Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2017, p. 500, § 1-1/SB 160, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Back the Badge Act of 2017.'"

Law reviews.

- For article recommending more consistency in age requirements of laws pertaining to the welfare of minors, see 6 Ga. St. B. J. 189 (1969). For article discussing the uneasy sharing of powers and responsibilities between the superior and juvenile courts in their concurrent jurisdiction over juveniles aged 13 to 18 and suggesting reforms, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 341 (1972). For article, "An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody," see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 275 (1973). For article, "Child Custody - Jurisdiction and Procedure," see 35 Emory L. J. 291 (1986). For article, "The Prosecuting Attorney in Georgia's Juvenile Courts," see 13 Ga. St. B. J. 27 (2008). For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 89 (2017). For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017). For comment on Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 100 S.E.2d 289 (1957), holding that parents cannot by contract restrict the discretion of the court in awarding custody and provision regulating the religious upbringing of the child may be entirely disregarded by the court, see 20 Ga. B. J. 546 (1958). For comment on J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975). For comment on Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) and Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979), regarding juvenile commitment to state mental hospitals upon application of parents or guardians, see 29 Emory L. J. 517 (1980).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 24-2402, 24-2408 and 24A-301, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-5 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-28(b), which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

In light of the reenactment of this chapter, effective January 1, 2014, the reader is advised to consult the annotations following Code Section 15-11-10, which may also be applicable to this Code section.

Additionally, many of the annotations found under this Code section were taken from cases decided prior to the adoption of the 1983 Constitution. See Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I.

Constitutionality of application.

- Defendant's contention that the provision for charging juveniles as adults was applied in an unconstitutionally discriminatory manner against the defendant and other black males was not established by any evidence. Skidmore v. State, 226 Ga. App. 130, 485 S.E.2d 540 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Definition of "full age."

- One becomes of "full age" on the day preceding the anniversary of one's birth, on the first moment of that day. Edmonds v. State, 154 Ga. App. 650, 269 S.E.2d 512 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Child turned 17 on the earliest moment of the day before juvenile's birthday.

- Delinquency petition against a juvenile was properly transferred to the state court on the ground that the juvenile was arrested for possessing marijuana on the day before the juvenile's seventeenth birthday; pursuant to former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-28 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-10,15-11-11,15-11-212, and15-11-560), the juvenile was deemed to have been 17 at the earliest moment of the day before the juvenile's birthday, which was the day the juvenile was arrested. In the Interest of A.P.S., 304 Ga. App. 513, 696 S.E.2d 483 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile subject to criminal adjudication when case transferred to superior court.

- Juvenile whose case is properly transferred to the superior court is subject to the criminal sanctions which may be imposed in that court. Thus, an adjudication of guilt of a juvenile in superior court is a criminal adjudication. Carrindine v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S.E.2d 627 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Confinement implies juvenile in need of supervision, correction, and training.

- Confinement necessarily deprives the parents of their prima facie prerogative of training and supervision, and implies that the juvenile is, within the terms of the juvenile law, one who is in need of supervision beyond the control of the parents and in need of correction and training which the parents cannot provide. Young v. State, 120 Ga. App. 605, 171 S.E.2d 756 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Juvenile court has jurisdiction despite indictment for noncapital felony.

- Indictment of a juvenile for a noncapital felony in the superior court does not oust the juvenile court of the court's first obtained jurisdiction under the Georgia Constitution and statute law. J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), commented on in 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Defendant claimed under 17 at the time offenses were committed.

- Superior court had authority to try the defendant who claimed to be under 17 at the time the offenses were committed since the jury was instructed that the defendant should be found guilty only if the defendant committed the alleged acts after the defendant turned 17. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 319, 447 S.E.2d 663 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court not divested of jurisdiction unless transfer proceeding held.

- Since jurisdiction is first acquired by the juvenile court, a subsequent superior court indictment does not divest the juvenile court of the juvenile court's jurisdiction unless a proper transfer proceeding has been held. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Exceptions to superior court jurisdiction to try juvenile.

- Superior court has jurisdictional power to try a juvenile defendant accused of an offense or offenses for which the maximum criminal penalty is neither life imprisonment nor death. J.J. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 660, 218 S.E.2d 668 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933. § 24A-301).

Jurisdiction in superior court.

