Behavior prescribed by O.C.G.A.

§ 17-10-30(b) did not involve fundamental right. - Defendants equal protection challenge under U.S. Const., amend. XIV and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II failed since the defendants were similarly situated to the defendants against whom the state sought the death penalty under one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances as provided in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b). The trial court did not err in refusing to apply strict scrutiny analysis in considering the defendants' equal protection challenge on the basis that the punishment prescribed by the criminal statute involves an interference with a fundamental right. The proper inquiry was whether the behavior involved a fundamental right, and the obvious answer was that the behavior did not. Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244, 702 S.E.2d 420 (2010).

O.C.G.A.

§ 44-13-100(a)(9) is constitutional. - O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(9) did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II, when the legislature rationally balanced the needs of creditors and bankruptcy debtors in requiring the debtors to sacrifice more of the debtor's penumbral property in order to obtain greater relief on property more central to a fresh start. McFarland v. Wallace (In re McFarland), 790 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2015).

Cited in Gordon v. State, 102 Ga. 673, 29 S.E. 444 (1897); Davis & Co. v. Morgan, 117 Ga. 504, 43 S.E. 732, 97 Am. St. R. 171, 61 L.R.A. 148 (1903); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Wright, 125 Ga. 589, 54 S.E. 52 (1906); Harp v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 130 Ga. 726, 61 S.E. 704, 14 Ann. Cas. 299 (1908); Henry v. Campbell, 133 Ga. 882, 67 S.E. 390, 27 L.R.A. (n.s.) 283, 18 Ann. Cas. 178 (1910); Gray v. McLendon, 134 Ga. 224, 67 S.E. 859 (1910); Holton v. City of Camilla, 134 Ga. 560, 68 S.E. 472, 31 L.R.A. (n.s.) 116, 20 Ann. Cas. 199 (1910); Cureton v. State, 135 Ga. 660, 70 S.E. 332, 49 L.R.A. (n.s.) 182 (1911); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781, 35 L.R.A. (n.s.) 583, 1972B Ann. Cas. 1259 (1911); Smith v. State, 141 Ga. 482, 81 S.E. 220, 1915C Ann. Cas. 999 (1914); Cutsinger v. City of Atlanta, 142 Ga. 555, 83 S.E. 263, 1915B L.R.A. 1097, 1916C Ann. Cas. 280 (1914); Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 16 Ga. App. 64, 84 S.E. 608 (1915); Almand v. Pate, 143 Ga. 711, 85 S.E. 909 (1915); Bunger v. State, 146 Ga. 672, 92 S.E. 72 (1917); Davis v. Mayor of Savannah, 147 Ga. 605, 95 S.E. 6 (1918); Ty Ty Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Colquitt Lumber Co., 153 Ga. 426, 112 S.E. 561 (1922); Badger v. State, 154 Ga. 443, 114 S.E. 635 (1922); Lynch v. State, 159 Ga. 76, 125 S.E. 70 (1924); Morgan v. Lowry, 168 Ga. 723, 149 S.E. 37 (1929); Greer v. State, 169 Ga. 552, 150 S.E. 839 (1929); Butler v. Mobley, 170 Ga. 265, 152 S.E. 229 (1930); Georgia Power Co. v. City of Decatur, 170 Ga. 699, 154 S.E. 268 (1930); Camp v. State, 171 Ga. 25, 154 S.E. 436 (1930); Mobley v. Brundage, 170 Ga. 829, 154 S.E. 452 (1930); Southern Transf. Co. v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 358, 155 S.E. 338 (1930); Meyers v. Whittle, 171 Ga. 509, 156 S.E. 120 (1930); Georgia Fertilizer Co. v. Walker, 171 Ga. 734, 156 S.E. 820 (1931); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 179, 156 S.E. 904 (1931); Gregory v. Quarles, 172 Ga. 45, 157 S.E. 306 (1931); Georgia Hwy. Express v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 431, 157 S.E. 464 (1931); Saunders v. State, 172 Ga. 770, 158 S.E. 791 (1931); Hines v. Etheridge, 173 Ga. 870, 162 S.E. 113 (1931); City of Newnan v. Atlanta Laundries, Inc., 174 Ga. 99, 162 S.E. 497 (1932); King v. State, 174 Ga. 432, 163 S.E. 168 (1932); Slater v. Davis, 174 Ga. 633, 163 S.E. 704 (1932); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Montgomery & Atlanta Freight Lines v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 175 Ga. 826, 166 S.E. 200 (1932); Milliron v. Harrison, 175 Ga. 764, 166 S.E. 231 (1932); State Bd. of Barber Exmrs. v. Blocker, 176 Ga. 125, 167 S.E. 298 (1932); City of Albany v. Ader, 176 Ga. 391, 168 S.E. 1 (1933); Nance v. Harrison, 176 Ga. 674, 169 S.E. 22 (1933); Interstate Co. v. Richardson, 177 Ga. 9, 169 S.E. 373 (1933); National Linen Serv. Corp. v. City of Albany, 177 Ga. 81, 169 S.E. 894 (1933); Mayor of Savannah v. V.C. Ellington Co., 177 Ga. 149, 170 S.E. 38 (1933); Felton v. Huiet, 178 Ga. 311, 173 S.E. 660 (1933); Guerry v. Harrison, 178 Ga. 669, 173 S.E. 831 (1934); Simmons v. Newton, 178 Ga. 806, 174 S.E. 703 (1934); Standard Oil Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 179 Ga. 371, 176 S.E. 1 (1934); City of Macon v. Ries, 179 Ga. 320, 176 S.E. 21 (1934); Southeastern Elec. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 179 Ga. 514, 176 S.E. 400 (1934); Georgia Power Co. v. City of Decatur, 179 Ga. 471, 176 S.E. 494 (1934); City of Douglas v. South Ga. Grocery Co., 180 Ga. 519, 179 S.E. 768 (1935); Jones v. City of Atlanta, 51 Ga. App. 218, 179 S.E. 922 (1935); Payne v. State, 180 Ga. 609, 180 S.E. 130 (1935); DeWell v. Quarles, 180 Ga. 864, 181 S.E. 159 (1935); National Linen Serv. Corp. v. City of Gainsville, 181 Ga. 397, 182 S.E. 610 (1935); Sosebee v. City of Demorest, 182 Ga. 338, 185 S.E. 330 (1936); Snow's Laundry v. City of Dublin, 182 Ga. 316, 185 S.E. 343 (1936); Keeney v. State, 182 Ga. 523, 186 S.E. 561 (1936); Wright v. Richmond County Dep't of Health, 182 Ga. 651, 186 S.E. 815 (1936); Commissioners of Glynn County v. Cate, 183 Ga. 111, 187 S.E. 636 (1936); Coy v. Linder, 183 Ga. 583, 189 S.E. 26 (1936); Gray v. City of Atlanta, 183 Ga. 730, 189 S.E. 591 (1937); National Fin. Co. v. Citizens Loan & Sav. Co., 184 Ga. 619, 192 S.E. 717 (1937); Jollie v. Hughes, 184 Ga. 860, 193 S.E. 769 (1937); Carmichael v. Atlanta Gaslight Co., 185 Ga. 34, 193 S.E. 896 (1937); Hornsby v. Bristow, 185 Ga. 577, 196 S.E. 25 (1938); Gibbs v. Milk Control Bd., 185 Ga. 844, 196 S.E. 791 (1938); Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446, 197 S.E. 846 (1938); Miller v. Head, 186 Ga. 694, 198 S.E. 680 (1938); Williamson v. Housing Auth., 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43 (1938); Lloyds Am. v. Brown, 187 Ga. 240, 200 S.E. 292 (1938); Ard v. City of Macon, 187 Ga. 127, 200 S.E. 678 (1938); City of Waycross v. Harrell, 59 Ga. App. 615, 1 S.E.2d 681 (1939); Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 188 Ga. 358, 3 S.E.2d 705 (1939); Garner v. Wood, 188 Ga. 463, 4 S.E.2d 137 (1939); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458, 6 S.E.2d 320 (1939); Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534, 6 S.E.2d 328 (1939); Independent Gasoline Co. v. Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 190 Ga. 613, 10 S.E.2d 58 (1940); Woodward v. City of Lithonia, 191 Ga. 234, 11 S.E.2d 476 (1940); Town of McIntyre v. Scott, 191 Ga. 473, 12 S.E.2d 883 (1940); Suttles v. Montgomery, 193 Ga. 128, 17 S.E.2d 734 (1941); Speed Oil of Atlanta, Inc. v. City of Rome, 193 Ga. 327, 18 S.E.2d 628 (1942); Ingram v. State, 193 Ga. 565, 19 S.E.2d 493 (1942); Huiet v. Dayan, 194 Ga. 250, 21 S.E.2d 423 (1942); DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth., 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942); Jeffreys-McElrath Mfg. Co. v. Huiet, 196 Ga. 710, 27 S.E.2d 385 (1943); Baskin v. Meadors, 196 Ga. 802, 27 S.E.2d 696 (1943); Steward v. Peerless Furn. Co., 70 Ga. App. 236, 28 S.E.2d 396 (1943); Lee v. City of Atlanta, 197 Ga. 518, 29 S.E.2d 774 (1944); Fowler v. Grimes, 198 Ga. 84, 31 S.E.2d 174 (1944); Ayers v. Franklin County, 199 Ga. 835, 35 S.E.2d 455 (1945); Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945); Parke, Davis & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 296, 36 S.E.2d 773 (1946); Deaton v. Mayor of Tallapoosa, 200 Ga. 632, 38 S.E.2d 284 (1946); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Suttles, 201 Ga. 84, 38 S.E.2d 786 (1946); Auld v. Schmelz, 201 Ga. 42, 39 S.E.2d 39 (1946); Reed v. City of Smyrna, 201 Ga. 228, 39 S.E.2d 668 (1946); McWhorter v. Settle, 202 Ga. 334, 43 S.E.2d 247 (1947); Cartersville Candlewick, Inc. v. Huiet, 204 Ga. 609, 50 S.E.2d 647 (1948); Burke v. State, 205 Ga. App. 520, 51 S.E.2d 693 (1949); Murphy v. West, 205 Ga. 116, 52 S.E.2d 600 (1949); Burke v. State, 205 Ga. 520, 54 S.E.2d 348 (1949); Burke v. State, 205 Ga. 656, 54 S.E.2d 350 (1949); Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E.2d 221 (1949); Lamons v. Yarbrough, 206 Ga. 50, 55 S.E.2d 551 (1949); Walton v. City of Atlanta, 89 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Redwine v. Southern Co., 206 Ga. 377, 57 S.E.2d 194 (1950); Capitol Distrib. Co. v. Redwine, 206 Ga. 477, 57 S.E.2d 578 (1950); Williams v. State, 206 Ga. 837, 59 S.E.2d 384 (1950); Cole v. Foster, 207 Ga. 416, 61 S.E.2d 814 (1950); McBurnett v. Balkcom, 207 Ga. 452, 62 S.E.2d 180 (1950); Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541, 72 S. Ct. 834, 96 L. Ed. 1130 (1952); Barge v. Camp, 209 Ga. 38, 70 S.E.2d 360 (1952); City of Atlanta v. Wilson, 209 Ga. 527, 74 S.E.2d 455 (1953); Porch v. Foster, 209 Ga. 697, 75 S.E.2d 420 (1953); Gulledge v. Augusta Coach Co., 210 Ga. 377, 80 S.E.2d 274 (1954); City of Atlanta v. Sims, 210 Ga. 605, 82 S.E.2d 130 (1954); Gary v. Johnson, 210 Ga. 686, 82 S.E.2d 651 (1954); Archer v. Johnson, 90 Ga. App. 418, 83 S.E.2d 314 (1954); City of McCaysville v. Tri-State Elec. Coop., 211 Ga. 5, 83 S.E.2d 598 (1954); Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 211 Ga. 223, 85 S.E.2d 14 (1954); Hutchins v. Howard, 211 Ga. 830, 89 S.E.2d 183 (1955); City of Moultrie v. Colquitt County Rural Elec. Co., 211 Ga. 842, 89 S.E.2d 657 (1955); City of Moultrie v. Burgess, 212 Ga. 22, 90 S.E.2d 1 (1955); Taylor v. Shetzen, 212 Ga. 101, 90 S.E.2d 572 (1955); Cruise v. City of Rome, 94 Ga. App. 373, 94 S.E.2d 617 (1956)

