breach standard in Florida

2019Ass’n v. Antonious, 722 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“Trial judges must studiously avoid the appearance of favoring one party in a lawsuit, and suggesting to counsel or a party how to proceed strategically constitutes a breach of this principle.”); Chastine v. Broome, 629 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (“Obviously, the trial judge serves as the neutral arbiter in the proceedings and must not enter the fray by giving ‘tips’ to either side.”).

2017Ass’n v. Antonious, 722 So.2d 247, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), for the proposition that “[t]rial judges must studiously avoid the appearance of favoring one party in a lawsuit, and suggesting to counsel or a party how to proceed strategically constitutes a breach of this principle”).

2019Ass’n v. Antonious, 722 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“Trial judges must studiously avoid the appearance of favoring one party in a lawsuit, and suggesting to counsel or a party how to proceed strategically constitutes a breach of this principle.”); Chastine v. Broome, 629 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (“Obviously, the trial judge serves as the neutral arbiter in the proceedings and must not enter the fray by giving ‘tips’ to either side.”).

2018Ass'n v. Antonious , 722 So.2d 247 , 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) ; see also Chastine v. Broome , 629 So.2d 293 , 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) ("[T]he trial judge serves as the neutral arbiter in the proceedings and must not enter the fray by giving 'tips' to either side.").

2024Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984) (“To prevail in a medical malpractice case a plaintiff must establish the following: the standard of care owed by the defendant, the defendant's breach of the standard of care, and that said breach proximately caused the damages claimed.”); Chaskes v. Gutierrez, 116 So. 3d 479, 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (observing: “Florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation and require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiff’s injury.” (quoting Gooding, 445 So. 2d at 1019 )).

2024Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984) (“To prevail in a medical malpractice case a plaintiff must establish the following: the standard of care owed by the defendant, the defendant's breach of the standard of care, and that said breach proximately caused the damages claimed.”); Chaskes v. Gutierrez, 116 So. 3d 479, 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (observing: “Florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation and require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiff’s injury.” (quoting Gooding, 445 So. 2d at 1019 )).

2024Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984) (“To prevail in a medical malpractice case a plaintiff must establish the following: the standard of care owed by the defendant, the defendant's breach of the standard of care, and that said breach proximately caused the damages claimed.”); Chaskes v. Gutierrez, 116 So. 3d 479, 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (observing: “Florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation and require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiff’s injury.” (quoting Gooding, 445 So. 2d at 1019 )).

2024Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984) (“To prevail in a medical malpractice case a plaintiff must establish the following: the standard of care owed by the defendant, the defendant's breach of the standard of care, and that said breach proximately caused the damages claimed.”); Chaskes v. Gutierrez, 116 So. 3d 479, 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (observing: “Florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation and require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiff’s injury.” (quoting Gooding, 445 So. 2d at 1019 )).

2024Such a requirement would improperly shift 6 the burden of proof and contravene the language in the statute providing that “the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight of evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider.” § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2022); see also Saunders v. Dickens, 151 So. 3d 434, 441 (Fla. 2014) (“[I]n a medical malpractice action, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the care provided by the physician was not that of a reasonabl

2018Id.

2019See Spadafora v. Carlo, 569 So. 2d 1329, 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("[A] violation of the building code is evidence of a breach of the standard of care in a premises liability case against a commercial landowner."); Lindsey v. Bill Arflin Bonding Agency Inc., 645 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("Because a 'building code is designed to protect the general public rather than a particular class of individuals,' a violation constitutes evidence of negligence . . . ." (quoting Grand Union Co. v. Rocker, 454 So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984))); Liberty Mut.

2019See Spadafora v. Carlo, 569 So. 2d 1329, 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("[A] violation of the building code is evidence of a breach of the standard of care in a premises liability case against a commercial landowner."); Lindsey v. Bill Arflin Bonding Agency Inc., 645 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("Because a 'building code is designed to protect the general public rather than a particular class of individuals,' a violation constitutes evidence of negligence . . . ." (quoting Grand Union Co. v. Rocker, 454 So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984))); Liberty Mut.

