12 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Murray v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016In Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988), for example, the Court held that under the independent source doctrine, an unlawful warrantless entry into a warehouse would not require suppression of evidence obtained during a subsequent warrant-based search of the warehouse if the government could establish (1) that the warrant was based on information independent of what the officers saw during the warrantless entry and (2) that the officers would have sought a warrant even if they had not previously entered the warehouse. 2016Id. at 541–43; see also id. at 547 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion in Murray ―makes the application of the independent source exception turn entirely on an evaluation of the officers‘ intent‖); United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1 , 9–10 (1st Cir. 2010) (in independent-source case where officer testified that he ―would have sought a warrant even had the officers not seen the bricks of cocaine in the garage,‖ the court explained that the ―police officers‘ subjective intent to seek a warrant is a factual determination subject to clear error review‖); United States v | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Wadegreen1 sentence2021Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (independent source factors include “the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description . . . and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jadlowegreen2 sentences2016Id. at 541–43; see also id. at 547 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion in Murray ―makes the application of the independent source exception turn entirely on an evaluation of the officers‘ intent‖); United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1 , 9–10 (1st Cir. 2010) (in independent-source case where officer testified that he ―would have sought a warrant even had the officers not seen the bricks of cocaine in the garage,‖ the court explained that the ―police officers‘ subjective intent to seek a warrant is a factual determination subject to clear error review‖); United States v 2016Id. at 541-43 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 ; see also id. at 547 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion in Murray "makes the application of the independent source exception turn entirely on an evaluation of the officers' intent”); United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir.2010) (in independent-source case where officer testified that he “would have sought a warrant even had the officers not seen the bricks of cocaine in the garage,” the court explained that the "police officers’ subjective intent to seek a warrant is a factual determination subject to clea | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cesar Augusto Restrepo and Luis Pulidogreen2 sentences2016Id. at 541–43; see also id. at 547 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion in Murray ―makes the application of the independent source exception turn entirely on an evaluation of the officers‘ intent‖); United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1 , 9–10 (1st Cir. 2010) (in independent-source case where officer testified that he ―would have sought a warrant even had the officers not seen the bricks of cocaine in the garage,‖ the court explained that the ―police officers‘ subjective intent to seek a warrant is a factual determination subject to clear error review‖); United States v 2016Id. at 541-43 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 ; see also id. at 547 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion in Murray "makes the application of the independent source exception turn entirely on an evaluation of the officers' intent”); United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir.2010) (in independent-source case where officer testified that he “would have sought a warrant even had the officers not seen the bricks of cocaine in the garage,” the court explained that the "police officers’ subjective intent to seek a warrant is a factual determination subject to clea | 1 | 1 |
Hicks v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 661-62 (D.C.1999) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine); Al- Mahdi v. United States, 867 A.2d 1011, 1023-24 (D.C.2005) (applying the independent source rule). | 1 | 1 |
Al-Mahdi v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 661-62 (D.C.1999) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine); Al- Mahdi v. United States, 867 A.2d 1011, 1023-24 (D.C.2005) (applying the independent source rule). | 1 | 1 |
Wells v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen2 sentences1990See Wells, supra, 513 A.2d at 242 (case with open legal issue remanded for “reasoned interpretation by the agency charged with administering the statute”). 10 It is possible that the appeals examiner alternatively relied upon a form of misconduct other than violation of an employer’s rule. 11 She states that “[t]he claimant’s conduct was intentionally done against the legitimate interest of this employer.” It is not clear what the source of this standard is, whether it is meant to be different from the rule violation standard and to what conduct the Department was referring. 1990See Wells, supra, 513 A.2d at 242 (case with open legal issue remanded for “reasoned interpretation by the agency charged with administering the statute”). 10 It is possible that the appeals examiner alternatively relied upon a form of misconduct other than violation of an employer’s rule. 11 She states that “[t]he claimant’s conduct was intentionally done against the legitimate interest of this employer.” It is not clear what the source of this standard is, whether it is meant to be different from the rule violation standard and to what conduct the Department was referring. | 1 | 1 |