Arlington Cem. v. Bindig, 212 Ga. 698, 95 S.E.2d 378 (1956); Hill v. Balkcom, 213 Ga. 58, 96 S.E.2d 589 (1957); Yancey v. State, 98 Ga. App. 797, 107 S.E.2d 265 (1959); Garland v. Tanksley, 99 Ga. App. 201, 107 S.E.2d 866 (1959); Ammons v. Central of Ga. Ry., 215 Ga. 758, 113 S.E.2d 438 (1960); Pasley v. State, 215 Ga. 768, 113 S.E.2d 454 (1960); Buchanan v. State, 215 Ga. 791, 113 S.E.2d 609 (1960); Josey v. State, 102 Ga. App. 707, 117 S.E.2d 641 (1960); Porter v. Watkins, 217 Ga. 73, 121 S.E.2d 120 (1961); Williams v. State, 217 Ga. 312, 122 S.E.2d 229 (1961); Cason v. State, 217 Ga. 339, 122 S.E.2d 232 (1961); Jones v. Mayor of Athens, 105 Ga. App. 86, 123 S.E.2d 420 (1961); Hill v. Busbia, 217 Ga. 781, 125 S.E.2d 34 (1962); Bennett v. George, 105 Ga. App. 527, 125 S.E.2d 122 (1962); Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 127 S.E.2d 454 (1962); Civils v. Fulton County, 218 Ga. 705, 130 S.E.2d 220 (1963); Harper Motor Lines v. Roling, 218 Ga. 812, 130 S.E.2d 817 (1963); Ferguson v. State, 219 Ga. 33, 131 S.E.2d 538 (1963); Pistor v. State, 219 Ga. 161, 132 S.E.2d 183 (1963); First Nat'l Bank v. State Hwy. Dep't, 219 Ga. 144, 132 S.E.2d 263 (1963); Pugh v. State, 219 Ga. 166, 132 S.E.2d 203 (1963); Coffee v. State, 219 Ga. 328, 133 S.E.2d 590 (1963); Metcalfe v. City of Decatur, 220 Ga. 160, 137 S.E.2d 659 (1964); Henson v. Georgia Indus. Realty Co., 220 Ga. 857, 142 S.E.2d 219 (1965); Shirley v. City of Commerce, 220 Ga. 896, 142 S.E.2d 784 (1965); Hornstein v. Lovett, 221 Ga. 279, 144 S.E.2d 378 (1965); Champion Papers, Inc. v. Williams, 221 Ga. 345, 144 S.E.2d 514 (1965); Stinson v. Manning, 221 Ga. 487, 145 S.E.2d 541 (1965); Kingsberry Homes Corp. v. Gwinnett County, 248 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Ga. 1965); Massey v. State, 222 Ga. 143, 149 S.E.2d 118 (1966); McLennan v. Undercofler, 222 Ga. 302, 149 S.E.2d 705 (1966); Ingram v. Payton, 222 Ga. 503, 150 S.E.2d 825 (1966); Givens v. Dutton, 222 Ga. 756, 152 S.E.2d 358 (1966); Undercofler v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 222 Ga. 822, 152 S.E.2d 878 (1966); Berta v. State, 223 Ga. 267, 154 S.E.2d 594 (1967); Hughes v. Reynolds, 223 Ga. 727, 157 S.E.2d 746 (1967); Southern Ry. v. Overnite Transp. Co., 223 Ga. 825, 158 S.E.2d 387 (1967); O'Quinn v. Ellis, 224 Ga. 328, 161 S.E.2d 832 (1968); Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 403, 162 S.E.2d 333 (1968); National Factor & Inv. Corp. v. State Bank, 224 Ga. 535, 163 S.E.2d 817 (1968); Bugden v. Bugden, 225 Ga. 413, 169 S.E.2d 337 (1969); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969); Pye v. State Hwy. Dep't, 226 Ga. 389, 175 S.E.2d 510 (1970); Bradfield v. Hospital Auth., 226 Ga. 575, 176 S.E.2d 92 (1970); Lane v. Morrison, 227 Ga. 468, 181 S.E.2d 339 (1971); Alexander v. State, 228 Ga. 179, 184 S.E.2d 450 (1971); Blocker v. Blackburn, 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971); Hart v. Columbus, 125 Ga. App. 625, 188 S.E.2d 422 (1972); Camp v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. 35, 189 S.E.2d 56 (1972); Blackmon v. Cobb County-Marietta Water Auth., 126 Ga. App. 459, 191 S.E.2d 128 (1972); White v. State, 230 Ga. 327, 196 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 886, 94 S. Ct. 222, 38 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1973); Breaux v. State, 230 Ga. 506, 197 S.E.2d 695 (1973); Nathan v. Smith, 230 Ga. 612, 198 S.E.2d 509 (1973); Cunningham v. State, 232 Ga. 416, 207 S.E.2d 48 (1974); Spalding County v. East Enters., Inc., 232 Ga. 887, 209 S.E.2d 215 (1974); Coleman v. GMC, 386 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Brownlee v. Williams, 233 Ga. 548, 212 S.E.2d 359 (1975); Rutledge v. Gaylord's, Inc., 233 Ga. 694, 213 S.E.2d 626 (1975); Doran v. Home Mart Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 233 Ga. 705, 213 S.E.2d 825 (1975); Pace v. City of Atlanta, 135 Ga. App. 399, 218 S.E.2d 128 (1975); Tucker Door & Trim Corp. v. Fifteenth St. Co., 235 Ga. 727, 221 S.E.2d 433 (1975); Busbee v. Georgia Conference, Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 235 Ga. 752, 221 S.E.2d 437 (1975); Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976); Boynton v. Carswell, 238 Ga. 417, 233 S.E.2d 185 (1977); Bickford v. Nolen, 142 Ga. App. 256, 235 S.E.2d 743 (1977); Meeks v. State, 142 Ga. App. 452, 236 S.E.2d 119 (1977); Dunn v. State, 239 Ga. 537, 238 S.E.2d 77 (1977); Georgia Franchise Practices Comm'n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 240 Ga. 743, 242 S.E.2d 69 (1978); Bradley v. Tenneco Oil Co., 146 Ga. App. 161, 245 S.E.2d 862 (1978); Williams v. Byrd, 242 Ga. 80, 247 S.E.2d 874 (1978); Moore v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 242 Ga. 182, 249 S.E.2d 549 (1978); Lott Inv. Corp. v. Gerbing, 242 Ga. 90, 249 S.E.2d 561 (1978); Ferrell v. State, 149 Ga. App. 405, 254 S.E.2d 404 (1979); Delk v. Sellers, 149 Ga. App. 439, 254 S.E.2d 446 (1979); City of Covington v. Newton County, 243 Ga. 476, 254 S.E.2d 855 (1979); Georgia Franchise Practices Comm'n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800, 262 S.E.2d 106 (1979); Board of Comm'rs v. Cooper, 245 Ga. 251, 264 S.E.2d 193 (1980); Huskins v. State, 245 Ga. 541, 266 S.E.2d 163 (1980); Mingo v. State, 155 Ga. App. 284, 270 S.E.2d 700 (1980); Austin v. McNeese, 156 Ga. App. 533, 275 S.E.2d 79 (1980); State v. Hudson, 247 Ga. 36, 273 S.E.2d 616 (1981); Fluker v. State, 248 Ga. 290, 282 S.E.2d 112 (1981); Barrett v. Carter, 248 Ga. 389, 283 S.E.2d 609 (1981); Carpenter v. State, 250 Ga. 177, 297 S.E.2d 16 (1982); Risdon Enters., Inc. v. Colemill Enters., Inc., 172 Ga. App. 902, 324 S.E.2d 738 (1984); Bowen v. City of Columbus, 256 Ga. 462, 349 S.E.2d 740 (1986); Stegall v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 256 Ga. 765, 353 S.E.2d 484 (1987); Rowe v. Rowe, 195 Ga. App. 493, 393 S.E.2d 750 (1990); Bowman v. Knight, 263 Ga. 222, 430 S.E.2d 582 (1993); Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga. App. 144, 473 S.E.2d 523 (1996); Fulton County Tax Comm'r v. GMC, 234 Ga. App. 459, 507 S.E.2d 772 (1998); Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Sweat, 276 Ga. 627, 580 S.E.2d 206 (2003); Golden v. State, 299 Ga. App. 407, 683 S.E.2d 618 (2009); WMW, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 291 Ga. 683, 733 S.E.2d 269 (2012).

Protection of private property.

- The Constitution of this state, by repeated declarations, leaves no room for doubt but that it intends to place around private property the same safeguards with which it shields life and liberty. Cox v. GE Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955).

The right of the humblest individual in the enjoyment of property must be protected. The power to take private property from the owner for public use often works extreme hardship and savors of oppression. Williams v. City of La Grange, 213 Ga. 241, 98 S.E.2d 617 (1957).

If one is granted the liberty to invade another's private property over the objection of the owner, the result is destruction of property without due process. Clark v. State, 219 Ga. 680, 135 S.E.2d 270 (1964).

Any invasion of the owner's dominion over the use or sale of the owner's private property, regardless of its degree, is interdicted by this paragraph. Clark v. State, 219 Ga. 680, 135 S.E.2d 270 (1964); Durham v. State, 219 Ga. 830, 136 S.E.2d 322 (1964).

Deprivation of property is denial of constitutional protection.

- Protection of the citizen and the citizen's property is not afforded when courts deprive the citizen of the possession of the citizen's property when the citizen's right thereto has not been forfeited under some rule of law. Frankel v. Frankel, 212 Ga. 643, 94 S.E.2d 728 (1956).

Right to transact business in a manner not contrary to public health, safety, morals, or public policy is a protected constitutional right and must be preserved to the citizens without discrimination. Hughes v. Reynolds, 223 Ga. 727, 157 S.E.2d 746 (1967).

Right to use property for business purpose.

- In the absence of valid zoning regulations or restrictive covenants to the contrary, the right to use one's property for a lawful business purpose is a right inherent in the ownership of the property, and is protected by the law. Sikes v. Pierce, 212 Ga. 567, 94 S.E.2d 427 (1956).

Right to sell property.

- The unshackled right to sell one's own property for a lawful use is within itself property protected by the Constitution and is beyond the reach of legislative impairment. Gray v. Georgia Real Estate Comm'n, 209 Ga. 301, 71 S.E.2d 645 (1952).

Billboard restrictions.

- Denial of permission to a landowner to raise a billboard following reconstruction of a highway which reduced visibility of the billboard to traffic was not a denial of equal protection since the landowner failed to show that the landowner received treatment dissimilar to others similarly situated. Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. DOT, 242 Ga. App. 835, 531 S.E.2d 719 (2000).

Protection applies to children.

- See In re G.L.H., 209 Ga. App. 146, 433 S.E.2d 357 (1993).

