source doctrine in Maryland

2025In holding that the independent source doctrine might support a decision not to suppress the drugs found in the search, the Court reasoned: “So long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one . . . [,] there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply.” Id. at 542 .

2025Invoking the exclusionary rule would put the police (and society) not in the same position they would have occupied if no violation occurred, but in a worse one. 12 Id. at 541 (emphasis in original).4 In this case, the State argues that the contraband found during the initial search of Harley’s home was admissible under the independent source doctrine.

2025The independent source doctrine does not focus on what might have happened had illegal conduct not occurred, but “on what actually happened—was the discovery tainted by the illegal[ity]?” Id. at 410 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). “‘[U]nder the independent source doctrine, evidence that was in fact discovered lawfully, and not as a direct or 11 indirect result of illegal activity, is admissible.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d.

2012The Court continued: The two doctrines differ in that “under the independent source doctrine, evidence that was in fact discovered lawfully, and not as a direct or indirect result of illegal activity, is admissible.” United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d Cir.1992).

2025In other words, under the independent source doctrine, “if the State can show that the source of the evidence was ‘wholly independent of any constitutional violation,’” then the constitutional violation “will not render the evidence in question inadmissible.” State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275, 298 (2003) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 443 ).

2016The court rejected the State’s argument that drug evidence nevertheless was properly admitted pursuant to the independent source doctrine: As the United States Supreme Court noted in Nix [v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)], the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to ensure that “the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been if no illegality had transpired.” Id. at 443 .

2025See Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 516-29 (2001) (discussing the attenuation doctrine).3 Here, the parties disagree about whether the independent source doctrine or the inevitable discovery doctrine applies.

2003Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 , 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2534 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472, 481-82 (1988) ("inevitable discovery” rule "is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered”); Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 536 , 781 A.2d 787, 815 (2001); State v. Wagoner, 130 N.M. 274 , 24 P.3d 306, 310 (2001); United States v. Leake, 95 F.3d 409, 412 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309 , 1318 n. 1 (7th

2012Accord United States v. May, 214 F.3d 900, 906 (7th Cir.) (money improperly seized pursuant to state search warrant, but properly “rediscovered” in legal federal search warrant, need not be suppressed pursuant to the independent source doctrine), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 891 , 121 S.Ct. 217 , 148 L.Ed.2d 153 (2000); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1143 (3d Cir.) (gun seized during unlawful entry, treated as being seized pursuant to the subsequent warranted search, was admissible pursuant to independent source doctrine), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 , 113 S.Ct. 421 , 121 L.Ed.2d 344 (1992)

2001This is accomplished “by allowing the introduction of evidence discovered initially during an unlawful search if the evidence is discovered later through a source that is untainted by the initial illegality.” United States v. May, 214 F.3d 900, 906 (7th Cir.2000).

2025The independent source doctrine does not focus on what might have happened had illegal conduct not occurred, but “on what actually happened—was the discovery tainted by the illegal[ity]?” Id. at 410 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). “‘[U]nder the independent source doctrine, evidence that was in fact discovered lawfully, and not as a direct or 11 indirect result of illegal activity, is admissible.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d.

2025The independent source doctrine does not focus on what might have happened had illegal conduct not occurred, but “on what actually happened—was the discovery tainted by the illegal[ity]?” Id. at 410 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). “‘[U]nder the independent source doctrine, evidence that was in fact discovered lawfully, and not as a direct or 11 indirect result of illegal activity, is admissible.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d.

2012Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984).

2012Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984).

2025In other words, under the independent source doctrine, “if the State can show that the source of the evidence was ‘wholly independent of any constitutional violation,’” then the constitutional violation “will not render the evidence in question inadmissible.” State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275, 298 (2003) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 443 ).

2004Its focus is on what actually happened — was the discovery tainted by the illegal search?" *407 374 Md. at 292 , 821 A.2d at 932 (quoting United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309 , 1318 n. 1 (7th Cir.1993)).

