O.C.G.A.

§ 16-9-121 is constitutional. - O.C.G.A. § 16-9-125 complies with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; since the crime of identity fraud, as defined by O.C.G.A. §§ 16-9-121 and16-9-125, when read in para materia, takes place in the county where the victim and his or her personal information are located, there is no constitutional bar to trying the defendant in that county. State v. Mayze, 280 Ga. 5, 622 S.E.2d 836 (2005).

O.C.G.A.

§ 19-9-62 constitutional. - O.C.G.A. § 19-9-62(a) did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; a trial court correctly ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a father's post-decree child custody modification action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-9-62 and that personal jurisdiction over the mother was unnecessary in order for it to address the requested modification. Devito v. Devito, 280 Ga. 367, 628 S.E.2d 108 (2006).

Applies to in personam cases.

- This paragraph comprehends cases in which a judgment in personam may be recovered, not cases respecting title to land. Wall v. Federal Land Bank, 240 Ga. 236, 240 S.E.2d 76 (1977) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Jurisdiction and venue distinguished.

- Jurisdiction means the power of a court to render a binding judgment in the case, and venue means the place of trial. Williams v. Fuller, 244 Ga. 846, 262 S.E.2d 135 (1979).

In a borrower's suit asserting various claims against a lender, which was a citizen of Delaware and California, and an appraiser in connection with a loan that encumbered the borrower's property with a debt that exceeded the property's value, jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 did not exist where the borrower and the appraiser were both citizens of Georgia; the fact that the borrower may have filed the suit in an inappropriate venue under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI did not render the appraiser's joinder fraudulent under the doctrine of fraudulent pleading because such a pleading of jurisdictional facts did not destroy diversity, as the appraiser was still a resident of Georgia. Austin v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2007).

Venue in criminal case is a jurisdictional fact which must be proved. Wright v. State, 219 Ga. App. 119, 464 S.E.2d 216 (1995).

General Assembly cannot declare persons domiciled and residing in one county residents of and domiciliaries of another county.

- The General Assembly has no right to provide that a natural person, an individual, who lives and has a domicile and residence in one county, and the person's domicile and residence is fixed there under the law as it stands, should be deemed also to be a resident, for certain purposes, of another county. A general law may fix the general place of the person's residence; but when the person has a residence and domicile fixed and established in accordance with the law, the legislature cannot declare that the person may also be a resident of another county at the same time. Youmans v. Hickman, 179 Ga. 684, 177 S.E. 238 (1934).

The constitutional venue provisions may not be altered or changed by the legislature or the courts and the adoption of procedural devices for adjudicating claims of various parties in the same action does not effect a change in the venue requirements of the Constitution. Pemberton v. Purifoy, 128 Ga. App. 892, 198 S.E.2d 356 (1973); Haley v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 141 Ga. App. 13, 232 S.E.2d 362 (1977).

The residence of an individual cannot be shifted to another county where the individual has a business, so that the latter county may be the proper venue of a suit against the individual because of a tort committed by the individual's agents in the county where the tort was committed. Youmans v. Hickman, 179 Ga. 684, 177 S.E. 238 (1934).

Trial by court with jurisdiction is constitutional right.

- It is not within the power of the General Assembly, by any exercise of its legitimate legislative functions, to impose limitations and restrictions which deprive the defendant of the defendant's constitutional right to be tried in a court that has jurisdiction of the defendant's case. Parks v. State, 212 Ga. 433, 93 S.E.2d 663 (1956).

The doctrine of forum non conveniens has never been expressly sanctioned in the Georgia courts. Smith v. Board of Regents, 165 Ga. App. 565, 302 S.E.2d 124 (1983).

Change of venue based on forum non conveniens improper.

- Because the relevant constitutional and statutory authority places venue, absent certain specified circumstances, squarely and solely in the county of the defendant's residence, and because Georgia's courts have not seen fit generally to invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. Smith v. Board of Regents, 165 Ga. App. 565, 302 S.E.2d 124 (1983).

Venue rights may be waived.

- The venue rights established under the Georgia Constitution may be waived. Holcomb v. Ellis, 259 Ga. 625, 385 S.E.2d 670 (1989).

O.C.G.A.

§ 17-2-2(b) does not violate this paragraph. - Section17-2-2(b), establishing venue when crime is committed on or immediately adjacent to boundary line between two counties, is not in violation of this paragraph, providing that criminal trials be held in county in which crime was committed. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Dismissal of modification complaint.

- Trial court did not err in declining to dismiss the mother's modification complaint pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-9-24(b) because the mother filed the motion as a separate action in the father's county of residence. Dallow v. Dallow, 299 Ga. 762, 791 S.E.2d 20 (2016).

Applicability of paragraph to federal court proceedings.

- This state constitutional limitation, while not a substantive right in a federal court, should be preserved whenever possible, so long as it does not jeopardize valid federal interests. United States ex rel. Std. Mach. & Fabricating Co. v. Collins & Co. Gen. Contractors, 648 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ga. 1986).

Abandonment of issue on appeal.

- In a breach of contract action, because the company failed to set forth any argument in the company's appellate brief that the trial court erred in failing to transfer the case because it was not jointly liable with the resident co-defendants, either as joint tortfeasors or as joint obligors, the appellate court deemed the issue of venue abandoned on appeal. Liberty Capital, LLC v. First Chatham Bank, 338 Ga. App. 48, 789 S.E.2d 303 (2016).

Cited in Citizens & S. Bank v. Taggart, 164 Ga. 351, 138 S.E. 898 (1927); Collier v. Duffell, 165 Ga. 421, 141 S.E. 194 (1927); Wimberly v. Harris, 47 Ga. App. 442, 170 S.E. 817 (1933); Nalley & Co. v. Moore, 51 Ga. App. 718, 181 S.E. 429 (1935); McGinty v. Gormley, 181 Ga. 644, 183 S.E. 804 (1935); Speed Oil Co. v. Aycock, 188 Ga. 46, 2 S.E.2d 666 (1939); State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237, 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947); Hays v. Jones, 81 Ga. App. 597, 59 S.E.2d 404 (1950); A.K. Adams & Co. v. Douglas-Coffee County Hosp. Auth., 209 Ga. 62, 70 S.E.2d 730 (1952); Bell v. Stevens, 100 Ga. App. 281, 111 S.E.2d 125 (1959); Wallace v. State, 216 Ga. 180, 115 S.E.2d 338 (1960); Pistor v. State, 219 Ga. 161, 132 S.E.2d 183 (1963); Byrd v. Moore Ford Co., 116 Ga. App. 292, 157 S.E.2d 41 (1967); Steadham v. State, 224 Ga. 78, 159 S.E.2d 397 (1968); Register v. Stone's Indep. Oil Distribs., 225 Ga. 490, 169 S.E.2d 781 (1969); Stinnett v. Ellis, 121 Ga. App. 279, 173 S.E.2d 454 (1970); Register v. Stone's Indep. Oil Distribs., Inc., 227 Ga. 123, 179 S.E.2d 68 (1971); McGuire v. McGuire, 228 Ga. 782, 187 S.E.2d 859 (1972); Southall v. Carter, 229 Ga. 240, 190 S.E.2d 517 (1972); Shell v. Watts, 229 Ga. 474, 192 S.E.2d 265 (1972); Pope v. Cokinos, 231 Ga. 79, 200 S.E.2d 275 (1973); Railey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 875, 201 S.E.2d 628 (1973); Jolly v. Egerton, 132 Ga. App. 243, 207 S.E.2d 634 (1974); Ogden Equip. Co. v. Talmadge Farms, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 834, 209 S.E.2d 260 (1974); Europa Hair, Inc. v. Browning, 133 Ga. App. 753, 212 S.E.2d 862 (1975); Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 134 Ga. App. 102, 213 S.E.2d 522 (1975); Graham v. Tallent, 235 Ga. 47, 218 S.E.2d 799 (1975); Daniel & Daniel, Inc. v. Stewart Bros., 139 Ga. App. 372, 228 S.E.2d 586 (1976); Scott v. Atlanta Dairies Coop., 239 Ga. 721, 238 S.E.2d 340 (1977); Davis v. State, 240 Ga. 763, 243 S.E.2d 12 (1978); Insurance Co. v. Dills, 145 Ga. App. 183, 243 S.E.2d 549 (1978); Bergen v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 245 Ga. 742, 267 S.E.2d 10 (1980); Shaheen v. Dunaway Drug Stores, Inc., 246 Ga. 790, 273 S.E.2d 158 (1980); Seymour v. Seymour, 156 Ga. App. 293, 274 S.E.2d 690 (1980); Parham v. Baldwin County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 161 Ga. App. 436, 288 S.E.2d 354 (1982); In re C.R., 160 Ga. App. 873, 288 S.E.2d 589 (1982); In re R.A.S., 249 Ga. 236, 290 S.E.2d 34 (1982); Troop Constr. Corp. v. Davis, 249 Ga. 830, 294 S.E.2d 503 (1982); Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1983); Potts v. Zant, 575 F. Supp. 374 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Smith v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 169 Ga. App. 751, 315 S.E.2d 265 (1984); Edwards v. Edmondson, 173 Ga. App. 353, 326 S.E.2d 550 (1985); Buchanan v. State, 173 Ga. App. 554, 327 S.E.2d 535 (1985); Robinson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 423, 356 S.E.2d 55 (1987); Schiefelbein v. State, 258 Ga. 623, 373 S.E.2d 354 (1988); Lewis v. Jarvis, 207 Ga. App. 246, 427 S.E.2d 596 (1993); Sikes v. Norton, 185 Bankr. 945 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995); Robinson v. Star Gas of Hawkinsville, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 112, 533 S.E.2d 97 (2000); Abrams v. Massell, 262 Ga. App. 761, 586 S.E.2d 435 (2003); Honeycutt v. Honeycutt, 284 Ga. 42, 663 S.E.2d 232 (2008).

