breach standard in Ohio

2025“Thus, although a motion for a directed verdict does not present a question of fact, when deciding a motion for a directed verdict the court must ‘review and consider the evidence.’” Id., quoting Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1982). {¶44} The trial court granted the partial directed verdict after deciding that the plaintiff did not establish that a violation of the standard of care proximately caused Andrew’s death. “‘To prevail on a claim of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish through expert testimony the acceptable medical standard of care, the defendant’s

2011See Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 579 , 1993-Ohio-183 , 613 N.E.2d 1014 , citing Bruni v. Tatsumi (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 127 , 346 N.E.2d 673 . plaintiffs] may be unable to prove that they would have been successful in the underlying matter(s) in question.” Id. at 427. {¶ 59} In this matter, plaintiff asserts that the judgment is not supported by competent, credible evidence because the opinion testimony of defense expert, Doctor Bunge, was premised upon his erroneous view that “ventilator alarms were not going off at the time the deceased received her last dose of Demerol,” and all of

2011See Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 579 , 1993-Ohio-183 , 613 N.E.2d 1014 , citing Bruni v. Tatsumi (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 127 , 346 N.E.2d 673 . plaintiffs] may be unable to prove that they would have been successful in the underlying matter(s) in question.” Id. at 427. {¶ 59} In this matter, plaintiff asserts that the judgment is not supported by competent, credible evidence because the opinion testimony of defense expert, Doctor Bunge, was premised upon his erroneous view that “ventilator alarms were not going off at the time the deceased received her last dose of Demerol,” and all of

2011See Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 579 , 1993-Ohio-183 , 613 N.E.2d 1014 , citing Bruni v. Tatsumi (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 127 , 346 N.E.2d 673 . plaintiffs] may be unable to prove that they would have been successful in the underlying matter(s) in question.” Id. at 427. {¶ 59} In this matter, plaintiff asserts that the judgment is not supported by competent, credible evidence because the opinion testimony of defense expert, Doctor Bunge, was premised upon his erroneous view that “ventilator alarms were not going off at the time the deceased received her last dose of Demerol,” and all of

2011See Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 579 , 1993-Ohio-183 , 613 N.E.2d 1014 , citing Bruni v. Tatsumi (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 127 , 346 N.E.2d 673 . plaintiffs] may be unable to prove that they would have been successful in the underlying matter(s) in question.” Id. at 427. {¶ 59} In this matter, plaintiff asserts that the judgment is not supported by competent, credible evidence because the opinion testimony of defense expert, Doctor Bunge, was premised upon his erroneous view that “ventilator alarms were not going off at the time the deceased received her last dose of Demerol,” and all of

2007See Berdyck v.Shinde , 66 Ohio St.3d 573 , 580-581 , 1993-Ohio-183 (in a negligence action involving the professional skill and judgment of a nurse, expert testimony must be presented to establish (1) the prevailing standard of care; (2) a breach of that standard; and (3) that the nurse's negligence was the proximate cause of the patient's injury; however, in a negligence action involving conduct within the common knowledge and experience of jurors, expert testimony is not required). {¶ 11} Accordingly, a directed verdict based upon the location of the call light was not appropriate.

2025Summary judgment in favor of the defendant-physician is appropriate where “the plaintiff fails to present expert testimony that [the] physician breached the applicable standard of care and that the breach constituted the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. . . .” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Culp v. Olukoga, 2013-Ohio-5211, ¶ 70 (4th Dist.).

2025If a plaintiff fails to present such expert testimony, then "a court may enter summary judgment in favor of the defendant-physician." Culp v. Olukoga, 2013-Ohio-5211, ¶ 70 (4th Dist.), quoting Armeni v. Aromatorio, 2012-Ohio-1500, ¶ 34 (7th Dist.); Taylor v. McCullough-Hyde Mem.

2020Portage No. 2005-P-0043, 2006-Ohio-1456, ¶ 18 (recognizing in a medical -35- malpractice case that “without a breach of the standard of care, it is elemental negligence law that the issue of proximate cause is moot”).

2017No. 2005-P-0043, 2006-Ohio-1456, ¶ 18 (without a breach of the standard of care, it is elemental negligence law that the issue of proximate cause is moot). {¶ 36} Because we have already decided that the Court of Claims' determination that Dr. Curell's decision to discharge Peter on March 22, 2005 did not fall below the standard of care was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we find appellants' third assignment of error to be moot.