This constitutional right of protection extends equally to children as well as adults. In re S.H., 204 Ga. App. 135, 418 S.E.2d 454 (1992).

Public office is not property within the sense of constitutional guaranties. Walton v. Davis, 188 Ga. 56, 2 S.E.2d 603 (1939).

A licensee facing the possibility of the loss of a license/livelihood must be allowed access to information held by the board that is exculpatory in order for the application of O.C.G.A. §§ 43-1-19(h)(2) and43-34-37(d) to reach a constitutional result. Wills v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Exmrs., 259 Ga. 549, 384 S.E.2d 636 (1989).

Legislative control of statutory remedies.

- Whatever legal remedies holders of security deeds have are given by virtue of statutes, and these remedies are subject to legislative control. Once given, they are subject to subsequent change when they do not violate vested rights. Hill v. Perkins, 218 Ga. 354, 127 S.E.2d 909 (1962).

State and federal provisions are substantially equivalent.

- This paragraph guarantees equal protection of the laws. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Wright, 125 Ga. 589, 54 S.E. 52 (1906), rev'd on other grounds, 207 U.S. 127, 28 S. Ct. 47, 52 L. Ed. 134 (1907); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. State, 135 Ga. 545, 69 S.E. 725, 32 L.R.A. (n.s.) 20 (1910), aff'd, 234 U.S. 280, 34 S. Ct. 829, 58 L. Ed. 1312 (1914), aff'd, 234 U.S. 280, 34 S. Ct. 829, 58 L. Ed. 1312 (1914).

This paragraph is the equivalent of a declaration that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Hobbs v. New England Ins. Co., 93 Ga. App. 687, 92 S.E.2d 636 (1956); State Hwy. Dep't v. Smith, 219 Ga. 800, 136 S.E.2d 334 (1964); Dansby v. Dansby, 222 Ga. 118, 149 S.E.2d 252 (1966).

"Equal protection" provisions of Georgia Constitution, though employing different phraseology than U.S. Const., amend. 14, are substantially equivalent of equal protection of the laws under the United States Constitution.

The equal protection clause of the Georgia Constitution is "substantially equivalent" to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution. Thus, a female plaintiff must show that she was intentionally discriminated against on the basis of sex in order to recover on her equal protection claim. Suber v. Bulloch County Bd. of Educ., 722 F. Supp. 736 (S.D. Ga. 1989).

The protection of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II and the equal protection clause of the federal constitution are coextensive. Rucks v. State, 201 Ga. App. 142, 410 S.E.2d 206 (1991).

The protection of the equal protection clause in the 1983 Georgia Constitution and the United States Constitution is coextensive; yet this court may interpret the equal protection clause in the Georgia Constitution to offer greater rights than the federal equal protection clause as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374, 418 S.E.2d 27 (1992).

Intent of equal protection.

- The equal protection provisions of the state and federal Constitutions are intended to prevent extraordinary benefits or burdens from flowing to any one group. Bickford v. Nolen, 240 Ga. 255, 240 S.E.2d 24 (1977).

Trial court erred in finding that a county board of commissioners violated a property owner's equal protection rights by refusing to re-zone the owner's property even though the board re-zoned the property of a landowner just five miles away on the same day it refused to re-zone the property owner's property; the landowner and the property owner were not similarly situated property owners, as required for equal protection purposes, because the landowner's property involved the existence of a pre-existing, non-conforming use of property and the property owner's property did not have that same designation. Rockdale County v. Burdette, 278 Ga. 755, 604 S.E.2d 820 (2004).

Protection for rights alone.

- The equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions protect rights alone, and have no reference to mere concessions or mere privileges which may be bestowed or withheld by the state or municipality at will. Bunn v. City of Atlanta, 67 Ga. App. 147, 19 S.E.2d 553, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666, 63 S. Ct. 73, 87 L. Ed. 535 (1942).

Protection not for privileges.

- Discrimination in the grant of favors by the state or municipality is not a denial of the equal protection of the law to those not favored when the privileges may be bestowed or withheld at will. Bunn v. City of Atlanta, 67 Ga. App. 147, 19 S.E.2d 553, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666, 63 S. Ct. 73, 87 L. Ed. 535 (1942).

Equal protection applies to all.

- An employer is entitled to the equal and impartial protection of the law just as much as the employer's employee. Ellis v. Parks, 212 Ga. 540, 93 S.E.2d 708 (1956).

Like treatment with no arbitrary governmental power.

- This constitutional guaranty requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions. Our system of government does not allow the exercise of arbitrary power. Dorsey v. City of Atlanta, 216 Ga. 778, 119 S.E.2d 553 (1961); Reed v. Hopper, 235 Ga. 298, 219 S.E.2d 409 (1975).

So long as the law operates alike on all members of the class, which includes all persons and property similarly situated, it is not subject to any objection that it is special or class legislation. Blackmon v. Monroe, 233 Ga. 656, 212 S.E.2d 827 (1975).

Equal protection requires uniformity upon all those coming within a class. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975).

This paragraph interdicts discrimination in laws.

- It demands uniformity and impartiality and hence, forbids discrimination. Simpson v. State, 218 Ga. 337, 127 S.E.2d 907 (1962).

Party claiming equal protection violation must be similarly situated.

- Landowners were not similarly situated to their neighbors, who had sought and received a permit and license to build a dock in a coastal marshland area, and the landowners failed to show that they would not have been able to build a dock had they so chosen. Therefore, the landowners' equal protection claim arising out of the issuance of the license to their neighbors failed. Hitch v. Vasarhelyi, 302 Ga. App. 381, 691 S.E.2d 286 (2010).

Discrimination not shown in composing grand jury array.

- Plea in abatement of a defendant's indictment for aggravated assault and other charges arising out of a road rage incident on the ground that the grand jury was not a fair and representative cross-section of the community was properly denied because an alleged disparity between the gender distribution in the county and the gender distribution on the grand jury was not indicative of prima facie discrimination; there was no constitutional guarantee that the grand or petit juries impaneled in a particular case would constitute a representative cross-section of the entire community, and the defendant offered no evidence that gender discrimination occurred with regard to the composition of the grand jury array. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).

Number of peremptory challenges afforded codefendants not violative of equal protection.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-8-4(b), which allows defendants tried jointly 14 peremptory challenges (while O.C.G.A. § 15-12-165 allows a defendant tried alone nine such challenges) does not violate equal protection as there are valid reasons for discriminating between the peremptory challenges of single defendants and codefendants: the avoidance of undue delay and a needless burden on the public. Dixon v. State, 285 Ga. 312, 677 S.E.2d 76 (2009), overruled on other grounds, 287 Ga. 242, 695 S.E.2d 255 (2010).

Differing treatment in similar circumstances is denial of equal protection.

- It is only when laws are applied differently to different persons under the same or similar circumstances that the equal protection of the law is denied. Franklin v. Mayor of Savannah, 199 Ga. 426, 34 S.E.2d 506 (1945); Hughes v. Reynolds, 223 Ga. 727, 157 S.E.2d 746 (1967); City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 213 S.E.2d 596 (1975).

Exclusion of one witness pursuant to rule of sequestration did not violate equal protection.

- Application of the rule of sequestration to exclude a single witness, the defendant's father, from trial, while allowing the victim's mother to attend the proceedings, notwithstanding that the mother was a witness at trial, did not violate the guarantee of equal protection. Nicely v. State, 291 Ga. 788, 733 S.E.2d 715 (2012).

Contract bidding process.

- Bidding insurer's summary judgment motion was properly granted as to its equal protection claim against a county as the county did not exercise arbitrary power but acted rationally and reasonably in rejecting all bids across the board after it was discovered that a consultant lacked a counselor's license under O.C.G.A. §§ 33-23-1.1 and33-23-4; because of the taint to the process, all bids were rejected, no classification was created at all, and all similarly situated persons were treated alike. Benefit Support, Inc. v. Hall County, 281 Ga. App. 825, 637 S.E.2d 763 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0306, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 214 (Ga. 2007).

Traffic consideration was rational basis for denying conditional use permit.

- City's rationale for granting a conditional use permit to a school, but disallowing it to built a 1500-seat football stadium, did not violate the school's equal protection rights, as evidence that the school's proposed stadium would exacerbate an already existing traffic problem in the area was a rational basis for the denial of that part of the permit; moreover, even if the school had shown it was similarly situated with other property owners whose applications were granted, it failed to show that the city's decision was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. City of Roswell v. Fellowship Christian Sch., Inc., 281 Ga. 767, 642 S.E.2d 824 (2007).

Although statute providing special benefits may not deny equal protection.

- A statute does not deny equal protection merely because certain persons may derive special benefits when all persons within its purview are subject to like conditions. Hancock v. Board of Tax Assessors, 226 Ga. 570, 176 S.E.2d 102 (1970).

Seduction statute (O.C.G.A. § 51-1-16), giving parents a cause of action for the seduction of their unmarried daughter, violates the equal protection clause because only men may be civilly liable under the statute. Franklin v. Hill, 264 Ga. 302, 444 S.E.2d 778 (1994).

O.C.G.A.

§ 46-3-204 is constitutional. - One-year statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 46-3-204 is constitutional because the statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Georgia Constitution and is not unconstitutionally vague. Daniel v. Amicalola Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 289 Ga. 437, 711 S.E.2d 709 (2011).

Use of direct recording electronic equipment does not deny equal protection.

- Trial court did not err in granting the Secretary of State, the Governor, and the Georgia State Election Board summary judgment in voters' action challenging the use of direct recording electronic equipment on the ground that it denied the voters equal protection under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II because all Georgia voters had the option of casting an absentee ballot or using the touch screen electronic voting machines on election day, and in deciding to forego the privilege of voting early on a paper ballot, voters assumed the risk of necessarily different procedures if a recount was required; since every Georgia citizen could vote by absentee ballot or by utilizing the touch screen voting system, the voters' contention that there was some state based classification between voters was false. Favorito v. Handel, 285 Ga. 795, 684 S.E.2d 257 (2009).

Election districts unconstitutional.

- Citizen was successful in the citizen's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equal protection challenge to the sizes of board of education districts in a county in Georgia; using the one person, one vote principle, the court declared the districts unconstitutional given their unacceptable deviations from the ideal district population size, enjoined further elections using the old districts, and implemented an interim new district map based on the 2000 census results taking care to ensure that the new map also satisfied the requirements of §§ 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. Markham v. Fulton County Bd. of Registrations & Elections, (N.D. Ga. May 29, 2002).

Redistricting attempts for school board members.

- While voting rights and the right to run for public office are core constitutional rights, an attempted deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights is not the same as an actual deprivation. Furthermore, incurring legal fees to vindicate rights does not itself establish that those rights were violated. Thus, plaintiff, a school board member, pursing attempted violations of plaintiff's right to run and hold a designated seat in a predefined district, could not succeed as an injunction in another lawsuit and failure of preclearance interfered with the implementation of the efforts of defendants, the local voting registrars; since the attempt to deprive plaintiff of plaintiff's constitutional rights did not succeed, neither can plaintiff's lawsuit succeed. Cook v. Randolph County, 573 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir. 2009).

Photo identification requirement.

- In an action by a political party challenging the 2006 Photo ID Act, amending O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, the photo ID requirement was not an impermissible qualification on voting in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II because the Act did not deprive any Georgia voter from casting a ballot in any election. Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 288 Ga. 720, 707 S.E.2d 67 (2011).

Differing terms of court.