2002The independent source doctrine had it genesis in Silverthorne Lumber Co., where the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applies not only to illegally seized evidence but also to other incriminating evidence derived from that primary evidence. 251 U.S. at 392 , 40 S.Ct. at 183 , 64 L.Ed. 319 .

2002The independent source doctrine had it genesis in Silverthorne Lumber Co., where the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applies not only to illegally seized evidence but also to other incriminating evidence derived from that primary evidence. 251 U.S. at 392 , 40 S.Ct. at 183 , 64 L.Ed. 319 .

2025See, e.g., Kamara v. State, 205 Md.

2025Id.

2025See generally Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013) (discussing the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement).6 Harley seems not to recognize that the presence or absence of exigent circumstances is immaterial to whether the court could uphold the search under the independent source doctrine.

2021Stat. Ann. § 570/414 (limited immunity does not apply “if law enforcement has reasonable 12 An Illinois appellate court interpreted the independent source exception narrowly in People v. Markham, 126 N.E.3d 759, 764 (Ill.

2017A concurring member of the three-judge panel, Judge Kathryn Graeff, concluded that, assuming arguendo that the stop was illegal, the evidence that was recovered from Mr. Sizer would have been admissible under the attenuation doctrine, rather than the independent source doctrine, in light of this Court’s decisions in Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261 , 909 A.2d 1048 (2006), Cox v. State, 397 Md. 200 , 916 A.2d 311 (2007), and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Utah v. Strieff, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016).

2017A concurring member of the three-judge panel, Judge Kathryn Graeff, concluded that, assuming arguendo that the stop was illegal, the evidence that was recovered from Mr. Sizer would have been admissible under the attenuation doctrine, rather than the independent source doctrine, in light of this Court’s decisions in Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261 , 909 A.2d 1048 (2006), Cox v. State, 397 Md. 200 , 916 A.2d 311 (2007), and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Utah v. Strieff, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016).

2013As this Court recently stated: “The principal in an agency relationship is not entitled to receive immunity simply because the agent is entitled to receive immunity; the principal must establish an independent basis to receive the benefit of an immunity shield---- [UJnless there is an independent source of immunity for the employer or principal, the cause of action premised on vicarious liability can be brought even if the employee or agent is entitled to immunity.” D’Aoust v. Diamond, 424 Md. 549, 605-07 , 36 A.3d 941 (2012); see also James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 332 , 418 A.

2013As this Court recently stated: “The principal in an agency relationship is not entitled to receive immunity simply because the agent is entitled to receive immunity; the principal must establish an independent basis to receive the benefit of an immunity shield---- [UJnless there is an independent source of immunity for the employer or principal, the cause of action premised on vicarious liability can be brought even if the employee or agent is entitled to immunity.” D’Aoust v. Diamond, 424 Md. 549, 605-07 , 36 A.3d 941 (2012); see also James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 332 , 418 A.

2012See, e.g., United States v. Etchin, 614 F.3d 726, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2010) (marijuana observed during illegal entry admissible because warrant affidavit contained sufficient probable cause without the illegally obtained evidence), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 953 , 178 L.Ed.2d 786 (2011); United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 283 (3d Cir.) (evidence found in residence admissible because search warrant affidavit contained sufficient probable cause after information obtained from illegal search of basement redacted), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 375 , 175 L.Ed.2d 157 (2009); United States

2012Accord United States v. May, 214 F.3d 900, 906 (7th Cir.) (money improperly seized pursuant to state search warrant, but properly “rediscovered” in legal federal search warrant, need not be suppressed pursuant to the independent source doctrine), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 891 , 121 S.Ct. 217 , 148 L.Ed.2d 153 (2000); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1143 (3d Cir.) (gun seized during unlawful entry, treated as being seized pursuant to the subsequent warranted search, was admissible pursuant to independent source doctrine), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 , 113 S.Ct. 421 , 121 L.Ed.2d 344 (1992)