11 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1890–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maleki v. Fine-Lando Clinic Chartered, S.C.green2 sentences2025See Maleki v. Fine-Lando Clinic Chartered, S.C., 162 Wis. 2d 73, 86 , 469 N.W.2d 629 (1991) (“There can be no conspiracy if malice is not found in respect to both [or all] conspirators.”). 14 2025See Maleki v. Fine-Lando Clinic Chartered, S.C., 162 Wis. 2d 73, 86 , 469 N.W.2d 629 (1991) (“There can be no conspiracy if malice is not found in respect to both [or all] conspirators.”). 14 | 1 | 1 |
Zintek v. Perchikgreen1 sentence2025See Zintek, 163 Wis. 2d at 457 (distinguishing criticisms of the medical care provided with expert opinion on negligent medical care). ¶22 Indeed, Dr. Goldman was consistent in his opinion that the breach of the standard of care in this case amounted to Dr. Smith creating the laceration and 8 No. 2023AP1576 then Dr. Smith’s failure to immediately identify and repair the laceration. | 1 | 1 |
Shier v. Freedmangreen2 sentences1975That standard was stated in Shier v. Freedman (1973), 58 Wis. 2d 269, 283, 284 , 206 N. W. 2d 166 , 208 N. W. 2d 328 : “[A] qualified medical (or dental) practitioner, be he a general practitioner or a specialist, should be subject to liability in an action for negligence if he fails to exercise that degree of care and skill which is exercised by the average practitioner in the class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances.” The burden to prove negligence was on the plaintiff, and there was no testimony by any medical expert to *201 show an appropriate standard of care 1975That standard was stated in Shier v. Freedman (1973), 58 Wis. 2d 269, 283, 284 , 206 N. W. 2d 166 , 208 N. W. 2d 328 : “[A] qualified medical (or dental) practitioner, be he a general practitioner or a specialist, should be subject to liability in an action for negligence if he fails to exercise that degree of care and skill which is exercised by the average practitioner in the class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances.” The burden to prove negligence was on the plaintiff, and there was no testimony by any medical expert to *201 show an appropriate standard of care | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Avery
green
1 sentence2023The court observed that, according to one commentator, “a breach of the requirement of good faith occurs ‘when discretion is used to recapture opportunities forgone upon contracting’” and that “[c]onsistent with good faith, a party may exercise a discretionary power ‘for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of formation—to capture opportunities that were preserved upon entering the contract, interpreted objectively.’” Id. at 432 (citing Steven J. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Sprecher v. Weston's Bar, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022Id. at 32-33 . ¶55 The circuit court determined that the Westons could be held personally liable for the bar’s breach of the lease, and the supreme court affirmed. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Water Well Solutions Service Group Inc. v. Consolidated Insurance Company
green
1 sentence2019Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Cook v. Continental Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2015In addition to joining the other defendants-respondents in arguing that expert testimony is needed to establish a breach in this case, an argument we have rejected, the Group also asserts expert testimony is necessary "to establish the parameters of acceptable professional conduct, given the underlying fact situation" — i.e., the standard of care — quoting Cook v. Continental Casualty Co., 180 Wis. 2d 237, 246 , 509 N.W.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted), and to establish "a causal relationship between an alleged breach of the standard of care and a claimed loss." ¶ 22. 2015In addition to joining the other defendants-respondents in arguing that expert testimony is needed to establish a breach in this case, an argument we have rejected, the Group also asserts expert testimony is necessary "to establish the parameters of acceptable professional conduct, given the underlying fact situation" — i.e., the standard of care — quoting Cook v. Continental Casualty Co., 180 Wis. 2d 237, 246 , 509 N.W.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted), and to establish "a causal relationship between an alleged breach of the standard of care and a claimed loss." ¶ 22. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Hoffman v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 71 . ¶ 27 The Hoffman court concluded that "to be sufficient in content, a spoliation notice must reasonably notify the recipient of a breach or a claim." Id. at 70 . 2009Id. at 71 . ¶ 27 The Hoffman court concluded that "to be sufficient in content, a spoliation notice must reasonably notify the recipient of a breach or a claim." Id. at 70 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co. v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2008Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co. v. Anderson, 2007 WI App 269 , 306 Wis. 2d 470 , 744 N.W.2d 300 . ¶ 20. 2008Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co. v. Anderson, 2007 WI App 269 , 306 Wis. 2d 470 , 744 N.W.2d 300 . ¶ 20. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Pierson v. Dorff
green
2 sentences1933Because of the vendor’s anticipatory breach, plaintiff, not being in default but having' lived up to its contract, had available the following remedies: It “could have maintained an action for damages against the party in default, or under the proper circumstances could sue in equity for affirmative relief of specific performance or for the negative relief of injunction, rescission, or cancellation;” or it “could have elected to treat such breach as a discharge and refuse to perform further, and use the breach as a defense. 5 Page, Contracts, p. 5338, § 3023.” Pierson v. Dorff, 198 Wis. 43, 49 1933Because of the vendor’s anticipatory breach, plaintiff, not being in default but having' lived up to its contract, had available the following remedies: It “could have maintained an action for damages against the party in default, or under the proper circumstances could sue in equity for affirmative relief of specific performance or for the negative relief of injunction, rescission, or cancellation;” or it “could have elected to treat such breach as a discharge and refuse to perform further, and use the breach as a defense. 5 Page, Contracts, p. 5338, § 3023.” Pierson v. Dorff, 198 Wis. 43, 49 | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Brigham v. Evans
green
1 sentence1890Brigham v. Evans, 113 Mass. 538 . | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.