words to a specific provision.

2013We often cite the intent of the framers of our founding documents as a guiding principle of our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 772 (Ind.2011), Spickermon v. Goddard, 182 Ind. 523, 525 , 107 N.E. 2, 3 (1914), State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 458 , 21 N.E. 274, 276 (1889), but rarely are we afforded the benefit of knowing exactly what the framers of our constitution were thinking when they penned the words to a specific provision.

2013We often cite the intent of the framers of our founding documents as a guiding principle of our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 772 (Ind.2011), Spickermon v. Goddard, 182 Ind. 523, 525 , 107 N.E. 2, 3 (1914), State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 458 , 21 N.E. 274, 276 (1889), but rarely are we afforded the benefit of knowing exactly what the framers of our constitution were thinking when they penned the words to a specific provision.

2013We often cite the intent of the framers of our founding documents as a guiding principle of our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 772 (Ind.2011), Spickermon v. Goddard, 182 Ind. 523, 525 , 107 N.E. 2, 3 (1914), State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 458 , 21 N.E. 274, 276 (1889), but rarely are we afforded the benefit of knowing exactly what the framers of our constitution were thinking when they penned the words to a specific provision.

2013We often cite the intent of the framers of our founding documents as a guiding principle of our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 772 (Ind.2011), Spickermon v. Goddard, 182 Ind. 523, 525 , 107 N.E. 2, 3 (1914), State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 458 , 21 N.E. 274, 276 (1889), but rarely are we afforded the benefit of knowing exactly what the framers of our constitution were thinking when they penned the words to a specific provision.

2004See, e.g., E.P. v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 653 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ("parent's constitutionally protected right to raise his or her child ... must at all times yield to the child's best interest as determined by the courts of this state"); B.G. v. H.S., 509 N.E.2d 214, 217 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) ("[the best interests of the child are the primary concern in an adoption proceeding"); Stout v. Tippecanoe County Dep't of Pub.

2004See, e.g., E.P. v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 653 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ("parent's constitutionally protected right to raise his or her child ... must at all times yield to the child's best interest as determined by the courts of this state"); B.G. v. H.S., 509 N.E.2d 214, 217 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) ("[the best interests of the child are the primary concern in an adoption proceeding"); Stout v. Tippecanoe County Dep't of Pub.

2003See LC. § 31-19-11-l(a)(1); see also Stout v. Tippeca noe County Dept. of Public Welfare, 182 Ind.App. 404 , 395 N.E.2d 444, 448 (1979) ("tlhe paramount consideration in any adoption proceeding is ... the best interest of the child").

2003See LC. § 31-19-11-l(a)(1); see also Stout v. Tippeca noe County Dept. of Public Welfare, 182 Ind.App. 404 , 395 N.E.2d 444, 448 (1979) ("tlhe paramount consideration in any adoption proceeding is ... the best interest of the child").

1999See, e.g., Ed Wiersma, 643 N.E.2d at 911-13 (consistent with pecuniary loss rule to allow dependent next of kin to recover damages based upon emotional loss of decedent’s love, care, and affection); Estate of Kuba v. Ristow Trucking Co., 508 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind.1987) (inconsistent with pecuniary' loss rule to allow wrongful death plaintiff to recover treble damages pursuant to separate statutory provision since treble damages are meant to punish- the defendants, not to compensate the decedent’s dependents).

1999See, e.g., Ed Wiersma, 643 N.E.2d at 911-13 (consistent with pecuniary loss rule to allow dependent next of kin to recover damages based upon emotional loss of decedent’s love, care, and affection); Estate of Kuba v. Ristow Trucking Co., 508 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind.1987) (inconsistent with pecuniary' loss rule to allow wrongful death plaintiff to recover treble damages pursuant to separate statutory provision since treble damages are meant to punish- the defendants, not to compensate the decedent’s dependents).