Venue as jurisdictional fact.

- Generally, criminal trials shall be tried in the county where the crime was committed, and venue is a jurisdictional fact that must be proven as part of the general case. McGee v. State, 209 Ga. App. 261, 433 S.E.2d 374 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000).

Discretion of trial court on venue.

- When a plaintiff brings suit in the same county on two claims arising from the same transaction and the Georgia Constitution designates that county as the venue for one of those claims, the trial court has the discretion to entertain both claims. Liberty Capital, LLC v. First Chatham Bank, 338 Ga. App. 48, 789 S.E.2d 303 (2016).

Evidence as to venue, though slight, is sufficient where there is no conflicting evidence. Wilkes v. State, 238 Ga. 57, 230 S.E.2d 867 (1976).

"Residence" of state agency.

- In the absence of statutory direction, the "residence" of a state agency for purposes of venue must be determined based upon the general meaning of the term. Hoffman v. Department of Cors., 218 Ga. App. 363, 460 S.E.2d 882 (1995).

In sexual harassment action alleging that the Department of Correction was a joint tort-feasor in incidents occurring prior to enactment of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, it was reasonable to establish venue based on the "residence" of the department in Fulton County, i.e., the site of the state capitol and seat of government as well as the location of the principal offices of the department. Hoffman v. Department of Cors., 218 Ga. App. 363, 460 S.E.2d 882 (1995).

Venue for sheriff's office in action based on O.C.G.A. § 15-16-21. - Trial court erred in finding that venue was proper in Dougherty County, Georgia and in denying the defendants' motion to dismiss on that basis because proper venue for the case against the state defendants for noncompliance with O.C.G.A. § 15-16-21(b)(1) and (g) was in Fulton County, Georgia, as although the defendants maintained offices throughout the State of Georgia, the defendants' principal offices were located in Fulton County. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dougherty County, 330 Ga. App. 581, 768 S.E.2d 771 (2015).

Resident defendant must be found liable for court to enter judgement against nonresident defendants.

- Where a single suit is brought against several joint tort-feasors in a county where one of them is a resident, and where the others reside in another county of the state, and where on the trial of the case the resident defendant is found not liable by the jury, and the nonresident defendants are found liable, the judge is without jurisdiction to enter judgment against the nonresident defendants. Evans v. Garrett, 72 Ga. App. 846, 35 S.E.2d 387 (1945).

Apparent venue negated by police subterfuge.

- Police officers' activities in maneuvering appellant into a county for the sole purpose of obtaining venue constituted a subterfuge and impermissibly conferred apparent venue over the defendant in that county. McCarty v. State, 152 Ga. App. 726, 263 S.E.2d 700 (1979).

Sole proprietorship.

- The county of residence of a sole proprietorship is the county of residence of its proprietor. Dowis v. Watson, 161 Ga. App. 749, 289 S.E.2d 558 (1982).

Venue will be determined as of date of filing as long as service is subsequently perfected upon defendant within a reasonable time period. Franek v. Ray, 239 Ga. 282, 236 S.E.2d 629 (1977).

For purposes of venue and other jurisdictional questions, party's residence at time of filing suit is determining factor. Franek v. Ray, 239 Ga. 282, 236 S.E.2d 629 (1977).

Codefendant's right to challenge venue.

- A nonresident codefendant who asserts the county of residence in the nonresident's answer may admit that the trial court is the proper venue without waiving the right to challenge venue later if the resident codefendant is dismissed from the case; there is no waiver in that instance because the earliest a defense of improper venue can be properly raised by the nonresident defendant is when the resident defendant has been adjudged not liable to the plaintiff and is dismissed from the case. Nadew v. Alemu, 217 Ga. App. 438, 457 S.E.2d 709 (1995).

An action for a writ of possession under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-231 is not a "civil action" within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI, and thus venue is proper in a county other than that of the defendant's residence. McClintock v. Wellington Trade, Inc., 252 Ga. 563, 315 S.E.2d 428 (1984).

Affidavit as to residence not controverted by other evidence.

- Trial court did not err in finding improper venue where evidence that defendant's spouse was a resident of Jackson County and that defendant practiced medicine in Jackson County was irrelevant, and evidence that the defendant spent several nights at the defendant's spouse's residence in Jackson County did not refute the defendant's affidavit stating the defendant's intent to remain a resident of DeKalb County. Lance v. Safwat, 170 Ga. App. 694, 318 S.E.2d 86 (1984).

Where a personal judgment may be recovered.

- General provision that all other civil cases shall be tried in county where defendant resides comprehends cases in which judgment in personam may be recovered; this construction is inevitable from the application of the rule of ejusdem generis, as well as from the clear import of the words themselves in the connection in which they are employed. Moss v. Strickland, 138 Ga. 539, 75 S.E. 622 (1912); Bennett v. Wheatley, 154 Ga. 591, 115 S.E. 83 (1922); Wilson v. Healey Real Estate & Imp. Co., 203 Ga. 52, 45 S.E.2d 656 (1947).

The constitutional scheme seems to be that the venue of every action not respecting title to land, wherein a personal judgment may be recovered, shall be the county of residence of the defendant in the action, or, if there be more than one, then in the county of one of them. Wilson v. Healey Real Estate & Imp. Co., 203 Ga. 52, 45 S.E.2d 656 (1947).

Paragraph's intent.

- Upon the whole, what is meant by this part of the Constitution is this: that all civil cases are to be tried in the county in which the defendant resides - the county in which the defendant resides should be ascertained by the law of residence, which may happen to be in existence at the time when the case arises, or perhaps at the time when the case is to be tried. Martin & Thompson, Inc. v. Allen, 188 Ga. 42, 2 S.E.2d 668 (1939).

Venue is in county where defendant resides.

- Under the Constitution and statutes of this state, venue of civil actions against natural persons, unless within specified exceptions, is the county where the defendant resides. Harmon v. Wiggins, 48 Ga. App. 469, 172 S.E. 847 (1934).

In a mortgage broker's breach of contract action against a limited liability company, the trial court erred in denying a motion to transfer to a proper venue filed by the mortgage broker president, who was added as a defendant, because the constitutional joint tortfeasor venue provision, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV, did not apply to subject the president to trial with the broker on the LLC's counterclaim in Coweta County since the broker did not reside in Coweta County; as an individual resident of DeKalb County, the president was entitled under the constitutional venue provisions to be sued in DeKalb County, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI. M&M Mortg. Co. v. Grantville Mill, LLC, 302 Ga. App. 46, 690 S.E.2d 630 (2010).

Trial court did not err in granting a landowner summary judgment in a church's quiet title action because the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied when prior action adjudicated that the director of the church did not have the authority to act on behalf of or to represent the church, but the director did so by directing the filing of the quiet title action; the previous litigation was decided by a court of competent jurisdiction because the case was filed in the superior court in the county of the director's residence, and that court could adjudicate whether the director had the authority to act on behalf of or to represent the church corporation. Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God, Inc. v. Brinson, 287 Ga. 485, 696 S.E.2d 667 (2010).

Trial court erred in finding that venue was proper in Effingham County, Georgia because the defendant, who maintained residences in both Effingham County and Chatham County, Georgia, was domiciled in Chatham County. Oglesby v. Deal, 311 Ga. App. 622, 716 S.E.2d 749 (2011).

Trial court did not err when the court denied the father's motion to move a child custody action from Gwinnett County to DeKalb County because the father had not proved domicile in DeKalb County; while the father testified that the father moved to DeKalb County, the father's driver's license showed a Gwinnett County address eight months later and the father had not notified the father's homeowner's insurance company or the Internal Revenue Service of the move. Goyal v. Fifadara, 324 Ga. App. 567, 751 S.E.2d 190 (2013).

Provisions of Ga. L. 1949, p. 1168, §§ 4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-21-56) were not sufficient to overrule provisions of this paragraph, providing that civil actions generally shall be brought in the county of the defendant's residence. However, where there were joint defendants, such an action may be brought in the county of residence of either. Banks County v. Stark, 88 Ga. App. 368, 77 S.E.2d 33 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Except as the Constitution may otherwise authorize, all civil cases shall be tried in the county of the defendant's residence.

- While jurisdiction of the person may be waived by appearance and pleading to the merits, parties cannot by consent give jurisdiction of the subject matter where the court has none. The superior court in one county has no jurisdiction in quo warranto of the office of "director" of electric corporation created and existing in another county. Smith v. Upshaw, 217 Ga. 703, 124 S.E.2d 751 (1962).

Residence of surety did not control.

- Fact that plaintiff, as surety, guaranteed performance of contract by contracting company, as principal, would not give superior court of county of residence of contracting company jurisdiction on petition of the surety to hear and determine the controversy between the contracting company and the city for which the work was to be performed as to whether or not there had been a breach of the contract on the part of the contracting company, nor would the fact that the plaintiff and contracting company had entered into a separate contract by the application for the performance bond give the plaintiff any right to compel the city to join in a suit with reference to this separate contract, since the city was not a party to the application and had no interest therein. Maryland Cas. Co. v. City of Adel, 87 Ga. App. 138, 73 S.E.2d 237 (1952).

