54 Pennsylvania opinions name it 7 courts 1890–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vicari v. Spiegelgreen2 sentences2016“With passage of the MCARE Act, the General Assembly created a more stringent standard for admissibility of medical expert testimony in a medical malpractice action by the imposition of specific additional requirements not present in the common law standard.” Vicari v. Spiegel, - 11 - J.A02042/16 989 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Pa. 2010) (“Vicari II”). 2016“With passage of the MCARE Act, the General Assembly created a more stringent standard for admissibility of medical expert testimony in a medical malpractice action by the imposition of specific additional requirements not present in the common law standard.” Vicari v. Spiegel, 605 Pa. 381 , 989 A.2d 1277, 1280 (2010) (“Vicari II”). | 4 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Chopakgreen2 sentences2019Id. at 701–02. 2015Id. at 701-02. | 2 | 3 |
Havasy v. Resnickgreen2 sentences2014In one case, the court determined that a “mistake of judgment” instruction was appropriate in a case involving a difficult diagnosis because such instruction “properly directed the jury to base its verdict on whether a physician had failed to follow proper medical procedure and not infer a breach of the standard of care merely from [the patient’s] unfortunate result.” Havasy v. Resnick, 415 Pa.Super. 480 , 609 A.2d 1326, 1336 (1992). 2014In one case, the court determined that a “mistake of judgment” instruction was appropriate in a case involving a difficult diagnosis because such instruction “properly directed the jury to base its verdict on whether a physician had failed to follow proper medical procedure and not infer a breach of the standard of care merely from [the patient’s] unfortunate result.” Havasy v. Resnick, 415 Pa.Super. 480 , 609 A.2d 1326, 1336 (1992). | 2 | 3 |
Milby, L. v. Pote, C. v. Southern Christriangreen2 sentences2025See Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2018).5 Section 3 of the MHCRA sets forth the procedure under which an owner of a manufactured home community may evict a lessee: A manufactured home lessee shall only be evicted in accordance with the following procedure: (1) A lessee shall not be evicted by any self-help measure. (2) Prior to the commencement of any eviction proceeding or the termination of or failure to renew the lease of a lessee, the manufactured home community owner shall notify the manufactured home community lessee in writing of the particular breach or violation of th 2025See Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2018).5 Section 3 of the MHCRA sets forth the procedure under which an owner of a manufactured home community may evict a lessee: A manufactured home lessee shall only be evicted in accordance with the following procedure: (1) A lessee shall not be evicted by any self-help measure. (2) Prior to the commencement of any eviction proceeding or the termination of or failure to renew the lease of a lessee, the manufactured home community owner shall notify the manufactured home community lessee in writing of the particular breach or violation of th | 2 | 2 |
CROSBY BY CROSBY v. Sultzgreen2 sentences2025See Crosby, 592 A.2d at 1340 . 2025See id. at 745- 48. | 2 | 2 |
Woods v. Brumlopgreen1 sentence2025Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 824 A.2d 1140, 1149 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Woods v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d 520, 523 (N.M. 1962)). | 1 | 1 |
Toogood v. Rogalgreen1 sentence2025Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 824 A.2d 1140, 1149 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Woods v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d 520, 523 (N.M. 1962)). | 1 | 1 |
Corvin, J. v. Tihansky, D.green1 sentence2021Brown v. Halpern, 202 A.3d 687, 703 (Pa. Super. 2019); Corvin v. Tihansky, 184 A.3d 986, 992 (Pa. Super. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
In re Interest of M.W.green1 sentence2021Brown v. Halpern, 202 A.3d 687, 703 (Pa. Super. 2019); Corvin v. Tihansky, 184 A.3d 986, 992 (Pa. Super. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Evansgreen1 sentence2020See Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d 458, 463 (Pa. 1998) (“Credibility determinations are within the sole province of the jury. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Edmundsgreen1 sentence2020Moreover, as noted, the Gary Court’s adoption of the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement ignored well-settled jurisprudence acknowledging that Article I, Section 8 affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, as the former embodies “a strong notion of privacy, carefully safeguarded in this Commonwealth for the past two centuries.” Majority Opinion at 48 (quoting Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 897 (Pa. 1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Storm v. Goldengreen1 sentence2017Cooper, Inc., 903 A.2d at 617-18 (architect was entitled to summary judgment where plaintiff’s only expert report did not opine as to either the architectural standard of care nor a breach of that standard); Storm, 538 A.2d at 64-66 (attorney entitled to judgment as a matter of law in legal 14 malpractice action where plaintiff failed to identify experts and provide expert reports). | 1 | 1 |
Guy M. Cooper, Inc. v. East Penn School Districtgreen1 sentence2017Cooper, Inc., 903 A.2d at 617-18 (architect was entitled to summary judgment where plaintiff’s only expert report did not opine as to either the architectural standard of care nor a breach of that standard); Storm, 538 A.2d at 64-66 (attorney entitled to judgment as a matter of law in legal 14 malpractice action where plaintiff failed to identify experts and provide expert reports). | 1 | 1 |