- O.C.G.A. §§ 15-6-3(15.1) and17-7-171 did not combine to deprive a criminal defendant of equal protection of the law by permitting the county of the defendant's adjudication to operate with only two terms of court, while other similar-sized counties operate with more terms of court. Although defendant may have had to wait months longer for the defendant's trial than similarly situated defendants in other counties, the presumptive validity of the statutes stood. Henry v. State, 263 Ga. 417, 434 S.E.2d 469 (1993).

Conflicting rules.

- Fact that one rule precludes defendant from commenting on state's failure to produce certain witnesses and another rule permits state to comment on defendant's failure to produce certain witnesses does not violate equal protection, as there is a rational reason for the disparity. Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1092, 103 S. Ct. 580, 74 L. Ed. 2d 940 (1982), but see, Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203, 476 S.E.2d 747 (1996).

Nonresident aliens.

- O.C.G.A. § 34-9-265, regarding the award of workers' compensation death benefits, clearly discriminates between U.S. and Canadian citizens and residents on the one hand and all other nonresident aliens on the other. However, the discrimination is not an unlawful one. Barge-Wagener Constr. Co. v. Morales, 263 Ga. 190, 429 S.E.2d 671 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1003, 114 S. Ct. 579, 126 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1993).

Hearing impaired suspects.

- Defendant failed to meet the defendant's burden to show that the procedure whereby criminal suspects who are hearing impaired are not interrogated for up to one hour except in the presence of a translator was arbitrary or otherwise not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Sisson v. State, 232 Ga. App. 61, 499 S.E.2d 422 (1998).

Jury pool.

- Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII for failing to properly pursue an equal protection objection under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II based on the exclusion of African-Americans from the jury and from the pool of available jurors; the only evidence showed that the population of available African-American jurors in the trial court's county was very small, and the defendant did not show that the jury list failed to contain a fair cross section of the community or that there was purposeful discrimination in the selection of the panel. Martin v. State, 281 Ga. App. 64, 635 S.E.2d 358 (2006).

A defendant's Batson challenge was properly denied. The prosecutor stated that one juror had an incarcerated relative, and although the defendant showed that the juror stated that the relationship was not close, the trial court had to decide the credibility of the race-neutral explanation. Nelson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 326, 657 S.E.2d 263 (2008).

When the prosecutor struck a juror because the prosecutor thought that the juror as an immigrant might apply an improper standard of proof, the trial court properly denied the defendant's Batson challenge. Batson did not extend to national origin; moreover, the prosecutor's other reason for striking the juror, that the juror's child had been charged with a crime, was race-neutral. Nelson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 326, 657 S.E.2d 263 (2008).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for not using the word "pretextual" in making Batson challenges. Although counsel did not use the word "pretextual," counsel sought to rebut the prosecutor's explanations by arguing either that the strike was not race-neutral or that, considering the totality of the jury's responses to questions on voir dire examination, there was no factual basis for the strike. Nelson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 326, 657 S.E.2d 263 (2008).

Peremptory striking of all black prospective jurors in a case is not per se a denial of equal protection, but presumption protecting prosecutor may well be overcome by proof of systematic exclusion of black jurors by use of peremptory challenges by district attorney resulting in no Negroes ever serving on petit juries in that circuit. Blackwell v. State, 248 Ga. 138, 281 S.E.2d 599 (1981).

Use of peremptory strikes to exclude white males.

- Despite defendant's ostensibly race-neutral reason for a single contested peremptory strike, after failing to express any reason why the juror's friendship with a district attorney was case-related, and the record failed to indicate that defendant did not challenge at least one other juror with a friend who worked as a prosecutor in the same judicial circuit, upon a showing by the state of a prima facie case of racial discrimination by virtue of defendant's use of all of defendant's peremptory strikes to remove whites from the jury, the trial court's finding that defendant's reliance on non-racial explanations to defend the strike was implausible and a mere pretext to disguise discrimination against white males was not clearly erroneous. Allen v. State, 280 Ga. 678, 631 S.E.2d 699 (2006).

While the trial court found that the state established a prima facie case of defendant's use of racial discrimination in using peremptory challenges, asked defense counsel to explain the basis for each of the strikes, and listened to rebuttal by the prosecuting attorney, based on the assumption that defense counsel had used the peremptory strikes to remove all white males from the venire, the court erred by not applying the three-step Batson/McCollum process in disallowing defendant's exercise of peremptory strikes against jurors 5, 7, and 10 and by ordering those panel members reseated. Moon v. State, 280 Ga. App. 84, 633 S.E.2d 418 (2006).

Use of peremptory strikes to exclude minorities.

- Trial court did not err in denying the Batson claim raised by defendant in a rape case after the state used two peremptory strikes to strike two African-American jurors; defendant did not carry the burden of proving that the state engaged in purposeful discrimination and, thus, did not show that the jury selection in defendant's case violated defendant's equal protection rights. Walker v. State, 270 Ga. App. 733, 607 S.E.2d 912 (2004).

Trial court erred in ruling that defendants had not shown discriminatory intent and in overruling their Batson challenge because the prosecutor's own explanation established that a discriminatory purpose was involved in the decision; the prosecutor stated that the juror was struck because the juror was black and had a black son in an interracial marriage. McCastle v. State, 276 Ga. App. 218, 622 S.E.2d 896 (2005).

Reasons given by a prosecutor for striking three jurors were sufficiently race neutral to withstand the defendant's Batson challenge, and the trial court did not clearly err in denying the Batson challenge, since the prosecutor explained that the prosecutor struck the first juror because that juror was quite young, had no world experience, the prosecutor had no rapport with the juror, and the juror worked as a police cadet, that the prosecutor struck the second juror because the juror was an extremely young, recent high school graduate, with no job, that the prosecutor could not establish a rapport with this juror, and that the juror had no life experience to give the juror a framework in which to fit the alleged crime, and that the prosecutor struck the third juror because, based on the juror's statements, the prosecutor was concerned that this juror would rely on "karmic justice," instead of making a decision based on the evidence. Mayes v. State, 279 Ga. App. 499, 631 S.E.2d 724 (2006).

Upon appellate review of an order denying defendant's Batson challenge, the appeals court found that after considering that the ratio of African-American jurors to white jurors exceeded the ratio of potential African-American jurors to potential white jurors, defendant failed to make out a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in jury selection. Goldberg v. State, 280 Ga. App. 600, 634 S.E.2d 419 (2006), aff'd, 282 Ga. 542, 651 S.E.2d 667 (2007).

While the defendant made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination regarding the state's use of three peremptory strikes, because sufficient race-neutral reasons existed for those strikes, the defendant's rights were not violated. LeMon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 527, 660 S.E.2d 11 (2008).

State provided sufficient race-neutral reasons for using nine of the state's 10 peremptory strikes against non-white prospective jurors, including that one stricken prospective juror worked for a group home with boys about the defendant's age, one had multiple conflicts with the criminal justice system, and one had been falsely accused of a crime but acted in self-defense, the same legal theory advanced by the defendant. Stacey v. State, 292 Ga. 838, 741 S.E.2d 881 (2013).

Use of peremptory strikes to exclude unmarried jurors.

- Defendant made a prima facie showing of race and gender discrimination in use of peremptory challenges; the prosecutor presented a race and gender neutral explanation, in accordance with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II, by stating that defendant struck every unmarried juror in the jury pool because the prosecutor thought that family-oriented jurors might have been more likely to convict defendant of domestic violence related offenses. Floyd v. State, 281 Ga. App. 72, 635 S.E.2d 366 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 86 (Ga. 2007), 552 U.S. 840, 128 S. Ct. 80, 169 L. Ed. 2d 62 (2007).

Use of peremptory strikes to exclude minorities and females.

- Claim by a defendant, an African-American woman, that the prosecutor violated Batson by striking potential jurors based on race and gender, failed. The prosecutor's explanations for the strikes were race and gender neutral because the strikes were not based on a characteristic that was peculiar to any race or on a stereotypical belief, the reasons proffered were specific and related to the case, and three African-Americans and seven women were chosen to serve on the jury. McKenzie v. State, 294 Ga. App. 376, 670 S.E.2d 158 (2008).

Death penalty statutes not racially discriminatory.

- Petitioner, a death row inmate, challenged the imposition of the death penalty in a federal habeas petition, arguing that the death penalty was being administered in a racially discriminatory manner; however, the argument failed because the statistical evidence was not so strong as to permit no inference other than that the results were the product of a racially discriminatory intent or purpose in that the death penalty was sought in 58 percent of the possible death penalty cases when the defendant was black but in only 40 percent of the cases when the defendant was white, and sought in only 25 percent of the cases when the victim was black and 54 percent of the cases when the victim was white. Jefferson v. Terry, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ga. 2007), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 570 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. Ga. 2009).

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(8) bears a rational relationship to the legitimate state purposes of providing deterrence of possible harm to peace officers and, thus, of protecting officers. Accordingly, the statutory aggravating circumstance does not violate equal protection under U.S. Const., amend. XIV or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II. Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244, 702 S.E.2d 420 (2010).

Court not required to appoint state-paid psychiatrist for defendant filing special plea of insanity.

- Trial court is under no constitutional or statutory duty to appoint a state-paid psychiatrist to evaluate a defendant even though a special plea of insanity has been filed. Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 590, 277 S.E.2d 505 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23, 426 S.E.2d 895 (1993) and, overruled on other grounds, McClellan v. State, 274 Ga. 819, 561 S.E.2d 82 (2002).

Private corporation may attack state statute on due process and equal protection grounds. Caldwell v. Hospital Auth., 248 Ga. 887, 287 S.E.2d 15 (1982).

A hospital authority has standing by statute to attack state law on grounds that it violates due process and equal protection clauses of Georgia Constitution. Caldwell v. Hospital Auth., 248 Ga. 887, 287 S.E.2d 15 (1982).

Separate classification and treatment of architects, engineers, and contractors by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51 from owners, tenants, and manufacturers is reasonable and not arbitrary. Mullis v. Southern Co. Servs., 250 Ga. 90, 296 S.E.2d 579 (1982).

Specialty training for physicians.

- Public hospital bylaw requiring specific postgraduate specialty training or residency in order for physicians to be eligible for admission to the medical staff did not transgress the equal protection or due process rights of osteopathic physicians. Silverstein v. Gwinnett Hosp. Auth., 861 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1988).

Public hospital bylaws excluding osteopathic physicians, who have not completed allopathic postgraduate training, from the medical staff do not violate the equal protection clause if the bylaws are rationally related to differences in osteopathic and allopathic training and promote a legitimate state interest in promoting quality health care. Silverstein v. Gwinnett Hosp. Auth., 672 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1988).

Grant of official immunity to state employee providing medical services.

- Grant of official immunity from a malpractice suit to a state-employed doctor based on the patient's status as a Medicaid patient did not violate the constitutional rights of the patient's parents, as the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Georgia Constitutions protected only rights, and a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., was merely a privilege. Porter v. Guill, 298 Ga. App. 782, 681 S.E.2d 230 (2009).

Plumbers.

- O.C.G.A. § 43-14-8 is unconstitutional insofar as it denies to formerly locally licensed plumbers the rights extended to formerly state-licensed plumbers by § 43-14-8. Waller v. State Constr. Indus. Licensing Bd., 250 Ga. 529, 299 S.E.2d 554 (1983) (decided prior to 1983 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 43-14-8).

Arbitration of attorney fee disputes.

- Neither State Bar Rule 6-303(a) nor Rule 6-502 violate the state and federal constitutional rights to equal protection as the interest of a state in regulating the legal profession and attorney-client relationship is a "compelling" one. Nodvin v. State Bar, 273 Ga. 559, 544 S.E.2d 142 (2001).

Punitive damages law.