Court maintains venue only if judgment is rendered against resident defendant. Thoni Oil Co. v. Tinsley, 140 Ga. App. 887, 232 S.E.2d 162 (1977).

If resident defendant is dismissed, the other defendant may still, prior to verdict, raise the question of lack of jurisdiction, if the defendant's nonresidence appears on the face of the plaintiff's pleading, or, if it does not so appear, may raise the question by plea; and this is true notwithstanding the defendant had previously filed a plea to the merits at a time when the defendant's defense of lack of jurisdiction would not have been well taken. Any other rule would open the door to easy evasion of the constitutional provision that, except in the enumerated cases, the venue of all suits is in the county of the defendant's residence. Metcalf v. Hale, 42 Ga. App. 402, 156 S.E. 301 (1930).

Petition dismissible for want of jurisdiction.

- Where the interests of the plaintiff and the resident defendant are identical and the allegations of the petition fail to show any justiciable controversy between the plaintiff and the resident defendant in which the nonresident defendant has any substantial interest, on motion of the nonresident defendant, setting out that it is a resident of a named county in this state and subject to suit only in the superior court of that county, the petition will be dismissed as to such nonresident defendant for want of jurisdiction. Maryland Cas. Co. v. City of Adel, 87 Ga. App. 138, 73 S.E.2d 237 (1952) (case cites former §§ 2-4903, 2-4904, and 2-4906).

Resident defendant must be found liable.

- Where suit is brought against two defendants, one of whom resides in the county, the court has no jurisdiction of nonresident defendant unless the resident codefendant is liable in the action. Metcalf v. Hale, 42 Ga. App. 402, 156 S.E. 301 (1930).

Service on nonresident motorist cannot affect jurisdiction for Georgia resident.

- Action cannot be instituted against a resident of Georgia in a county other than that of the resident's residence where the nonresident motorist is found and served. Such a fictitious residence of the nonresident motorist is not sufficient to authorize the joining of a resident of Georgia outside the county of residence. Horton v. Western Contracting Corp., 113 Ga. App. 613, 149 S.E.2d 542 (1966).

This paragraph simply prescribes that suits must be brought in the county of the defendant's residence, and the whole subject of domicile and residence of persons both natural and artificial is left to be determined by the General Assembly. Drake v. Chesser, 230 Ga. 148, 196 S.E.2d 137 (1973); Davenport v. Petroleum Delivery Serv. of Ga., Inc., 134 Ga. App. 418, 214 S.E.2d 692, aff'd, 235 Ga. 116, 218 S.E.2d 848 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Venue when one defendant an unknown.

- Venue provisions of the uninsured motorist statute, O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(d)(1), were held to apply in a suit related to an automobile collision brought against a known Georgia resident and an unknown defendant under a joint tortfeasor theory. Carpenter v. McMann, Ga. , S.E.2d (Aug. 2, 2018).

O.C.G.A. § 43-34-38 does not violate this paragraph. Smith v. State Bd. of Medical Exmrs., 172 Ga. 106, 157 S.E. 268 (1931) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

This paragraph is applicable to tort actions. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Gilland, 130 Ga. App. 788, 204 S.E.2d 469 (1974) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Venue where accident occurred out of state.

- The venue of an action for damages for injuries suffered by plaintiff when the plaintiff fell in a store in Tennessee was proper in the county in Georgia where the defendant resided. Gray v. Armstrong, 222 Ga. App. 392, 474 S.E.2d 280 (1996).

Auto negligence case, neither party Georgia resident, but defendant served in Georgia.

- In an auto negligence suit, a trial court properly found that venue was proper in Muscogee County, Georgia, though the accident occurred in Alabama and both parties were Alabama residents, because the defendant was found and served in Muscogee County. Gowdy v. Schley, 317 Ga. App. 693, 732 S.E.2d 774 (2012).

One's legal residence for purpose of being sued in this state is generally the same county as his or her domicile. Sorrells v. Sorrells, 247 Ga. 9, 274 S.E.2d 314 (1981).

There must be either tacit or explicit intention to change one's domicile before there is a change of legal residence. Sorrells v. Sorrells, 247 Ga. 9, 274 S.E.2d 314 (1981).

Suits against guardians in representative capacity.

- General requirement that defendant in civil case must be tried in county of the defendant's residence is applicable to suits against guardians in their representative capacities; and suit against a guardian must be brought in the county of the guardian's residence unless such representative is subject to suit in another county within one of the exceptions to the general rule which are embodied in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Paras. I through V and VII. Kimsey v. Caudell, 109 Ga. App. 271, 135 S.E.2d 903 (1964).

Venue in legitimacy action.

- The rights afforded a mother in the scheme for legitimating the mother's child render the mother a defendant within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; thus, that portion of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(a) that provides for venue in the county of the putative father, when different from the county of the mother, offends the Georgia Constitution. Where one portion of a statute is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Georgia has the power to sever that portion of the statute and preserve the remainder if the remaining portion of the Act accomplishes the purpose the Georgia General Assembly intended; accordingly, severance of this venue provision does not affect the purpose of the remainder of the statute, and the remaining provisions of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(a) are to be given full effect. Holmes v. Traweek, 276 Ga. 296, 577 S.E.2d 777 (2003).

Termination of parental rights.

- Termination of parental rights does not fall under any exceptions to general civil provision that all civil cases must be tried where defendant resides and, therefore, must be tried in the county of the parent's residence. Quire v. Clayton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538 (1978).

Venue under Child Custody Intrastate Jurisdiction Act.

- Boyfriend, who had been appointed temporary guardian of child, was not the child's "legal custodian" as that term was used in the Georgia Child Custody Intrastate Jurisdiction Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-20 et seq., and, thus, the provisions of the Act, including its venue provisions, did not apply; accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the grandmother's petition for custody of the child on the ground that venue was not proper in the county where the mother was incarcerated but would have been proper where the temporary guardian, the boyfriend, resided, as application of the general venue rules governing venue in civil cases, contained in the Georgia Constitution, showed that since the mother was a necessary party to the grandmother's custody action, filing the action in the county where the mother was incarcerated was proper. Gordon v. Gordon, 269 Ga. App. 224, 603 S.E.2d 732 (2004).

Counterclaim for change in custody.

- Under the plain language of the statute, the trial court erred in denying a motion to dismiss a parent's counterclaim seeking a change in physical custody and in finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the same. Seeley v. Seeley, 282 Ga. App. 394, 638 S.E.2d 837 (2006).

Application of guardianship must be heard in county of mentally incompetent's residence.

- Where a person files an application for the appointment of a guardian of an allegedly mentally incompetent state resident, the allegedly mentally incompetent person is entitled to have the application for guardianship heard in the probate court of the county of his or her residence. Sorrells v. Sorrells, 247 Ga. 9, 274 S.E.2d 314 (1981).

Representative of alleged incompetent can contest jurisdiction.

- Where representative of alleged incompetent files a plea to court's jurisdiction on ground that alleged incompetent is a resident of another county, the plea should be sustained if it is determined that the alleged incompetent is, in fact and in law, a resident of the other county. Sorrells v. Sorrells, 247 Ga. 9, 274 S.E.2d 314 (1981).

Resident defendant must be found liable.

- Where suit is brought against two or more defendants jointly liable to plaintiff, one of whom resides in county where suit is brought, court has jurisdiction of the other defendants, who are nonresidents of the county, where the resident defendant is liable in the action. Moore v. Bryan, 52 Ga. App. 272, 183 S.E. 117 (1935).

General venue provisions of the Georgia Constitution apply in a proceeding involving termination of parental rights.

- The Constitution grants to a parent the right to defend a termination of parental rights suit in the county in which the parent resides. Quire v. Clayton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538 (1978); Williams v. Department of Human Resources, 150 Ga. App. 610, 258 S.E.2d 288 (1979).

Adoption petitions.

- This constitutional requirement that venue in civil cases be in county where defendant resides is not in conflict with former O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1, requiring that petitions for adoption be filed in the county where the adopting parents reside. Chandler v. Cochran, 247 Ga. 184, 275 S.E.2d 23 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

The award of custody made by the divorce court is a final judgment on the facts then existing.

- Where the record showed that a divorce action terminated with the entry of a final judgment and decree, that the wife subsequently changed her residence to another county, and that the husband filed his motion to modify outside the term of court, the trial court erred in ruling on the husband's motion to modify visitation. Ward v. Ward, 194 Ga. App. 669, 391 S.E.2d 480 (1990).

Action to modify decree awarding alimony is separate action and must be filed in county of defendant's residence under the mandate of the Constitution. Hill v. Harper, 230 Ga. 246, 196 S.E.2d 397 (1973).

Actions to modify alimony and divorce decrees must proceed in the county where the defendant currently resides. Buckholts v. Buckholts, 251 Ga. 58, 302 S.E.2d 676 (1983).

Father waived his defense to lack of venue in mother's counterclaim in an action for modification of child visitation by failing to file a motion to dismiss in a timely and expeditious manner. Houston v. Brown, 212 Ga. App. 834, 443 S.E.2d 3 (1994).

Bringing change of custody suit as submission to jurisdiction for counter-claim regarding child support.

- Where plaintiff brings suit for change of custody in county other than county of residence, the plaintiff submits to jurisdiction of court in which suit is filed for purpose of allowing defendant to file counterclaim for revision of child support. Ledford v. Bowers, 248 Ga. 804, 286 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

Action to revise alimony is separate action.

