breach standard in District of Columbia

2014A. Steele’s Legal Malpractice Claim A plaintiff alleging legal malpractice must establish “the applicable standard of care, a breach of that standard, and a causal relationship between the violation and the harm complained of.” Biomet Inc. v. Finnegan Henderson LLP, 967 A.2d 662, 664 (D.C.2009) (citing O’Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C.1982)).

2011To prevail on a claim of legal malpractice under District of Columbia law, “a plaintiff must establish [1] the applicable standard of care, [2] a breach of the standard of care, and [3] a causal relationship between the violation and the harm complained of.” Biomet Inc. v. Finnegan Henderson LLP, 967 A.2d 662, 664-65 (D.C.2009) (citing O’Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C.1982)).

2006To establish causation, a plaintiff must “present evidence from which a reasonable *247 juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standard of care and the plaintiffs injuries and that the injuries were foreseeable.” Psychiatric Inst. of Washington v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 624 (D.C.1986).

2005I agree with the majority in part; the only claim with respect to which Ms. Garby presented sufficient evidence of proximate cause was the failure of the doctors to apprise Mrs. Garby that her husband had recently planned to commit suicide by leaping to his death. 12 In Psychiatric Inst. of Washington v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 624 (D.C.1986), we set forth the requirements for establishing the requisite causation in a medical malpractice case: To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal r

2005“To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standard of care and the plaintiffs injuries and that the injuries were foreseeable.” District of Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591, 600 (D.C.1998) (quoting District of Columbia v. Watkins, 684 A.2d 395, 402 (D.C.1996)).

2000“To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standard of care and the plaintiffs injuries and that the injuries were foreseeable.” Wilson, supra, 721 A.2d at 600 (citations omitted).

2024Instead, Mr. Cornoni’s trial strategy “focus[ed] on the effect Mr. Tovar’s mild traumatic brain injury had on his life and his inability to work.” A plaintiff must establish three elements to prevail on a legal malpractice claim: “the applicable standard of care, a breach of that standard, and a causal relationship between the violation and the harm complained of.” Biomet Inc. v. Finnegan Henderson LLP, 967 A.2d 662, 664 (D.C. 2009).

2014A. Steele’s Legal Malpractice Claim A plaintiff alleging legal malpractice must establish “the applicable standard of care, a breach of that standard, and a causal relationship between the violation and the harm complained of.” Biomet Inc. v. Finnegan Henderson LLP, 967 A.2d 662, 664 (D.C.2009) (citing O’Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C.1982)).

2024The standard of care that a lawyer must exercise is “that degree of reasonable care and skill expected of lawyers acting under similar circumstances.” Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 561 (D.C. 1979). 19 The judgmental immunity doctrine “provides that an informed professional judgment made with reasonable care and skill cannot be the basis of a legal malpractice claim.” Biomet Inc., 967 A.2d at 666 .

1986See, e.g., Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C.1984); Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 560 (D.C.1979); Haven v. Randolph, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 150, 151 , 494 F.2d 1069, 1070 (1974). 6 To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standard of care and the plaintiffs injuries and that the injuries were foreseeable.

2006“In order to prove legal malpractice, a plaintiff must establish the applicable standard of care, a breach of that standard, and a causal relationship between the violation and the harm complained of.” Mills v. Cooter, 647 A.2d 1118, 1123 (D.C.1994).

2004“In order to prove legal malpractice, a plaintiff must establish the applicable standard of care, a breach of that standard, and a causal relationship between the violation and the harm complained of.” Mills v. Cooler, 647 A.2d 1118, 1123 (D.C.1994) (citation omitted).

2003“To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standard of care and the plaintiffs injuries and that the injuries were foreseeable.” Psychiatric Inst. of Wash. v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 624 (D.C.1986) (emphasis in original) (citing District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 716 (D.C.1984); Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 320 (D.C.1980)).

1997Psychiatric Inst. of Washington, supra, 509 A.2d at 624 ; Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 320-21 (D.C.1980).

2014As a general matter, to establish proximate cause “the expert need only state an opinion, based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the defendant’s negligence is more likely than anything else to have been the cause (or a cause) of the plaintiffs injury.” Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 570 (D.C.1996); see generally Talley v. Varma, 689 A.2d 547, 552 (D.C.1997) (“To establish causation, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standa

2005See also Talley v. Varma, 689 A.2d 547, 552 (D.C.1997) (“To establish causation, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standard of care and the plaintiffs injuries, and that the injuries were foreseeable.”); Twyman v. Johnson, 655 A.2d 850, 854 (D.C.1995) (directed verdict required where a conclusion that negligence had substantially contributed to the injury “would have rested upon surmise”).

2003“To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standard of care and the plaintiffs injuries and that the injuries were foreseeable.” Psychiatric Inst. of Wash. v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 624 (D.C.1986) (emphasis in original) (citing District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 716 (D.C.1984); Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 320 (D.C.1980)).

1986See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 716 (D.C.1984); Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 320 (D.C.1980).

2014On the other hand, although “conflicts in the testimony of witnesses, including expert witnesses, called by a party are not necessarily fatal to his case,” Kosberg v. Washington Hospital Center, 394 F.2d 947, 950 (D.C.Cir.1968), “inconsistent testimony on causation may render the whole testimony inconclusive, thus requiring the entry of a directed verdict,” Talley, 689 A.2d at 553 .

1988Indeed, her testimony, “if believed by the jury, might have established both the standard of care and its violation.” Id.

2005“To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standard of care and the plaintiffs injuries and that the injuries were foreseeable.” District of Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591, 600 (D.C.1998) (quoting District of Columbia v. Watkins, 684 A.2d 395, 402 (D.C.1996)).