- Paragraph (e)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1, requiring that 75 percent of punitive damages awarded in a product liability action be paid into the state treasury, does not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 436 S.E.2d 635 (1993); State v. Moseley, 263 Ga. 680, 436 S.E.2d 632 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1107, 114 S. Ct. 2101, 128 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1994).

Allocation of a portion of the fines and forfeitures collected in this state to the Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit Fund is not a violation of this paragraph because of the possibility that peace officers will institute prosecutions for the sole purpose of building the fund, as public officers are presumed to do their duty. Cole v. Foster, 207 Ga. 416, 61 S.E.2d 814 (1950).

Employees' equal protection challenge to the reduction in their retirement benefits was belied by evidence that an age reduction factor was applied to employees retiring both before and after July 1, 1998. Alverson v. Employees' Ret. Sys., 272 Ga. App. 389, 613 S.E.2d 119 (2005).

Unconstitutionality of wrongful death provisions.

- Because the rights of children whose mothers had been wrongfully killed were protected by former O.C.G.A. § 51-4-3 in ways in which the rights of children whose fathers had been wrongfully killed were not protected, O.C.G.A. § 51-4-2 deprived children of deceased fathers who left widows equal protection of the law in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II. Henceforth, children of deceased fathers who left widows were to be afforded rights afforded children under former O.C.G.A. § 51-4-3. Tolbert v. Murrell, 253 Ga. 566, 322 S.E.2d 487 (1984).

Classification of minors in statute of limitations.

- The 1987 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73 which altered tolling provisions otherwise applicable to tort claims by injured minors in cases in which tort claims arose from health care professionals' malpractice, did not violate a brain-damaged child's right to equal protection or right of access to the courts. Smith v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 262 Ga. 566, 423 S.E.2d 235 (1992).

Disparate treatment of individual and corporate insureds under paragraphs (b)(2) and (e) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45 is not a violation of equal protection in that it bears a real relation to the object of the legislation, which is to protect unsophisticated and, more likely, unwary insureds by assuring that insurance remains in effect pending written notice of intention not to renew. Home Materials, Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 599, 300 S.E.2d 139 (1983).

Denial of insurance coverage to resident operating vehicle registered out of state constitutional.

- This provision is not violated by the denial of the $45,000 optional no-fault coverage, otherwise available under Flewellen v. Atlantic Cas. Co., 250 Ga. 709, 300 S.E.2d 673 (1983), to a Georgia resident who was injured in the course of employment in Georgia while operating a vehicle licensed outside of the state and insured under a policy issued outside of the state to an out-of-state resident, but that the parties understood would be used and garaged in Georgia. Doran v. Travelers Indem. Co., 254 Ga. 63, 326 S.E.2d 221 (1985).

Statutory scheme providing different procedures for handling service upon foreign and domestic corporations does not deny domestic corporations equal protection under the state and federal Constitutions. Ticor Constr. Co. v. Brown, 255 Ga. 547, 340 S.E.2d 923 (1986).

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-285, in authorizing disparate treatment of occupational diseases and other injuries compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection. Price v. Lithonia Lighting Co., 256 Ga. 49, 343 S.E.2d 688 (1986).

Ability to pay court costs.

- When the defendant did not claim that the defendant was being treated differently from other individuals similarly situated in regard to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-2, which provides that findings of the court concerning the ability of a party to pay costs shall be final, there was no merit to the defendant's claim that the defendant was suffering discrimination because the defendant was indigent. Penland v. State, 256 Ga. 641, 352 S.E.2d 385 (1987).

Charitable immunity doctrine does not constitute a violation of the equal protection or due process clauses of the federal or state constitutions. Ponder v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 256 Ga. 833, 353 S.E.2d 515, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 863, 108 S. Ct. 181, 98 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1987); Patterson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 192 Ga. App. 167, 384 S.E.2d 205 (1989).

Child testimony statute not void.

- O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 is not unconstitutional by allowing the state to bolster the testimony of the victim while denying the same opportunity to the defendant. Weathersby v. State, 262 Ga. 126, 414 S.E.2d 200 (1992).

The 1995 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16, allowing the admission into evidence of hearsay statements made by a child under the age of 14 years who witnessed an act of physical or sexual abuse inflicted upon another, violates constitutional principles of equal protection. Woodard v. State, 269 Ga. 317, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998).

Juvenile court jurisdiction statute does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution, nor does it violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions. Bishop v. State, 265 Ga. 821, 462 S.E.2d 716 (1995); Murphy v. State, 267 Ga. 100, 475 S.E.2d 590 (1996).

Sentencing juvenile as adult.

- Juvenile defendant was tried in superior court for murder and conspiracy to commit armed robbery, but was convicted only of the latter charge. The superior court's decision to sentence the defendant as an adult under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(i) did not violate the defendant's due process or equal protection rights as the defendant had no constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile. Pascarella v. State, 294 Ga. App. 414, 669 S.E.2d 216 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0426, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 188 (Ga. 2009).

Reckless conduct statute vague regarding child care.

- Because the reckless conduct statute failed to provide defendant with fair notice that the defendant could be held criminally responsible for leaving children in the care of the defendant's older son, it failed to clearly define its prohibitions, rendering it unconstitutionally vague as applied. Hall v. State, 268 Ga. 89, 485 S.E.2d 755 (1997).

Immunity granted employers in the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., does not violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Joseph Campbell Co., 261 Ga. 822, 411 S.E.2d 871 (1992).

Provisions of the Tort Reform Act (O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1), relating to punitive damages, violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions, violated the excessive fines provisions of both constitutions, and violated the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution. McBride v. GMC, 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).

Georgia witness competency statutes present a reasonable requirement regarding the minimal level of understanding for people participating in one of the most important functions of government and do not violate the equal protection clause. Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406, 383 S.E.2d 555 (1989).

State had standing to challenge Georgia witness competency statutes. Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406, 383 S.E.2d 555 (1989).

Public officers' malpractice statute not unconstitutional.

- O.C.G.A. § 45-11-4, by affording only certain enumerated officials the privilege of appearing before the grand jury prior to indictment for malpractice, does not violate the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. State v. Deason, 259 Ga. 183, 378 S.E.2d 120 (1989).

Implied consent statute does not violate the dictates of equal protection set forth in the Georgia and federal Constitutions. Lutz v. State, 274 Ga. 71, 548 S.E.2d 323 (2001).

Municipal affirmative action program providing favored treatment for minority and female-owned business enterprises in the award of city contracts violated the equal protection clause since the city failed to identify the need for a race-conscious program in the awarding of the city's public contracts and the program was not "narrowly tailored" to remedy prior discrimination. American Subcontractors Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 14, 376 S.E.2d 662 (1989).

Affirmative action programs.

- Because genuine issues of fact existed as to whether the defendants violated the equal protection clause in connection with the operation of a county's minority and female business enterprise program, they were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as to plaintiff's state equal protection claim. Webster v. Fulton County, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (N.D. Ga. 1999).

Standing to challenge administration of municipal programs.

- City employees did not have standing to make equal protection challenges against the administration of retirement incentive programs when the employees retired prior to adoption of the programs or at a time when the administration of a particular program did not affect their rights. Smith v. City of LaGrange, 218 Ga. App. 394, 461 S.E.2d 550 (1995).

Standing to challenge Medicaid reimbursement for medically necessary abortion.

- The trial court erroneously dismissed a complaint filed by certain medical providers, alleging violations of the Georgia Constitution on privacy and equal protection grounds, and holding that the medical providers lacked third-party standing to assert a claim on behalf of their Medicaid-eligible patients as: (1) the medical providers properly asserted an injury in fact insofar as they had a direct financial interest in obtaining state funding to reimburse them for the cost of abortion services provided to Medicaid-eligible women, and have alleged that they performed, and will continue to perform, medically necessary abortions for which they will not be reimbursed under Georgia's Medicaid program; and (2) the relationship between the medical providers and their patients made them uniquely qualified to litigate the constitutionality of the state's action interfering with a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy. Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Burgess, 282 Ga. 433, 651 S.E.2d 36 (2007).

Tractor-trailer length limits.

- Enforcement of total length limits, i.e., combination of vehicle and load, for general freight transport that are different from those total length limits enforced as to live poultry transport violates the equal protection clause. State v. Moore, 259 Ga. 139, 376 S.E.2d 877 (1989).

Pay for public officials.

- The payment plan for police officers in Columbus, Georgia did not deny the officers equal protection under either U.S. Const., amend. 14 or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II, as there were legitimate government purposes, which satisfied rational basis review, and the pay plan at issue enjoyed a strong presumption of constitutionality; improving the educational quality of the police force was a legitimate government purpose, as was increasing pay for new officers, which was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of recruiting and retaining the best qualified new officers. Ackerman v. Columbus, Ga., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (M.D. Ga. 2003).

Pension funds for county employees.

- Court fines and forfeitures were county funds and, thus, the payment of those monies into a court clerk's state retirement plan were contributions made with county funds; the county's determination to exclude the clerk from the county's pension plan, based on the county's decision that it should contribute to each constitutional officer's retirement plan only once, did not violate equal protection, since it was based on a rational distinction between the various constitutional officers, and furthered the legitimate governmental purpose of equalizing the county's pension contributions and fostering financial responsibility in the funding of its retirement plans. Morgan County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Mealor, 280 Ga. 241, 626 S.E.2d 79 (2006).

Prior service credit for retirement.

- Employee Retirement System classification system, providing differing methods of credit for military service based upon the dates and conditions of service, does not violate equal protection rights. Horton v. State Employee Retirement Sys., 262 Ga. 458, 421 S.E.2d 703 (1992).

Review of Department of Natural Resources decisions.

- The Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq., and O.C.G.A. § 12-2-1 govern the procedure for judicial review of final decisions of the Department of Natural Resources; since the party seeking review failed to make a timely request therefor, affirmance of the final decision of the Department violated neither equal protection nor due process. Nix v. Long Mtn. Resources, Inc., 262 Ga. 506, 422 S.E.2d 195 (1992).

Statute of repose for medical malpractice claims is rationally related to a legitimate legislative attempt to reduce the uncertainties and costs related to malpractice litigation long after the medical services have been rendered and does not violate equal protection guarantees. Hanflik v. Ratchford, 848 F. Supp. 1539 (N.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d 1391 (11th Cir. 1995).

Statute of repose for medical malpractice suits under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(b) did not violate the equal protection clauses of the federal or Georgia Constitutions. There was a rational basis for treating medical malpractice differently from other forms of professional malpractice and for the five-year repose period itself, based on the considerations that uncertainty over the causes of illness and injury made it difficult for insurers to adequately assess premiums and that the passage of time made it more difficult to determine the cause of injury. Nichols v. Gross, 282 Ga. 811, 653 S.E.2d 747 (2007).

1994 Sign Ordinance.

- The 1994 Sign Ordinance, a comprehensive regulatory framework for the posting of all signs within the City of Atlanta, does not violate equal protection or free speech. Outdoor Sys. v. City of Atlanta, 885 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995).

Classification of property as part of Airport Noise Abatement Program.

- Classifications drawn by a city between single-family and multi-family residences as part of its Airport Noise Abatement Program did not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection. City of Atlanta v. Watson, 267 Ga. 185, 475 S.E.2d 896 (1996).

Mandatory minimum sentences.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1, imposing mandatory minimum sentences in certain cases, does not violate equal protection because the legislation bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate legislative concern of deterring crime and ensuring that a court imposed sentence will be served in its entirety. Campbell v. State, 268 Ga. 44, 485 S.E.2d 185 (1997).

Exclusion from drug court program did not violate equal protection.