- Action for revision of award of permanent alimony and support after decree of divorce and award of alimony becomes final is not divorce case but is new and distinct action separate from the original divorce action in which the alimony was awarded. Being a separate and independent suit, it is subject to the constitutional provisions respecting venue just as any other civil case. Bugden v. Bugden, 224 Ga. 517, 162 S.E.2d 719 (1968).

Jurisdiction in habeas corpus action for child custody not sustained.

- In habeas corpus action for child custody where the petition does not allege that the defendant is a resident of the county but alleges that the petitioner believes that the petitioner is a resident of such county, and the defendant could admit that the petitioner believes the defendant to be a resident of the county without conceding in any way that the defendant is a resident of that county, petition failed to allege that the defendant was a resident of the county and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and fails to show that the court had jurisdiction of the defendant and was subject to general demurrer (now motion to dismiss for failure to state claim) specifically pointing out this defect. Dutton v. Freeman, 213 Ga. 445, 99 S.E.2d 204 (1957).

Court of appropriate jurisdiction.

- Where there is an attack upon a part of an original divorce decree and the court's jurisdiction is based upon the original decree having allegedly been obtained by fraud, the superior court granting the decree attacked is the superior court of appropriate jurisdiction. Hill v. Harper, 230 Ga. 246, 196 S.E.2d 397 (1973).

Transfer provision not violative of Constitution.

- The provision of former Code 1933, § 24A-1201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30), providing that after adjudication of delinquency in a court of another county the proceeding shall be transferred to the county of the child's residence for disposition, is not violative of this paragraph. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Trial court erred in granting transfer motion.

- In a wrongful death medical malpractice suit, the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion to transfer venue of the case because the remaining defendant had waived the defendant's venue defenses and, therefore, the plaintiff had no standing to require the trial court to transfer the case to the county where the defendant resided when suit was filed. Richardson v. Gilbert, 319 Ga. App. 72, 733 S.E.2d 783 (2012).

Determining legal residence in delinquency proceeding.

- A juvenile proceeding for delinquency or unruly conduct may be tried either in the county where the child resides or in the county where the unruly or delinquent conduct occurred. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994).

In determining where a juvenile resides for purposes of venue under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15, it is generally the legal residence that controls. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994).

In a proceeding against a juvenile for the status offense of unruliness, the juvenile's legal residence for purposes of venue was in the county of the Department of Family & Children Services having custody over the juvenile, even though the place of the offense and the juvenile's family residence were in other counties. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994).

Minor who is resident of this state is subject to jurisdiction of juvenile court of county of the minor's residence, the proceedings in such court being civil rather than criminal in nature. Where the crime charged is a felony, such minor is also subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the superior court of the county wherein the felony was committed. Whitman v. State, 96 Ga. App. 730, 101 S.E.2d 621 (1957).

Juvenile court action not bar to superior court action.

- Juvenile court of residence of defendant may proceed to punish juvenile in civil action, and superior court of county where felony is committed may also proceed to try defendant in a criminal action, the one not being a bar to the other. Whitman v. State, 96 Ga. App. 730, 101 S.E.2d 621 (1957).

Instances of venue in civil cases.

- Returns of administrators, under former Code 1882, § 2598 (see now O.C.G.A. § 53-7-163). Young v. Brown, 75 Ga. 1 (1885).

This paragraph was held to regulate venue in suits as to validation of municipal bonds. Ray v. City of Lavonia, 141 Ga. 626, 81 S.E. 884 (1914) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Affidavit contesting assessment by Superintendent of Banks. Martin v. Bennett, 291 F. 626 (N.D. Ga. 1923).

Attachment proceedings.

- There was no constitutional provision which fixed the venue of attachment proceedings against nonresidents. Hence, former Civil Code 1910, § 5063 (see now O.C.G.A. § 18-3-17) must apply. Carroll & Downs v. Groover, 27 Ga. App. 747, 110 S.E. 30 (1921).

Where declaration in attachment does not show that the defendant was a nonresident or that the defendant was a resident of the county where the attachment was returned, nor was the ground of attachment one that would lie only against a nonresident, the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's demurrer (now motion to dismiss for failure to state claim) to petition for lack of jurisdiction over defendant. Harris v. McDaniel, 92 Ga. App. 299, 88 S.E.2d 442 (1955).

Superior Court of Murray County did not have jurisdiction to entertain case for declaratory judgment where all of the parties defendant except one defendant, against whom no substantial equitable relief was prayed, were nonresidents of Murray County; the equitable feature of the case is removed, leaving the action solely one at law under Ga. L. 1945, p. 137 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 4, T. 9). The venue of such an action is in the county where the defendant resides. The nonresident defendants not being of the class of persons who may be sued in counties other than the counties of their residence as permitted in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Paras. IV and V (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Paras. IV and V), the court was without jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment as to their rights. Harper v. Gunby, 215 Ga. 466, 111 S.E.2d 85 (1959).

Venue where tenant sold crops illegally in two counties. Curry v. State, 17 Ga. App. 272, 86 S.E. 533 (1915).

Venue where stolen goods taken to several counties. Williams v. State, 105 Ga. 743, 31 S.E. 749 (1898).

Where defendant's lottery operation covers several counties, each county would have jurisdiction over defendant for trial, regardless of the defendant's activities in other counties. Lunsford v. State, 60 Ga. App. 537, 4 S.E.2d 112 (1939).

Proceeding by a money rule is civil case within meaning of this paragraph. Commins v. Ross, 44 Ga. App. 182, 160 S.E. 679 (1931) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Confirmation required by Ga. L. 1935, p. 381, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161) is not a civil case within the meaning of this paragraph, requiring civil cases to be brought in the county where the defendant resides. Wall v. Federal Land Bank, 240 Ga. 236, 240 S.E.2d 76 (1977) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Plaintiff is required to bring an action for civil damages in county of residence of defendant trespassers and not in the county where the trespass allegedly occurred. Jones v. Hudgins, 218 Ga. 43, 126 S.E.2d 414 (1962).

If libel action is brought against noncorporate newspaper, venue would, by constitutional mandate, have to be brought in county of residence of libeler, which may not be the county where the newspaper is published. Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth. v. Cox Enters., 243 Ga. 760, 256 S.E.2d 443 (1979).

Convict does not acquire residence in county where the convict has been involuntarily placed to serve sentence of confinement. Williams v. Department of Human Resources, 150 Ga. App. 610, 258 S.E.2d 288 (1979).

Boundary-line dispute.

- Where equitable relief is sought in conjunction with a boundary-line dispute (i.e., removal of a fence and ejectment from a disputed strip of land), the county of the defendant's residence is the proper venue forum. Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 409 S.E.2d 208 (1991).

Dispossessory warrant proceeding not civil case.

- A dispossessory warrant proceeding being a summary statutory action to obtain possession of premises, in which proceeding the only judgment which can be obtained by the landlord is the statutory incidental penalty for double rent, now no longer double, imposed upon the tenant for unlawfully withholding possession, such a proceeding is not a civil case within the meaning of this paragraph, which declares that "all other civil cases shall be tried in the county where the defendant resides." Wilson v. Healey Real Estate & Imp. Co., 203 Ga. 52, 45 S.E.2d 656 (1947) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Section 44-7-54 did not violate this paragraph.

- Portions of O.C.G.A. § 44-7-54, which formerly provided that issue formed in dispossessory warrant shall be returned to "the county where the land lies," was not violative of this paragraph. Wilson v. Healey Real Estate & Imp. Co., 203 Ga. 52, 45 S.E.2d 656 (1947) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Venue in action against motor carrier.

- Under the constitutional and statutory venue provisions applicable to a tort action against a domestic motor carrier corporation, a motor carrier "may be" sued in the county where the cause of action or some part thereof originated or may be sued in the county where it maintains its principal office and place of business. Thomas v. Bobby Stevens Hauling Contractors, 165 Ga. App. 710, 302 S.E.2d 585 (1983).

Notwithstanding the 1937 legislation allowing permissive joinder under O.C.G.A. § 46-7-12, a suit in tort against a motor carrier is not ancillary to a suit in contract against the carrier's insurer, and such a tort action must be brought only where venue would be constitutionally permitted. Thomas v. Bobby Stevens Hauling Contractors, 165 Ga. App. 710, 302 S.E.2d 585 (1983).

Recovery of payment due on account.

- Proper venue for action to recover payment due on an account was in the county where the debtor resided, not the county where the debtor's sole proprietorship was located. Lee v. Xerox Corp., 193 Ga. App. 432, 387 S.E.2d 653 (1989).

Consent judgment against joint tortfeasors.

- Where a single suit is brought against several joint tortfeasors in a county where one of them is a resident, and the others reside outside the county, a consent judgment and an agreement not to enforce it constitute a finding that the resident is liable and do not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants in the county where suit was brought. Motor Convoy, Inc. v. Brannen, 194 Ga. App. 795, 391 S.E.2d 671, aff'd, 260 Ga. 340, 393 S.E.2d 262 (1990).

Tort Claims Act.

- O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28, establishing the venue of tort actions against the state under the Georgia Tort Claims Act in the county wherein the loss occurred, does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI. Campbell v. Department of Cors., 268 Ga. 408, 490 S.E.2d 99 (1997).

Probate.

- Where the decedent's grandniece filed a caveat to the probate of the will in solemn form on grounds of undue influence and contract to make a will and then filed an identical complaint in the superior court, the superior court was an improper venue for the contract to make a will action, as the co-executors did not live in the county where the action was filed as was required under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; as a result, the case had to be transferred to the appropriate superior court as provided under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VIII. SunTrust Bank v. Peterson, 263 Ga. App. 378, 587 S.E.2d 849 (2003).