Rizzo v. Hainesgreen1 sentence2016See Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 67, n.10 (Pa. 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Annabigreen2 sentences2015For expert testimony on the standard of care in medical malpractice matters, the MCARE Act requires a “three part test in which each basis must be established.” Rose v. Annabi, 2007 PA Super 308 , 934 A.2d 743, 746 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also, Vicari v. Spiegel, 605 Pa. 381, 388 , 989 A.2d at 1281, 1282 (Pa. 2010) (each of the three Section 512(c) requirements (standard-of-care-familiarity, same-subspecialty, and board-certification) is mandatory). 2015For expert testimony on the standard of care in medical malpractice matters, the MCARE Act requires a “three part test in which each basis must be established.” Rose v. Annabi, 2007 PA Super 308 , 934 A.2d 743, 746 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also, Vicari v. Spiegel, 605 Pa. 381, 388 , 989 A.2d at 1281, 1282 (Pa. 2010) (each of the three Section 512(c) requirements (standard-of-care-familiarity, same-subspecialty, and board-certification) is mandatory). | 1 | 1 |
Home Indemnity Co. v. Snowdengreen2 sentences2013Co. v. Snowden, 223 Ark. 64 , 264 S.W.2d 642, 645 (1954)). 2013Co. v. Snowden, 223 Ark. 64 , 264 S.W.2d 642, 645 (1954)). | 1 | 1 |
| Buckman v. Verazingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Lehmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Paoli Memorial Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blicha v. Jacksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Estate of Albrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lohm Estategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fonner v. Shandon, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Montgomery v. South Philadelphia Medical Group, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mitchell v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ferry v. Fishergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Flanagan v. Labegreen | 1 | 1 |
| TAYLOR Et Vir v. Spencer Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Milliken & Co. v. Gardnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grossman v. Barke
green
2 sentences2018In support of this argument, Dr. Crisci asserts: "Dr. Igidbashian testified that it was a breach of the standard of care for Dr. Crisci not to have ordered a new study; however, Dr. Igidbashian did not testify that there was a breach in the *643 standard of care with regard to the interpretation of the study itself." Id. 2018In support of this argument, Dr. Crisci asserts: "Dr. Igidbashian testified that it was a breach of the standard of care for Dr. Crisci not to have ordered a new study; however, Dr. Igidbashian did not testify that there was a breach in the standard of care with regard to the interpretation of the study itself." Id. | 3 | 2018–2020 |
Vallone v. Creech
green
2 sentences2009Id. 820 A.2d at 766 . ¶ 6 In the present case, we do not have a case where the breach of the standard of care is uncontroverted. 2009Id. 820 A.2d at 766 . ¶ 6 In the present case, we do not have a case where the breach of the standard of care is uncontroverted. | 2 | 2004–2009 |
Flanagan v. Labe
green
2 sentences2007The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is: By holding that a nurse is competent to render an opinion that a breach of the standard of care caused plaintiffs medical condition, did the Superior Court render a decision in direct conflict with Flanagan v. Labe, 547 Pa. 254 , 690 A.2d 183 (1997), in which this Court held that a nurse is incompetent to render an opinion on causation in a medical malpractice action because it calls for a medical diagnosis which a nurse is statutorily prohibited from rendering? 2007The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is: By holding that a nurse is competent to render an opinion that a breach of the standard of care caused plaintiffs medical condition, did the Superior Court render a decision in direct conflict with Flanagan v. Labe, 547 Pa. 254 , 690 A.2d 183 (1997), in which this Court held that a nurse is incompetent to render an opinion on causation in a medical malpractice action because it calls for a medical diagnosis which a nurse is statutorily prohibited from rendering? | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Welsh v. Bulger
green
2 sentences2004Id. 698 A.2d at 586 . 1999Welsh, supra at 512-14 , 698 A.2d at 585 , citing Thompson . ¶ 12 To establish her prima facie case, plaintiff relied on Nurse Schubert’s report to establish the standard of care for operating room nurses and a breach of that standard when a patient falls from an operating table. | 2 | 1999–2004 |
Emerich v. Philadelphia Center for Human Development, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024Larsen cites to Crosby, Emerich v. Philadelphia Center for Human Development, Inc., 720 A.2d 1032 (Pa. 1998), and Matharu v. Muir, 86 A.3d 250 (Pa. Super. 2014), for their rejection of the broad notion that a health care provider can never owe a duty to someone other than that provider’s patient. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Matharu v. Muir
green
1 sentence2024Larsen cites to Crosby, Emerich v. Philadelphia Center for Human Development, Inc., 720 A.2d 1032 (Pa. 1998), and Matharu v. Muir, 86 A.3d 250 (Pa. Super. 2014), for their rejection of the broad notion that a health care provider can never owe a duty to someone other than that provider’s patient. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Tong-Summerford, A. v. Abington Mem. Hosp.
