18 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1941–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Phifergreen2 sentences2013According to the State, since “[t]he stop of defendant by Chapel Hill Police Department was independent of any stop by [Lieutenant] Shatley,” a proper application of “the independent source rule[, which] provides that evidence obtained illegally should not be suppressed if it is later acquired pursuant to a constitutionally valid search or seizure,” State v. McKinney, 361 N.C. 53, 58 , 637 S.E.2d 868, 872 (2006) (citing State v. Phifer, 297 N.C. 216, 224-26 , 254 S.E.2d 586, 590-91 (1979)), would necessitate a determination that any evidence obtained as a result of the activities of the Chapel 2013According to the State, since “[t]he stop of defendant by Chapel Hill Police Department was independent of any stop by [Lieutenant] Shatley,” a proper application of “the independent source rule[, which] provides that evidence obtained illegally should not be suppressed if it is later acquired pursuant to a constitutionally valid search or seizure,” State v. McKinney, 361 N.C. 53, 58 , 637 S.E.2d 868, 872 (2006) (citing State v. Phifer, 297 N.C. 216, 224-26 , 254 S.E.2d 586, 590-91 (1979)), would necessitate a determination that any evidence obtained as a result of the activities of the Chapel | 3 | 3 |
State v. McKinneygreen2 sentences2013According to the State, since “[t]he stop of defendant by Chapel Hill Police Department was independent of any stop by [Lieutenant] Shatley,” a proper application of “the independent source rule[, which] provides that evidence obtained illegally should not be suppressed if it is later acquired pursuant to a constitutionally valid search or seizure,” State v. McKinney, 361 N.C. 53, 58 , 637 S.E.2d 868, 872 (2006) (citing State v. Phifer, 297 N.C. 216, 224-26 , 254 S.E.2d 586, 590-91 (1979)), would necessitate a determination that any evidence obtained as a result of the activities of the Chapel 2013According to the State, since “[t]he stop of defendant by Chapel Hill Police Department was independent of any stop by [Lieutenant] Shatley,” a proper application of “the independent source rule[, which] provides that evidence obtained illegally should not be suppressed if it is later acquired pursuant to a constitutionally valid search or seizure,” State v. McKinney, 361 N.C. 53, 58 , 637 S.E.2d 868, 872 (2006) (citing State v. Phifer, 297 N.C. 216, 224-26 , 254 S.E.2d 586, 590-91 (1979)), would necessitate a determination that any evidence obtained as a result of the activities of the Chapel | 2 | 2 |
Gilliam v. . Birdgreen2 sentences1979This doctrine is aptly stated by Justice Battle in Gilliam v. Bird, 30 N.C. 280, 283 (1848), as follows: ‘(W)henever both parties claim under the same person, neither of them can deny his right, and then, as between them, the elder is the better title and must prevail.’ This statement is quoted with approval in Stewart v. Cary, 220 N.C. 214, 221 , 17 S.E. 2d 29, 33 (1941), where many cases relating to the common source doctrine are cited. 1971This doctrine is aptly stated by Justice Battle in Gilliam v. Bird, 30 N.C. 280, 283 (1848), as follows: “(W)henever both parties claim under the same person, neither of them can deny his right, and then, as between them, the elder is the better title and must prevail.” This statement is quoted with approval in Stewart v. Cary, 220 N.C. 214, 221 , 17 S.E. 2d 29, 33 (1941), where many cases relating to the common source doctrine are cited. | 2 | 2 |
Stewart v. . Carygreen2 sentences1979This doctrine is aptly stated by Justice Battle in Gilliam v. Bird, 30 N.C. 280, 283 (1848), as follows: ‘(W)henever both parties claim under the same person, neither of them can deny his right, and then, as between them, the elder is the better title and must prevail.’ This statement is quoted with approval in Stewart v. Cary, 220 N.C. 214, 221 , 17 S.E. 2d 29, 33 (1941), where many cases relating to the common source doctrine are cited. 1979This doctrine is aptly stated by Justice Battle in Gilliam v. Bird, 30 N.C. 280, 283 (1848), as follows: ‘(W)henever both parties claim under the same person, neither of them can deny his right, and then, as between them, the elder is the better title and must prevail.’ This statement is quoted with approval in Stewart v. Cary, 220 N.C. 214, 221 , 17 S.E. 2d 29, 33 (1941), where many cases relating to the common source doctrine are cited. | 2 | 2 |
Murray v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017This exception is distinct from the state action requirement and permits the introduction of evidence initially discovered from an unlawful search “but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 , 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2533 , 101 L. 2002“The independent source doctrine permits the introduction of evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from lawful activities untainted by the initial illegality.” Id. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2016"The independent source doctrine permits the introduction of evidence initially discovered, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from lawful activities untainted by the initial illegality." State v. Robinson, 148 N.C.App. 422 , 429, 560 S.E.2d 154 , 159 (2002) (citation omitted). 2016"The independent source doctrine permits the introduction of evidence initially discovered, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from lawful activities untainted by the initial illegality." State v. Robinson, 148 N.C.App. 422 , 429, 560 S.E.2d 154 , 159 (2002) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Arizona v. Evansgreen2 sentences2017Id. at 4, 14-16 . 2017Id. at 4, 14-16 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lombardogreen2 sentences2006The “excise and re-examine” corollary to the independent source rule, as explained by Justice Powell in Giordano , qualifies the cardinal principle that if “information used to obtain [a search] warrant was procured through an unconstitutional seizure[,] . . . the warrant and the search conducted under it were illegal and the evidence obtained from them was ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ ” State v. Lombardo, 306 N.C. 594, 597-98 , 295 S.E.2d 399, 402 (1982) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963)). 