Counterclaim.

- Regarding counterclaims, Georgia law has long held that a party that files suit in a Georgia court submits oneself to that court's jurisdiction and venue relating to all matters directly connected with the case that the party had originated; one who goes into the court of a county other than that of the party's residence, to assert a claim or set up an equity, must be content to allow that court to determine any counter-claim growing out of the original suit which the defendant sees fit to set up by a cross-action. Kennestone Hosp., Inc. v. Hopson, 264 Ga. App. 123, 589 S.E.2d 696 (2003).

Construction with statutory provisions.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2, governing venue in criminal cases, does not conflict with the state constitutional requirement that all criminal cases be tried in the county where the crime was committed. Miller v. State, 174 Ga. App. 42, 329 S.E.2d 252 (1985).

Allegations of venue. Morakes v. State, 158 Ga. 114, 123 S.E. 687 (1924).

The venue of criminal cases is determined at the time of trial, regardless of location of territory when crime was committed. Bundrick v. State, 125 Ga. 753, 54 S.E. 683 (1906); Pope v. State, 124 Ga. 801, 53 S.E. 384, 110 Am. St. R. 197, 4 Ann. Cas. 551 (1906); Minter v. State, 158 Ga. 127, 123 S.E. 23 (1924).

Venue of the crime must be established clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 718, 341 S.E.2d 274 (1986).

Under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI, venue lies in the county where a crime is committed. Goodrum v. State, 259 Ga. App. 704, 578 S.E.2d 484 (2003).

Because the state failed to prove the element of venue beyond a reasonable doubt, and there was no indication in the record that the juvenile waived said requirement or that the court took judicial notice of venue as an element of the offenses charged, the juvenile's adjudications of delinquency had to be reversed. In the Interest of J.B., 289 Ga. App. 617, 658 S.E.2d 194 (2008).

Venue of city coextensive with county.

- Venue for the Atlanta City Court did not need to be shown to be in Fulton County or DeKalb County as venue was coextensive with city territorial limits and need not be shown to lie in either county. State v. Walker, 276 Ga. 756, 585 S.E.2d 77 (2003).

Venue not relevant to motion to suppress.

- Grant of the defendant's motion to suppress on the basis of venue was reversed because the state did not need to establish venue at the pretrial hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress as it was not relevant to the issues raised in the motion, which challenged the reasonable basis for the traffic stop or whether the resulting search of the defendant and the defendant's vehicle were supported by probable cause. State v. Wallace, 338 Ga. App. 611, 791 S.E.2d 187 (2016).

Defendant's plea of not guilty contested every allegation against the defendant, including those pertaining to venue. Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 504 S.E.2d 679 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000), reversing Graves v. State, 227 Ga. App. 628, 490 S.E.2d 111 (1997).

Test to determine county crime committed in when in doubt not violative of paragraph.

- Where it cannot be determined in what county a crime was committed, charge by trial court that the crime shall be considered to have been committed in any county in which the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that it might have been committed and which correctly stated the law concerning venue in subsections (b), (e), and (h) of O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2, does not violate this paragraph. Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180, 274 S.E.2d 455 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

State not required to stipulate to venue.

- Venue is not a fact to which the state is required to stipulate whenever the defendant wishes to do so, particularly when the state disbelieves the defendant's account of that fact, because stipulations and waivers of jurisdictional defenses streamline a proceeding in which both parties agree on a fact, making further proof unnecessary; stipulations and jurisdictional waivers are not a means of forcing an opposing party to agree to facts it believes are not true and would mislead the factfinder. If the facts are disputed, the parties' competing evidence and arguments can be presented to the factfinder to resolve. State v. Dixon, 286 Ga. 706, 691 S.E.2d 207 (2010).

Proof of venue.

- Testimony of police officers that the crimes charged in the indictment occurred in the county where defendant's trial was conducted was sufficient to authorize finding of venue. Jones v. State, 220 Ga. App. 161, 469 S.E.2d 300 (1996).

When a criminal defendant pleads not guilty, the defendant has challenged venue and the state will not be permitted to invoke the exception permitting it to establish venue with mere slight evidence. Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000).

Evidence that showed that the police in a particular county investigated the subject crimes and that the medical examiner in that same county performed the autopsy on the murdered man killed during the subject crimes was sufficient to prove venue was proper in defendant's trial on those same crimes. Allison v. State, 259 Ga. App. 775, 577 S.E.2d 845 (2003).

State proved venue in Cobb County beyond a reasonable doubt, with direct and circumstantial evidence, which showed that the defendant committed aggravated sexual battery upon the child victim while traveling from the victim's home in Cobb County to a bus stop. Harris v. State, 279 Ga. App. 570, 631 S.E.2d 772 (2006).

The incident on which a sodomy charge was based occurred about one mile from the home in Gordon County where the defendant and the victim lived, when the defendant and the victim were driving home; thus, under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(e), the crime was considered to have occurred in Gordon County, through which the car traveled, and the state proved venue. Prudhomme v. State, 285 Ga. App. 662, 647 S.E.2d 343 (2007).

In a juvenile delinquency case, the state had failed to prove venue where it offered no evidence that a church where an aggravated assault occurred was within the boundaries of the county in question; as to charges of obstruction of an officer, there was no evidence as to the location of the houses where the acts in question occurred. In the Interest of D.D., 287 Ga. App. 512, 651 S.E.2d 817 (2007).

In a prosecution for aggravated child molestation and sodomy, a child's testimony that the defendant sodomized the child at the child's home on three occasions was sufficient to prove that venue was in the county where that home was located. Terry v. State, 293 Ga. App. 455, 667 S.E.2d 109 (2008).

While there was sufficient evidence that the defendant obstructed an officer in making an arrest, as there was no evidence that the city and street where the arrest and the obstruction occurred were in Floyd County, the state failed to prove venue, which was an essential element of the obstruction charge. Frasier v. State, 295 Ga. App. 596, 672 S.E.2d 668 (2009).

State's failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and the codefendant possessed a pipe with traces of methamphetamine on it, which was discovered in a search of the defendant's impounded vehicle in the county, rendered the verdict contrary to law, without a sufficient evidentiary basis, because venue was an essential element of the crime, and there was no direct evidence of possession of the pipe in the county; because there was no evidence placing the pipe in the vehicle while the vehicle was in the county, and there was a possibility that the pipe was put in the vehicle after the shootings during one of several stops the defendant and the codefendant made while in Alabama, venue for possession of methamphetamine was not proven to be in the county. Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (2009).

Venue with regard to convictions for possession of methamphetamine and of the less than an ounce of marijuana was established as being in the county where the drugs were discovered during a search of the defendant's impounded vehicle because although the state presented no evidence that the methamphetamine residue and the marijuana found in the vehicle were in the possession of the defendant and the codefendant while they were in the county. On cross-examination, the defendant admitted to having hand-rolled a marijuana cigarette found in the vehicle the morning of the shooting; that testimony, coupled with the undisputed fact that the defendant, the codefendant, and the vehicle were at a service station in the county at a time following the point at which the defendant admitted having made the cigarette, established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and codefendant possessed the marijuana cigarette in the county. Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (2009).

State failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt because evidence that the defendant's drugs sales to an informant occurred somewhere in Vidalia, Georgia, was insufficient to establish that the crimes occurred in Toombs County since the habeas court properly took judicial notice that Vidalia was located in two different counties, Toombs and Montgomery; there was no evidence that the drug task force agents were limited to acting within Toombs County, and even if the agents' authority was limited to Toombs County, the agents did not exercise any police power during the time in which the drug sales were made that was required to be limited to the agents' territorial jurisdiction, but instead, the agents were simply watching the informant and the defendant as the agents drove, and in doing so, the agents would have been authorized to follow the defendant across county lines. Thompson v. Brown, 288 Ga. 855, 708 S.E.2d 270 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial after the defendant was convicted of rape because venue was sufficiently established by a detective's testimony that the apartment complex where the crimes occurred was in DeKalb County, and even accepting the defendant's argument that the evidence only supported the conclusion that the victim could have been driven into another county before the rape occurred, that would not preclude a jury's conclusion that venue could be proper in DeKalb County; because the most definite testimony regarding the location of the crimes related to DeKalb County, the jury was authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the rape could have occurred there. Bizimana v. State, 311 Ga. App. 447, 715 S.E.2d 754 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support codefendant's conviction on 12 counts of identity fraud, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121(a)(1), based on the state introducing evidence that the victims' identifying information was found in the Henry County, Georgia, residence of defendant, and 12 of the victims testified at trial that they did not authorize any such use of their identifying information, and codefendant admitted in her statement that she was a party to the crime in that she provided the victims' identifying information to an unauthorized third party, thus, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that at least part of the identity fraud took place in Henry County, regardless of whether codefendant was ever actually in that county. Manhertz v. State, 317 Ga. App. 856, 734 S.E.2d 406 (2012).

Since there was no clear evidence that the fatal injury was inflicted anywhere other than Harris County, where the victim was found, and where the victim died, the state sufficiently proved venue. Walton v. State, 293 Ga. 607, 748 S.E.2d 866 (2013).