2019See Spadafora v. Carlo, 569 So. 2d 1329, 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("[A] violation of the building code is evidence of a breach of the standard of care in a premises liability case against a commercial landowner."); Lindsey v. Bill Arflin Bonding Agency Inc., 645 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("Because a 'building code is designed to protect the general public rather than a particular class of individuals,' a violation constitutes evidence of negligence . . . ." (quoting Grand Union Co. v. Rocker, 454 So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984))); Liberty Mut.

2019See 766.103(3)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (defining medical consent in terms of whether it “was in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice among members of the medical profession with similar training and 8 experience”); Doctors Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Evans, 543 So. 2d 809, 812-13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (recognizing that under Florida law, “issues of informed consent are such that lay persons cannot determine through the use of their common knowledge that a breach of the standard of care occurred”).

2017Dockswell, 177 So.3d at 275-76 (Conner, J., dissenting).

2017See also L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1997). - 12 - Dockswell, 177 So. 3d at 275-76 (Conner, J., dissenting).

2017See also L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1997). - 12 - Dockswell, 177 So. 3d at 275-76 (Conner, J., dissenting).

2016Cf. Chua v. Hilbert, 846 So.2d 1179, 1182-83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (discussing identification of the specific risk relevant to the informed consent issue).

2016Johnson v. Badger Acquisition of Tampa LLC, 983 So.2d 1175, 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), this rule does not apply to the RVA because the RVA cannot be violated.

2016Reviewing the motion for new trial and the argument made therein—that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence as to a breach of the standard of care—reasonable minds could not differ on the propriety of granting a new trial. “[T]he closer an issue comes to being purely legal in nature, the less discretion a trial court enjoys in ruling on a new trial motion.” Van, 122 So.3d at 258 (quoting Tri-Pak Mach., Inc. v. Hartshorn, 644 So.2d 118, 119-20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (emphasis omitted)).

2014Ass’n v. Antonious, 722 So.2d 247, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“Trial judges must studiously avoid the appearance of favoring one party in a lawsuit, and suggesting to counsel or a party how to proceed strategically constitutes a breach of this principle.”); Leigh v. Smith, 503 So.2d 989, 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (“Certainly an allegation that a judge assisted the opposing attorney in the trial of the ease by ‘signal-ling’ is sufficient, by itself, to warrant disqualification.”).

2013Eight years following Torncello , the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Salsbury Industries v. United States, 905 F.2d 1518, 1521 (Fed.Cir.1990), limited Torncello’s holding, finding that it stood for the “the unremarkable proposition that when the government contracts with a party knowing full well that it will not honor the contract, it cannot avoid a breach claim by adverting to the convenience termination clause.” Likewise, in Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman, 55 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1995), the Federal Circuit again approved such treatment, interpreting Sa

2013Eight years following Torncello , the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Salsbury Industries v. United States, 905 F.2d 1518, 1521 (Fed.Cir.1990), limited Torncello’s holding, finding that it stood for the “the unremarkable proposition that when the government contracts with a party knowing full well that it will not honor the contract, it cannot avoid a breach claim by adverting to the convenience termination clause.” Likewise, in Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman, 55 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1995), the Federal Circuit again approved such treatment, interpreting Sa

2013There, the court reviewed the termination for convenience jurisprudence, finding that it “discloses mixed signals about limiting terminations under the bad faith/abuse of discretion standard ... or the change of circumstances test in Torncello.” Id. at 1540.

2013Eight years following Torncello , the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Salsbury Industries v. United States, 905 F.2d 1518, 1521 (Fed.Cir.1990), limited Torncello’s holding, finding that it stood for the “the unremarkable proposition that when the government contracts with a party knowing full well that it will not honor the contract, it cannot avoid a breach claim by adverting to the convenience termination clause.” Likewise, in Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman, 55 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1995), the Federal Circuit again approved such treatment, interpreting Sa

2008See Ingram v. Hook's Drugs Inc., 476 N.E.2d 881 , 884 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1985).

2003Corp. v. Aldrich, 835 So.2d 318, 327-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). ("To prevail in a medical malpractice case, a plaintiff must establish the standard of care owed by the defendant, the defendant's breach of the standard of care, and that such breach proximately caused the alleged damages.").