- Superior court had exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of two persons, 15 and 16 years of age, who were alleged to have committed armed robbery with a rifle, and there was no error in the court's refusal to transfer the case to juvenile court. Bearden v. State, 241 Ga. App. 842, 528 S.E.2d 275 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Unaccepted offer to reduce armed robbery to robbery did not obligate the state to reduce the charge because armed robbery was punishable by life imprisonment, it was not a transferable offense, and the trial court was without authority to transfer the armed robbery case from superior court to juvenile court. State v. Harper, 271 Ga. App. 761, 610 S.E.2d 699 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

While an original child molestation charge brought against a juvenile was properly filed in the juvenile court, once the state added an aggravated sexual battery count via an amendment, the superior court gained jurisdiction. Thus, the juvenile's allegations that the state failed to comply with the procedural requirements under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-49(c)(1) and (e) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-472) should have been raised in the superior court, and had no bearing on the validity of the delinquency petitions or the substantive charges against the juvenile in juvenile court. In the Interest of K.C., 290 Ga. App. 416, 659 S.E.2d 821 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Since an armed robbery was completed when control of the money in a cash register was ceded to the defendant and the other four robbers, the facts were sufficient to indict the defendant, who was 16 years old, for armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a); therefore, the superior court lacked authority under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) to transfer the case to a juvenile court. Gutierrez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 371, 702 S.E.2d 642 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant to 20 years to serve 10 in prison pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b) and (d) because, although the defendant was only 13 years old, the defendant participated in an armed robbery; the legislature's determination that the superior court has jurisdiction over minors 13 to 17 years of age who are alleged to have committed certain serious offenses is founded on a rational basis, including the need for secure placement of certain violent juvenile offenders and the safety of students and citizens of Georgia. Cuvas v. State, 306 Ga. App. 679, 703 S.E.2d 116 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Waiver of presentment.

- Lower appellate court erred when the court affirmed the transfer of the defendant from the superior court to the juvenile court because the court misunderstood O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1 when the court concluded that the statute does not permit a detained child to waive presentation within 180 days of the date of detention as the defendant filed an express waiver. State v. Baxter, 300 Ga. 268, 794 S.E.2d 49 (2016).

Superior court loss of jurisdiction after 180 days.

- Because a grand jury did not indict a juvenile within 180 days after the juvenile's detention as required by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(vii) and no extension of time had been granted as of that date, the grand jury lost authority over the case by operation of law. The trial court's order granting the state's request for an out-of-time extension was void. Nunnally v. State, 311 Ga. App. 558, 716 S.E.2d 608 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Same 180-day time limitation applied to both former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-28(b) and15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-560,15-11-561,15-11-563, and15-11-566), and that 180 days began to run on the day the juvenile was detained whenever the superior court was exercising jurisdiction under either section; it necessarily follows that anytime the superior court loses jurisdiction which was conferred by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) because the state failed to obtain an indictment within 180 days of the date the juvenile was detained, the time will also have expired within which the state could procure an indictment if the superior court were proceeding under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 and, thus, a transfer back to the superior court under those circumstances is pointless since an indictment returned by the grand jury would be void. In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga. App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Although O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1 allows the state to request one automatic 90-day extension, this extension cannot be granted after the expiration of the 180 days; the legislature intended to set time limitations for the state to act in those situations in which the juvenile is detained and the superior court is exercising jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to either former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) or former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-561,15-11-563, and15-11-566). In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga. App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Trial court erred by denying a juvenile's motion to quash the indictment for failing to obtain an indictment within 180 days of the juvenile's detention as mandated by O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1 because the 180-day time limit did not cease to run while the juvenile was released on bail, thus, the case had to be transferred back to the juvenile court. Edwards v. State, 323 Ga. App. 864, 748 S.E.2d 501 (2013).

Exceptions to juvenile court's exclusive original jurisdiction.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 24A-301 and 24A-401 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-10,15-11-11,15-11-212, and15-11-560) did not vest exclusive original jurisdiction in the juvenile court over the following class of youthful offenders: persons between the ages of 17 and 21 years, who have committed noncapital felonies, and who were under the supervision of or were on probation to a juvenile court for acts of delinquency committed before reaching the age of 17 years. State v. Crankshaw, 243 Ga. 183, 253 S.E.2d 69 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Transfer to superior court not required if no exclusive jurisdiction.

- In a child molestation case, it was not necessary for the juvenile court to transfer the charges to the superior court in order for the superior court to have jurisdiction because the juvenile court's finding that there was no evidence that the defendant was under 17 when the acts were committed amounted to a finding that the juvenile court did not have exclusive jurisdiction. Landrum v. State, 210 Ga. App. 275, 436 S.E.2d 40 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Transfer from superior court.

