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27 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Murray v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025Murray established that when applying the independent source doctrine to an unlawful entry, the question is “whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence.” 487 U.S. at 542 . 2025The independent source doctrine “applies when evidence is discovered as a result of unlawful police activity but is also discovered independently through a lawful investigation that occurs either before or after the illegal activity, so long as the independent investigation is ‘untainted by the initial illegality.”’ Jackson v. State, 1 So. 3d 273, 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988)). | 2 | 3 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2025The independent source doctrine “applies when evidence is discovered as a result of unlawful police activity but is also discovered independently through a lawful investigation that occurs either before or after the illegal activity, so long as the independent investigation is ‘untainted by the initial illegality.”’ Jackson v. State, 1 So. 3d 273, 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988)). 2019The independent source rule "applies when evidence is discovered as a result of unlawful police activity but is also *260 discovered independently through a lawful investigation that occurs either before or after the illegal activity, so long as the independent investigation itself is 'untainted by the initial activity.' " Id. at 65 (quoting Jackson v. State , 1 So.3d 273 , 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) ). | 1 | 3 |
Segura v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1993NOTES [1] A "911 open line call" means that someone from the gas station location called 911 and did not hang up or disconnect the telephone. [2] Chicone briefly mentions that the independent source doctrine of Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), and the inevitable discovery doctrine of Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), are not applicable to this case. 1993NOTES [1] A "911 open line call" means that someone from the gas station location called 911 and did not hang up or disconnect the telephone. [2] Chicone briefly mentions that the independent source doctrine of Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), and the inevitable discovery doctrine of Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), are not applicable to this case. | 1 | 3 |
Miguel Rodriguez v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2025Rodriguez v. State, 187 So. 3d 841, 845 (Fla. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
T.D.S. v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Therefore, we set the record straight in Brown, explaining: [W]e clarify Samuels and hold that the specific statute number is unnecessary where, as here, the defendant has had notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the court’s oral pronouncement and written order are specific enough to place the parties and the reviewing court on notice of the statutory authority for the assessment. 3 Cf. T.D.S., 45 So. 3d at 18 (“The source of the requirement that a cost assessment in a criminal proceeding contain a reference to the statutory authority is not directly found in a statute or a rule of proce | 1 | 1 |
McDonnell v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Unlike the independent source rule, which the First District explained “applies when evidence is discovered as a result of unlawful police activity but is also discovered independently through a lawful investigation that occurs either before or after the illegal activity, so long as the independent investigation [itself] is ‘untainted by the initial activity,’” Id. at 278 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988)), under the inevitable discovery doctrine, ‘“evidence otherwise subject to suppression can be admitted if the State shows that the officers “ultimately would have dis 2014Unlike the independent source rule, which the First District explained “applies when evidence is discovered as a result of unlawful police activity but is also discovered independently through a lawful investigation that occurs either before or after the illegal activity, so long as the independent investigation [itself] is ‘untainted by the initial activity,’ ” Id. at 278 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)), under the inevitable discovery doctrine, “ ‘evidence otherwise subject to suppression can be admitted if the State shows that th | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Bally’s of Louisiana, Incgreen1 sentence2012See Martinez v. Bally’s Louisiana, Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 477 (5th Cir.2001) (“Although a judicial admission is not itself evidence, it has the effect of withdrawing a fact from contention.”); United States v. Blood, 806 F.2d 1218 , R1221 (4th Cir.1986) (“Generally, statements by an attorney concerning a matter within his employment may be admissible against the retaining client. | 1 | 1 |
Waller v. Stategreen1 sentence2010At least to a large extent, this requirement can be traced to the en banc decision of this court in Reyes v. State, 655 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) superseded, by statute, § 938.15, Fla. Stat. (1997), on other grounds as recognized in Waller v. State, 911 So.2d 226, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Manning v. Clarkgreen1 sentence1996Manning v. Clark, 56 So.2d 521, 523 (Fla.1951). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Vicknairgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nix v. Williams
green
2 sentences2009Under the independent source doctrine, evidence is admissible if the State can show that it was obtained by “means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.” Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 . 2009Under the independent source doctrine, evidence is admissible if the State can show that it was obtained by “means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.” Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 . | 8 | 1984–2019 |
Spera v. State
green
2 sentences2026That is, rule 3.850 movants are permitted to amend defective pleadings “only if they can be amended in good faith.” Spera, 971 So. 2d at 762 . 2 This Court has mentioned this rule of law, but only when reversing an 2 The Spera court relied on its earlier decision in Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2005), where it held that a death- sentenced postconviction movant should have been given the opportunity to amend a facially insufficient postconviction claim. 2012If that order had granted Mr. Williams an opportunity to amend his first ground pursuant to Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754 (Fla.2007), perhaps this reversal could have been avoided. | 2 | 2012–2026 |
Hines v. State
green
2 sentences2019The independent source rule "applies when evidence is discovered as a result of unlawful police activity but is also *260 discovered independently through a lawful investigation that occurs either before or after the illegal activity, so long as the independent investigation itself is 'untainted by the initial activity.' " Id. at 65 (quoting Jackson v. State , 1 So.3d 273 , 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) ). 2019The independent source rule "applies when evidence is discovered as a result of unlawful police activity but is also *260 discovered independently through a lawful investigation that occurs either before or after the illegal activity, so long as the independent investigation itself is 'untainted by the initial activity.' " Id. at 65 (quoting Jackson v. State , 1 So.3d 273 , 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) ). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Ojeda
green