Defendant's conviction for making a false statement in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20 was reversed on appeal because the state offered no proof that the jail where the alleged statement was made was in a particular county and since the defendant was transported, the false statement may have been made in another county. Stockard v. State, 327 Ga. App. 184, 755 S.E.2d 548 (2014).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft by taking since it showed that defendant never used the funds borrowed for relocating the Florida plant, as promised, and the loan was secured with equipment that defendant did not own; however, the prosecution failed to prove venue was proper in Dodge County, Georgia, since although the contracts were executed in Dodge County, there was no evidence that defendant exercised any control over the $ 350,000 in Dodge County. Davis v. State, 326 Ga. App. 279, 754 S.E.2d 815 (2014).

Sufficient evidence supported that venue was properly established in Bibb County, Georgia, with regard to the defendant's aggravated assault, kidnapping, and rape convictions because although the two women were not sure where the defendant had driven them, the testimony of the camper whom one victim had found upon escaping established venue in Bibb County and the second area where the other victim was raped was only three minutes from the first. Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 796 S.E.2d 757 (2017).

Venue in the county was established beyond a reasonable doubt under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(c) because both victims suffered gunshot wounds and died at an address located in the county. Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 1, 799 S.E.2d 196 (2017).

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes were committed in DeKalb County, including the victim's statement to police identifying the roadways the victim traveled, which included that area where a body was found, and the defendant's statement to a probation officer that the defendant had committed crimes against both victims in an area where the defendant stayed, to which DeKalb County authorities responded. Faust v. State, 303 Ga. 731, 814 S.E.2d 714 (2018).

Uniform traffic citations are not evidence, and thus cannot provide the factual basis necessary to establish venue. Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 504 S.E.2d 679 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000), reversing Graves v. State, 227 Ga. App. 628, 490 S.E.2d 111 (1997).

Venue is a jurisdictional fact, and if not proved, a new trial is required. Davis v. State, 82 Ga. 205, 8 S.E. 184 (1888); Alexander v. State, 105 Ga. 834, 31 S.E. 754 (1898); Mill v. State, 1 Ga. App. 134, 57 S.E. 969, later appeal, 2 Ga. App. 398, 58 S.E. 673 (1907), later appeal, 3 Ga. App. 414, 60 S.E. 4 (1908).

Trial in an improper venue will not prevent trial in proper venue. Barrs v. State, 22 Ga. App. 642, 97 S.E. 86, cert. denied, 227 Ga. App. 803 (1918), overruled on other grounds, Deyton v. Wanzer, 240 Ga. 509, 241 S.E.2d 228 (1978).

In Georgia, power to change venue in criminal cases is vested exclusively in superior courts. Slaughter v. State, 61 Ga. App. 619, 7 S.E.2d 215 (1940) (decision based in part on former Code 1933, § 27-1201).

Grant or denial of motions for change of venue lies largely within discretion of trial judge.

- The requirement that a defendant be tried in the county where the crime is alleged to have occurred cannot be vacated by a legislative Act purporting to vest discretion in a trial judge relating to the comfort of the jury. Hannah v. State, 212 Ga. 313, 92 S.E.2d 89 (1956).

The exercise of judicial discretion will not be reversed on appeal unless it is made to appear that there has been an abuse of discretion. Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975).

Burden of persuasion.

- Jury charge based on O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 did not improperly shift the burden of persuasion regarding venue to defendants; however, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that the subject legislation was poorly drafted and courts in the future should refrain from quoting such language, then the court suggested that the intent of the statute could be better effectuated by another instruction (which the court provided). Napier v. State, 276 Ga. 769, 583 S.E.2d 825 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Shelton v. Lee, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 452 (Ga. 2016).

An Act which disregards this paragraph is unconstitutional. Dempsey v. State, 94 Ga. 766, 22 S.E. 57 (1894) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Venue provisions of Ch. 11, T. 15 and this Constitution in accord.

- Although some of the proceedings in juvenile court are of a criminal character, all are not. For those that are, delinquency, unruliness, and juvenile traffic offenses, the venue provisions of Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 15) and this Constitution, that venue lies in the county in which the act was committed, are in accord. Quire v. Clayton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Accessory before the fact is indictable and triable in county where principal crime was committed. Welch v. State, 49 Ga. App. 380, 175 S.E. 598 (1934).

Acts relating to trial of misdemeanors in Criminal Court of Fulton County did not contravene provisions of U.S. Const., amend. 14 for the reason that defendants therein in seeking a review by appellate courts must proceed by the slower and more expensive method of first petitioning to the superior court of the county for a certiorari, whereas, if tried in the superior court, they may sue out a bill of exceptions directly to the Court of Appeals, for the further reason that newly discovered evidence cannot be considered by superior courts in awarding a new trial on a petition for certiorari, or for the further reason that misdemeanor defendants in the court of the trial have no right to move for a change of venue as defendants were permitted to move in the superior courts, under Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VIII) and this paragraph, and former Code 1933, § 27-1201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 17-7-150). McIntyre v. State, 190 Ga. 872, 11 S.E.2d 5 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 695, 61 S. Ct. 732, 85 L. Ed. 1130 (1941) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Venue in cases of kidnapping is proper in the county where the victim was seized. Harris v. State, 165 Ga. App. 249, 299 S.E.2d 924 (1983).

Venue in violation of state ethics law.

- When the defendants were indicted under O.C.G.A. § 21-5-9 for failing to file documents with the state ethics commission under O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34, venue was in the county where the commission was exclusively located; the place fixed for performance of the required act fixed the situs of the alleged crime. McKinney v. State, 282 Ga. 230, 647 S.E.2d 44 (2007).

Traffic cases.

- Trial of defendant in the Atlanta Traffic Court, a city court which sits in the Fulton County portion of Atlanta, was improper where the state proved that the alleged offense took place in the City of Atlanta but did not offer any proof that it occurred in Fulton County; defendant is entitled to be tried in the county in which the offense was alleged to have occurred. Waller v. State, 231 Ga. App. 323, 498 S.E.2d 362 (1998).

Offense of armed robbery and possession of firearm during felony.

- Where the victim testified that movant took a car from the victim at gunpoint in Chatham County, Georgia, a reasonable trier of fact was authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that movant committed the crimes of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in Chatham County, making that county the appropriate venue for movant's trial pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a); thus, the convictions and sentences were not void and the trial court properly dismissed, based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, movant's postconviction motion to vacate the convictions and sentences. Green v. State, 259 Ga. App. 195, 575 S.E.2d 921 (2002).

Evidence of venue in fleeing and eluding case.

- In a fleeing and eluding case under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395, the evidence was sufficient to establish venue as required by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a), based on evidence that the chase originated in the county and continued there, including an eyewitness's testimony, dash cam footage, and a map. Payne v. State, 338 Ga. App. 677, 791 S.E.2d 451 (2016).

Medicaid fraud.

- In a Medicaid fraud case committed by a fraudulent scheme or device under O.C.G.A. § 49-4-146.1(b)(1)(C) of the Georgia Medical Assistance Act, O.C.G.A. § 49-4-140 et seq., pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a), venue is proper in any county where an act was committed in furtherance of the fraudulent transaction and since defendants committed acts in furtherance of the fraud in counties in which they were tried and convicted then venue in those counties was proper and the appellate court improperly reversed defendants' convictions. State v. Kell, 276 Ga. 423, 577 S.E.2d 551 (2003).

Identity fraud.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-9-125 complies with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; since the crime of identity fraud, as defined by O.C.G.A. §§ 16-9-121 and16-9-125 when read in para materia, takes place in the county where the victim and the victim's personal information are located, there is no constitutional bar to trying the defendant in that county. State v. Mayze, 280 Ga. 5, 622 S.E.2d 836 (2005).

Trial court erred in sustaining defendant's demurrer to the identity fraud charges as O.C.G.A. § 16-9-125 did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI, since identity fraud was a continuing offense, which extended into the county where the victim resided or was located. State v. Mayze, 280 Ga. 5, 622 S.E.2d 836 (2005).

State established venue under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. §§ 16-9-125 and17-2-2(a) because a reasonable trier of fact was authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims resided or were found in Forsyth County at the time the offense of financial identity fraud was committed as alleged in the indictment; the victim testified that the victim had been a resident of Forsyth County for twelve years and that the victim's company had been located there for seventeen years. Zachery v. State, 312 Ga. App. 418, 718 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

Financial transaction fraud.

- Venue was proper for a conviction of financial transaction card theft, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-31(a), as jurisdiction was proper in the county where the offense occurred, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI, and the trial was held in the county in which the defendant resided and the site where the stolen cards were found. Middlebrooks v. State, 277 Ga. App. 551, 627 S.E.2d 154 (2006).

DUI cases.

- Defendant's DUI conviction had to be reversed as the prosecution failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt even though the city where the offense occurred was only within one county; the Georgia Constitution, state statutory law, and judicial precedent required that the prosecution expressly prove venue and the appellate court could not presume the trial court took judicial notice of venue. Robinson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 186, 581 S.E.2d 285 (2003).

After a defendant was granted a directed verdict on the basis that the state failed to prove venue in a criminal prosecution for driving under the influence per se, retrial was not barred under U.S. Const., amend. V and O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8 because, while venue had to be laid in the county in which the crime was allegedly committed under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 and venue was a jurisdictional fact, failure to prove venue was a procedural error that implied nothing as to defendant's guilt or innocence. Hudson v. State, 296 Ga. App. 758, 675 S.E.2d 603, cert. denied, No. S09C1163, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 413 (Ga. 2009); cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1076, 130 S. Ct. 799, 175 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2009).

Inadequate showing of venue in murder conviction.

