36 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Methodist Hospitals, Inc. v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Johnson, 856 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (to establish the applicable standard of care and a breach of that standard in a medical negligence case, a plaintiff generally must present expert testimony); Troutwine Ests. 2016Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Johnson, 856 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). | 2 | 2 |
Miller Ex Rel. Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc.green2 sentences2014See Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1332 (holding that the medical review panel is “authorized to review the medical records and other submitted material pertaining to each defendant’s treatment of’ a patient and that “[w]hile a medical malpractice plaintiff must, as a prerequisite to filing suit, present the . proposed complaint for review and expert opinion by a medical review panel, there is no requirement for such plaintiff to fully explicate and provide the particulars or legal contentions regarding the claim”); see also Johnson v. St. 2014See Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1332 (holding that the medical review panel is “authorized to review the medical records and other submitted material pertaining to each defendant’s treatment of” a patient and that “[w]hile a medical malpractice plaintiff must, as a prerequisite to filing suit, present the proposed complaint for review and expert opinion by a medical review panel, there is no requirement for such plaintiff to fully explicate and provide the particulars or legal contentions regarding the claim”); see also Johnson v. St. | 2 | 2 |
Whyde v. Czarkowskigreen2 sentences2011Thus, this case is more akin to cases in which the panel opinion favors the physician and the patient is required to present sufficient expert medical testimony to negate the panel's opinion in order to survive summary judgment, see Whyde v. Czarkowski, 659 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied, than cases in which the panel opinion favors the patient and any evidence designated by the physician to refute the panel opinion would only create an issue of fact. 10 . 2004See id. at 628 . | 2 | 2 |
Southeast Land Development, Ltd. v. Primrose Management, L.L.C.green2 sentences2017L.L.C., 193 Ohio App.3d 465 , 952 N.E.2d 563, 571 (2011), for the proposition that the prior breach doctrine is applicable only when the non-breaching party treats the contract as terminated not continuing. 2017L.L.C., 193 Ohio App.3d 465 , 952 N.E.2d 563, 571 (2011), for the proposition that the prior breach doctrine is applicable only when the non-breaching party treats the contract as terminated not continuing. | 1 | 2 |
Oelling v. Raogreen2 sentences2014Id. 1995See Oelling v. Rao (1992), Ind., 593 N.E.2d 189, 190 . | 1 | 2 |
Bamberger & Feibleman v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co.green2 sentences2002Bamberger & Feibleman v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 665 N.E.2d 933, 937 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). 2000Bamberger & Feibleman, 665 N.E.2d at 937 . | 1 | 2 |
Randolph County Hospital v. Livingstongreen1 sentence2024Hosp. v. Livingston, 650 N.E.2d 1215, 1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (applying Jordan to conclude the doctor’s “bare assertion that he is familiar with the standard of care of physicians engaged in abdominal surgery” was enough to bar summary judgment), reh’g denied, trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Minickgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Jones v. Minick, 697 N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (relying on Jordan and its progeny to find a genuine issue of fact about the alleged breach in the standard of care even though the affidavit was “not as thorough as it could be”), trans. denied; Randolph Cnty. | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Parkgreen1 sentence2023Indeed, relying on Winona, in Martinez v. Park, we succinctly and unambiguously stated that “Without a showing of an underlying breach of the standard of care by Dr. Park proximately causing Martinez’s injuries, the Healthcare Center cannot be liable for the negligent credentialing of him.” 959 N.E.2d 259, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). [20] Just as we did in Fairbanks, we conclude here that “a medical malpractice action cannot become completely unmoored from the provision of what our case law has established is the very essence of health care . . . .” 895 N.E.2d at 738 . | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Olsongreen1 sentence2019(See Appellant’s Br. at 20-21) (citing, e.g., Ross v. Olson, 825 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (stating “[t]o establish the applicable standard of care and to show a breach of that standard, a plaintiff [in a medical malpractice action] must generally offer expert testimony”), trans. denied; Hacker v. Holland, 570 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (noting Indiana law normally requires the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action to put forth expert testimony demonstrating the standard of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-SC-1018 | November 15, 2019 Page 6 of 11 car | 1 | 1 |
