guiding principle in New Mexico

2023The special concurrence stated that because GEICO stacks coverage, its failure to disclose the stacked coverages available to insureds “runs afoul of the guiding principle behind Jordan—that ‘in order for the offer and rejection requirements of [the UM/UIM statute] to effectuate the policy of expanding UM/UIM coverage, the insurer is required to meaningfully offer such coverage and the insured must knowingly and intelligently act to reject it before it can be excluded from the policy.’” Id. ¶ 35 (Attrep, J., specially concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Marckstadt, 2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 1

2022Nevertheless, we conclude that Jordan does not require, under the circumstances present in this case, a determination as a matter of law that Contreras’s apparent rejection of UM/UIM coverage was valid simply because it complied with the requirements set forth in Jordan. {17} This conclusion is consistent with the guiding principle behind Jordan’s prescription of its four requirements: “[I]n order for the offer and rejection requirements of [the UM/UIM statute] to effectuate the policy of expanding UM/UIM coverage, the insurer is required to meaningfully offer such coverage and the insured mus

2023Power Co., 2020-NMCA-011, ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks and citation 19 omitted). “[P]lain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent.” 20 High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5 , 126 5 1 N.M. 413 , 970 P.2d 599 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023Power Co., 2020-NMCA-011, ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[P]lain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent.” High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5 , 126 N.M. 413 , 970 P.2d 599 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022Nevertheless, we conclude that Jordan does not require, under the circumstances present in this case, a determination as a matter of law that Contreras’s apparent rejection of UM/UIM coverage was valid simply because it complied with the requirements set forth in Jordan. {17} This conclusion is consistent with the guiding principle behind Jordan’s prescription of its four requirements: “[I]n order for the offer and rejection requirements of [the UM/UIM statute] to effectuate the policy of expanding UM/UIM coverage, the insurer is required to meaningfully offer such coverage and the insured mus

2022In determining whether Loya obtained a valid rejection of UM/UIM coverage on remand, the district court should consider the guiding principle behind Jordan’s four requirements: “[I]n order for the offer and rejection requirements of [the UM/UIM statute] to effectuate the policy of expanding UM/UIM coverage, the insurer is required to meaningfully offer such coverage and the insured must knowingly and intelligently act to reject it before it can be excluded from a policy.” Marckstadt, 2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 16 ; see Jordan, 2010-NMSC-051, ¶¶ 18, 20 (citing Marckstadt, 2010-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 16-17 ).

2022See State v. Vest, 17 2021-NMSC-020, ¶ 18 , 488 P.3d 626 (“A statute must be construed so that no part 18 of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous.” (internal quotation marks and 19 citation omitted)). 20 1 {39} Our plain-meaning interpretation of Subsections (A)-(C) is not eroded by the 2 plain language of Section 10-16-17.

2022See State v. Vest, 17 2021-NMSC-020, ¶ 18 , 488 P.3d 626 (“A statute must be construed so that no part 18 of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous.” (internal quotation marks and 19 citation omitted)). 20 1 {39} Our plain-meaning interpretation of Subsections (A)-(C) is not eroded by the 2 plain language of Section 10-16-17.

2018“The guiding principle in statutory construction requires that 17 we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, 18 recognizing that when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, 4 1 we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” 2 Id. ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Johnson, 2009- 3 NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177 , 218 P.3d 863 (“The primary indicator of legislative 4 intent is the plain language of the statute.”). “[A] statute must be read and given effect 5 as it

2018“The guiding principle in statutory construction requires that 17 we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, 18 recognizing that when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, 4 1 we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” 2 Id. ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Johnson, 2009- 3 NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177 , 218 P.3d 863 (“The primary indicator of legislative 4 intent is the plain language of the statute.”). “[A] statute must be read and given effect 5 as it

2019Santa Fe Police Dep’t v. One (1) Black 2006 Jeep, 2012-NMCA-027, ¶ 7 , 286 P.3d 1223 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2018“The guiding principle in statutory construction requires that 17 we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, 18 recognizing that when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, 4 1 we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” 2 Id. ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Johnson, 2009- 3 NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177 , 218 P.3d 863 (“The primary indicator of legislative 4 intent is the plain language of the statute.”). “[A] statute must be read and given effect 5 as it

2019“In addition, the failure of a district court to apply the applicable statutory guidelines to order a change of custody will constitute an abuse of discretion.” Hough, 2017-NMCA-050 , ¶ 18. {13} “The guiding principle in child custody determinations is the best interests of the child.” Id. ¶ 28; Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 1991-NMSC-101 , ¶ 13, 113 N.M. 57 , 823 P.2d 299 (“The ‘best interests criterion’ . . . is the lodestar for determining a custody award, under both statute and case law in New Mexico[.]”).