1998Watkins, supra, 684 A.2d at 402 (quoting Psychiatric Inst. of Washington v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 624 (D.C.1986)).

2014As a general matter, to establish proximate cause “the expert need only state an opinion, based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the defendant’s negligence is more likely than anything else to have been the cause (or a cause) of the plaintiffs injury.” Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 570 (D.C.1996); see generally Talley v. Varma, 689 A.2d 547, 552 (D.C.1997) (“To establish causation, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standa

2011See, e.g., Giordano, 968 A.2d at 498 & n. 7.

2011Generally, “a lawyer must exercise that degree of reasonable care and skill expected of lawyers acting under similar circumstances.” Battle v. Thornton, 646 A.2d 315, 319 (D.C.1994) (citing O’Neil, 452 A.2d at 341 ).

2009LEXIS 13531, *3 (6th Cir.1984) (applying state law that “does not require the expert witness to state explicitly that the defendant violated an applicable standard of care so long as the expert provides sufficient evidence of prevailing standards and the jury has other evidence which demonstrates that a departure from the standards of care actually did occur”), citing Baldwin v. Williams, 104 Mich.App. 735 , 306 N.W.2d 314, 316 (1981) (“this Court has not required that an expert witness testify that a breach has occurred in a case where the expert stated the applicable standard of care and oth

2009LEXIS 13531, *3 (6th Cir.1984) (applying state law that “does not require the expert witness to state explicitly that the defendant violated an applicable standard of care so long as the expert provides sufficient evidence of prevailing standards and the jury has other evidence which demonstrates that a departure from the standards of care actually did occur”), citing Baldwin v. Williams, 104 Mich.App. 735 , 306 N.W.2d 314, 316 (1981) (“this Court has not required that an expert witness testify that a breach has occurred in a case where the expert stated the applicable standard of care and oth

2009Weiner v. Kneller, 557 A.2d 1306, 1310 (D.C.1989) (explaining that a party need not describe in a Rule 26(b)(4) statement “every possible direction his expert's testimony could take,” and observing that courts "have generally allowed experts to state the natural concomitants of their arguments, ... when they have been satisfied that such testimony was of a piece with the original theory”). 40 .

2009Cf. Ferrell v. Rosenbaum, 691 A.2d 641, 649 (D.C.1997) (“Although Dr. Rosenbaum did not make an admission as to the ultimate issue of breach of the standard of care, he testified that the fact that his notes did not indicate that he had seen the blood work probably meant that he had not reviewed the blood data.

2009LEXIS 13531, *3 (6th Cir.1984) (applying state law that “does not require the expert witness to state explicitly that the defendant violated an applicable standard of care so long as the expert provides sufficient evidence of prevailing standards and the jury has other evidence which demonstrates that a departure from the standards of care actually did occur”), citing Baldwin v. Williams, 104 Mich.App. 735 , 306 N.W.2d 314, 316 (1981) (“this Court has not required that an expert witness testify that a breach has occurred in a case where the expert stated the applicable standard of care and oth

2009LEXIS 13531, *3 (6th Cir.1984) (applying state law that “does not require the expert witness to state explicitly that the defendant violated an applicable standard of care so long as the expert provides sufficient evidence of prevailing standards and the jury has other evidence which demonstrates that a departure from the standards of care actually did occur”), citing Baldwin v. Williams, 104 Mich.App. 735 , 306 N.W.2d 314, 316 (1981) (“this Court has not required that an expert witness testify that a breach has occurred in a case where the expert stated the applicable standard of care and oth

2009LEXIS 13531, *3 (6th Cir.1984) (applying state law that “does not require the expert witness to state explicitly that the defendant violated an applicable standard of care so long as the expert provides sufficient evidence of prevailing standards and the jury has other evidence which demonstrates that a departure from the standards of care actually did occur”), citing Baldwin v. Williams, 104 Mich.App. 735 , 306 N.W.2d 314, 316 (1981) (“this Court has not required that an expert witness testify that a breach has occurred in a case where the expert stated the applicable standard of care and oth

2009LEXIS 13531, *3 (6th Cir.1984) (applying state law that “does not require the expert witness to state explicitly that the defendant violated an applicable standard of care so long as the expert provides sufficient evidence of prevailing standards and the jury has other evidence which demonstrates that a departure from the standards of care actually did occur”), citing Baldwin v. Williams, 104 Mich.App. 735 , 306 N.W.2d 314, 316 (1981) (“this Court has not required that an expert witness testify that a breach has occurred in a case where the expert stated the applicable standard of care and oth

2007See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Zukerberg, 880 A.2d 276, 281 (D.C.2005) (“This court has defined proximate causation as that cause which, in natural and continual sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.”) (emphasis added) (citing St.

2005See also Talley v. Varma, 689 A.2d 547, 552 (D.C.1997) (“To establish causation, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standard of care and the plaintiffs injuries, and that the injuries were foreseeable.”); Twyman v. Johnson, 655 A.2d 850, 854 (D.C.1995) (directed verdict required where a conclusion that negligence had substantially contributed to the injury “would have rested upon surmise”).

2005See also Talley v. Varma, 689 A.2d 547, 552 (D.C.1997) ("To establish causation, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct and substantial causal relationship between the defendant's breach of the standard of care and the plaintiff's injuries, and that the injuries were foreseeable."); Twyman v. Johnson, 655 A.2d 850, 854 (D.C.1995) (directed verdict required where a conclusion that negligence had substantially contributed to the injury "would have rested upon surmise").

2005Id. at 707 (citation omitted).

2005Id. at 707 (citation omitted).

2000Robinson v. Group Health Ass’n, 691 A.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C.1997) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted) (citing in part W.