2010The same is true with respect to nurses and negligence actions, “expert testimony must be presented to establish the prevailing standard of care, a breach of that standard, and that the nurse’s negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the patient’s injury.” Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 97 , 592 N.E.2d 828 , paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶17} With respect to LMH’s liability in this case, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital is liable for the negligent acts of its employees. -9- Case No. 1-09-24 Klema v. St.

2010With respect to nurses and negligence actions, “expert testimony must be presented to establish the prevailing standard of care, a breach of that standard, and that the nurse’s negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the patient’s injury.” Ramage, 64 Ohio St.3d 97 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2017"Where the alleged negligence involves the professional skill and judgment of a nurse, expert testimony must be presented to establish the prevailing standard of care, a breach of that standard, and that the nurse's negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the patient's injury." Id. at 103-104, 592 N.E.2d 828 . {¶ 80} Attorney Norman and the law firm respond by arguing a qualified expert was required to prove breach of the standard of care for a financial professional.

2010The same is true with respect to nurses and negligence actions, “expert testimony must be presented to establish the prevailing standard of care, a breach of that standard, and that the nurse’s negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the patient’s injury.” Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 97 , 592 N.E.2d 828 , paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶17} With respect to LMH’s liability in this case, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital is liable for the negligent acts of its employees. -9- Case No. 1-09-24 Klema v. St.

2026Adams v. Kurz, 2010-Ohio-2776 , ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), citing Williams v. Lo, 2008-Ohio-2804, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), citing Campbell v. Ohio State Univ.

2008Williams v. Lo , Franklin App. No. 07AP-949, 2008-Ohio-2804 .

2013No. 2480, 1989 WL 106582 , *2 (Sept. 13, 1989): see also Kelly v. Accountancy Bd. of Ohio, 88 Ohio App.3d 453, 459 (10th Dist.1993) (R.C. 2921.22 “unambiguously reveals an intent on the part of the legislature to encourage the reporting of felonies and to prohibit recrimination against individuals who make such required disclosures.”).

2009See R.C. 2921.22 ("Reporting felony; medical personnel to report gunshot, stabbing, and burn injuries and suspected domestic violence"); Kelly v. Accountancy Bd. of Ohio (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 453 , 459-460 (finding that the phrase "disclosure of information," contained in R.C. 2921.22 (G), which is the statute that protects an individual who discloses information that a felony has been or is being committed to law enforcement officers from liability or recrimination in the event that the disclosure results in a breach of privilege or confidence, is "not be limited solely to notifying authorit

2026See Orion Mgmt., Inc. v. Kaeka, 2025-Ohio-1047, ¶ 86 (9th Dist.) (“If the nonmoving party fails to present evidence on one or more essential elements of a claim, a directed verdict is proper”) (quotations omitted); Mayhorn v. Pavey, 8 Ohio App.3d 189, 193 (10th Dist. 1982) (affirming directed verdict for defendant physician where plaintiff’s case depended on expert testimony to establish a breach of the standard of care, and the expert’s own testimony failed to provide probative evidence on that issue). {¶28} For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County is aff

2026Ohio Emergency Servs., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus; see also Czarney v. Porter, 2006-Ohio-2471, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), quoting Johnson v. Grant Hosp., 31 Ohio App.2d 118, 124-125 (10th Dist. 1972) (“Where the issue is one of an exercise of judgment or skill requiring the specialized training of a nurse, expert-opinion evidence would be required”), reversed on other grounds, 32 Ohio St.2d 169 (1972). {¶ 27} However, there is a “common knowledge exception” to the general rule that expert testimony is necessary in actions involving the negligence of a medical professio

2026Ohio Emergency Servs., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus; see also Czarney v. Porter, 2006-Ohio-2471, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), quoting Johnson v. Grant Hosp., 31 Ohio App.2d 118, 124-125 (10th Dist. 1972) (“Where the issue is one of an exercise of judgment or skill requiring the specialized training of a nurse, expert-opinion evidence would be required”), reversed on other grounds, 32 Ohio St.2d 169 (1972). {¶ 27} However, there is a “common knowledge exception” to the general rule that expert testimony is necessary in actions involving the negligence of a medical professio