- Defendant was not admitted into a drug court program under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(a) not because of the defendant's HIV status, but because the defendant had a mental illness, was under a doctor's supervision, and was taking four prescription medications. As the state's interest in preserving the defendant's health was rationally related to the state's decision to exclude the defendant from the program, there was no equal protection violation. Evans v. State, 293 Ga. App. 371, 667 S.E.2d 183 (2008).

AIDS testing of convicts.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-10-15(b) does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the government's interest outweighs the individual's and the results are kept confidential and cannot be used against the individual in a criminal prosecution; nor does O.C.G.A. § 17-10-15(b) violate the right to privacy under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the state or federal equal protection clauses. Adams v. State, 269 Ga. 405, 498 S.E.2d 268 (1998).

Driving under the influence by minor.

- O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(k) (minor driving under the influence) does not violate the right to equal protection under the federal or state constitutions. Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472, 510 S.E.2d 527 (1999).

Purity requirement of drugs.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) did not violate principles of equal protection of the law because the statute contained no purity requirement, as was required for cocaine. Because the legislature was under no duty to treat all drugs and drug offenders the same, the mere fact that cocaine and methamphetamine were both listed as Schedule II controlled substances did not mean that the legislature had to enact identical statutes pertaining to those substances, and the statute treated all those charged with methamphetamine trafficking equally. Hardin v. State, 277 Ga. 242, 587 S.E.2d 634 (2003).

Inheritance through out of wedlock children.

- O.C.G.A. § 53-2-4(b)(2) creates a gender-based classification in violation of the equal protection clauses of both the United States and Georgia Constitutions; it provides that a father of a child born out of wedlock cannot inherit from his child if he failed or refused to openly treat the child as his own, but that a mother who acts in the same manner can inherit from the child, and there is no legitimate state interest achieved by not subjecting mothers of illegitimate children to the same standards of conduct. Rainey v. Chever, 270 Ga. 519, 510 S.E.2d 823 (1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1044, 119 S. Ct. 2411, 144 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1999).

Deprived children.

- Treating deprived children who were placed in the legal custody of the Department of Families and Children Services because there was no relative committed to the child who was available for immediate placement differently from deprived children who did have a committed parent or guardian available for immediate placement did not violate the equal protection clause or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II, as the classes were not similarly situated and the laws were rationally related to the goal of minimizing government intervention while ensuring that children were reared in a familial environment. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006).

Action for termination of parental rights.

- By not raising the issue below, a mother in a termination of parental rights case waived her arguments that the trial court violated equal protection and due process by not determining whether her mental health concerns affected her ability to complete the specific goals in her case plan; moreover, there was uncontradicted evidence that despite her mental health problems, the mother understood the case plan, appreciated its requirements, and could have completed it, but did not do so, and the mother testified that she was able both physically and mentally to care for the child. In the Interest of H.M., 287 Ga. App. 418, 651 S.E.2d 527 (2007).

Parents required to pay part of costs of case plan in deprivation.

- In a deprivation proceeding, the department of family and child services did not violate equal protection by requiring the parents to pay part of the costs for services mandated under their case plan. The department was not drawing a distinction between similarly situated parties in that a parent who could afford to contribute financially was not similarly situated to one who could not afford to do so; moreover, even if the parents were similarly situated to others who were not required to pay for a portion of services, the goals served by the contribution requirement of calling for parents to take responsibility for conduct that harmed their children and of increasing the likelihood of success for family reunification represented legitimate governmental purposes. In the Interest of P.N., 291 Ga. App. 512, 662 S.E.2d 287 (2008).

Rational basis for disparate treatment of utility companies.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the county, particularly because the telecommunications company did not show its equal protection rights had been violated. Although the telecommunications company argued that the county, through its ordinance, imposed a permit fee on telecommunication companies that it did not charge other utilities, the county was able to show that the telecommunication companies filed for a disproportionately high number of the permits to use the county's rights of way and also that their installations had caused a disproportionately high amount of damages and disruption in the county, which meant there existed a rational basis for imposing permit fees on telecommunication companies, but not on other utilities. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Cobb County, 277 Ga. 314, 588 S.E.2d 704 (2003).

Driving under the influence jury charges.

- Equal protection clause was not violated in charging the jury to convict if defendant was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was "less safe" for defendant to drive, rather than if defendant was "rendered incapable of driving safely"; the standards were legally equivalent. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 426, 602 S.E.2d 177 (2004).

State conduct is required.

- Former employee's claims that the employee was dismissed because of expressive activity, failed under both Georgia's equal protection provisions and freedom of speech guarantees because the former employer and the two managers, were not state actors or private parties acting under the color of state law. Johnson v. Shoney's, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2005).

Education.

- Claim that the equal protection clause imposed an obligation on the state to equalize education opportunities, and that education was a "fundamental right" subject to strict scrutiny has been rejected and a trial court properly dismissed a complaint alleging violations of constitutional rights arising from the closing of an elementary school. Williams v. State of Ga., 277 Ga. App. 850, 627 S.E.2d 891 (2006).

The mere fact that a defendant who pled guilty was treated differently than one who was convicted after trial did not violate the equal protection clause because the defendants were not similarly situated; thus, the defendant's equal protection claim, based on the rule requiring that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea be filed in the same term as that in which the defendant was sentenced, failed. Smith v. State, 283 Ga. 376, 659 S.E.2d 380 (2008).

Elementary school orchestra and band teachers' equal protection claims failed because: (1) the school district had a rational basis for treating those teachers and Grades 1 through 3 paraprofessionals differently with regard to which employees would be retained since, inter alia, "teachers" and "paraprofessionals" were treated differently under Georgia law; and (2) the district was not collaterally estopped from defending against the equal protection claims since the district was not subject to offensive, non-mutual collateral estoppel. Demaree v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2013)(Unpublished).

O.C.G.A. § 20-2-690.1 did not violate equal protection because the defendant failed to show any potential variation in application of the statute without a rational basis and the statute was reasonably related to the legitimate governmental interest of ensuring that children residing in Georgia are afforded the opportunity of an education. Pitts v. State, 293 Ga. 511, 748 S.E.2d 426 (2013).

O.C.G.A.

§ 42-1-12, pertaining to registration of convicted sex offenders, does not violate the concept of equal protection under the law. - Trial court did not err in revoking a convicted sexual offender's probation for failing to register an address change after the offender moved into a motel because the offender failed to establish that the offender was treated differently from a similarly situated nonresident sexual offender entering the state; if O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(7) applies to a hypothetical nonresident sexual offender, that person must update his or her information within 72 hours of a change of address as required in § 42-1-12(f)(5), and any nonresident sexual offender who is required to register by virtue of the specification of § 42-1-12(e)(7) is equally subject to the requirement that he or she register a new address within 72 hours of changing that address and equally subject to being charged with a violation. Dunn v. State, 286 Ga. 238, 686 S.E.2d 772 (2009).

Age classification in criminal statute of limitation tolling provision.

- Supreme Court of Georgia holds that the age classification chosen in the tolling statute of O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2.2 does not violate the Equal Protection clauses of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II, and U.S. Const., amend. XIV. Harper v. State, 292 Ga. 557, 738 S.E.2d 584 (2013).

State has right to classify.

- A very wide discretion must be conceded to the legislative power of the state in the classification of trades, callings, businesses, or occupations which may be subjected to special forms of regulation or taxation through an excise or license tax. Nance v. Harrison, 176 Ga. 674, 169 S.E. 22 (1933).

The State of Georgia has an inherent, sovereign right to properly classify all businesses carried on within the state's borders. Harrison v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 183 Ga. 1, 187 S.E. 648 (1936), rev'd on other grounds, 301 U.S. 459, 57 S. Ct. 838, 81 L. Ed. 1223 (1937).

The right of the legislature to make reasonable classifications of persons and things for the purpose of legislation is clearly recognized by all authorities. The mere fact that legislation is based on a classification, and is made to apply to certain persons and not to others, does not affect its validity, if it be so made that all persons subject to its terms are treated alike under like circumstances and conditions. Rourke v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 636, 1 S.E.2d 728 (1939).

Reasonable classification permitted.

- The lawmaking power may classify and provide penalties applicable to different classes, so long as the classification is fair and reasonable, and all coming within the same class are treated alike. Leonard v. American Life & Annuity Co., 139 Ga. 274, 77 S.E. 41 (1913); Commercial Sec. Co. v. Lee, 148 Ga. 597, 97 S.E. 516 (1918); Assets Realization Co. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. 301, 103 S.E. 463 (1920).

The constitutional guaranty of equal protection requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions. However, it does not prevent a reasonable classification relating to the purpose of the legislation. Reed v. Hopper, 235 Ga. 298, 219 S.E.2d 409 (1975).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion in arrest of judgment, as the indictment filed against defendant arising out of the offense of first-degree homicide by vehicle, which contained a predicate offense making it easier to convict defendant because defendant was under 21-years-old and had a blood alcohol concentration of .02 or more at the time of the accident that killed defendant's passenger, did not violate defendant's equal protection rights under the state and federal constitutions because the predicate offense did not operate to disadvantage a suspect class or interfere with a fundamental right; rather, it was rationally related to the state's legitimate purpose in deterring younger, more inexperienced drivers from drinking and driving. David v. State, 261 Ga. App. 468, 583 S.E.2d 135 (2003).

Because the legislative purpose of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) is legitimate, and the classification drawn has some reasonable relation to furthering that purpose, the classification passes constitutional muster, and, although § 51-1-29.5(c) raises the burden of proof in certain cases, it does not deprive one of the right to a jury trial or any other fundamental right. Promoting affordable liability insurance for health care providers and hospitals, and thereby promoting the availability of quality health care services, are legitimate legislative purposes, and it is entirely logical to assume that emergency medical care provided in hospital emergency rooms is different from medical care provided in other settings and that establishing a standard of care and a burden of proof that reduces the potential liability of the providers of such care will help achieve those legitimate legislative goals. Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 287 Ga. 7, 694 S.E.2d 75 (2010).

When classification is based on rational distinctions.

- Under the equal protection guarantee of the Georgia Constitution, classification in legislation is permitted when the classification is based on rational distinctions, and the basis of the classification bears a direct and real relation to the object or purpose of the legislation. Cannon v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 479, 241 S.E.2d 238 (1978); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Five Transp. Co., 246 Ga. 447, 271 S.E.2d 844 (1980); Home Materials, Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 599, 300 S.E.2d 139 (1983).

Classification must have reasonable basis.

- The fact that a revenue or tax-raising statute discriminates in favor of a certain class does not make it arbitrary, if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction. Nance v. Harrison, 176 Ga. 674, 169 S.E. 22 (1933).

Municipal ordinances which are intended to regulate lawful occupations and businesses must be reasonable, otherwise they are void. Bunn v. City of Atlanta, 67 Ga. App. 147, 19 S.E.2d 553, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666, 63 S. Ct. 73, 87 L. Ed. 535 (1942).

Classification is permitted, provided it is made upon reasonable basis. City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 213 S.E.2d 596 (1975).

Classification must relate to object of legislation.

- In order to constitutionally classify for legislation, the basis for classification must relate to the object or purpose of the legislation. City of Atlanta v. Wilson, 209 Ga. 527, 74 S.E.2d 455 (1953); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975).

This paragraph allows classification by legislation only when the basis of such classification bears a direct and real relation to the object or purpose of the legislation, and when thus classified, uniformity upon all those coming within the class satisfies the Constitution. Simpson v. State, 218 Ga. 337, 127 S.E.2d 907 (1962).

