breach standard in Michigan

2025See Martinez v Redform Comm Hosp, 148 Mich App 221, 230 ; 384 NW2d 134 (1986).

2025See Martinez v Redform Comm Hosp, 148 Mich App 221, 230 ; 384 NW2d 134 (1986).

2014See Wiley v Henry Ford Cottage Hosp, 257 Mich App 488, 493 ; 668 NW2d 402 (2003).

2014See Wiley v Henry Ford Cottage Hosp, 257 Mich App 488, 493 ; 668 NW2d 402 (2003).

2026An exception to this general rule exists when “the professional’s breach of the standard of care is so obvious that it is within the common knowledge and experience of an ordinary layperson.” Elher v Misra, 499 Mich 11, 21-22 ; 878 NW2d 790 (2016).

2026An exception to this general rule exists when “the professional’s breach of the standard of care is so obvious that it is within the common knowledge and experience of an ordinary layperson.” Elher v Misra, 499 Mich 11, 21-22 ; 878 NW2d 790 (2016).

2022Way, and an affidavit by defense expert Dr. John Webber, opining that Dr. Drew’s opinion regarding the breach of the standard of care was not generally accepted by the board-certified general surgery community. 4 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579 ; 113 S Ct 2786 ; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993). -2- of the American College of Surgeons.

2022Way, and an affidavit by defense expert Dr. John Webber, opining that Dr. Drew’s opinion regarding the breach of the standard of care was not generally accepted by the board-certified general surgery community. 4 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579 ; 113 S Ct 2786 ; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993). -2- of the American College of Surgeons.

2018DeCosta v Gossage, 486 Mich 116, 122 ; 782 8 MCL 600.2912b(4) provides: (4) The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following: (a) The factual basis for the claim. (b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant. (c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility. (d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care. (e) The

2018DeCosta v Gossage, 486 Mich 116, 122 ; 782 8 MCL 600.2912b(4) provides: (4) The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following: (a) The factual basis for the claim. (b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant. (c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility. (d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care. (e) The

2017See id . at 497-498, 711 N.W.2d 795 (holding that when the testimony of the plaintiff's proposed expert witness was not admissible under MCL 600.2169(1)(b) to establish the standard of care, the defendant was entitled to summary disposition because the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the standard of care and the breach of that standard).

2017See id. at 497-498 (where the testimony of the plaintiff’s proposed expert witness was not admissible under MCL 600.2169(1)(b) to establish the standard of care, the defendant was entitled to summary disposition because the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the standard of care and the breach of that standard).

2024Kalaj v Khan, 295 Mich App 420, 429 ; 820 NW2d 223 (2012); see also Thomas v McPherson Comm Health Ctr, 155 Mich App 700, 705 ; 400 NW2d 629 (1986) (indicating that “in an action for malpractice against a hospital, expert testimony is required to establish the applicable standard of conduct, the breach of that standard, and causation”).

2024Kalaj v Khan, 295 Mich App 420, 429 ; 820 NW2d 223 (2012); see also Thomas v McPherson Comm Health Ctr, 155 Mich App 700, 705 ; 400 NW2d 629 (1986) (indicating that “in an action for malpractice against a hospital, expert testimony is required to establish the applicable standard of conduct, the breach of that standard, and causation”).

2019To establish medical malpractice, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving “(1) the applicable standard of care, (2) a breach of that standard by the defendant, (3) an injury, and (4) proximate causation between the alleged breach of duty and the injury.” Rock v Crocker, 499 Mich 247, 255 ; 884 NW2d 227 (2016). “‘Proximate cause’ is a legal term of art that incorporates both cause in fact and legal (or ‘proximate’) cause.” Craig, 471 Mich at 86 .

2018To establish a cause of action for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the appropriate standard of care governing the defendant’s conduct at the time of the purported negligence, (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care, (3) that the plaintiff was injured, and (4) that the plaintiff’s injuries were the proximate result of the defendant’s breach of the applicable standard of care. [Craig ex rel Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 86 ; 684 NW2d 296 (2004); MCL 600.2912a (codifying the common-law elements).] Plaintiff’s medical expert testified that the standard of ca

2009Why would it matter that the notice of intent was defective as to the professional corporation if a professional corporation is never entitled to a notice of intent in the first place? 9 (a) The factual basis for the claim. (b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant. (c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility. (d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care. (e) The manner in which it is allege

2008That provision provides the following: The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following: (a) The factual basis for the claim. (b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant. (c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility. (d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care. (e) The manner in which it is alleged the br

2026In this medical malpractice claim, plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating each of the following elements: “(1) the applicable standard of care, (2) a breach of that standard by [a] defendant, (3) an injury, and (4) proximate causation between the alleged breach of duty and the injury.” Rock v Crocker, 499 Mich 247, 255 ; 884 NW2d 227 (2016).