Hacker v. Hollandgreen1 sentence2019(See Appellant’s Br. at 20-21) (citing, e.g., Ross v. Olson, 825 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (stating “[t]o establish the applicable standard of care and to show a breach of that standard, a plaintiff [in a medical malpractice action] must generally offer expert testimony”), trans. denied; Hacker v. Holland, 570 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (noting Indiana law normally requires the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action to put forth expert testimony demonstrating the standard of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-SC-1018 | November 15, 2019 Page 6 of 11 car | 1 | 1 |
KD EX REL. KD v. Chambersgreen2 sentences2016K.D. v. Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied. “[A] malpractice plaintiff cannot present one breach of the standard of care to the panel and, after receiving an opinion, proceed to trial and raise claims of additional, separate breaches of the standard of care that were not presented to the panel and addressed in its opinion.” Id. [11] In the preset case, the Horns contend that all of their allegations regarding the breach of standard of care,'including the lack of indications to perform the procedure, were presented to the medical *4 review panel in their proposed com 2016K.D. v. Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied. “[A] malpractice plaintiff cannot present one breach of the standard of care to the panel and, after receiving an opinion, proceed to trial and raise claims of additional, separate breaches of the standard of care that were not presented to the panel and addressed in its opinion.” Id. [11] In the preset case, the Horns contend that all of their allegations regarding the breach of standard of care,'including the lack of indications to perform the procedure, were presented to the medical *4 review panel in their proposed com | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Goodman v. Haltergreen2 sentences1912State, ex rel., v. Helms (1893), 136 Ind. 122 , 35 N. E. 893; Hochstettler v. Hosier Coal, etc., Co. (1893), 8 Ind. App. 442 , 35 N. E. 927 ; State, ex rel., v. Halter (1898), 149 Ind. 292, 300, 302 , 47 N. E. 665 , 49 N. E. 7 ; Starr v. State, ex rel. (1898), 149 Ind. 592, 594, 595 , 49 N. E. 591 ; City of Indianapolis v. Ritzinger (1900), 24 Ind. App. 65, 77 , 56 N. E. 141 . . 1912State, ex rel., v. Helms (1893), 136 Ind. 122 , 35 N. E. 893; Hochstettler v. Hosier Coal, etc., Co. (1893), 8 Ind. App. 442 , 35 N. E. 927 ; State, ex rel., v. Halter (1898), 149 Ind. 292, 300, 302 , 47 N. E. 665 , 49 N. E. 7 ; Starr v. State, ex rel. (1898), 149 Ind. 592, 594, 595 , 49 N. E. 591 ; City of Indianapolis v. Ritzinger (1900), 24 Ind. App. 65, 77 , 56 N. E. 141 . . | 1 | 1 |
| Starr v. State ex rel. Ketchamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Slease v. Hughbanks
green
2 sentences2020Id. at 499 . 2005Id. | 4 | 1999–2020 |
Narducci v. Tedrow
green
2 sentences2018Id. 2018Id. | 3 | 2005–2018 |
Planned Parenthood of Northwest Indiana, Inc. v. Vines
green
2 sentences1995Planned Parenthood of Northwest Indiana v. Vines (1989), Ind.App., 543 N.E.2d 654, 660 , trans. denied. 1991“In the context of medical negligence, a plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) the standard of care owed the patient, (2) a breach of that standard, and (3) that the plaintiff suffered a compensable injury proximately caused by the defendant’s breach of the standard.” Planned Parenthood of Northwest Indiana v. Vines (1989), Ind.App., 543 N.E.2d 654, 660 , trans. denied. | 3 | 1991–1995 |
Syfu v. Quinn
green
2 sentences2016Id. 2006Syfu v. Quinn, 826 N.E.2d 699 . | 2 | 2006–2016 |
Vlach v. Goode
green
2 sentences1993As the Bonneses recognize, to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice based upon negligence a plaintiff must show sufficient evidence of “(1) the standard of care the doctor owed the patient, (2) a breach of that standard, and (3) that the plaintiff suffered a compensable injury proximately caused by the defendant’s breach of duty.” Vlach v. Goode (1987), Ind.App., 515 N.E.2d 569 , 572 trans. denied. 1989Cf. Vlack v. Goode (1987), Ind. App., 515 N.E.2d 569 , 572 rehearing denied, A nurse, even one working under standing orders or a protocol established by a physician, "must meet the standard of care to which nurses practicing that profession in the community are held." Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co. (1955), 136 Cal.App.2d 229 , 288 P.2d 581, 587 . | 2 | 1989–1993 |
Watson Water Company, Inc. v. Indiana-American Water Company, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026Further asserting the prior breach doctrine did not prevent it from enforcing the right-of-first-refusal clause, Watson cited an Ohio Court of Appeals opinion for the notion “that the prior breach doctrine is applicable only when the non-breaching party treats the contract as terminated not continuing.” Id. at 849 (citing Se. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Fairbanks Hospital v. Harrold
green
1 sentence2023Indeed, relying on Winona, in Martinez v. Park, we succinctly and unambiguously stated that “Without a showing of an underlying breach of the standard of care by Dr. Park proximately causing Martinez’s injuries, the Healthcare Center cannot be liable for the negligent credentialing of him.” 959 N.E.2d 259, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). [20] Just as we did in Fairbanks, we conclude here that “a medical malpractice action cannot become completely unmoored from the provision of what our case law has established is the very essence of health care . . . .” 895 N.E.2d at 738 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hacker v. Holland
