Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-612 (2020)
Parole eligibility — Date of offense
- A person's parole eligibility shall be determined by the laws in effect at the time of the offense for which he or she is sentenced to the Division of Correction.
- For an offender serving a sentence for a felony committed before April 1, 1977, § 16-93-601 governs that person's parole eligibility.
- For an offender serving a sentence for a felony committed between April 1, 1977, and April 1, 1983, § 16-93-604 governs that person's parole eligibility.
- For an offender serving a sentence for a felony committed on or after April 1, 1983, but before January 1, 1994, § 16-93-607 governs that person's parole eligibility.
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For an offender serving a sentence for a felony committed on or after January 1, 1994, § 16-93-614 governs that person's parole eligibility, unless otherwise noted and except:
- If the felony is murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, kidnapping, if a Class Y felony, § 5-11-102(b)(1), aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103, rape, § 5-14-103, or causing a catastrophe, § 5-38-202(a), and the offense occurred after July 28, 1995, § 16-93-618 governs that person's parole eligibility;
- If the felony is manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or the former § 5-64-401, or possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, the former § 5-64-403(c)(5), and the offense occurred after April 9, 1999, § 16-93-618 governs that person's parole eligibility;
- If the felony is battery in the second degree, § 5-13-202, aggravated assault, § 5-13-204, terroristic threatening, § 5-13-301, domestic battering in the second degree, § 5-26-304, or residential burglary, § 5-39-201(a), and the offense occurred on or after April 1, 2015, § 16-93-620 governs that person's parole eligibility; or
- If the felony was committed by a person who was a minor at the time of the offense, he or she was committed to the Department of Correction, or to the division, and the offense occurred before, on, or after March 20, 2017, § 16-93-621 governs that person's parole eligibility.
- For an offender serving a sentence for a felony committed on or after January 1, 1994, § 16-93-615 governs that person's parole eligibility procedures.
History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 97; 2015, No. 895, § 24; 2017, No. 539, § 9; 2019, No. 910, §§ 912, 913.
A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”
Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”
Acts 2017, No. 539, § 1, provided: “Title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017’.”
Acts 2017, No. 539, § 2, provided: “Legislative intent.
“(a)(1) The General Assembly acknowledges and recognizes that minors are constitutionally different from adults and that these differences must be taken into account when minors are sentenced for adult crimes.
“(2) As the United States Supreme Court quoted in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), ‘only a relatively small proportion of adolescents’ who engage in illegal activity ‘develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior,’ and ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,’ including ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control’.
“(3) Minors are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their family and peers, and they have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.
“(4) The United States Supreme Court has emphasized through its cases in Miller, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), that ‘the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes’.
“(5) Youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs, these individuals can become contributing members of society.
“(b) In the wake of these United States Supreme Court decisions and the emerging juvenile brain and behavioral development science, several states, including Texas, Utah, South Dakota, Wyoming, Nevada, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Alaska, West Virginia, Colorado, Hawaii, Delaware, Connecticut, Vermont, Massachussets, and the District of Columbia, have eliminated the sentence of life without parole for minors.
“(c) It is the intent of the General Assembly to eliminate life without parole as a sentencing option for minors and to create more age-appropriate sentencing standards in compliance with the United States Constitution for minors who commit serious crimes.”
Amendments. The 2015 amendment added (e)(3).
The 2017 amendment added (e)(4).
The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a); and inserted “or to the Division of Correction” in (e)(4).