Poe v. Ullmangreen2 sentences1974See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 , 81 S.Ct. 1752 , 6 L. 1974See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 , 81 S.Ct. 1752 , 6 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences2014The test is whether the evidence in question “has been come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (citation omitted). 2014The test is whether the evidence in question “has been come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (citation omitted). | 2 | 1978–2014 |
Nix v. Williams
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 542 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Gibson v. Freeman
green
1 sentence2010Gibson, 941 A.2d at 1036 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Phillip Coltrane v. United States
green
1 sentence1988Although its existence has been stated and restated in a number of our decisions, the source of the rule in our jurisdiction is Coltrane v. United States, 135 U.S. App.D.C. 295, 418 F.2d 1131 (D.C.Cir.1969). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
McKenna v. Austin
green
2 sentences1987Accordingly, when one makes full reparation for all the loss, the others are discharged from liability to the injured person.... 77 U.S.App.D.C. at 233 , 134 F.2d at 664 . 8 This same principle is the source of the requirement that in an action by an injured party against one tortfeasor, at the least a credit must normally be given against any judgment in an amount equal to any settlement proceeds received from another joint tortfeasor; otherwise the injured party would be unjustly enriched. 9 However, the issue still remains whether the $27,500 provided for in the settlement with Gordon is in 1987Accordingly, when one makes full reparation for all the loss, the others are discharged from liability to the injured person.... 77 U.S.App.D.C. at 233 , 134 F.2d at 664 . 8 This same principle is the source of the requirement that in an action by an injured party against one tortfeasor, at the least a credit must normally be given against any judgment in an amount equal to any settlement proceeds received from another joint tortfeasor; otherwise the injured party would be unjustly enriched. 9 However, the issue still remains whether the $27,500 provided for in the settlement with Gordon is in | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Fitzpatrick v. New York
green
2 sentences1978Despite the recognition by two Justices that “[i]t is a significant constitutional question whether the ‘independent source’ exception to inadmissibility of fruits, Wong Sun, supra [371 U.S.], at 487-88 [ 83 S.Ct. 407 ], encompasses a hypothetical as well as an actual independent source,” Fitzpatrick v. New York, 414 U.S. 1050 , 94 S.Ct. 554 , 555, 38 L.Ed.2d 338 (1973) (White, J. & Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), the Supreme Court has declined the invitation to pass upon the validity of such an exception. 1978Despite the recognition by two Justices that "[i]t is a significant constitutional question whether the `independent source' exception to inadmissibility of fruits, Wong Sun, supra [371 U.S.], at 487-88 [ 83 S.Ct. 407 ], encompasses a hypothetical as well as an actual independent source," Fitzpatrick v. New York, 414 U.S. 1050 , 94 S.Ct. 554 , 555, 38 L.Ed.2d 338 (1973) (White, J. & Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), the Supreme Court has declined the invitation to pass upon the validity of such an exception. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. Antranik Paroutian
green
2 sentences1978Noting that evidence actually derived from independent legal leads — from an “independent source,” id. at 489 — was admissible, the court declined to extend the independent source rule into the realm of the “possible.” [A] showing that the government had sufficient independent information available so that in the normal course of events it might have discovered the question evidence without an illegal search cannot excuse the illegality or cure tainted matter. 1978Noting that evidence actually derived from independent legal leads from an "independent source," id. at 489 was admissible, the court declined to extend the independent source rule into the realm of the "possible." [A] showing that the government had sufficient independent information available so that in the normal course of events it might have discovered the question evidence without an illegal search cannot excuse the illegality or cure tainted matter. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Brown v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1978A chain of one link cannot be attenuated. [29] It is vital to bear in mind that the government bears the burden of proof of attenuation of the taint, Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , as it does for all exceptions to exclusion. 1978A chain of one link cannot be attenuated. [29] It is vital to bear in mind that the government bears the burden of proof of attenuation of the taint, Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , as it does for all exceptions to exclusion. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Sardo v. Villapiano
green
2 sentences1978As a source for the presumption, Boone cited Sardo v. Villapiano, 65 App.D.C. 121 , 81 F.2d 255 (1935). 1978As a source for the presumption, Boone cited Sardo v. Villapiano, 65 App.D.C. 121 , 81 F.2d 255 (1935). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Laird v. Tatum
green
2 sentences1974The requirement that a party have “standing” to invoke the judicial power of the United States is designed to enforce the mandate of Article III of the Constitution that federal courts have jurisdiction only in “cases” and “controversies”, Laird v. Tatum, supra, 408 U.S. at 14 , 92 S.Ct. 2318 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 154 , although Article III is not the exclusive source of this requirement. 1974The requirement that a party have “standing” to invoke the judicial power of the United States is designed to enforce the mandate of Article III of the Constitution that federal courts have jurisdiction only in “cases” and “controversies”, Laird v. Tatum, supra, 408 U.S. at 14 , 92 S.Ct. 2318 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 154 , although Article III is not the exclusive source of this requirement. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.