green
1 sentence2019(See Appellant’s Br. at 20-21) (citing, e.g., Ross v. Olson, 825 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (stating “[t]o establish the applicable standard of care and to show a breach of that standard, a plaintiff [in a medical malpractice action] must generally offer expert testimony”), trans. denied; Hacker v. Holland, 570 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (noting Indiana law normally requires the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action to put forth expert testimony demonstrating the standard of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-SC-1018 | November 15, 2019 Page 6 of 11 car | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Garneau v. Bush
green
2 sentences2016Indeed, Dr. Fehrenbacher designated the affidavit of Dr. Kiray, in which Dr. Kiray averred that the Panel members concluded “Dr. Fehrenbacher failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care when, on or before March 24, 2010, she failed to order an MRA and/or further vascular consultation before or at the same time as making a neurosurgery referral.” Appendix at 31. [21] Smith attempts to liken her case to Garneau, 838 N.E.2d 1134 . 2016Id. at 1145 . [23] The record before us does not contain an expert affidavit addressing whether Dr. Fehrenbacher’s post-surgery treatment of Smith constituted a breach of the standard of care that resulted in injury to Smith. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sawlani v. Mills
green
1 sentence2010The Opinion should be construed like Sawlani v. Mills, [ 830 N.E.2d 932 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied], that is, finding a breach of the standard of care, but no determination whether Natalie was damaged as a result. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Widmeyer v. Faulk
green
1 sentence1997Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Petroski v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
green
2 sentences1996Petroski, 171 Ind.App. at 18 , 354 N.E.2d at 741 . 1996Petroski, 171 Ind.App. at 18 , 354 N.E.2d at 741 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Vergara Ex Rel. Vergara v. Doan
green
1 sentence1993The appropriate standard of care that a physician must exercise is “that degree of care, skill, and proficiency exercised by reasonably careful, skillful, and prudent practitioners in the same class to which he belongs, acting under the same or similar circumstances.” Vergara by Vergara v. Doan (1992), Ind., 593 N.E.2d 185, 187 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Wilson v. Sligar
green
1 sentence1991“In Indiana, an expert witness may not testify as to the standard of care unless the record shows that the witness is familiar with the standard of care in the same or similar locality as the one in which the complained of services were performed.” Wilson v. Sligar (1987), Ind.App., 516 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 , trans. denied. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co.
green
2 sentences1989Cf. Vlack v. Goode (1987), Ind. App., 515 N.E.2d 569 , 572 rehearing denied, A nurse, even one working under standing orders or a protocol established by a physician, "must meet the standard of care to which nurses practicing that profession in the community are held." Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co. (1955), 136 Cal.App.2d 229 , 288 P.2d 581, 587 . 1989Cf. Vlack v. Goode (1987), Ind. App., 515 N.E.2d 569 , 572 rehearing denied, A nurse, even one working under standing orders or a protocol established by a physician, "must meet the standard of care to which nurses practicing that profession in the community are held." Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co. (1955), 136 Cal.App.2d 229 , 288 P.2d 581, 587 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Sylvester v. State
green
2 sentences1946Rep. 812 , *421 “It is the duty of the presiding judge . . . to interfere of his own motion to prevent a breach of privilege of counsel, and if he fails to do so and the abuse of privilege is of such character as to produce the conviction that injustice resulted therefrom, the duty of this court is to apply the corrective by awarding a new trial.” See also Sylvester v. State (1933), 205 Ind. 628, 630 , 187 N. E. 669, 670 . 1946Rep. 812 , *421 “It is the duty of the presiding judge . . . to interfere of his own motion to prevent a breach of privilege of counsel, and if he fails to do so and the abuse of privilege is of such character as to produce the conviction that injustice resulted therefrom, the duty of this court is to apply the corrective by awarding a new trial.” See also Sylvester v. State (1933), 205 Ind. 628, 630 , 187 N. E. 669, 670 . | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Palmer v. . Jones neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
State ex rel. Cunningham v. Helms
neutral
1 sentence1912State, ex rel., v. Helms (1893), 136 Ind. 122 , 35 N. E. 893; Hochstettler v. Hosier Coal, etc., Co. (1893), 8 Ind. App. 442 , 35 N. E. 927 ; State, ex rel., v. Halter (1898), 149 Ind. 292, 300, 302 , 47 N. E. 665 , 49 N. E. 7 ; Starr v. State, ex rel. (1898), 149 Ind. 592, 594, 595 , 49 N. E. 591 ; City of Indianapolis v. Ritzinger (1900), 24 Ind. App. 65, 77 , 56 N. E. 141 . . | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Hochstettler v. Mosier Coal & Mining Co. neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| City of Indianapolis v. Ritzinger green | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.