11 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1963–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bender v. Eatongreen2 sentences2010Luke Hosps., 160 S.W.3d at 775 ; accord Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 802 . 2010Luke Hosps., 160 S.W.3d at 775 ; accord Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 802 . | 2 | 2 |
Blankenship v. Colliergreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Blankenship v. Collier, 302 S.W.3d 665 (Ky. 2010). 2023Blankenship v. Collier, 302 S.W.3d 665 (Ky. 2010). | 1 | 2 |
Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Society, Inc.green1 sentence2025Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 908 (Ky. 2013) (shifting the foreseeability question from the duty analysis to the breach analysis in open and obvious cases); see also Culp, 663 S.W.3d at 454. -14- For instance, in Walmart v. Reeves, our Supreme Court made it clear that even business owners do not owe a “universal duty” to protect its patrons from all third- party acts. 671 S.W.3d at 29. | 1 | 1 |
Blair v. Eblengreen1 sentence2025And even though Dr. Nunley’s initial perception turned out to be incorrect, that an acute coronary syndrome was a more likely threat to Mr. Raines than aortic dissection, he nevertheless used “that degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent pract[it]ioner in the same class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances.” Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970). | 1 | 1 |
Napper v. KENWOOD DRIVE-IN THEATRE COMPANYgreen1 sentence2025Instead, the Reeves Court clarified that when determining a business’s duty to its patrons, a trial court must consider whether the harm was foreseeable to the business, which then necessitates asking whether the harm “could have been anticipated by the property owner.” Id. at 29 (citing Napper v. Kenwood Drive-In Theatre Co., 310 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ky. 1958)) (“For example, if [harm] of a sufficiently similar kind occurred sufficiently close in time to the one at issue, then the [harm] at issue would have been foreseeable.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
The St. Luke Hospitals, Inc. v. Kopowski
green
2 sentences2010Luke Hosps., 160 S.W.3d at 775 ; accord Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 802 . 2010Luke Hosps., 160 S.W.3d at 775 ; accord Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 802 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Alex Argotte M.D. v. Jacqulyn G. Harrington
green
1 sentence2021It was incumbent upon the Shwabs to “show the physician’s actions for obtaining consent fell outside ‘the accepted standard of medical . . . practice.’” Argotte, 521 S.W.3d at 556 (quoting KRS 304.40-320(1)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012In their brief, Irvine and Pyles contend, by virtue of the circuit court’s November 8, 2010 order granting summary judgment, the circuit court ”exclud[ed] the Appellants’ expert from testifying” because "the Appellant’s [sic] expert report did not satisfy the standards required of [Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)].” (Appellee Irvine and Pyles’ Brief at 13). 2012In their brief, Irvine and Pyles contend, by virtue of the circuit court’s November 8, 2010 order granting summary judgment, the circuit court ”exclud[ed] the Appellants’ expert from testifying” because "the Appellant’s [sic] expert report did not satisfy the standards required of [Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)].” (Appellee Irvine and Pyles’ Brief at 13). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Ready v. Jamison
green
1 sentence2005We stated, “[w]hile dismissal still may be appropriate where the breach of the rule and the harm to the opponent is sufficiently serious, under CR 73.02(2) the appellate court is charged with the burden of deciding the appropriate sanction on a case by case basis.” Id. at 482 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Doyle v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1979Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). 1979Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Watkins v. Department of Highways of the Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1963Appellants rely mainly on Watkins, Consulting Engineer v. Department of Highways, Ky., 290 S.W.2d 28 , and Derby Road Building Company v. Commonwealth, Ky., 317 S.W.2d 891 , as affording a breach in the doctrine. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Derby Road Building Co. v. Commonwealth, Department of Highways
green
1 sentence1963Appellants rely mainly on Watkins, Consulting Engineer v. Department of Highways, Ky., 290 S.W.2d 28 , and Derby Road Building Company v. Commonwealth, Ky., 317 S.W.2d 891 , as affording a breach in the doctrine. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.