- State did not show that a superior court abused the court's discretion in reaching a decision that a 14-year-old defendant's aggravated sexual assault case was "extraordinary" and should be heard in juvenile court due to the defendant's social immaturity. State v. Ware, 258 Ga. App. 564, 574 S.E.2d 632 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Collateral estoppel did not prohibit transfer back to superior court.

- Disregarding the question of whether collateral estoppel actually applied in the context of a case, the transfer of an involuntary manslaughter case, under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.4 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-567), against a juvenile to the juvenile court did not collaterally estop a later transfer of the case back to the superior court under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-561,15-11-563,15-11-566) because the first transfer was based on the jurisdictional restrictions in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) and at the time of that transfer, the superior court did not consider or rule on the multiple factors in former § 15-11-30.2 on which the second transfer was based. In the Interest of C.G., 291 Ga. App. 743, 662 S.E.2d 823 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Habeas corpus petition does not confer superior court jurisdiction.

- If a juvenile court order entered pursuant to former Code 1933, § 24A-2301 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-211,15-11-212,15-11-215) after notice and hearing was still in effect, the superior court had no jurisdiction of the related habeas corpus petition. West v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 243 Ga. 425, 254 S.E.2d 373 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Violation of probation.

- Under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2(2)(B) and15-11-28(a)(1)(F) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-10, and15-11-11), a juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant, who was over 17 when a probation violation occurred; thus, the defendant's commitment under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2, and15-11-602) was void. The state had not filed a petition for probation revocation, but only for a violation of probation. In the Interest of T.F., 314 Ga. App. 606, 724 S.E.2d 892 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Child molestation.

- Because child molestation was not an offense listed in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560), the trial court erred in using former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(a)(2)(D) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2) to classify the offense as a designated felony act when the court sentenced a juvenile. In the Interest of M. S., 277 Ga. App. 706, 627 S.E.2d 422 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Because the indictment alleged and the evidence at trial authorized a finding that the defendant committed aggravated child molestation on some date after July 1, 2006, the trial court could not be divested of jurisdiction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-560). Therefore, the trial court correctly denied the motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. Adams v. State, 288 Ga. 695, 707 S.E.2d 359 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Armed robbery.

- Denial of the defendant's motion to transfer under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) was upheld; the armed robbery was completed at the time the cash register was opened and the flap resting on the top of the cash raised, thereby ceding control of the money to the perpetrators and satisfying the requisite slightest change of location necessary for the armed robbery. Gutierrez v. State, 290 Ga. 643, 723 S.E.2d 658 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Transfer to superior court was improper.

- Juvenile court erred in granting the state's motion to transfer the defendant juvenile's case back to the superior court pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-561,15-11-563, and15-11-566) because the superior court had properly transferred the case to the juvenile court since the defendant was not indicted within 180 days of detention as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1; the time limits set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1 were plainly stated and mandatory and clearly express the legislative intent that when a juvenile was detained and the superior court was exercising jurisdiction under either former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) or former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2, the state must obtain an indictment within the specified time or the superior court lost the jurisdiction conferred by those provisions. In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga. App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Transfer to juvenile court was only appropriate action.

- Under the plain mandate of O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50.1(b), once the grand jury fails to return a true bill within 180 days of the juvenile's detention, the only action the Georgia superior court is authorized to take is to transfer the case to the juvenile court and any indictment the grand jury returned after the 180 days is void. Edwards v. State, 323 Ga. App. 864, 748 S.E.2d 501 (2013).

Jurisdiction over offenses committed when juvenile 16.

- Juvenile court retained jurisdiction over the defendant for an offense the defendant committed when the defendant was 16 years old until the entry of the court's order transferring the case to the superior court. In re D.L., 228 Ga. App. 503, 492 S.E.2d 273 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Lack of jurisdiction to award permanent custody.

- Judgment was reversed because the juvenile court's authority to place a child in the custody of a "willing" and "qualified" relative was not authority to award permanent custody of the child as custody was determined by discerning the best interests of the child and not the willingness or the qualifications of a person to take temporary custody of the child. Ertter v. Dunbar, 292 Ga. 103, 734 S.E.2d 403 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile court is court of special and limited jurisdiction, and the court's judgments must show on the judgment's face such facts as are necessary to give the court jurisdiction of the person and subject matter. If the order of a juvenile court fails to recite the jurisdictional facts, the judgment is void. Williams v. Department of Human Resources, 150 Ga. App. 610, 258 S.E.2d 288 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only those powers specifically conferred upon the courts by statute. In re J.O., 191 Ga. App. 521, 382 S.E.2d 214 (1989), overruled on other grounds, In re T.A.W., 265 Ga. 106, 454 S.E.2d 134 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Jurisdiction of capital felonies and custody cases distinguished.