If the legislative purpose is legitimate and the classification drawn has some reasonable relation to furthering that purpose, the classification passes muster. Wilder v. State, 232 Ga. 404, 207 S.E.2d 38 (1974).

Limitation on income benefits in former Code 1933, § 56-3404, as construed by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, established a constitutionally permissible classification reasonably related to the purposes of the no-fault Act. Leonard v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 247 Ga. 574, 277 S.E.2d 675 (1981).

That employee is entitled to benefits based on employment by hospital bears substantial relationship to purpose of Employment Security Law. Caldwell v. Hospital Auth., 248 Ga. 887, 287 S.E.2d 15 (1982).

Any reasonable state of facts will sustain classification.

- A classification, even though discriminatory, is not a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived that would sustain it. Wilder v. State, 232 Ga. 404, 207 S.E.2d 38 (1974); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Five Transp. Co., 246 Ga. 447, 271 S.E.2d 844 (1980).

Arbitrary classification not allowed.

- The law recognizes the right and power of a municipal government to make reasonable classifications of subjects for taxation and to make subclassifications of such classes. But it does not permit an arbitrary classification, the basis for which has no reasonable relationship to the purpose for which classification is made. Elder v. Smith, 188 Ga. 65, 2 S.E.2d 670 (1939).

An arbitrary classification, when there exists no real difference as concerns the purpose of the legislation, is not allowed and constitutes a violation of the Constitution notwithstanding an arbitrary attempt to classify and then discriminate as between those in the different classifications. Simpson v. State, 218 Ga. 337, 127 S.E.2d 907 (1962).

Standard for valid classification.

- If the selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law. Nance v. Harrison, 176 Ga. 674, 169 S.E. 22 (1933).

If the legislature has the power to enact discriminatory legislation, the discrimination is not invalid under the equal protection provision of the Constitution, if not so arbitrary as to be unreasonable and beyond the wide discretion that a legislature may exercise. Harrison v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 183 Ga. 1, 187 S.E. 648 (1936), rev'd on other grounds, 301 U.S. 459, 57 S. Ct. 838, 81 L. Ed. 1223 (1937).

Classification for taxation.

- All that the law requires is that classification of persons who are to be exempt from taxation shall not be arbitrary and unreasonable. Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803 (1968).

Uniformity within classes satisfies Constitution.

- When a proper basis for classification exists, the law may classify; and uniformity within the classes thus created satisfies the Constitution. Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803 (1968).

Imperfect classifications not necessarily violative.

- The validity of the state's classifications does not depend upon their absolute correctness nor upon the absence of any under- or over-inclusiveness in the categories drawn. Wilder v. State, 232 Ga. 404, 207 S.E.2d 38 (1974).

In the area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate the equal protection clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Five Transp. Co., 246 Ga. 447, 271 S.E.2d 844 (1980).

Mathematical precision not required.

- In its regulation of business and industry, the state is not bound to make classifications which are perfectly symmetrical or mathematically precise, so long as the classifications are not arbitrary or unreasonable. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Five Transp. Co., 246 Ga. 447, 271 S.E.2d 844 (1980).

If a classification has some reasonable basis, it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Five Transp. Co., 246 Ga. 447, 271 S.E.2d 844 (1980).

Court need not agree with soundness of categories.

- The court must necessarily agree with the soundness of the distinction maintained by the statutory scheme. If the legislative purpose is legitimate and the classification drawn has some reasonable relation to furthering that purpose, the classification passes muster. Wilder v. State, 232 Ga. 404, 207 S.E.2d 38 (1974).

Basis for separate classification of businesses.

- A mere difference in the nature or character of two businesses which it is sought to regulate by legislative enactment will not be sufficient to justify separate classification of each business into different classes. But if a business is affected with a great public interest in which all of the citizens of the state are concerned, and injury will result to the general public unless regulatory control is applied, a right of classification arises on behalf of the general public. Harrison v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 183 Ga. 1, 187 S.E. 648 (1936), rev'd on other grounds, 301 U.S. 459, 57 S. Ct. 838, 81 L. Ed. 1223 (1937).

Distinction between residents and nonresidents is permissible classification.

- An ordinance, which provides that rates for water service shall be higher in territory outside the corporate limits, is not unconstitutional and void as denying equal protection under the federal and state Constitutions. Barr v. City Council, 206 Ga. 753, 58 S.E.2d 823 (1950).

When the city has the right under the city's charter to furnish water to resident and nonresident users, and to classify the rates for such service, an ordinance, increasing the rates and fixing rates for nonresident users higher than for resident users, is not violative of the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. Messenheimer v. Windt, 211 Ga. 575, 87 S.E.2d 402 (1955).

The incest statute's classification on the basis of step-parent and step-child bears a rational relationship to the governmental interest in protecting children and family unity and does not violate equal protection guarantees. Benton v. State, 265 Ga. 648, 461 S.E.2d 202 (1995).

Classification of procedural rules by amount in controversy permitted.

- Classification by the General Assembly of procedural rules based upon the amount in controversy does not deny poor persons equal protection of the laws under the Georgia and federal Constitutions. Sellers v. Home Furnishing Co., 235 Ga. 831, 222 S.E.2d 34 (1976).

Population is discriminatory basis for classification.

- Population as the sole basis for the attempted classification of counties to be excluded from the privilege of fishing noncommercially on Sunday is discriminatory and repugnant to this paragraph. McAllister v. State, 220 Ga. 570, 140 S.E.2d 828 (1965).

Present customers and future customers of a utility do not form discrete classes for purposes of equal protection analysis because customers are a constantly fluctuating group. Lasseter v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 253 Ga. 227, 319 S.E.2d 824 (1984).

O.C.G.A. § 46-2-26.3 does not create an unconstitutional classification although its application is in fact limited to only one power plant, because it is possible to conclude that the section does not confer a special benefit upon the utility. Lasseter v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 253 Ga. 227, 319 S.E.2d 824 (1984).

Improper classification found.

- Directives which the University System of Georgia's Board of Regents gave the institutions for calculating pay raises resulted in some faculty members being treated unfairly and not receiving the full pay to which they were entitled under their contracts, and violated the equal protection rights of the affected faculty members, as there was no standard delineating what sets of circumstances would authorize the use of each method, and instead conferred upon the institutions uncontrolled discretion in deciding which of the two methods to use in calculating pay; the classification was also defective in that it drew a line between otherwise identical groups without an objective basis for doing so. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. v. Rux, 260 Ga. App. 760, 580 S.E.2d 559 (2003).

DUI cases ineligible for first offender treatment.

- O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(f) did not violate equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II by excluding driving-under-the-influence offenses from First Offender Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 et seq., coverage. The defendant did not show the absence of a rational relationship between the state's compelling interest in protecting the public's safety and the classification; the defendant's equal protection argument boiled down to no more than the claim that the legislature made a bad policy judgment about which offenders should be eligible for First Offender Act treatment. Rhodes v. State, 283 Ga. 361, 659 S.E.2d 370 (2008).

Courts of equity to provide relief.

- If by mistake the constitutional protection provided for in this paragraph is denied the citizen, and it is not voluntarily rectified, courts of equity will command its rectification. Whipple v. County of Houston, 214 Ga. 532, 105 S.E.2d 898 (1958).

A citizen who has been wronged by an arbitrary or capricious exercise of the power to grant licenses may not be prevented from seeking aid from the courts to protect the citizen. Jenkins v. Manry, 216 Ga. 538, 118 S.E.2d 91 (1961).

Consumer has standing to challenge a rate schedule on the ground that the schedule discriminates against the consumer or a class of consumers in violation of the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal Constitutions. Georgia Power Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 233 Ga. 558, 212 S.E.2d 628 (1975).

Individuals outside affected class lack standing.

- When none of the petitioners come within the class of individuals who are alleged to have been discriminated against, those petitioners are not in a position to raise the question of violation of this paragraph. Villyard v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 204 Ga. 517, 50 S.E.2d 313 (1948).

Municipal corporation may not protest denial of equal protection.

- A municipal corporation created by the state for the better ordering of government cannot make the point that a provision of the state law is invalid because it denies to the municipality the equal protection of the laws. V.C. Ellington Co. v. City of Macon, 177 Ga. 541, 170 S.E. 813 (1933).

A county or municipal corporation, created by the legislature, does not have standing to invoke the equal protection clause of the state or federal Constitution in opposition to the legislature. City of Atlanta v. Spence, 242 Ga. 194, 249 S.E.2d 554 (1978).

Collateral source damages provision unconstitutional.

- O.C.G.A. § 51-12-1(b), which authorizes the admission of evidence of collateral sources of recovery available to a plaintiff seeking special damages for tortious injury, violates the provision of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II, which proclaims that the paramount duty of government is the protection of person and property and that the protection shall be impartial and complete. Denton v. Con-Way S. Express, Inc., 261 Ga. 41, 402 S.E.2d 269 (1991).

Laws for protection of public permitted.

- To be able to prevent the construction or maintenance of fire hazards is as much within the scope of the general powers of a municipality as the building of a school house. Irwin v. Torbert, 204 Ga. 111, 49 S.E.2d 70 (1948).

The state in the exercise of its police powers may make, repeal, alter, or modify laws for the protection of the public. Bailey v. State, 210 Ga. 52, 77 S.E.2d 511 (1953).

A municipality can, in the exercise of its police power, make reasonable regulations to protect its citizens, including measures designed to preclude the use of water unfit for human consumption or other use. City of Midway v. Midway Nursing & Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 230 Ga. 77, 195 S.E.2d 452 (1973).

Act must bear reasonable relation to public health.

- An Act which, considered as a whole, does not bear any reasonable or substantial relation to the public health, safety, or morality, or other phase of the general welfare, is unconstitutional and void as an exercise of the police power. Bramley v. State, 187 Ga. 826, 2 S.E.2d 647 (1939).

No power to arbitrarily discriminate.

- A municipal government is without power under the "police power" to arbitrarily and without cause discriminate between licensees by revoking one license and not those of others who occupy exactly the same position, since the licensee has something more than a "mere privilege" and is entitled to the equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution. Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Distrib. Co., 202 Ga. 559, 43 S.E.2d 704 (1947).

State not victim has interest in prosecutions.

- Trial court abused the court's discretion by dismissing charges alleging that the defendant violated state statutes prohibiting affrays, disrupting a public school, and criminal trespass by fighting on school grounds, over the state's objection, after defense counsel told the court that school officials wanted the charges dismissed. State v. Perry, 261 Ga. App. 886, 583 S.E.2d 909 (2003).

Power to zone established.

- The police power of the state to zone property to prevent its use for certain purposes in the future, as distinguished from the taking or damaging in respect to a use already in existence, is not open to question, and does not require the payment of any compensation. National Adv. Co. v. State Hwy. Dep't, 230 Ga. 119, 195 S.E.2d 895 (1973).

Power to zone limited.

- When substantial expenditures are made in the acquisition of property or in preparations for the construction of a building in reliance upon the granting of a permit, vested rights are acquired which cannot be displaced by the passage of a new ordinance. Clairmont Dev. Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255, 149 S.E.2d 489 (1966).

Criteria for valid zoning ordinances.

- A zoning ordinance does not offend equal protection if it has some fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation and furnishes a legitimate ground of differentiation. Parking Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 264 Ga. 764, 450 S.E.2d 200 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116, 115 S. Ct. 2268, 132 L. Ed. 2d 273 (1995).

Notice and hearing required.

- It is a prerequisite to the validity of a municipal ordinance that notice be given and an opportunity for a hearing be accorded to anyone who has an interest or property right in the property which may be affected by the zoning regulation. Sikes v. Pierce, 212 Ga. 567, 94 S.E.2d 427 (1956).

