breach standard in Nebraska

2024ARP Cite as 317 Neb. 690 seeking to hold Frost “liable for Arp’s . . . alleged negli- gent behavior.” 15 But it reversed that “portion of the court’s order granting summary judgment on [RFI’s] independent negligence claim against Frost,” 16 reasoning that determina- tions of “[w]hat standard of care was required of Frost and whether Frost’s actions or inactions constituted a breach of that standard are questions for the finder of fact.” 17 The Court of Appeals remanded the cause “for further consideration of the remaining issues . . . related to [RFI’s] independent neg- ligence claim.” 18 (c)

2024Georgia courts have interpreted the intentional tort excep- tion to the waiver of sovereign immunity in The Georgia Tort Claims Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 50-21-24 (7) (2009), in a manner unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 , 108 S. Ct. 2449 , 101 L.

2024Georgia courts have interpreted the intentional tort excep- tion to the waiver of sovereign immunity in The Georgia Tort Claims Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 50-21-24 (7) (2009), in a manner unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 , 108 S. Ct. 2449 , 101 L.

2019The court did not err in denying the doctors’ motions for directed verdict: The doctors waived any error in the denial at the close of the - 188 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports ANDERSON v. BABBE Cite as 304 Neb. 186 patient’s case by presenting evidence, and evidence subse- quently adduced established a breach of the standard of care.

2019They asserted that neither of the Andersons’ expert witnesses mentioned the words “‘standard of care.’” The doc- tors noted that the family physician was never asked if he was familiar with the standard of care expected of family practice - 191 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports ANDERSON v. BABBE Cite as 304 Neb. 186 physicians in Omaha, that the podiatrist was not asked if he knew what the standard of care was, and that neither expert testified that a breach of the standard of care occurred.

2000In People v. Adler, 629 P.2d 569 (Colo. 1981), the court concluded that although pointing out a possible defect in the prosecution’s case may have been ill advised, it was held that such conduct did not result in a breach of that test.

2000To establish a breach of that standard, the plaintiff offered his own affidavit, which stated that “ ‘at no time prior to or during the course of the chemotherapy treatment’ did [the defendant doctor] inform Sherry Healy that death was a potential side effect of the chemotherapy.” Id. at 9 , 511 N.W.2d at 503 .

2000To establish a breach of that standard, the plaintiff offered his own affidavit, which stated that “ ‘at no time prior to or during the course of the chemotherapy treatment’ did [the defendant doctor] inform Sherry Healy that death was a potential side effect of the chemotherapy.” Id. at 9 , 511 N.W.2d at 503 .

1923The principle has been well expressed by Justice Brewer in the leading case of Dill v. Pope, 29 Kan. 289 , in the following language: “A party to a contract who prevents the performance of any condition can neither claim benefit nor escape liability from the failure of such condition. * * * The rule is clear and well settled, and founded in absolute justice, that no party to a contract can either prevent performance by another of any of its conditions, or, on the other hand, disable himself from complying with any condition, and derive any benefit or escape any liability thereby.77 Other autho

1923The principle has been well expressed by Justice Brewer in the leading case of Dill v. Pope, 29 Kan. 289 , in the following language: “A party to a contract who prevents the performance of any condition can neither claim benefit nor escape liability from the failure of such condition. * * * The rule is clear and well settled, and founded in absolute justice, that no party to a contract can either prevent performance by another of any of its conditions, or, on the other hand, disable himself from complying with any condition, and derive any benefit or escape any liability thereby.77 Other autho

1923The principle has been well expressed by Justice Brewer in the leading case of Dill v. Pope, 29 Kan. 289 , in the following language: “A party to a contract who prevents the performance of any condition can neither claim benefit nor escape liability from the failure of such condition. * * * The rule is clear and well settled, and founded in absolute justice, that no party to a contract can either prevent performance by another of any of its conditions, or, on the other hand, disable himself from complying with any condition, and derive any benefit or escape any liability thereby.77 Other autho

1923The principle has been well expressed by Justice Brewer in the leading case of Dill v. Pope, 29 Kan. 289 , in the following language: “A party to a contract who prevents the performance of any condition can neither claim benefit nor escape liability from the failure of such condition. * * * The rule is clear and well settled, and founded in absolute justice, that no party to a contract can either prevent performance by another of any of its conditions, or, on the other hand, disable himself from complying with any condition, and derive any benefit or escape any liability thereby.77 Other autho

1923The principle has been well expressed by Justice Brewer in the leading case of Dill v. Pope, 29 Kan. 289 , in the following language: “A party to a contract who prevents the performance of any condition can neither claim benefit nor escape liability from the failure of such condition. * * * The rule is clear and well settled, and founded in absolute justice, that no party to a contract can either prevent performance by another of any of its conditions, or, on the other hand, disable himself from complying with any condition, and derive any benefit or escape any liability thereby.77 Other autho

1914The supreme court said: “It is the duty of the presiding judge, as stated in Perkins v. Guy, 55 Miss. 153 , and Cavanah v. State, 56 Miss. 299 , to interfere of his own motion to prevent a breach of the privilege of counsel, and if he fails to do so, and the abuse of privilege is of such character as to produce the conviction that injustice resulted therefrom, the duty of this court is to apply the corrective by awarding a new trial.” “The worst criminal is entitled to be judged by the laws; and, if his .conviction is secured by means of a perversion of the law, the injury to the cause of publ

1914The supreme court said: “It is the duty of the presiding judge, as stated in Perkins v. Guy, 55 Miss. 153 , and Cavanah v. State, 56 Miss. 299 , to interfere of his own motion to prevent a breach of the privilege of counsel, and if he fails to do so, and the abuse of privilege is of such character as to produce the conviction that injustice resulted therefrom, the duty of this court is to apply the corrective by awarding a new trial.” “The worst criminal is entitled to be judged by the laws; and, if his .conviction is secured by means of a perversion of the law, the injury to the cause of publ

1914In McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63 , the court quoted briefly the language of Chief Justice Christiancy in Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405 .

1914In McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63 , the court quoted briefly the language of Chief Justice Christiancy in Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405 .