- Defendant's murder conviction was reversed because although the evidence established that the cause of death, the shooting of the victim, was inflicted on a boat ramp in or near Lock and Dam Park and venue was proper where the boat ramp was situated under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(c), there was no evidence as to the county in which the park was located. Twitty v. State, 298 Ga. 204, 779 S.E.2d 298 (2015).

Adequate evidence of proper venue.

- Although the prosecution did not introduce direct evidence which showed that the location of a robbery and murder was in the county where the defendant was tried, it did introduce evidence which showed that the crime occurred near a lounge that was in the county, and the jury was able to find proper venue by considering that evidence and the facts that the police officer who investigated the crime worked for the county and that the deceased's body was taken to the county's coroner for autopsy. Chapman v. State, 275 Ga. 314, 565 S.E.2d 442 (2002).

In a child molestation case, venue in McIntosh County was proper; the victim testified that the crime occurred in the home of the victim's aunt, where the victim currently lived, and the aunt testified that she currently lived in McIntosh County. Flanders v. State, 285 Ga. App. 805, 648 S.E.2d 97 (2007).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for child molestation, the victim's testimony that the victim lived in a particular city, which was located in Spalding County, and that the incident occurred at another apartment, which the evidence revealed through the testimony was also located in that particular city, there was sufficient evidence to prove venue in Spalding County beyond a reasonable doubt. Mahone v. State, 293 Ga. App. 790, 668 S.E.2d 303 (2008).

Although defendant argued that the state failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a) generally, a criminal case had to be tried in the county in which the crime was committed. The state had the burden of proving venue, which the state could do using either direct or circumstantial evidence, and whether the evidence as to venue satisfied the reasonable-doubt standard was a question for the jury, and the court's decision will not be set aside if there is any evidence to support the decision; therefore, because in defendant's case, the victim testified that defendant molested the victim in their residence and that the residence was located in Grady County, Georgia, venue was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Bynum v. State, 300 Ga. App. 163, 684 S.E.2d 330 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0225, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 300 (Ga. 2010).

Evidence that a police officer found the victim lying on a sidewalk in Fulton County was sufficient to establish venue in that county under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a). Branford v. State, 299 Ga. App. 890, 685 S.E.2d 731 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment charging the defendant with arranging to buy cattle and failing or refusing to pay the seller in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-58 on the ground that venue did not lie in Laurens County because there was some evidence that the place of payment was at the seller's location in Laurens County and that the defendant wrongfully failed or refused to pay the seller in Laurens County for the cattle; even if the defendant's fraudulent intent arose in Kansas sometime after the cattle were shipped, the crime was not consummated until the defendant failed or refused to pay. Babbitt v. State, 314 Ga. App. 115, 723 S.E.2d 10 (2012).

Evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was properly in Houston County because the state presented testimony at trial establishing that the crimes against the victim culminating in the victim's murder were committed in Houston County as the place where the victim was severely beaten was in Houston County, the place where the victim was strangled to death was in Houston County, and the place where the victim's body was discovered was in Houston County; thus, the failure to prove venue was not a meritorious basis for granting directed verdicts of acquittal. Pike v. State, 302 Ga. 795, 809 S.E.2d 756 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of rape and false imprisonment because venue in Fulton County was proper as the night club and the house the victim ran to after the rape were located there; the victim accepted a ride from two men who, against the victim's will, drove the victim to a nearby field and then, forcibly and against the victim's will, had sex with the victim; a sexual assault exam was performed, DNA samples were collected from the victim, and the rape kit was sent to the GBI crime lab; and, about 20 years later, the crime lab generated a profile of the male DNA which matched known DNA profiles of the defendant contained in an existing DNA database and in buccal swabs obtained from the defendant by search warrant. Walker v. State, 341 Ga. App. 742, 801 S.E.2d 621 (2017).

Because any challenge on direct appeal to the sufficiency of proof of venue in a child molestation case would have failed due to evidence in the record from which the jury could have inferred venue was proper, appellate counsel was not unreasonable in failing to raise such a challenge. Martin v. McLaughlin, 298 Ga. 44, 779 S.E.2d 294 (2015).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment charging the defendant with arranging to buy cattle and failing or refusing to pay the seller in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-58 on the ground that venue did not lie in Laurens County because there was some evidence that the place of payment was at the seller's location in Laurens County and that the defendant wrongfully failed or refused to pay the seller in Laurens County for the cattle; even if the defendant's fraudulent intent arose in Kansas sometime after the cattle were shipped, the crime was not consummated until the defendant failed or refused to pay. Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. 685, 740 S.E.2d 609 (2013).

Venue properly set forth in indictment.

- Contrary to defendant's contention, the indictment against him was not fatally flawed as it stated the venue of the crimes by indicating that it was returned in the Superior Court of Elbert County, Georgia, and that each count charged was committed by him in the county and state aforesaid. Leverette v. State, 291 Ga. 834, 732 S.E.2d 255 (2012).

Waiver of improper venue.

- Although Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI sets forth venue requirements, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of venue is a "procedural matter" and may be waived in certain situations; where defendant failed to raise the issue of improper venue in the first direct appeal of defendant's conviction, defendant was not entitled to raise the venue issue in an appeal of a later denial of a motion to vacate the conviction due to the alleged improper venue. Shields v. State, 276 Ga. 669, 581 S.E.2d 536 (2003).

Trial court not required to instruct jury on lesser included offense over which court lacks venue.

- Court of appeals erred in reversing the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of theft by taking since there was no evidence that the included crime was committed in the county in which the defendant was being tried; although the state was unwilling to allow the defendant to waive venue or stipulate that what occurred was a theft by taking that happened entirely in Clayton County, the defendant was free to present evidence and argue to the jury that while the defendant was guilty of committing theft by taking in Clayton County, the defendant was not guilty of armed robbery in DeKalb County. But the defendant could not require the state to agree that the defendant committed theft by taking in Clayton County or require the trial court to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense over which the court lacked venue. State v. Dixon, 286 Ga. 706, 691 S.E.2d 207 (2010).

Venue was question for jury.

- Whether the state established venue was a question for a jury because the question of whether the defendant's efforts to abandon the illegal files was successful when the defendant placed the files in the trash before entering Clayton County could not be determined as a matter of law at the pretrial stage. State v. Al-Khayyal, 322 Ga. App. 718, 744 S.E.2d 885 (2013).

Jury instruction on venue in homicide cases.

- Jury instruction in a murder case under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(c), that, if it could not be determined where the cause of death was inflicted, it "shall be considered" that it was inflicted in the county where the body was discovered, did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant. As a result, the following cases are disapproved: Napier v. State, 276 Ga. 769(2), 583 S.E.2d 825 (2003), Owens v. State, 286 Ga. 821, 827(3), 693 S.E.2d 490 (2010), and Owens v. McLaughlin, 733 F.3d 320, 327 (11th Cir. 2013). Shelton v. Lee, 299 Ga. 350, 788 S.E.2d 369 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1066, 197 L. Ed. 2d 187 (U.S. 2017).

Standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence of venue.

- When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as to venue, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and inquire whether the evidence would authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was properly laid. Decisions of the Court of Appeals to the contrary are disapproved. Martin v. McLaughlin, 298 Ga. 44, 779 S.E.2d 294 (2015).

Editor's notes.

- Some of the cases noted under this subheading were decided prior to the addition of the provision regarding prescribing of venue as to corporations by law.

General Assembly has power to declare residence of corporations. Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 127 S.E.2d 454 (1962).

The right of the General Assembly to create a corporation carries with it the power to designate its venue. Davenport v. Petroleum Delivery Serv. of Ga., Inc., 134 Ga. App. 418, 214 S.E.2d 692, aff'd, 235 Ga. 116, 218 S.E.2d 848 (1975).

Since the General Assembly may fix the residence of a corporation under this paragraph, there appears to be no reason it cannot also fix the residence of a corporation under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV). White v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 233 Ga. 919, 213 S.E.2d 879 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Venue of corporation provided by statute not exclusive of venue provided by Constitution.

- The General Assembly may declare a corporation to be a resident of a county for venue purposes under this paragraph, the general venue-residence provision, but the venue of a corporation provided by statute is not the exclusive venue provided by the Constitution. Glover v. Donaldson, 243 Ga. 479, 254 S.E.2d 857 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Place of suit against corporation.

- A corporation must generally be sued in the county of its principal office or place of business. Campbell v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 140 Ga. App. 435, 231 S.E.2d 450 (1976).

Although O.C.G.A. § 9-12-132 of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, O.C.G.A. § 9-12-130 et seq., did not contain a venue provision, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(1) provided that venue was in the county where the corporation maintained its registered office; therefore, the Superior Court of Cobb County erred in denying the corporation's motion to set aside a foreign judgment when the corporation's registered office was in Henry County. Cherwood, Inc. v. Marlin Leasing Corp., 268 Ga. App. 64, 601 S.E.2d 356 (2004).

This paragraph applies to corporations as well as to natural persons and therefore a corporation must be sued in the county of its residence unless the case comes within one of the exceptions set out in the Constitution. Lloyd Adams, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 633, 10 S.E.2d 46 (1940); Benton Rapid Express v. Johnson, 202 Ga. 597, 43 S.E.2d 667 (1947); Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 127 S.E.2d 454 (1962); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Gilland, 130 Ga. App. 788, 204 S.E.2d 469 (1974) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Residence of Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority.