A zoning ordinance, in which no language appears providing for hearing and notice of hearing to the property affected thereby, is clearly in contravention of the constitutional requirements of due process, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. Bell v. Studdard, 220 Ga. 756, 141 S.E.2d 536 (1965).

Notice by publication of a rezoning hearing is proper and adequate insofar as the requirements of equal protection are concerned. F.P. Plaza, Inc. v. Waite, 230 Ga. 161, 196 S.E.2d 141, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825, 94 S. Ct. 129, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).

Exercise of zoning power to be reasonably and fairly done.

- Municipalities and counties which have had conferred upon them the power to zone property cannot always at one and the same time enact such a comprehensive scheme of zoning and planning as will particularly describe and embrace every piece of property in the entire area of the county or municipality. When reasonably and fairly done, however, such power may be exercised by the enactment of different ordinances affecting different areas at different times. Taylor v. Shetzen, 212 Ga. 101, 90 S.E.2d 572 (1955).

Zoning ordinance which changed rear-yard setback for properties zoned for multi-family use after the date the ordinance was passed but which retained a prior and more restrictive setback requirement for properties zoned prior to that date was arbitrary and unreasonable and, thus, violated the equal protection clauses of the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Bailey Inv. Co. v. Augusta-Richmond County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 256 Ga. 186, 345 S.E.2d 596 (1986).

Detriment to owner by zoning.

- In a suit by a property buyer against the county alleging that the zoning was unconstitutional, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the county on the ground that the owner did not prove a significant detriment, because the evidence authorized inferences that the buyer could not feasibly develop the property for residential use under the current agricultural zoning, and that the property only had economic value for residential uses. Legacy Inv. Group, LLC v. Kenn, 279 Ga. 778, 621 S.E.2d 453 (2005).

Ordinance banning permit applications if two or more ordinance violations existed.

- In a declaratory judgment action brought by a developer against a county seeking to invalidate an ordinance which required denial of the developer's land disturbance permit based on two soil-related ordinance violations existing, the judgment in favor of the developer was upheld on appeal with regard to the developer's claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged violations of the developer's equal protection rights in the county's enforcement of the ordinance. The trial court properly determined that the developer was not required to prove a valid property right with regard to the developer's equal protection challenge; the trial court properly awarded attorney fees to the developer under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 as the jury was authorized to award the attorney fees as an element of the damages it awarded on the developer's federal equal protection claim, regardless of whether the developer could prevail on any state law claim for damages; but the trial court erred by failing to address the merits of the developer's petition for a declaratory judgment since the overall enforceability of the ordinance, which was still the law, was not rendered moot by the withdrawal notice. Fulton County v. Legacy Inv. Group, LLC, 296 Ga. App. 822, 676 S.E.2d 388 (2009).

Unequal taxation forbidden.

- The discrimination in taxation which the equal protection clause forbids is the failure of the taxing authorities to tax all like property which is subject to taxation equally or to tax the property of one owner and exempt like property belonging to another owner. Delta Air Lines v. Coleman, 219 Ga. 12, 131 S.E.2d 768, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 904, 84 S. Ct. 195, 11 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1963).

Unequal benefit did not violate equal protection.

- County's approval of a tax assessment of each property in the county in order to pay for medical care for indigent patients did not violate due process and equal protection under U.S. Const., amends. 5 and 14 and under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Paras. I and II even though not all taxpayers benefitted; the question of the benefit to each taxpayer was for the legislature except in extraordinary cases, and the instant case was not extraordinary. Greene County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Higdon, 277 Ga. App. 350, 626 S.E.2d 541 (2006).

Meaning of uniform taxation.

- The requirement in the Constitution that the rule of taxation shall be uniform means that all kinds of property of the same class not absolutely exempt must be taxed alike, by the same standard of valuation, equally with other taxable property of the same class, and coextensively with the territory to which it applies. Colvard v. Ridley, 218 Ga. 490, 128 S.E.2d 732 (1962).

Property valuation by method other than standard method.

- The uniformity clause of the state constitution and the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions were not offended by a county's valuation of a motel by a method other than the standard method for motels, since the motel property was not actually being operated as a motel and there was no income stream from which to calculate room revenue for use with the standard gross income multiplier method. Coastal Equities, Inc. v. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 201 Ga. App. 571, 411 S.E.2d 540, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 903, 411 S.E.2d 540 (1991).

Statute creating special districts for the purpose of implementing a hotel/motel tax did not violate state and federal constitutional due process and equal protection guarantees. Youngblood v. State, 259 Ga. 864, 388 S.E.2d 671 (1990).

County homestead tax exemptions did not violate equal protection.

- County homestead exemptions from ad valorem and education taxes did not violate due process or equal protection because they were rationally related to the legitimate government interests of the encouragement of neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability, and the protection of reliance interest of existing homeowners, and the limits placed on the exemptions were not arbitrary. Blevins v. Dade County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 113, 702 S.E.2d 145 (2010).

Ordinance imposing an occupational tax on attorneys.

- City ordinance imposing an occupational tax on attorneys who maintain an office and practice law in the city did not violate constitutional equal protection because the tax paid for a variety of city services that benefited all citizens within the city, including attorneys. It was reasonable for the city to require attorneys with offices inside city limits to help pay for city services from which the attorneys benefit, and all attorneys subject to the ordinance were taxed uniformly. Moss v. City of Dunwoody, 293 Ga. 858, 750 S.E.2d 326 (2013).

Inconsistent state action is denial of equal protection.

- Allowing students who move into fraternity housing to void their university housing contracts while not extending the same privilege to other students is state action which denies equal protection of the laws. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-93.

Unreasonable restriction on police power.

- Requiring state personnel to sign waivers of liability for injuries sustained while carrying out their duties of inspection constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the state's police power. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-121.

Fulton County's obligation to accord equal treatment to all superior court judges of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit is applicable to all county funded support services, including staffing (e.g., law clerks, secretaries, court reporters, case managers and the like) and the operating budget required for a superior court judge to properly perform the judge's constitutional and statutory duties. 2002 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U2002-6.

ALR.

- Constitutionality of statute as affected by discrimination in punishment for same offense based upon age, color, or sex, 8 A.L.R. 854.

Constitutionality of regulations as to milk, 18 A.L.R. 235; 42 A.L.R. 556; 58 A.L.R. 672; 80 A.L.R. 1225; 101 A.L.R. 64; 110 A.L.R. 644; 119 A.L.R. 243; 155 A.L.R. 1383.

Constitutionality of statutes restricting right of aliens to bear arms, 34 A.L.R. 63.

Constitutionality of statutes imposing absolute liability on private persons or corporations, irrespective of negligence or breach of a specific statutory duty, for injury to person or property, 53 A.L.R. 875.

Statute regulating banks and trust companies as special or class legislation, or as denying the equal protection of the laws, 111 A.L.R. 140.

Validity, construction, and application of statutes or ordinances relating to inspection of food sold at retail, 127 A.L.R. 322.

Exception of existing buildings or businesses from statute or ordinance enacted in exercise of police or license taxing power, as unconstitutional discrimination, 136 A.L.R. 207.

Racial segregation, 38 A.L.R.2d 1188.

What businesses or establishments fall within state civil rights statute provisions prohibiting discrimination, 87 A.L.R.2d 120.

Preconviction procedure for raising contention that enforcement of penal statute or law is unconstitutionally discriminatory, 4 A.L.R.3d 404.

Validity of statutes restricting political activities of public officers or employees, 28 A.L.R.3d 717.

Indigency of offender as affecting validity of imprisonment as alternative to payment of fine, 31 A.L.R.3d 926.

Racial discrimination in punishment for crime, 40 A.L.R.3d 227.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance respecting employment of women in places where intoxicating liquors are sold, 46 A.L.R.3d 369.

Zoning provisions protecting land owners who applied for or received building permit prior to change in zoning, 49 A.L.R.3d 1150.

Discrimination in provision of municipal services or facilities as civil rights violation, 51 A.L.R.3d 950.

Application of state law to sex discrimination in sports, 66 A.L.R.3d 1262.

Mandatory retirement of public officer or employee based on age, 81 A.L.R.3d 811.

Recovery of damages as remedy for wrongful discrimination under state or local civil rights provisions, 85 A.L.R.3d 351.

Statute expressly allowing alimony to wife, but not expressly allowing alimony to husband, as unconstitutional sex discrimination, 85 A.L.R.3d 940.

State laws prohibiting sex discrimination as violated by dress or grooming requirements for customers of establishments serving food or beverages, 89 A.L.R.3d 7.

Validity, construction, and effect of state statutes affording preferential property tax treatment to land used for agricultural purposes, 98 A.L.R.3d 916.

Validity of statutory classifications based on population - tax statutes, 98 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Constitutionality of rape laws limited to protection of females only, 99 A.L.R.3d 129.

Identification of jobseeker by race, religion, national origin, sex, or age, in "Situation Wanted" employment advertising as violation of state civil rights laws, 99 A.L.R.3d 154.

Validity of state statutes restricting right of aliens to bear arms, 28 A.L.R.4th 1096.

Judicial power to order discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment, 48 A.L.R.4th 67.

Validity, construction, and effect of state statutes restricting political activities of public officers or employees, 51 A.L.R.4th 702.

Court appointment of attorney to represent, without compensation, indigent in civil action, 52 A.L.R.4th 1063.

AIDS infection as affecting right to attend public school, 60 A.L.R.4th 15.

"Guilty but mentally ill" statutes: validity and construction, 71 A.L.R.4th 702.

Nonconsensual treatment of involuntarily committed mentally ill persons with neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs as violative of state constitutional guaranty, 74 A.L.R.4th 1099.

Power of court or other public agency to order medical treatment over parental religious objections for child whose life is not immediately endangered, 21 A.L.R.5th 248.

Voir dire exclusions of men from state trial jury or jury panel - Post-J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), cases, 88 A.L.R.5th 67.

Federal and state constitutional provisions as prohibiting discrimination in employment on basis of gay, lesbian, or bisexual sexual orientation or conduct, 96 A.L.R.5th 391.

Application of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002) to state death penalty proceedings, 110 A.L.R.5th 1.

Federal and state constitutional provisions and state statutes as prohibiting employment discrimination based on heterosexual conduct or relationship, 123 A.L.R.5th 411.

Class-of-one equal protection claims based upon real estate development, zoning, and planning, 68 A.L.R.6th 229.

When intervention as matter of right is appropriate under Rule 24(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in civil rights action, 132 A.L.R. Fed. 147.

What constitutes reverse or majority race or national origin discrimination violative of federal constitution or statutes - private employment cases, 150 A.L.R. Fed. 1

What constitutes reverse or majority race or national origin discrimination violative of federal constitution or statutes - nonemployment cases, 152 A.L.R. Fed. 1

What constitutes reverse or majority gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes - public employment cases, 153 A.L.R. Fed. 609.

What constitutes reverse sex or gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes - nonemployment cases, 166 A.L.R. Fed. 1

What constitutes reverse or majority race or national origin discrimination violative of federal constitution or statutes - public employment cases, 168 A.L.R. Fed. 1

Equal protection and due process clause challenges based on racial discrimination - Supreme Court cases, 172 A.L.R. Fed. 1

Equal protection and due process clause challenges based on sex discrimination - Supreme Court cases, 178 A.L.R. Fed. 25.

Forcible administration of antipsychotic medication to pretrial detainees - Federal cases, 188 A.L.R. Fed. 285.

Construction and application of constitutional rule of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986) - United States Supreme Court cases, 8 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 547.