source warning in Oregon

2024“The independent source doctrine permits the introduction of ‘evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.’ ” Johnson, 335 Or at 519 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 US 533, 537 , 108 S Ct 2529 , 101 L Ed 2d 472 (1988)).

2024“The independent source doctrine permits the introduction of ‘evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.’ ” Johnson, 335 Or at 519 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 US 533, 537 , 108 S Ct 2529 , 101 L Ed 2d 472 (1988)).

2022ANALYSIS Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution pro- vides that “[n]o person shall be * * * compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” To protect that right against compelled self-incrimination, the Supreme Court “has held that, before questioning, police must give Miranda warnings to a person who is in full custody or in circum- stances that create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling.” State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 638 , 136 P3d 22 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Moore/Coen, 349 Or 371,

2022ANALYSIS Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution pro- vides that “[n]o person shall be * * * compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” To protect that right against compelled self-incrimination, the Supreme Court “has held that, before questioning, police must give Miranda warnings to a person who is in full custody or in circum- stances that create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling.” State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 638 , 136 P3d 22 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Moore/Coen, 349 Or 371,

2015Article I, section 12, provides, in part, that “[n]o person shall *** be compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” That provision “is an independent source for warnings similar to those required under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 , 86 S Ct 1602 , 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).” State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639 , 641 n 1, 175 P3d 454 (2007).

2015Article I, section 12, provides, in part, that “[n]o person shall *** be compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” That provision “is an independent source for warnings similar to those required under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 , 86 S Ct 1602 , 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).” State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639 , 641 n 1, 175 P3d 454 (2007).

2014Similarly, in Scovill By & Through Hubbard v. City of Astoria, 324 Or 159 , 921 P2d 1312 (1996), the source of the tort claim was immaterial in deciding the elements of the claim.

2014Similarly, in Scovill By & Through Hubbard v. City of Astoria, 324 Or 159 , 921 P2d 1312 (1996), the source of the tort claim was immaterial in deciding the elements of the claim.

2014In this context, “indirect” fruit refers to “evidence [that] was acquired by the police after some initial Fourth Amendment violation.” United States v. Crews, 445 US 463, 471 , 100 S Ct 1244 , 63 L Ed 2d 537 (1980) (emphasis in original). *496 There are three recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule: (1) the inevitable discovery exception; (2) the independent source exception; and (3) the attenuation exception. 4 United States v. Smith, 155 F3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir 1998).

2014In this context, “indirect” fruit refers to “evidence [that] was acquired by the police after some initial Fourth Amendment violation.” United States v. Crews, 445 US 463, 471 , 100 S Ct 1244 , 63 L Ed 2d 537 (1980) (emphasis in original). *496 There are three recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule: (1) the inevitable discovery exception; (2) the independent source exception; and (3) the attenuation exception. 4 United States v. Smith, 155 F3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir 1998).

2025Nevertheless, the court went on to conclude that it need Cite as 374 Or 189 (2025) 201 not “defer” to the administrative rule regarding any “meth- ods and procedures”: “The court concludes that it need not defer to OAR 150- 308-0690 with respect to methods and procedures of deter- mining the real market value of [PacifiCorp’s] system, to the extent that the source of the rule’s authority is ORS 308.205(2).” 25 OTR at 244.

2023State v. Nieman, 242 Or App 269 , 271 n 1, 256 P3d 126 , rev den, 350 Or 571 (2011). 702 State v. Hadd 714 (2014).

2023State v. Nieman, 242 Or App 269 , 271 n 1, 256 P3d 126 , rev den, 350 Or 571 (2011). 702 State v. Hadd 714 (2014).

2023State v. Nieman, 242 Or App 269 , 271 n 1, 256 P3d 126 , rev den, 350 Or 571 (2011). 702 State v. Hadd 714 (2014).

2023State v. Avila-Nava, 356 Or 600, 609 , 341 P3d 2 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 444 , 86 S Ct 1602 , 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires par- ticular warnings to be given when a person is in custody or “otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution is an independent source for warnings similar to those required under the Fifth Amendment.

2021In Sustar v. County Court for Marion County, 101 Or 657, 665 , 201 P 445 (1921), this court announced a standard for determin- ing whether a punishment is disproportionate to an offense, stating: “In order to justify the court in declaring punishment cruel and unusual with refence to its duration, the punishment must be so proportioned to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances[.]” The court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Weems as the source of that standard.