- Juvenile court and the superior court have concurrent jurisdiction of delinquent acts which constitute capital felonies, but the juvenile court may consider questions of custody only if such issues are transferred to the juvenile court from the superior court. Quire v. Clayton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Jurisdiction of included offenses.

- Superior court had jurisdiction to convict a juvenile defendant of aggravated assault since that offense was part of the same transaction as the greater offense of armed robbery over which the court had jurisdiction. Leeks v. State, 226 Ga. App. 227, 483 S.E.2d 691 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5) Houston v. State, 237 Ga. App. 878, 517 S.E.2d 357 (1999);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Age at time of offense controls.

- Although a juvenile no longer qualified as a child under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(2)(A) and (B) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2) after the seventeenth birthday, it is the juvenile's age at the time of the offense that controls; therefore, because the juvenile was under the age of 17 at the time the act of delinquency was committed, the juvenile court properly exercised exclusive original jurisdiction over the juvenile's case. In the Interest of J.T.D., 242 Ga. App. 243, 529 S.E.2d 377 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

As there was evidence that the defendant molested the victim after turning 17, the juvenile court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the defendant's sexual molestation case, and the defendant's conviction in a superior court was proper. McGruder v. State, 279 Ga. App. 851, 632 S.E.2d 730 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Noncapital juvenile cases.

- Juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over noncapital juvenile cases. State v. Crankshaw, 243 Ga. 183, 253 S.E.2d 69 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Speeding is an act designated a crime by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 (now subsection (a) of § 40-6-1) and, therefore, a speeding charge against a 16-year-old juvenile could be tried only in juvenile court. In re L.J.V., 180 Ga. App. 400, 349 S.E.2d 37 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Acts constituting armed robbery with a firearm.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment on the ground that the prosecution was barred by double jeopardy since the defendant previously had been adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court for the acts alleged in the indictment because the juvenile court's adjudication of the defendant as delinquent was void, and jeopardy did not attach during the juvenile court proceeding; because the superior court had exclusive jurisdiction under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(vii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) since the defendant was alleged in the juvenile court to have committed acts constituting armed robbery with a firearm, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the defendant delinquent for acts constituting armed robbery, notwithstanding the state's initial participation in the juvenile proceedings or the defendant's admission of the allegations in that court. Bonner v. State, 302 Ga. App. 57, 690 S.E.2d 216 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-528).

Juvenile court properly dismissed delinquency petition since transfer hearing did not apply.

- Juvenile court properly dismissed a delinquency petition without a hearing, which petition alleged that the juvenile committed aggravated sodomy, as former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(f) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) expressly provided that the transfer hearing provisions did not apply to any proceeding within the exclusive jurisdiction of a superior court, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560), which included aggravated sodomy. In the Interest of N.C., 293 Ga. App. 374, 667 S.E.2d 181 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Superior court may deny motion for transfer to juvenile court.

- When a juvenile defendant is charged with a crime for which the juvenile could be punished by loss of life or confinement for life in a penitentiary, and the superior court first took jurisdiction over such juvenile, the trial court may deny a motion which seeks to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court for a hearing to determine defendant's amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 353, 219 S.E.2d 419 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-301).

Armed robbery case could not be transferred to juvenile court.

- Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to petition to have the defendant's case transferred to juvenile court as the defendant was 16 when the crime was committed; as the case involved an armed robbery, the case could not be transferred to juvenile court. Hall v. State, 274 Ga. App. 842, 619 S.E.2d 344 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Denial of transfer after verdict.

- Superior court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to transfer to the juvenile court for final disposition after the defendant was found guilty of a lesser included offense over which the court lacked exclusive jurisdiction. Reynolds v. State, 266 Ga. 235, 466 S.E.2d 218 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile defendant was charged with murder and conspiracy to commit armed robbery; the defendant was convicted in the superior court of the latter crime. As former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(i) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) have the superior court the discretion over whether to transfer the case to juvenile court for disposition or to retain jurisdiction for sentencing, the court properly sentenced the defendant as an adult to 10 years' imprisonment, the maximum sentence. Furthermore, the sentence did not violate the defendant's due process or equal protection rights as the defendant had no constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile. Pascarella v. State, 294 Ga. App. 414, 669 S.E.2d 216 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0426, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 188 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Concurrent jurisdiction of superior courts to try juvenile defendants.

