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15 Virginia opinions name it 5 courts 1914–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Griffett v. Ryangreen2 sentences2002Griffett v. Ryan, 247 Va. 465, 470 (1994); St. 2000Griffett v. Ryan, 247 Va. 465, 470 , 443 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1994); see also St. | 2 | 2 |
Horton v. Hortongreen1 sentence2025Cf. Horton v. Horton, 254 Va. 111, 115 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Bitar v. Rahmangreen1 sentence2024Bitar v. Rahman, 272 Va. 130, 137-38 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Beverly Enterprises-Virginia, Inc. v. Nicholsgreen2 sentences2010Cf. Beverly Enters.-Va., Inc. v. Nichols, 247 Va. 264, 269 , 441 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1994) (in nursing home negligence case, holding that whether expert testimony is required depends upon the degree of specialized knowledge required to determine the applicable standard and apply it to the facts). 2010Cf. Beverly Enters.-Va., Inc. v. Nichols, 247 Va. 264, 269 , 441 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1994) (in nursing home negligence case, holding that whether expert testimony is required depends upon the degree of specialized knowledge required to determine the applicable standard and apply it to the facts). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Koulizakisgreen2 sentences2006See Brown v. Koulizakis, 229 Va. 524 , 532, 331 S.E.2d 440 , 446 (1985) (in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant breached the applicable standard of care and that the negligent acts were a proximate cause of the injury). 2006See Brown v. Koulizakis, 229 Va. 524 , 532, 331 S.E.2d 440 , 446 (1985) (in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant breached the applicable standard of care and that the negligent acts were a proximate cause of the injury). | 1 | 1 |
Ortiz v. Barrettgreen2 sentences1997Code §54.1-3906; Ortiz v. Barrett, 222 Va. 118, 126, 278 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1981). 1997Code §54.1-3906; Ortiz v. Barrett, 222 Va. 118, 126, 278 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Washington County National Bank v. Washington Countygreen2 sentences1971City of Richmond Commonwealth, 188 Va. 600, 625 , 50 S.E.2d 654, 666 (1948); Washington Bank Washington Co., 176 Va. 216, 218 , 10 S.E.2d 515, 516 (1940). 1971City of Richmond Commonwealth, 188 Va. 600, 625 , 50 S.E.2d 654, 666 (1948); Washington Bank Washington Co., 176 Va. 216, 218 , 10 S.E.2d 515, 516 (1940). | 1 | 1 |
City of Richmond v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1971City of Richmond Commonwealth, 188 Va. 600, 625 , 50 S.E.2d 654, 666 (1948); Washington Bank Washington Co., 176 Va. 216, 218 , 10 S.E.2d 515, 516 (1940). 1971City of Richmond Commonwealth, 188 Va. 600, 625 , 50 S.E.2d 654, 666 (1948); Washington Bank Washington Co., 176 Va. 216, 218 , 10 S.E.2d 515, 516 (1940). | 1 | 1 |
Montecon v. Fauresgreen1 sentence1914See Montecan v. Faures, 3 La. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences1988Similarly, in Safeco Ins., the trial court, sitting without a jury, found that a 51-day delay between the accident date and the date of notice was a breach of the requirement that notice be given “as soon as practicable.” In affirming the trial court, we said that the issue was “whether the trial court’s implicit holding that the notice was untimely is supported by credible evidence.” 223 Va. at 324 , 288 S.E.2d at 473 . 1988Similarly, in Safeco Ins., the trial court, sitting without a jury, found that a 51-day delay between the accident date and the date of notice was a breach of the requirement that notice be given “as soon as practicable.” In affirming the trial court, we said that the issue was “whether the trial court’s implicit holding that the notice was untimely is supported by credible evidence.” 223 Va. at 324 , 288 S.E.2d at 473 . | 3 | 1988–1998 |
Bryan v. Burt
green
2 sentences2002They maintained that Perdieu failed to present expert testimony on these three required elements. *417 HCMF joined Dr. Rosenbaum’s and BFPC’s motion to strike the evidence and further argued that in order to establish proximate cause, pursuant to Bryan v. Burt, 254 Va. 28 , 486 S.E.2d 536 (1997), Perdieu was required to state “what should have been done.” HCMF maintained that Perdieu failed to present any evidence as to what measures should have been taken to prevent Overton’s falls. 2002They maintained that Perdieu failed to present expert testimony on these three required elements. *417 HCMF joined Dr. Rosenbaum’s and BFPC’s motion to strike the evidence and further argued that in order to establish proximate cause, pursuant to Bryan v. Burt, 254 Va. 28 , 486 S.E.2d 536 (1997), Perdieu was required to state “what should have been done.” HCMF maintained that Perdieu failed to present any evidence as to what measures should have been taken to prevent Overton’s falls. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Smith v. Lámar
green
1 sentence1988While the Virginia Supreme Court in Smith v. Lamar, 212 Va. 820 (1972), mandated a different standard of care for a police officer in hot pursuit of a violator, a breach of this standard nevertheless constitutes simple negligence. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Geo. Home Ins. v. Kinnier's adm'x
neutral
1 sentence1968The Court said: “Now this conduct of the company’s agent . . . amounted ... to a dispensing with the performance of the condition by the assured, or a waiver of the forfeiture incurred by the breach of it, or . . . [it] operated as an estoppel, precluding tihe company from afterwards relying upon the breach as a bar tú the claim of the assured for indemnity under the policy.” Id. at 107-08 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.