breach standard in Illinois

2014Thomas v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 344 Ill.

2013Thomas v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 344 Ill.

2008However, even if plaintiff was able to show the second element, namely a breach of the standard of care, there was no evidence of the third element, namely, a causal relationship between an alleged breach of duty and the death at issue. "`[I]n order to sustain the burden of proof, a plaintiff's expert must demonstrate within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the defendant's breach in the standard of care is more probably than not the cause of the injury.'" Bergman v. Kelsey, 375 Ill.App.3d 612, 625 , 313 Ill.Dec. 862 , 873 N.E.2d 486 (2007), quoting Knauerhaze v. Nelson, 361 Ill.Ap

2008However, even if plaintiff was able to show the second element, namely a breach of the standard of care, there was no evidence of the third element, namely, a causal relationship between an alleged breach of duty and the death at issue. "`[I]n order to sustain the burden of proof, a plaintiff's expert must demonstrate within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the defendant's breach in the standard of care is more probably than not the cause of the injury.'" Bergman v. Kelsey, 375 Ill.App.3d 612, 625 , 313 Ill.Dec. 862 , 873 N.E.2d 486 (2007), quoting Knauerhaze v. Nelson, 361 Ill.Ap

2009App. 3d 591, 601 (2006). “ ‘[T]o sustain the burden of proof, a plaintiff’s expert must demonstrate within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the defendant’s breach in the standard of care is more probably than not the cause of the injury.’ ” Bergman v. Kelsey, 375 Ill.

2008However, even if plaintiff was able to show the second element, namely, a breach of the standard of care, there was no evidence of the third element, namely, a causal relationship between an alleged breach of duty and the death at issue. “ ‘[I]n order to sustain the burden of proof, a plaintiffs expert must demonstrate within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the defendant’s breach in the standard of care is more probably than not the cause of the injury’ ” Bergman v. Kelsey, 375 Ill.

2023Id.

1998The rationale for the requirement of expert testimony is that "jurors are not skilled in the practice of medicine and would find it difficult without the help of medical evidence to determine any lack of necessary scientific skill on the part of the physician [or any other health care provider]." Walski v. Tiesenga , 72 Ill. 2d 249, 256 , 381 N.E.2d 279, 282 (1978).

2011Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 321 Ill.App.3d at 637 , 254 Ill.Dec. 543 , 747 N.E.2d 955 . ¶ 30 The "voluntary payment" provision in Pekin's policy to XData provided: "[n]o insureds will, except at their own cost, voluntarily make a payment, assume any obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid, without our consent." ¶ 31 Here, we conclude that XData did not breach the "voluntary payment" provision in the insurance policy.

2011Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 321 Ill.App.3d at 637 , 254 Ill.Dec. 543 , 747 N.E.2d 955 . ¶ 30 The "voluntary payment" provision in Pekin's policy to XData provided: "[n]o insureds will, except at their own cost, voluntarily make a payment, assume any obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid, without our consent." ¶ 31 Here, we conclude that XData did not breach the "voluntary payment" provision in the insurance policy.

2008App. 3d at 1125 . “[I]n a medical malpractice action, it is the plaintiff’s duty to establish the proper standard of care to be applied to a defendant-doctor’s conduct, a breach of that standard, and a resulting injury proximately caused by the breach of care.” Northern Trust Co. v. Upjohn Co., 213 Ill.

2008App. 3d at 1125 . “[I]n a medical malpractice action, it is the plaintiff’s duty to establish the proper standard of care to be applied to a defendant-doctor’s conduct, a breach of that standard, and a resulting injury proximately caused by the breach of care.” Northern Trust Co. v. Upjohn Co., 213 Ill.

2025Neade v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 443-44 (2000) (citing Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 241-42 (1986)).

2020Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 241-42 , 489 N.E.2d 867, 872 (1986).

2015Our courts have long held that a reviewing court is "not a repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Velocity Investments, LLC v. Alston, 397 Ill.

2015Our courts have long held that a reviewing court is “not a repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Velocity Investments, LLC v. Alston, 397 Ill.

2009See Cammon, 301 Ill.App.3d at 950 , 235 Ill.Dec. 158 , 704 N.E.2d at 739 (claim that hospital was negligent in destroying patient records that plaintiff needed to support a medical-malpractice lawsuit did not arise out of patient care; plaintiff's injury was her inability to prove her medical-negligence allegations, and it arose out of the actual destruction of the documents, not out of the breach of the standard of care).

2009See Cammon, 301 Ill.App.3d at 950 , 235 Ill.Dec. 158 , 704 N.E.2d at 739 (claim that hospital was negligent in destroying patient records that plaintiff needed to support a medical-malpractice lawsuit did not arise out of patient care; plaintiff's injury was her inability to prove her medical-negligence allegations, and it arose out of the actual destruction of the documents, not out of the breach of the standard of care).

1997See Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d at 171 , 421 N.E.2d at 868 .

1997See Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d at 171 , 421 N.E.2d at 868 .

1997See People v. Knippenberg, 66 Ill.2d 276 , 6 Ill.Dec. 46 , 362 N.E.2d 681 (1977).

1997See People v. Knippenberg, 66 Ill. 2d 276 (1977).

1989In addition to the existence of such a rule, it must be shown that the breach of the rule is deliberate or its equivalent, as stated in the above-quoted definition.” Jackson, 105 Ill. 2d at 512-13 .

1985In addition to the existence of such a rule, it must be shown that the breach of the rule is deliberate or its equivalent, as stated in the above-quoted definition.” ( 105 Ill. 2d 501, 512-13 .) In outlining this definition of misconduct, our supreme court specifically rejected the argument that, in order to establish misconduct under section 602A, it is necessary to show that the conduct, in question, harmed or potentially harmed the employer.

2025Neade v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 443-44 (2000) (citing Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 241-42 (1986)).

2001(Emphasis added.) Neade, 193 Ill. 2d at 449 , 739 N.E.2d at 505 .

2019Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95, 106-07 (1997). ¶ 31 The trial court found that a JNOV was warranted because John failed to offer expert testimony to establish proximate causation to link the alleged deviations from the standard of care to Jill’s death, which resulted from suicide by Tylenol overdose.

2018Holton v. Memorial Hospital , 176 Ill. 2d 95 , 106-07, 223 Ill.Dec. 429 , 679 N.E.2d 1202 (1997). ¶ 31 The trial court found that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was warranted because John failed to offer expert testimony to establish proximate causation to link the alleged deviations from the standard of care to Jill's death, which resulted from suicide by Tylenol overdose.

2007App. 3d 209, 222 (1990) (the jury is uniquely qualified to resolve conflicting medical testimony concerning the applicable standard of care and a defendant’s breach of that standard); Sinclair v. Berlin, 325 Ill.

2007App. 3d 209, 222 (1990) (the jury is uniquely qualified to resolve conflicting medical testimony concerning the applicable standard of care and a defendant's breach of that standard); Sinclair v. Berlin, 325 Ill.

2005Mengelson , 323 Ill.

2005Mengelson, 323 Ill.

2026See Council for Jewish Elderly v. Kurtz, 2024 IL App (1st) 230102, ¶ 42 (“Both quantum meruit and unjust enrichment are quasi-contractual legal theories based on a contract implied by law.”). ¶ 20 That leaves fraudulent misrepresentation as the only claim that could be barred by the Tort Immunity Act.