- The 1935 amendment to former Code 1933, § 24-2402 did not so change the Juvenile Court Act of 1915 (former Code 1910, Ch. 24-24) as to deprive the superior courts in a county where juvenile courts had been established of the right to try a defendant indicted for a felony, although the defendant may have been less than 16 years of age at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. Mills v. State, 56 Ga. App. 390, 192 S.E. 730 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Superior court exceeded the court's authority in transferring the prosecution of two juveniles to juvenile court after the state elected to pursue the cases in superior court as former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(1) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-560) granted the superior court concurrent jurisdiction over the cases before it, and the court was obligated to retain jurisdiction prior to indictment. State v. Henderson, 281 Ga. 623, 641 S.E.2d 515 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Because the juvenile court had concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings involving the termination of parental rights in connection with an adoption proceeding, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C), the appellate court rejected a parent's argument that the juvenile court improperly referred to surrender of parental rights in certain of the court's orders and that by doing so the court exceeded the court's jurisdiction. In the Interest of A.C., 283 Ga. App. 743, 642 S.E.2d 418 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

In a case in which: (1) an inmate was charged in juvenile court with aggravated assault and aggravated battery pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-560); (2) after the victim died, the inmate was indicted in a county superior court for felony murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery without a transfer hearing being held in the juvenile court as required by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2; (3) the superior court was exercising the court's jurisdiction pursuant to former § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A); and (4) the juvenile court judge ordered the juvenile complaint against the inmate to be dismissed, the inmate's motion for reconsideration of the denial of the inmate's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was properly denied; any due process error had no effect on the outcome of the inmate's case since the felony murder charge was properly before the superior court and would have been proved by the same evidence. Moreover, the inmate's right against excessive punishment was not violated. Miller v. Martin, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Constitution authorizes concurrent jurisdictional scheme.

- Law provides a concurrent jurisdictional scheme that is authorized by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I). J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), commented on in 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

When the controlling language of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I) was read with the former Juvenile Code, it was apparent that a harmonious and reasonable system of concurrent jurisdiction between the juvenile courts and superior courts had been achieved. J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), commented on in 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Statutory scheme which contemplates trials of juveniles in felony cases that are punished by death or life imprisonment in either superior or juvenile court does not deprive juveniles of any substantive or procedural due process rights. Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592, 385 S.E.2d 661 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Matters relating to custody and visitation.

- Superior and juvenile courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all matters relating to custody and visitation, except in those situations in which exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the superior court. In re D.N.M., 193 Ga. App. 812, 389 S.E.2d 336, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 910, 389 S.E.2d 336 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Matters relating to adoption.

- Fact that the natural mother of a child, who sought the termination of the natural father's parental rights, contemplated a possible adoption did not automatically render the proceeding one "in connection with" an adoption. In re D.L.N., 234 Ga. App. 123, 506 S.E.2d 403 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Trial court did not err in concluding that the court had jurisdiction over an adoption and termination of parental rights proceeding as statutory law granted the trial court jurisdiction over adoption proceedings and other proceedings that were not granted exclusively to the juvenile courts; since the juvenile courts were granted exclusive jurisdiction over deprivation proceedings, those types of matters were to be heard by the juvenile courts, but the trial court had the authority to hear adoption and other matters, such as the adoptive parents' adoption petition filed to adopt the biological parents' minor child. Snyder v. Carter, 276 Ga. App. 426, 623 S.E.2d 241 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Prosecutor's discretion to choose superior rather than juvenile court.

- Prosecutor's decision to bring an action in superior rather than juvenile court does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution because the initial option to select a forum when concurrent jurisdiction exists belongs to the litigant, and it is neither judicial, legislative, or executive power. Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592, 385 S.E.2d 661 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juveniles charged with capital offenses.

- Superior courts and juvenile courts have concurrent jurisdiction over juveniles charged with capital offenses, and whichever court first takes jurisdiction over the matter in question may retain jurisdiction, subject to the right of the juvenile court to transfer the case to the superior court. Relyea v. State, 236 Ga. 299, 223 S.E.2d 638 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301) Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977);(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Transfer provisions did not apply in armed robbery case.