2019“In addition, the failure of a district court to apply the applicable statutory guidelines to order a change of custody will constitute an abuse of discretion.” Hough, 2017-NMCA-050 , ¶ 18. {13} “The guiding principle in child custody determinations is the best interests of the child.” Id. ¶ 28; Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 1991-NMSC-101 , ¶ 13, 113 N.M. 57 , 823 P.2d 299 (“The ‘best interests criterion’ . . . is the lodestar for determining a custody award, under both statute and case law in New Mexico[.]”).

2024See Schuermann v. Schuermann, 1980-NMSC-027 , ¶ 4, 94 N.M. 81 , 607 P.2d 619 (“[T]he controlling inquiry of the [district] court in settling any custody dispute is the best interests of the child.”); see also Hough v. Brooks, 2017-NMCA-050 , ¶ 28, 399 P.3d 387 (“The guiding principle in child custody determinations is the best interests of the child.”).

2024See Schuermann v. Schuermann, 1980-NMSC-027 , ¶ 4, 94 N.M. 81 , 607 P.2d 619 (“[T]he controlling inquiry of the [district] court in settling any custody dispute is the best interests of the child.”); see also Hough v. Brooks, 2017-NMCA-050 , ¶ 28, 399 P.3d 387 (“The guiding principle in child custody determinations is the best interests of the child.”).

2015Coop., 1993-NMSC-015 , ¶ 12, 115 N.M. 293 , 850 P.2d 996 10 (providing that issues resolved in an administrative agency adjudication decision may 11 be given preclusive effect in later civil trials). 12 {6} Despite the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts that application of the doctrine of issue 13 preclusion would be unfair. [MIO 1] As a basis for her assertion, Plaintiff emphasizes 14 that a guiding principle of this doctrine is that the party to be bound had “a full and 15 fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior litigation.” [MIO1] See Guzman v. 16 Laguna Dev.

2015Coop., 1993-NMSC-015 , ¶ 12, 115 N.M. 293 , 850 P.2d 996 10 (providing that issues resolved in an administrative agency adjudication decision may 11 be given preclusive effect in later civil trials). 12 {6} Despite the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts that application of the doctrine of issue 13 preclusion would be unfair. [MIO 1] As a basis for her assertion, Plaintiff emphasizes 14 that a guiding principle of this doctrine is that the party to be bound had “a full and 15 fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior litigation.” [MIO1] See Guzman v. 16 Laguna Dev.

2011See State v. Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 34 , 122 N.M. 16 724, 931 P.2d 69 (holding that “[w]hen evidence at trial supports the giving of an 17 instruction on a defendant’s theory of the case, failure to so instruct is reversible 18 error” (emphasis added)); State v. Lopez, 1996-NMSC-036 , ¶ 11, 122 N.M. 63 , 920 19 P.2d 1017 (recognizing that the failure to include an essential element in an instruction 6 1 for a crime does not constitute fundamental error “when the element that was omitted 2 from the instruction was not at issue in the trial” (emphasis added)).

2011See State v. Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 34 , 122 N.M. 16 724, 931 P.2d 69 (holding that “[w]hen evidence at trial supports the giving of an 17 instruction on a defendant’s theory of the case, failure to so instruct is reversible 18 error” (emphasis added)); State v. Lopez, 1996-NMSC-036 , ¶ 11, 122 N.M. 63 , 920 19 P.2d 1017 (recognizing that the failure to include an essential element in an instruction 6 1 for a crime does not constitute fundamental error “when the element that was omitted 2 from the instruction was not at issue in the trial” (emphasis added)).

2005See State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6 , 134 N.M. 172 , 74 P.3d 1064 (explaining that in ascertaining legislative intent we start by looking at the words chosen by the legislature).

