breach standard in North Carolina

2021Auth., 209 N.C.

2021Auth., 209 N.C.

2009Rorrer did not, however, address the admissibility of evidence of an expert witness’ personal practices under Rules 401 and 402, but rather held that the personal opinion of an expert witness as to what a professional should have done is not sufficient to establish a breach of the standard of care: “The mere fact that one [expert witness] testifies that he would have acted contrarily to or differently from the action taken by defendant is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of defendant’s negligence.” Id. at 357 , 329 S.E.2d at 367 . .The Supreme Court in Rorrer upheld the trial cou

2009Rorrer did not, however, address the admissibility of evidence of an expert witness’ personal practices under Rules 401 and 402, but rather held that the personal opinion of an expert witness as to what a professional should have done is not sufficient to establish a breach of the standard of care: “The mere fact that one [expert witness] testifies that he would have acted contrarily to or differently from the action taken by defendant is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of defendant’s negligence.” Id. at 357 , 329 S.E.2d at 367 . .The Supreme Court in Rorrer upheld the trial cou

2006The Commission further finds that it was a breach of the standard of care for defendant to promote Dr. Ahmad after the University was placed on notice that he had sexually harassed Ms. Brinson; that at the time of Ms. Brinson's sexual harassment complaint to the University, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required employers to take sexual harassment complaints seriously; and that as of the time of Ms. Brinson's complaint of sexual harassment to the University, the common law of North Carolina was that the knowledge by an agent and/or manager was imputed to the employer, as was enunci

2006The Commission further finds that it was a breach of the standard of care for defendant to promote Dr. Ahmad after the University was placed on notice that he had sexually harassed Ms. Brinson; that at the time of Ms. Brinson's sexual harassment complaint to the University, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required employers to take sexual harassment complaints seriously; and that as of the time of Ms. Brinson's complaint of sexual harassment to the University, the common law of North Carolina was that the knowledge by an agent and/or manager was imputed to the employer, as was enunci

2016Henderson & Corbin, Inc., 107 N.C.

2014Id. at 630 , 644 S.E.2d at 629 .

2014Id. at 630 , 644 S.E.2d at 629 .

2012App. 743, 747 , 682 S.E.2d 746, 749 (2009), appeal dismissed, 363 N.C. 856 , 694 S.E.2d 392 (2010) (quoting Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 294 , 354 S.E.2d 228, 234 (1987)). {29} To construe the contract, courts look to the four corners of the entire agreement to determine the intent of the parties at the moment of its execution.

2012App. 743, 747 , 682 S.E.2d 746, 749 (2009), appeal dismissed, 363 N.C. 856 , 694 S.E.2d 392 (2010) (quoting Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 294 , 354 S.E.2d 228, 234 (1987)). {29} To construe the contract, courts look to the four corners of the entire agreement to determine the intent of the parties at the moment of its execution.

2010Weaver v. Sheppa, 186 N.C.

2010As this Court has explained, “[o]ur courts rely on medical experts to show medical causation because ‘the exact nature and probable genesis of a particular type of injury involves complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymenf.]’ ” Azar v. Presbyterian Hosp., 191 N.C.

2010Services of N.C., L.L.C., 610 F. Supp. 2d 528 , 530−31 (W.D.N.C. 2009), aff’d, No. 09-1432 (4th Cir. Apr. 28, 2010) (per curium) (unpublished opinion) (dismissal of a legal malpractice complaint that failed to identify a formal legal duty independent of those articulated in the Rules of Professional Conduct or the corresponding State Bar ethics opinions). {43} The circumstances of this case and the complexities of the relationships between the parties are such that a determination of a breach of the standard of care cannot be determined by an ethics professor who does not practice law in comme

2005Thus, “in order for the conduct of the intervening agent to break the sequence of events . . . the intervening conduct must be of such nature and kind that the original wrongdoer had no reasonable ground to anticipate it.” Id. *751 Plaintiffs argue that the evidence supports two theories of a breach of the standard of care by the labor and delivery nurses and that each breach was a proximate cause of Emma Pope’s injuries. 1 Plaintiffs introduced the deposition testimony of Dr. McAlister, and this testimony was read into the record.

1998Evans v. Appert, 91 N.C.

1994In Progressive Sales, Inc. v. Williams, Willeford, Boger, Grady & Davis, 86 N.C.App. 51 , 356 S.E.2d 372 (1987), our Court made reference to Rorrer , noting "[a]Lthough Rorrer does not mandate introducing expert testimony in a legal malpractice action, that case does stress the need to establish the standard of care in the same or similar legal community.... [T]he purpose of putting on evidence as to the standard of care in a malpractice lawsuit [is] to see if this defendant's actions `lived up' to that standard." Id. at 56, 356 S.E.2d at 375 .

1994In Progressive Sales, Inc. v. Williams, Willeford, Boger, Grady & Davis, 86 N.C.App. 51 , 356 S.E.2d 372 (1987), our Court made reference to Rorrer , noting "[a]Lthough Rorrer does not mandate introducing expert testimony in a legal malpractice action, that case does stress the need to establish the standard of care in the same or similar legal community.... [T]he purpose of putting on evidence as to the standard of care in a malpractice lawsuit [is] to see if this defendant's actions `lived up' to that standard." Id. at 56, 356 S.E.2d at 375 .

1951In Martin v. Amos, supra, this Court in opinion by Nash, J., had this to say: “The object of all laws is to repress vice and to promote the general welfare of the State; and no one can be assisted by the law in enforcing demands founded on a breach or violation of its principles.

1929Co., 193 N. C., 446 , 137 S. E., 310 .” However, it has also been held by this Court that the provision in the statutory fire insurance policy, restricting the power of an agent of an insurance company to waive provisions or conditions, the breach or violation of which renders the policy void or releases the company from liability under the policy, and requiring a waiver in cases where a waiver is permitted by the terms of the policy, to be in writing and added to the policy, does not as a general rule refer to or include conditions existing at the inception of the contract; the provision is a

1929Co., 193 N. C., 446 , 137 S. E., 310 .” However, it has also been held by this Court that the provision in the statutory fire insurance policy, restricting the power of an agent of an insurance company to waive provisions or conditions, the breach or violation of which renders the policy void or releases the company from liability under the policy, and requiring a waiver in cases where a waiver is permitted by the terms of the policy, to be in writing and added to the policy, does not as a general rule refer to or include conditions existing at the inception of the contract; the provision is a

1929This principle was applied in Greene v. Ins. *142 Co., 196 N. C., 335 , 145 S. E., 616 , and in accordance therewith the judgment rendered in the Superior Court con the verdict was reversed.

1929This principle was applied in Greene v. Ins. *142 Co., 196 N. C., 335 , 145 S. E., 616 , and in accordance therewith the judgment rendered in the Superior Court con the verdict was reversed.

1922We held in S. v. Davenport, 156 N. C., 596 , at 597: “Improper remarks made by counsel to the jury are not reversible error when it appears that the court has instructed the jury not to consider them, but to confine themselves in their consideration to the facts bearing upon the issues; and exception to the instructions not being more specific or full, must be taken by way of prayers for special instruction thereon.