- Juvenile court erred in finding that a juvenile case involving armed robbery with a firearm was subject to the transfer provisions delineated in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-561,15-11-563, and15-11-566) because, under subsection (f) of that section, the transfer provisions did not apply in cases involving armed robbery with a firearm, which were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior court under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(vii) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-560). However, because the juvenile court had concurrent jurisdiction to enter the judgment due to the state's filing a petition in the juvenile court, the state had no right to appeal from the judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(A)(5). In re D. L., 302 Ga. App. 234, 690 S.E.2d 522 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Concurrent jurisdiction over capital felonies must necessarily extend to related lesser crimes forming part of the same criminal transaction. Worthy v. State, 253 Ga. 661, 324 S.E.2d 431 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

When the superior court obtained exclusive jurisdiction over the defendant upon allegations of aggravated sodomy and aggravated child molestation against the defendant, evidence of other acts not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court did not constitute "extraordinary cause" to transfer the case to the juvenile court. Reynolds v. State, 217 Ga. App. 570, 458 S.E.2d 855 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

First court to take jurisdiction will retain jurisdiction, where courts have concurrent jurisdiction. J.G.B. v. State, 136 Ga. App. 75, 220 S.E.2d 79 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301) Couch v. State, 253 Ga. 764, 325 S.E.2d 366 (1985);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

When common-law courts have concurrent jurisdiction, first court taking jurisdiction will retain jurisdiction. Lincoln v. State, 138 Ga. App. 234, 225 S.E.2d 708 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Whichever court first takes jurisdiction retains jurisdiction subject to the power of the juvenile court to transfer cases to the superior court. Lane v. Jones, 626 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 928, 101 S. Ct. 1384, 67 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981).

Court lacked jurisdiction in adoption.

- Georgia superior court erred by ordering a father's parental rights terminated and granting a couple's petition for adoption because the court lacked jurisdiction in the case since adoption had already commenced via a deprivation proceeding in a Georgia juvenile court; thus, the juvenile court should have presided over the termination proceeding. Alizota v. Stanfield, 319 Ga. App. 256, 734 S.E.2d 497 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Concurrent jurisdiction over custody issues.

- Subsection (c) of this section is applicable only in those cases where the juvenile court and the superior court have concurrent jurisdiction and custody is the subject of controversy. Brooks v. Leyva, 147 Ga. App. 616, 249 S.E.2d 628 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

No transfer hearing required when concurrent jurisdiction.

- Transfer hearing is not required when the offense is one over which the juvenile and superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction and the superior court first takes jurisdiction. Lewis v. State, 246 Ga. 101, 268 S.E.2d 915 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

If either the juvenile court or the superior court properly could have exercised jurisdiction, no petition alleging delinquency was ever filed in the juvenile court, and the superior court first took jurisdiction through indictment, jurisdiction properly vested in the superior court and no transfer hearing pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561,15-11-563, and15-11-566) was required. Taylor v. State, 194 Ga. App. 871, 392 S.E.2d 57 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

No transfer hearing if juvenile court did not exercise jurisdiction.

- When the defendant, then a juvenile, was charged with armed robbery in 1993, both the juvenile and superior courts could exercise jurisdiction over the defendant under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-560). Since there was no evidence that the juvenile court had ever exercised jurisdiction, no transfer hearing was required for the superior court to exercise jurisdiction. Styles v. State, 291 Ga. App. 255, 661 S.E.2d 641 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Superior courts not deprived of constitutional felony jurisdiction.

- While the juvenile court jurisdiction embraces all minors under the age of 17, this cannot deprive the superior courts of this state of their constitutional felony jurisdiction. Jones v. State, 119 Ga. App. 105, 166 S.E.2d 617 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Original and concurrent jurisdiction in noncapital juvenile cases.

- Under the statutory scheme, exclusive original jurisdiction of noncapital juvenile cases is placed in the juvenile courts with the concurrent jurisdiction of the superior courts becoming effective when activated by a proper transfer from the juvenile courts. J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), commented on in 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

While under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11 and15-11-560) an involuntary manslaughter charge could not be initiated in a superior court, which properly transferred the matter to a juvenile court, assuming the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2(a)(3) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-561) were met, the juvenile court did not err in granting a motion to transfer the case back to the superior court as the authority to do so was specifically given in former § 15-11-30.2. In the Interest of C.G., 291 Ga. App. 743, 662 S.E.2d 823 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Statutory criminal safeguards with concurrent jurisdiction.