2005See State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6 , 134 N.M. 172 , 74 P.3d 1064 (explaining that in ascertaining legislative intent we start by looking at the words chosen by the legislature).

2004See Roth v. Thompson, 113 N.M. 331, 332 , 825 P.2d 1241, 1242 (1992).

2004See Roth v. Thompson, 113 N.M. 331, 332 , 825 P.2d 1241, 1242 (1992).

1999State Univ., 115 N.M. 229, 237 , 849 P.2d 372, 380 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 81 N.M. 460 , 468 P.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1970)). {14} In all of these situations, the guiding principle underlying the courts’ definition of a “pending case” has been that: The evident intention of [Article IV, Section 34 of] the [New Mexico] Constitution is to prevent legislative interference with matters of evidence and procedure in cases that are in the process or course of litiga-, tion in the various courts of the state, and which have not been concluded, finished, or determined by a final judg

1999State Univ., 115 N.M. 229, 237 , 849 P.2d 372, 380 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 81 N.M. 460 , 468 P.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1970)). {14} In all of these situations, the guiding principle underlying the courts’ definition of a “pending case” has been that: The evident intention of [Article IV, Section 34 of] the [New Mexico] Constitution is to prevent legislative interference with matters of evidence and procedure in cases that are in the process or course of litiga-, tion in the various courts of the state, and which have not been concluded, finished, or determined by a final judg

1991See also, e.g., Fingert v. Fingert, 221 Cal.App.3d 1575, 1580 , 271 Cal.Rptr. 389, 391 (1990) (“The primary concern in a custody dispute is the best interests of the child.”); Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn.1985) (“The guiding principle in all custody cases is the best interests of the child.”); Hartman v. Hartman, 328 Pa.Super. 154, 157 , 476 A.2d 938, 939 (1984) (“It is well-established that the sole criterion in child custody decisions is the best interests and welfare of the child.”).

1991See also, e.g., Fingert v. Fingert, 221 Cal.App.3d 1575, 1580 , 271 Cal.Rptr. 389, 391 (1990) (“The primary concern in a custody dispute is the best interests of the child.”); Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn.1985) (“The guiding principle in all custody cases is the best interests of the child.”); Hartman v. Hartman, 328 Pa.Super. 154, 157 , 476 A.2d 938, 939 (1984) (“It is well-established that the sole criterion in child custody decisions is the best interests and welfare of the child.”).

1991See also, e.g., Fingert v. Fingert, 221 Cal.App.3d 1575, 1580 , 271 Cal.Rptr. 389, 391 (1990) (“The primary concern in a custody dispute is the best interests of the child.”); Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn.1985) (“The guiding principle in all custody cases is the best interests of the child.”); Hartman v. Hartman, 328 Pa.Super. 154, 157 , 476 A.2d 938, 939 (1984) (“It is well-established that the sole criterion in child custody decisions is the best interests and welfare of the child.”).

1991See also, e.g., Fingert v. Fingert, 221 Cal. App.3d 1575, 1580 , 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 391 (1990) ("The primary concern in a custody dispute is the best interests of the child."); Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn. 1985) ("The guiding principle in all custody cases is the best interests of the child."); Hartman v. Hartman, 328 Pa.Super. 154, 157 , 476 A.2d 938, 939 (1984) ("It is well-established that the sole criterion in child custody decisions is the best interests and welfare of the child.").

1991See also, e.g., Fingert v. Fingert, 221 Cal.App.3d 1575, 1580 , 271 Cal.Rptr. 389, 391 (1990) (“The primary concern in a custody dispute is the best interests of the child.”); Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn.1985) (“The guiding principle in all custody cases is the best interests of the child.”); Hartman v. Hartman, 328 Pa.Super. 154, 157 , 476 A.2d 938, 939 (1984) (“It is well-established that the sole criterion in child custody decisions is the best interests and welfare of the child.”).

1991See also, e.g., Fingert v. Fingert, 221 Cal.App.3d 1575, 1580 , 271 Cal.Rptr. 389, 391 (1990) (“The primary concern in a custody dispute is the best interests of the child.”); Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn.1985) (“The guiding principle in all custody cases is the best interests of the child.”); Hartman v. Hartman, 328 Pa.Super. 154, 157 , 476 A.2d 938, 939 (1984) (“It is well-established that the sole criterion in child custody decisions is the best interests and welfare of the child.”).