2021In Sustar v. County Court for Marion County, 101 Or 657, 665 , 201 P 445 (1921), this court announced a standard for determin- ing whether a punishment is disproportionate to an offense, stating: “In order to justify the court in declaring punishment cruel and unusual with refence to its duration, the punishment must be so proportioned to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances[.]” The court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Weems as the source of that standard.

2020Cite as 307 Or App 49 (2020) 57 order vacating the requirement to install and use an igni- tion interlock device if the defendant: “(a) Has complied with the condition of the diversion agreement described in ORS 813.602(3) for at least six con- secutive months and provides a certificate to the court from the ignition interlock device manufacturer’s representative stating that the device has not recorded a negative report[.]” (Emphases added.) The referenced statute, ORS 813.602(3), is the source of the requirement that a person subject to a diversion agreement install an ignition interlock dev

2018Affeld , 307 Or. at 128 , 764 P.2d 220 .

2018Affeld , 307 Or. at 128 , 764 P.2d 220 .

2015Because the department is the source of the rule defining value of the loss, OAR 150-308.205-(F)(3)(k), the department’s interpretation of that rule is entitled to deference “as long as its interpretation is a plausible one and not inconsistent with the rule, its context, or any other source of law.” Powerex Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 357 Or 40, 54 , 346 P3d 476 (2015) (quotation omitted).

2015Because the department is the source of the rule defining value of the loss, OAR 150-308.205-(F)(3)(k), the department’s interpretation of that rule is entitled to deference “as long as its interpretation is a plausible one and not inconsistent with the rule, its context, or any other source of law.” Powerex Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 357 Or 40, 54 , 346 P3d 476 (2015) (quotation omitted).

2013The first mention of Article I, section 11, as a source of the requirement that the state prove venue as a material allegation occurred in the 1923 decision in State v. Casey, 108 Or 386 , 213 P 771 (1923).

2013The first mention of Article I, section 11, as a source of the requirement that the state prove venue as a material allegation occurred in the 1923 decision in State v. Casey, 108 Or 386 , 213 P 771 (1923).

2011On appeal, defendant does not contest those rulings. 9 Accord Holcomb v. Hill, 235 Or App 419, 434 , 233 P3d 448 , rev den, 349 Or 370 (2010) (the fact that “throughout the conversation, [an officer] had probable cause to arrest [a suspect] * * * does not render the circumstances so compelling as to require the giving of Miranda warnings”). 10 As noted, the duration of the encounter in its totality was two hours, but the final 20 to 30 minutes did not involve any questions eliciting inculpatory responses. 11 Here, in contrast to Roble-Baker, where the defendant had to rely on the police for a

2011On appeal, defendant does not contest those rulings. 9 Accord Holcomb v. Hill, 235 Or App 419, 434 , 233 P3d 448 , rev den, 349 Or 370 (2010) (the fact that “throughout the conversation, [an officer] had probable cause to arrest [a suspect] * * * does not render the circumstances so compelling as to require the giving of Miranda warnings”). 10 As noted, the duration of the encounter in its totality was two hours, but the final 20 to 30 minutes did not involve any questions eliciting inculpatory responses. 11 Here, in contrast to Roble-Baker, where the defendant had to rely on the police for a

2011On appeal, defendant does not contest those rulings. 9 Accord Holcomb v. Hill, 235 Or App 419, 434 , 233 P3d 448 , rev den, 349 Or 370 (2010) (the fact that “throughout the conversation, [an officer] had probable cause to arrest [a suspect] * * * does not render the circumstances so compelling as to require the giving of Miranda warnings”). 10 As noted, the duration of the encounter in its totality was two hours, but the final 20 to 30 minutes did not involve any questions eliciting inculpatory responses. 11 Here, in contrast to Roble-Baker, where the defendant had to rely on the police for a

2011The Supreme Court discussed that issue again in Foster, 303 Or at 524-29 .

2003The Supreme Court more fully explained what it meant by an “active, continuous relationship” in Cavan v. General Motors, 280 Or 455 , 571 P2d 1249 (1977).

2003The Supreme Court more fully explained what it meant by an “active, continuous relationship” in Cavan v. General Motors, 280 Or 455 , 571 P2d 1249 (1977).