- Juvenile court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over delinquent acts for which a child under 17 years old may be punished by loss of life or confinement for life in the penitentiary. Nevertheless, the rules as to confessions of juveniles are the same because law enforcement officers cannot be certain when the officers question a juvenile what kind of case may develop, and the statutory safeguards are applicable to both criminal and juvenile cases. Jackson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 375, 246 S.E.2d 407 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Filing of juvenile complaint does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in juvenile court.

- Although the filing of a juvenile complaint form alone may commence informal proceedings, the filing will not operate to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court since the juvenile court would have concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court. State v. Whetstone, 264 Ga. 135, 441 S.E.2d 842 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Jurisdiction, once exercised, becomes exclusive.

- Jurisdiction, once exercised, becomes exclusive rather than concurrent, subject to the right of either court to transfer to the other. J.T.M. v. State, 142 Ga. App. 635, 236 S.E.2d 764 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Jurisdiction over juveniles of county juvenile or superior courts.

- Minor who is a resident of this state is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court of the county of the minor's residence, the proceedings in such court being civil rather than criminal in nature. If the crime charged is a felony, such minor is also subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the superior court of the county wherein the felony was committed. Whitman v. State, 96 Ga. App. 730, 101 S.E.2d 621 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

No error to transfer case to juvenile court for investigation.

- If a change of circumstances is alleged subsequent to a decree of divorce awarding custody of a minor child to one of the two parties, it is not error for the judge of the superior court to transfer the investigation thus called for to the juvenile court for investigation. Slate v. Coggins, 181 Ga. 17, 181 S.E. 145 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Decree of divorce in a case in which the custody of a minor child is involved, awarding the child to one party or the other, is final, except when a change of circumstances is shown; when such change is alleged, it is not error for the judge of the superior court to transfer the investigation thus called for to the juvenile court for investigation. Fortson v. Fortson, 197 Ga. 699, 30 S.E.2d 165 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Since there was evidence that the living conditions and conduct of children, subjects of a custody award in a divorce decree, were much worse than as shown upon a former trial, the judge did not err in transferring the investigation to the juvenile court for trial and determination. Fortson v. Fortson, 197 Ga. 699, 30 S.E.2d 165 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Superior court may deny motion for transfer to juvenile court.

- When a juvenile defendant is charged with a crime for which the juvenile could be punished by loss of life or confinement for life in a penitentiary, and the superior court first took jurisdiction over such juvenile, the trial court may deny a motion which seeks to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court for a hearing to determine defendant's amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 353, 219 S.E.2d 419 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-301).

Armed robbery case could not be transferred to juvenile court.

- Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to petition to have the defendant's case transferred to juvenile court as the defendant was 16 when the crime was committed; as the case involved an armed robbery, the case could not be transferred to juvenile court. Hall v. State, 274 Ga. App. 842, 619 S.E.2d 344 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Denial of transfer after verdict.

- Superior court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to transfer to the juvenile court for final disposition after the defendant was found guilty of a lesser included offense over which the court lacked exclusive jurisdiction. Reynolds v. State, 266 Ga. 235, 466 S.E.2d 218 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile defendant was charged with murder and conspiracy to commit armed robbery; the defendant was convicted in the superior court of the latter crime. As former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(i) (see O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) have the superior court the discretion over whether to transfer the case to juvenile court for disposition or to retain jurisdiction for sentencing, the court properly sentenced the defendant as an adult to 10 years' imprisonment, the maximum sentence. Furthermore, the sentence did not violate the defendant's due process or equal protection rights as the defendant had no constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile. Pascarella v. State, 294 Ga. App. 414, 669 S.E.2d 216 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0426, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 188 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

In custody litigation, the juvenile court errs in hearing a case in which there is no order transferring the case from the superior court. Further, if an order of a juvenile court fails to recite the jurisdictional facts (i.e., such facts as are necessary to give it jurisdiction of the person and subject matter), the judgment is void. Lockhart v. Stancil, 258 Ga. 634, 373 S.E.2d 355 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5); In re W.W.W., 213 Ga. App. 732, 445 S.E.2d 832 (1994); In re M.C.J., 271 Ga. 546, 523 S.E.2d 6 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5) but see (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court cannot modify superior court's custody determination.

- Juvenile court, without proper transfer from superior court, is without authority to modify custody provisions of the final divorce decree in regard to the mother's visitation privileges. In re M.M.A., 174 Ga. App. 898, 332 S.E.2d 39 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5) Owen v. Owen, 183 Ga. App. 472, 359 S.E.2d 229 (1987);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Jurisdiction in temporary custody matters.