2026Ohio Emergency Servs., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus; see also Czarney v. Porter, 2006-Ohio-2471, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), quoting Johnson v. Grant Hosp., 31 Ohio App.2d 118, 124-125 (10th Dist. 1972) (“Where the issue is one of an exercise of judgment or skill requiring the specialized training of a nurse, expert-opinion evidence would be required”), reversed on other grounds, 32 Ohio St.2d 169 (1972). {¶ 27} However, there is a “common knowledge exception” to the general rule that expert testimony is necessary in actions involving the negligence of a medical professio

2026See Orion Mgmt., Inc. v. Kaeka, 2025-Ohio-1047, ¶ 86 (9th Dist.) (“If the nonmoving party fails to present evidence on one or more essential elements of a claim, a directed verdict is proper”) (quotations omitted); Mayhorn v. Pavey, 8 Ohio App.3d 189, 193 (10th Dist. 1982) (affirming directed verdict for defendant physician where plaintiff’s case depended on expert testimony to establish a breach of the standard of care, and the expert’s own testimony failed to provide probative evidence on that issue). {¶28} For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County is aff

2025Also, the trial court granted Dr. Ghaffari’s request that the jury only consider the giving of 4-milligrams of morphine as a violation of the standard of care and not any of Dr. Ghaffari’s other acts. {¶57} Susan argues that the admissibility of a breach of the standard of care is not contingent upon a related proximate cause opinion. “‘The crux of a medical- malpractice claim is whether the defendant-doctor’s treatment fell below the appropriate standard of care.’” Adams v. Durrani, 2022-Ohio-60, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.), quoting Setters v. Durrani, 2020-Ohio-6859, ¶ 48 (1st Dist.). {¶58} “‘In order

2025In such cases, expert testimony is necessary to demonstrate "(1) the applicable standard of care within the medical community, (2) the defendant breached that standard of care, and (3) the breach of the standard of care proximately caused the plaintiff's injury." Schumacher v. Patel, 2023-Ohio-4623, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.).

2025Also, the trial court granted Dr. Ghaffari’s request that the jury only consider the giving of 4-milligrams of morphine as a violation of the standard of care and not any of Dr. Ghaffari’s other acts. {¶57} Susan argues that the admissibility of a breach of the standard of care is not contingent upon a related proximate cause opinion. “‘The crux of a medical- malpractice claim is whether the defendant-doctor’s treatment fell below the appropriate standard of care.’” Adams v. Durrani, 2022-Ohio-60, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.), quoting Setters v. Durrani, 2020-Ohio-6859, ¶ 48 (1st Dist.). {¶58} “‘In order

2025“Thus, although a motion for a directed verdict does not present a question of fact, when deciding a motion for a directed verdict the court must ‘review and consider the evidence.’” Id., quoting Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1982). {¶44} The trial court granted the partial directed verdict after deciding that the plaintiff did not establish that a violation of the standard of care proximately caused Andrew’s death. “‘To prevail on a claim of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish through expert testimony the acceptable medical standard of care, the defendant’s

2025“Thus, although a motion for a directed verdict does not present a question of fact, when deciding a motion for a directed verdict the court must ‘review and consider the evidence.’” Id., quoting Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1982). {¶44} The trial court granted the partial directed verdict after deciding that the plaintiff did not establish that a violation of the standard of care proximately caused Andrew’s death. “‘To prevail on a claim of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish through expert testimony the acceptable medical standard of care, the defendant’s

2025Also, the trial court granted Dr. Ghaffari’s request that the jury only consider the giving of 4-milligrams of morphine as a violation of the standard of care and not any of Dr. Ghaffari’s other acts. {¶57} Susan argues that the admissibility of a breach of the standard of care is not contingent upon a related proximate cause opinion. “‘The crux of a medical- malpractice claim is whether the defendant-doctor’s treatment fell below the appropriate standard of care.’” Adams v. Durrani, 2022-Ohio-60, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.), quoting Setters v. Durrani, 2020-Ohio-6859, ¶ 48 (1st Dist.). {¶58} “‘In order

2025If a plaintiff fails to present such expert testimony, then "a court may enter summary judgment in favor of the defendant-physician." Culp v. Olukoga, 2013-Ohio-5211, ¶ 70 (4th Dist.), quoting Armeni v. Aromatorio, 2012-Ohio-1500, ¶ 34 (7th Dist.); Taylor v. McCullough-Hyde Mem.