- Pursuant to this paragraph, General Assembly may fix residence of Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority for venue purposes when it is sued alone, but Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV) provides the venue when MARTA is sued as a joint tort-feasor. Glover v. Donaldson, 243 Ga. 479, 254 S.E.2d 857 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Situation rendering paragraph inapplicable.

- Where the defendant carrier and the individual defendant were joint tort-feasors, venue of the suit as to both could be laid in the county of either of them pursuant to Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV), and under such circumstances, the provision of this paragraph, to the effect that a defendant is entitled to be sued in the county of the defendant's residence, does not apply. Jones v. Chandler, 88 Ga. App. 103, 76 S.E.2d 237 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Amendment of 1912 (Ga. L. 1912, p. 66, §§ 1-4) fixing venue of electric companies was not violative of this paragraph. Central Ga. Power Co. v. Stubbs, 141 Ga. 172, 80 S.E. 636 (1913) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Venue against railroads fixed by O.C.G.A. § 46-1-2 is cumulative. Williams v. East Tenn., V. & Ga. Ry., 90 Ga. 519, 16 S.E. 303 (1892); Gilbert v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 104 Ga. 412, 30 S.E. 673 (1898).

Proper venue had to be determined pursuant to Georgia's long arm statute.

- Trial court did not err in denying a motion filed by a corporate president and the president's spouse to dismiss a corporation's action against them or, in the alternative, to transfer the case because the trial court's application of the relation-back statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c), did not violate the constitutional right of the president and the wife to be sued in the county where they resided under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; because the president and the spouse were not residents of Georgia when the suit was filed, the proper venue had to be determined pursuant to Georgia's Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-91 and9-10-93. Cartwright v. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc., 312 Ga. App. 890, 720 S.E.2d 200 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0600, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 306 (Ga. 2012).

Editor's notes.

- Some of the cases noted under this subheading were decided prior to the addition of the provision regarding prescribing of venue as to corporations by law.

Office and place of business.

- Foreign corporation has residence in any county in this state for the purpose of being sued where it has an office and a place of doing business. Jones v. Chandler, 88 Ga. App. 103, 76 S.E.2d 237 (1953).

Agent upon whom service can be perfected.

- A foreign corporation doing business in this state, for purposes of suit, may be treated as a resident of this state and of any county in which it has an agent upon whom service can be perfected. Jones v. Chandler, 88 Ga. App. 103, 76 S.E.2d 237 (1953).

Foreign LLC's principal place of business was not LLC's registered office in Georgia.

- Under O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-510(b)(4) and14-11-1108(b), venue for a Georgia corporation's suit against a foreign LLC lay in the county where the tort occurred, Thomas County; the provision allowing the LLC to transfer venue to the LLC's principal place of business did not apply because the statute permitted transfer only to a county in Georgia and the LLC's principal place of business was in Maryland as shown in the LLC's application for a certificate of authority under O.C.G.A. § 14-11-702(a)(6). Kingdom Retail Group, LLC v. Pandora Franchising, LLC, 334 Ga. App. 812, 780 S.E.2d 459 (2015), aff'd, 299 Ga. 723, 791 S.E.2d 786 (2016).

Foreign railway company can have residence in this state, which will subject it to suit in the courts; whenever it is present in any county of this state conducting a part of the business for which it was organized, it becomes a resident of such county. Jones v. Chandler, 88 Ga. App. 103, 76 S.E.2d 237 (1953).

Action against nonresident motor common carrier.

- Even though a nonresident interstate motor common carrier was registered in Georgia and had a registered agent for service of process, venue of a personal injury action against the carrier and nonresident driver was proper only in the county in which the accident occurred. Southern Drayage, Inc. v. Williams, 216 Ga. App. 721, 455 S.E.2d 418 (1995).

Nonresident who voluntarily institutes suit in this state submits, for all purposes of that suit, to jurisdiction of the courts of the county in which suit is pending and is not deprived of constitutional venue requirements of this paragraph. Howard Concrete Pipe Co. v. Cohen, 139 Ga. App. 491, 229 S.E.2d 8 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Temporary presence of nonresident tortfeasor.

- The temporary presence of a nonresident tortfeasor in this state is not such residence within the meaning of the Constitution as will authorize joining, in a suit against the tortfeasor in the county where the tortfeasor is found and served, other joint tortfeasors who reside in a different county or counties of this state. Benton Rapid Express v. Johnson, 202 Ga. 597, 43 S.E.2d 667 (1947).

Exception to trial in county of crime.

- This paragraph requires that unless an impartial jury cannot be obtained "all criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the crime was committed." Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 648 F.2d 446, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1035, 102 S. Ct. 575, 70 L. E. 2d 480 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 17 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI).

Best test of jury impartiality is examination of prospective jurors on voir dire. Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975).

Judge need not put all jurors on voir dire before granting change of venue, as voir dire questions go to the impartiality of the juror; and, if the judge is satisfied that no qualified jury can be obtained in a certain county, the judge can in the judge's discretion grant a change of venue. Alley v. Gormley, 181 Ga. 650, 183 S.E. 787 (1935).

Test for pretrial publicity impact.

- Test as to whether pretrial publicity has so prejudiced a case that accused cannot receive fair trial is whether jurors summoned to try the case have formed fixed opinions as to guilt or innocence of accused from pretrial publicity. Wilkes v. State, 238 Ga. 57, 230 S.E.2d 867 (1976).

Motions for change of venue within court's discretion.

- Grant or denial of motions for change of venue lies within discretion of trial court and its discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981).

Test for determining whether trial court abused its discretion in overruling a motion for change of venue based on alleged juror prejudice is whether the jurors summoned to try the case are found at voir dire to have formed fixed opinions as to guilt or innocence. Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981).

The prospective jurors passed the test of impartiality and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's motion for a change of venue. Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981).

Submission of conflicting evidence not sufficient to demonstrate abuse of discretion.

- The fact that conflicting evidence is submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion for change of venue based on alleged juror prejudice is not sufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981).

Superior Court judge may not change venue on own motion over defendant's objection.

- Under Georgia's constitutional and statutory law, a superior court judge lacks the authority to grant a change of venue in a criminal case, on the judge's own motion and over defense objection, on the ground that a fair and impartial jury cannot be obtained in the county where the crime was allegedly committed. Patterson v. Faircloth, 256 Ga. 489, 350 S.E.2d 243 (1986), disapproving dicta in Wheeler v. State, 42 Ga. 306 (1871).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 496 et seq. 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, §§ 3, 29 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 92A C.J.S., Venue, §§ 4 et seq., 79 et seq., 86.

ALR.

- Constitutionality of statute for prosecution of offense in county other than that in which it was committed, 76 A.L.R. 1034.

National bank as subject to suit outside county of its residence, 86 A.L.R. 47.

Venue of action for damage to growing crops, 103 A.L.R. 374.

Guardianship of incompetent or infant as affecting venue of action, 111 A.L.R. 167.

Venue of civil action for false imprisonment, 133 A.L.R. 1122.

What amounts to a personal injury within venue statute, 134 A.L.R. 751.

Right to be tried in county or district in which offense was committed, as susceptible of waiver, 137 A.L.R. 686.

Different or same venue or place of trial of proceeding or issue, and effect thereof, in respect of main action and ancillary garnishment or attachment, 139 A.L.R. 1478.

Right of defendant, upon motion made or renewed after plaintiff has closed his case without proving liability on part of codefendant, to change of venue to the county or district which would have been proper venue but for the joinder of the codefendant, 140 A.L.R. 1287.

Right of defendant in civil action to change of venue upon motion made after time specified by statute or rule in that regard, as affected by fact that codefendant had made such a motion within the prescribed period, 141 A.L.R. 1177.

Venue of action against an unincorporated association, 145 A.L.R. 700.

What is an action for damages to personal property within venue statute, 29 A.L.R.2d 1270.

Venue of action against nonresident motorist served constructively under statute, 38 A.L.R.2d 1198.

Venue of actions or proceedings against public officers, 48 A.L.R.2d 423.

Venue of action for the cutting, destruction, or damage of standing timber or trees, 65 A.L.R.2d 1268.

Proper forum and right to maintain action for airplane accident causing death over or in high seas, 66 A.L.R.2d 1002.

Venue of action for slander, 70 A.L.R.2d 1340.

What is place of tort causing personal injury or resultant damage or death, for purpose of principle of conflict of laws that law of place of tort governs, 77 A.L.R.2d 1266.

Appealability of order relating to transfer, on jurisdictional grounds, of cause from one state court to another, 78 A.L.R.2d 1204.

Binding effect of order on motion for change of venue, where action is terminated otherwise than on merits and reinstituted, 85 A.L.R.2d 993.

Prohibition as appropriate remedy to restrain civil action for lack of venue, 93 A.L.R.2d 882.

Place of personal representative's appointment as venue of action against him in his official capacity, 93 A.L.R.2d 1199.

Independent venue requirements as to cross complaint or similar action by defendant seeking relief against a codefendant or third party, 100 A.L.R.2d 693.

Venue of civil libel action against newspaper or periodical, 15 A.L.R.3d 1249.

Pretrial publicity in criminal case as ground for change of venue, 33 A.L.R.3d 17.

Right of accused in misdemeanor prosecution to change of venue on grounds of inability to secure fair trial and the like, 34 A.L.R.3d 804.

Change of venue by state in criminal case, 46 A.L.R.3d 295.

Venue in action for malicious prosecution, 12 A.L.R.4th 1278.

Validity of contractual provision limiting place or court in which action may be brought, 31 A.L.R.4th 404.