- Trial court erred when the court prohibited the Department of Human Resources from placing children with their mother or allowing the children to visit with the mother unsupervised and by staying any decision of a juvenile court that would be contrary to the court's order because, although the trial court and the juvenile court had concurrent jurisdiction over the temporary custody of the children, the juvenile court in the contemporaneous deprivation proceeding had the authority to order the disposition best suited to the needs of the children, including the transfer of temporary legal custody, and the juvenile court had already exercised the court's jurisdiction over the temporary custody of the children in light of the deprivation action; although the trial court expressed the court's concern about the department's decision to recommend that the children be physically placed with the mother, the juvenile court was competent to oversee the department, and there was no good reason for the trial court to conclude that the trial court was in a better position to address the department's placement decisions than the juvenile court. Long v. Long, 303 Ga. App. 215, 692 S.E.2d 811 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Giving the juvenile court an additional opportunity to take jurisdiction of a case at the earliest possible moment is consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of the Juvenile Code. In re C.R., 263 Ga. 155, 430 S.E.2d 3 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court lacked jurisdiction since there was no order of the superior court transferring the issue of custody so as to meet the requirements of subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-212). In re C.F., 199 Ga. App. 858, 406 S.E.2d 279 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Cited in In the Interest of D. H., 332 Ga. App. 274, 772 S.E.2d 70 (2015); State v. Cash, 302 Ga. 587, 807 S.E.2d 405 (2017).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24A-301, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-5 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-28(b), which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Scope of exclusive jurisdiction.

- Juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over the following classes of traffic offenders: (1) offenders under the age of 16 who have committed a "juvenile traffic offense"; (2) offenders under the age of 17 who have committed any traffic offense; and (3) offenders under the age of 21 who have committed any traffic offense, and "who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 17 years, and who have been placed under the supervision of the court or on probation to the court." 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-18 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Magistrate court judge may issue arrest warrants for juveniles charged with an offense enumerated in subparagraph (b)(2)(A) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560). 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U98-9 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Court records concerning juveniles prosecuted as adults.

- Court records concerning juveniles should be afforded the same treatment as any other superior court records when the court retains exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving a juvenile 13 to 17 years of age who is accused of committing specified felonies. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-8 (decided under former O.C.G.A., § 15-11-5).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 27 et seq. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 40 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 343 et seq. 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 180 et seq., 287 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, §§ 99 et seq., 122 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) §§ 3, 4.

ALR.

- Constitutionality of statute as affected by discrimination in punishments for same offense based upon age, color, or sex, 3 A.L.R. 1614; 8 A.L.R. 854.

Jurisdiction of another court over child as affected by assumption of jurisdiction by juvenile court, 11 A.L.R. 147; 78 A.L.R. 317; 146 A.L.R. 1153.

What constitutes delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant, 45 A.L.R. 1533; 85 A.L.R. 1099.

Power of juvenile court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over infant delinquent or offender, 76 A.L.R. 657.

Enlistment or mustering of minors into military service, 137 A.L.R. 1467; 147 A.L.R. 1311; 148 A.L.R. 1388; 149 A.L.R. 1457; 150 A.L.R. 1420; 151 A.L.R. 1455; 151 A.L.R. 1456; 152 A.L.R. 1452; 153 A.L.R. 1420; 153 A.L.R. 1422; 154 A.L.R. 1448; 155 A.L.R. 1451; 155 A.L.R. 1452; 156 A.L.R. 1450; 157 A.L.R. 1449; 157 A.L.R. 1450; 158 A.L.R. 1450.

Marriage as affecting jurisdiction of juvenile court over delinquent or dependent, 14 A.L.R.2d 336.

Homicide by juvenile as within jurisdiction of a juvenile court, 48 A.L.R.2d 663.

Age of child at time of alleged offense or delinquency, or at time of legal proceedings, as criterion of jurisdiction of juvenile court, 89 A.L.R.2d 506.

Parent's involuntary confinement, for failure to care for child as result thereof, as evincing neglect, unfitness, or the like in dependency or divestiture proceeding, 79 A.L.R.3d 417.

Authority of court to order juvenile delinquent incarcerated in adult penal institution, 95 A.L.R.3d 568.

Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings, 5 A.L.R.4th 234.

Jurisdiction or power of juvenile court to order parent of juvenile to make restitution for juvenile's offense, 66 A.L.R.4th 985.