2006The “excise and re-examine” corollary to the independent source rule, as explained by Justice Powell in Giordano , qualifies the cardinal principle that if “information used to obtain [a search] warrant was procured through an unconstitutional seizure[,] . . . the warrant and the search conducted under it were illegal and the evidence obtained from them was ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ ” State v. Lombardo, 306 N.C. 594, 597-98 , 295 S.E.2d 399, 402 (1982) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jerry Alvin Williamsgreen1 sentence2006Cir. 1969))); United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 1980) (“‘[I]f the lawfully obtained information amounts to probable cause and would have justified issuance of the warrant apart from the tainted information, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is admitted.’ ” (quoting James, 418 F.2d at 1152 )); cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding that when false statements are knowingly or recklessly made by an officer in a warrant application, they must be “set to one side, [and if] the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable ca | 1 | 1 |
State v. Louchheimgreen2 sentences2006Cir. 1969))); United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 1980) (“‘[I]f the lawfully obtained information amounts to probable cause and would have justified issuance of the warrant apart from the tainted information, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is admitted.’ ” (quoting James, 418 F.2d at 1152 )); cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding that when false statements are knowingly or recklessly made by an officer in a warrant application, they must be “set to one side, [and if] the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable ca 2006Cir. 1969))); United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 1980) (“‘[I]f the lawfully obtained information amounts to probable cause and would have justified issuance of the warrant apart from the tainted information, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is admitted.’ ” (quoting James, 418 F.2d at 1152 )); cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding that when false statements are knowingly or recklessly made by an officer in a warrant application, they must be “set to one side, [and if] the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable ca | 1 | 1 |
cluster 451942green2 sentences2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex 2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex | 1 | 1 |
United States v. George E. Veillette, Jr.green1 sentence2006Cir. 1969))); United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 1980) (“‘[I]f the lawfully obtained information amounts to probable cause and would have justified issuance of the warrant apart from the tainted information, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is admitted.’ ” (quoting James, 418 F.2d at 1152 )); cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding that when false statements are knowingly or recklessly made by an officer in a warrant application, they must be “set to one side, [and if] the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable ca | 1 | 1 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2006The “excise and re-examine” corollary to the independent source rule, as explained by Justice Powell in Giordano , qualifies the cardinal principle that if “information used to obtain [a search] warrant was procured through an unconstitutional seizure[,] . . . the warrant and the search conducted under it were illegal and the evidence obtained from them was ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ ” State v. Lombardo, 306 N.C. 594, 597-98 , 295 S.E.2d 399, 402 (1982) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Thomas Johnstongreen2 sentences2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex 2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gene Allen Herroldgreen2 sentences2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex 2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cesar Augusto Restrepo and Luis Pulidogreen1 sentence2006See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 991 F.2d 1182, 1186 (4th Cir. 1993) (“The inclusion of tainted evidence does not invalidate a search warrant if enough untainted evidence supports it . . . .”); United States v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964, 970 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that a warrant is valid under the independent source rule so long as the “warrant affidavit, once purged of tainted facts ... contains sufficient evidence to constitute probable cause”), cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arlin Ernest Wright, Jr.green1 sentence2006See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 991 F.2d 1182, 1186 (4th Cir. 1993) (“The inclusion of tainted evidence does not invalidate a search warrant if enough untainted evidence supports it . . . .”); United States v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964, 970 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that a warrant is valid under the independent source rule so long as the “warrant affidavit, once purged of tainted facts ... contains sufficient evidence to constitute probable cause”), cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Isaac L. James, Jr. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex 2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex | 1 | 1 |
Franks v. Delawaregreen1 sentence2006Cir. 1969))); United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 1980) (“‘[I]f the lawfully obtained information amounts to probable cause and would have justified issuance of the warrant apart from the tainted information, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is admitted.’ ” (quoting James, 418 F.2d at 1152 )); cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding that when false statements are knowingly or recklessly made by an officer in a warrant application, they must be “set to one side, [and if] the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable ca | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harborred2 sentences1992See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 , 12 L. 1992See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 , 12 L. | 1 | 1 |