green
1 sentence2023Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Thompson v. Nason Hospital
green
1 sentence2022Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in limiting the testimony/opinions of Plaintiffs’ experts at trial based on the qualifications and experience of Plaintiff’s experts, and the trial court’s application/interpretation of the MCARE Act[, 40 P.S. §§ 1303.101-1303.910,] and Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991)? | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth v. Butler
green
1 sentence2020Without determining whether a breach of the privilege in fact occurred, the court held that the 14We recently granted allowance of appeal in another case to address the following question: Is Act 21 punitive, such that its retroactive application to [Petitioner] and its mechanism for determining whether an individual is a sexually violent delinquent child are unconstitutional under Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.[3]d 1189 (Pa. 2017) and Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017)? | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re: H.R., a minor
green
1 sentence2020In re H.R., 207 A.3d 906 (Pa. 2019). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
McCool v. Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2017McCool, 984 A.2d at 571-72 ; Vazquez, 39 A.3d at 397-401 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ditch v. Waynesboro Hospital
green
1 sentence2017Based on these allegations, we would determine that Mr. Vianello raises a medical malpractice claim against Appellees, as his “claim pertains to an action that occurred within the course of a professional relationship[,]” and his “claim raises questions of medical judgment beyond -8- J-S53005-17 the realm of common knowledge and experience.” Ditch, 917 A.2d at 322 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Vazquez v. CHS Professional Practice, P.C.
green
1 sentence2017McCool, 984 A.2d at 571-72 ; Vazquez, 39 A.3d at 397-401 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Pringle v. Rapaport
green
2 sentences2014Pringle, supra at 170-71 , quoting Pa. SSJI (Civ.) 11.01 (2009) (Subcommittee Note) (with internal citations omitted). 9 The Superior Court thus observed that, “[f]or these reasons, the Committee determined that the principle expressed by an “error of judgment” charge lie., that a physician may make an error that does not rise to the level of a breach of the standard of care) is adequately covered in a jury charge by the basic instruction on the professional standard of care.” Id. at 171 , citing to Pa. SSJI (Civ.) 11.01 (2009) at 3-4 (Subcommittee Note). 2014Pringle, supra at 170-71 , quoting Pa. SSJI (Civ.) 11.01 (2009) (Subcommittee Note) (with internal citations omitted). 9 The Superior Court thus observed that, “[f]or these reasons, the Committee determined that the principle expressed by an “error of judgment” charge lie., that a physician may make an error that does not rise to the level of a breach of the standard of care) is adequately covered in a jury charge by the basic instruction on the professional standard of care.” Id. at 171 , citing to Pa. SSJI (Civ.) 11.01 (2009) at 3-4 (Subcommittee Note). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Incollingo v. Ewing green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Freed v. Geisinger Medical Center green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Brannan v. Lankenau Hospital green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| McClain v. Welker green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Katz v. St. Mary Hospital green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Neal by Neal v. Lu green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Commonwealth v. Hendricks green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Layne v. Fort Carson National Bank green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Schaller v. Marine National Bank of Neenah green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Bruton v. United States green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc. green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Morgan's Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Yingst v. Lebanon & Annville St. Ry. Co. neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Rhodes v. Terheyden green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Schalcher v. Bergdoll neutral | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Hibert v. Lang green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Cramond v. President of the Bank of the United States neutral | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Gandy v. Weckerly green | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Edwards v. Lycoming County Mutual Insurance neutral | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.