2026In this medical malpractice claim, plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating each of the following elements: “(1) the applicable standard of care, (2) a breach of that standard by [a] defendant, (3) an injury, and (4) proximate causation between the alleged breach of duty and the injury.” Rock v Crocker, 499 Mich 247, 255 ; 884 NW2d 227 (2016).

2026Under MCL 600.2169(1) and Cox, 322 Mich App at 301 , plaintiff must offer the expert testimony of a registered nurse in order to establish the standard of care applicable to registered nurses and to establish a breach of that standard of care.

2024“In general, expert testimony is necessary in a malpractice action to establish the applicable standard of care and the defendant’s breach of that standard.” Id.

2016Rather, “a physician must act within the standard of care on each visit, and a physician’s continued adherence to a particular diagnosis or treatment plan at a later appointment might constitute a breach of the standard of care if there are facts that show that continued adherence was unreasonable.” Id.

2015She stated that Dr. Stevenson should have made a timely referral “after 14, or at the most, 21 days of ongoing clinical mouth lesions that progressed to bilateral large lesions as of November 9, 2010.” As recognized by this Court in Kincaid, 300 Mich App at 535 , “a physician must act within the standard of care on each visit, and a physician’s continued adherence to a particular diagnosis or treatment plan at a later appointment might constitute a breach of the standard of care if there are facts that show that continued adherence was unreasonable.” As an example of an unreasonable adherence

2019See generally Ligons v Crittenton Hosp, 490 Mich 61, 89 ; 803 NW2d 271 (2011). -2- plaintiff’s attorney concerning the allegations contained in the notice and shall contain a statement of each of the following: (a) The applicable standard of practice or care. (b) The health professional’s opinion that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility receiving the notice. (c) The actions that should have been taken or omitted by the health professional or health facility in order to have complied with the applicable standard of practice or c

2019See generally Ligons v Crittenton Hosp, 490 Mich 61, 89 ; 803 NW2d 271 (2011). -2- plaintiff’s attorney concerning the allegations contained in the notice and shall contain a statement of each of the following: (a) The applicable standard of practice or care. (b) The health professional’s opinion that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility receiving the notice. (c) The actions that should have been taken or omitted by the health professional or health facility in order to have complied with the applicable standard of practice or c

2011See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed) (defining “proceeding” as including “[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment”; “[a]ny procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency”; and “[a]n act or step that is part of a larger action”); see, also, Bush, 484 Mich at 176-177 ; Boodt, 481 Mich at 568 n 6 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting).6 Further, because MCL 600.2301 permits amendment “either in form or substance,” amending the substance of an AOM to more clearly state the manner in which the br

2011See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed) (defining “proceeding” as including “[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment”; “[a]ny procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency”; and “[a]n act or step that is part of a larger action”); see, also, Bush, 484 Mich at 176-177 ; Boodt, 481 Mich at 568 n 6 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). 6 Further, because MCL 600.2301 permits amendment “either in form or substance,” amending the substance of an AOM to more clearly state the manner in which the b

2011In doing so, the Bush majority questioned precedent set forth in Roberts, 466 Mich at 57 , and Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr, 481 Mich 558 ; 751 NW2d 44 (2008).

2004An omission of an identification of a breach of the standard of care did not occur in Roberts, supra. Thus, the analysis and outcome do not bear upon the resolution of this case.

2026See Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 162-163 ; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).

2026See Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 162-163 ; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).

2026See Brownell v Garber, 199 Mich App 519, 532 ; 503 NW2d 81 (1993).

2026See Brownell v Garber, 199 Mich App 519, 532 ; 503 NW2d 81 (1993).

2017That is, it did not allege a breach of the standard of care and proximate cause based on anesthesia given during the surgical procedure. [ Id. at 482-483 , 679 N.W.2d 98 ]. 3 *914 The Gulley-Reaves panel agreed that the NOI was defective because it "did not set forth the minimal requirements to identify that the anesthesia was a potential cause of plaintiff's injury," and because the NOI "was silent with regard to any breach of the standard of care during the administration of anesthesia." Id. at 487 , 679 N.W.2d 98 .

2017That is, it did not allege a breach of the standard of care and proximate cause based on anesthesia given during the surgical procedure. [ Id. at 482-483 , 679 N.W.2d 98 ]. 3 *914 The Gulley-Reaves panel agreed that the NOI was defective because it "did not set forth the minimal requirements to identify that the anesthesia was a potential cause of plaintiff's injury," and because the NOI "was silent with regard to any breach of the standard of care during the administration of anesthesia." Id. at 487 , 679 N.W.2d 98 .