| King v. Leegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mobley v. . Griffin
green
2 sentences1979Chief Justice Bobbitt stated for our Supreme Court in King v. Lee, 279 N.C. 100, 105 , 181 S.E. 2d 400, 403 (1971): “Petitioners, in attempting to prove the alleged tenancy in common, relied upon the sixth method stated in Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N.C. 112 , 10 S.E. 142 (1889), that is, the common source doctrine. 1979Chief Justice Bobbitt stated for our Supreme Court in King v. Lee, 279 N.C. 100, 105 , 181 S.E. 2d 400, 403 (1971): “Petitioners, in attempting to prove the alleged tenancy in common, relied upon the sixth method stated in Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N.C. 112 , 10 S.E. 142 (1889), that is, the common source doctrine. | 2 | 1971–1979 |
State v. Romano
green
2 sentences2017Id. at ___, 785 S.E.2d at 174-75 . 2017Id. at ___, 785 S.E.2d at 174-75 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Henry Pollak, Inc. v. Miller
green
1 sentence2006Cir. 1969))); United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 1980) (“‘[I]f the lawfully obtained information amounts to probable cause and would have justified issuance of the warrant apart from the tainted information, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is admitted.’ ” (quoting James, 418 F.2d at 1152 )); cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding that when false statements are knowingly or recklessly made by an officer in a warrant application, they must be “set to one side, [and if] the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable ca | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Lone Pine Steering Committee v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
green
1 sentence2006Cir. 1969))); United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 1980) (“‘[I]f the lawfully obtained information amounts to probable cause and would have justified issuance of the warrant apart from the tainted information, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is admitted.’ ” (quoting James, 418 F.2d at 1152 )); cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding that when false statements are knowingly or recklessly made by an officer in a warrant application, they must be “set to one side, [and if] the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable ca | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Charley v. United States
green
2 sentences2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex 2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Helton v. United States
green
2 sentences2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex 2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In re Marik
green
2 sentences2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex 2006Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1144 (3rd Cir.) (applying the independent source rule to uphold a warrant because the application contained probable cause apart from the improper information), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); *60 United States v. Johnston, 876 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (“[W]e must consider whether ‘the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989); Alex | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Wallace
green
2 sentences2002“The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search.” Wallace, 111 N.C. 2002However, “[a]ny search pursuant to a warrant is not a genuinely independent source of information sufficient to remove the taint of an earlier unlawful entry if the warrant was either prompted by what officers saw in the initial unlawful entry, or if the information obtained during the entry *430 was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to issue the search warrant.” Id. at 590 , 433 S.E.2d at 243 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Segura v. United States
green
2 sentences2002In applying the independent source doctrine in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 , 82 L. 2002In applying the independent source doctrine in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 , 82 L. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
County of Lancaster v. Mecklenburg County
green
2 sentences1999County of Lancaster v. Mecklenburg County, 334 N.C. 496 , 503-04 n.4, 434 S.E.2d 604 , 610 n.4 (1993) 4 Because the zoning statute (the source of the requirement that special damages be alleged in the context of writ of certiorari petitions) does not require parties to be “aggrieved” in order to file a declaratory judgment action and because the Declaratory Judgment Act does not require a pleading of special damages, we hold it is not required. 1999County of Lancaster v. Mecklenburg County, 334 N.C. 496 , 503-04 n.4, 434 S.E.2d 604 , 610 n.4 (1993) 4 Because the zoning statute (the source of the requirement that special damages be alleged in the context of writ of certiorari petitions) does not require parties to be “aggrieved” in order to file a declaratory judgment action and because the Declaratory Judgment Act does not require a pleading of special damages, we hold it is not required. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Nix v. Williams green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Buffaloe v. United Carolina Bank green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Smith v. Ford Motor Co. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Economy Finance Corp. v. Leathers green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Chatham Estates v. American National Bank green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Allen v. Conservative Hunting Club green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Dem on the Demise of Johnson v. Watts neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.