2 sentences2019Nix , 467 U.S. at 443 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 . "[T]he 'exclusionary rule' has no application where the government can show it has learned of the challenged evidence from an 'independent source.' The rule applies where the illegal search or seizure was not an actual cause of the discovery of the subject evidence." State v. Ojeda , 147 So.3d 53 , 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). 2019Nix , 467 U.S. at 443 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 . "[T]he 'exclusionary rule' has no application where the government can show it has learned of the challenged evidence from an 'independent source.' The rule applies where the illegal search or seizure was not an actual cause of the discovery of the subject evidence." State v. Ojeda , 147 So.3d 53 , 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt
green
2 sentences1984The source of this requirement is apparently the much criticized opinion by Justice Holmes in United Zinc & Chemical Company v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 , 42 S.Ct. 299 , 66 L.Ed. 615 (1921). 1 However, we should not read this requirement so literally that we abolish application of the attractive nuisance doctrine to concealed dangers operating in connection with conditions or other objects on property, which jointly contribute to the child’s injury. 1984The source of this requirement is apparently the much criticized opinion by Justice Holmes in United Zinc & Chemical Company v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 , 42 S.Ct. 299 , 66 L.Ed. 615 (1921). 1 However, we should not read this requirement so literally that we abolish application of the attractive nuisance doctrine to concealed dangers operating in connection with conditions or other objects on property, which jointly contribute to the child’s injury. | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States
red
2 sentences1984Nix v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). 1984Nix v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). | 2 | 1981–1984 |
Bryant v. State
green
1 sentence2026That is, rule 3.850 movants are permitted to amend defective pleadings “only if they can be amended in good faith.” Spera, 971 So. 2d at 762 . 2 This Court has mentioned this rule of law, but only when reversing an 2 The Spera court relied on its earlier decision in Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2005), where it held that a death- sentenced postconviction movant should have been given the opportunity to amend a facially insufficient postconviction claim. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
O'Hare v. State
neutral
2 sentences2023However, “[t]he ‘exclusionary rule’ has no application where the government can show it has learned of the challenged evidence from an ‘independent source.’ The rule applies where the illegal search or seizure was not an actual cause of the discovery of the subject evidence.” O’Hare v. State, 263 So. 3d 255 , 259–60 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (citation omitted). 10 The independent source doctrine 4 “applies when evidence is discovered as a result of unlawful police activity but is also discovered independently through a lawful investigation that occurs either before or after the illegal activity, so 2023However, “[t]he ‘exclusionary rule’ has no application where the government can show it has learned of the challenged evidence from an ‘independent source.’ The rule applies where the illegal search or seizure was not an actual cause of the discovery of the subject evidence.” O’Hare v. State, 263 So. 3d 255 , 259–60 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (citation omitted). 10 The independent source doctrine 4 “applies when evidence is discovered as a result of unlawful police activity but is also discovered independently through a lawful investigation that occurs either before or after the illegal activity, so | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Brown v. State
neutral
1 sentence2023Therefore, we set the record straight in Brown, explaining: [W]e clarify Samuels and hold that the specific statute number is unnecessary where, as here, the defendant has had notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the court’s oral pronouncement and written order are specific enough to place the parties and the reviewing court on notice of the statutory authority for the assessment. 3 Cf. T.D.S., 45 So. 3d at 18 (“The source of the requirement that a cost assessment in a criminal proceeding contain a reference to the statutory authority is not directly found in a statute or a rule of proce | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Mosier
green
2 sentences2014For example, in State v. Mosier, 392 So.2d 602 (Fla. Bd DCA 1981), we concluded that a search by plain clothes detectives of a suitcase checked by Mosier at a Continental Airlines ticket counter was lawful, despite the fact Mosier had earlier refused them permission to search the suitcase during the course of an illegal Terry stop. 6 Mosier, 392 So.2d at 604 . 2014For example, in State v. Mosier, 392 So.2d 602 (Fla. Bd DCA 1981), we concluded that a search by plain clothes detectives of a suitcase checked by Mosier at a Continental Airlines ticket counter was lawful, despite the fact Mosier had earlier refused them permission to search the suitcase during the course of an illegal Terry stop. 6 Mosier, 392 So.2d at 604 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Griffith
green
2 sentences2014State v. Griffith, 500 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), issued by this Court a few years after Mosier, provides an even more cogent example of the operation of the independent source rule. 2014State v. Griffith, 500 So.2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), issued by this Court a few years after Mosier , provides an even more cogent example of the operation of the independent source rule. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George W. BLOOD, Defendant-Appellant
green
1 sentence2012See Martinez v. Bally’s Louisiana, Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 477 (5th Cir.2001) (“Although a judicial admission is not itself evidence, it has the effect of withdrawing a fact from contention.”); United States v. Blood, 806 F.2d 1218 , R1221 (4th Cir.1986) (“Generally, statements by an attorney concerning a matter within his employment may be admissible against the retaining client. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Reyes v. State
green
1 sentence2010At least to a large extent, this requirement can be traced to the en banc decision of this court in Reyes v. State, 655 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) superseded, by statute, § 938.15, Fla. Stat. (1997), on other grounds as recognized in Waller v. State, 911 So.2d 226, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
North Carolina v. Pearce
red
2 sentences2002The source of the presumption of vindictiveness is North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). 2002The source of the presumption of vindictiveness is North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Ohio Rlty. Inv. Corp. v. Southern Bk. of W. Palm Beach
green
1 sentence1997The case we cited to support a rule of strict construction, Venetian Cove, in turn cites Ohio Realty Investment Corp. v. Southern Bank, 300 So.2d 679 (Fla.1974), as the source of the rule. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Reed v. State
green
1 sentence1993We agree only because the state failed to make this argument or present the evidence to support it during the suppression hearing. [3] Whiting v. State, 595 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Mosby v. State, 575 So.2d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Reed v. State, 577 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Whiting v. State
green
1 sentence1993We agree only because the state failed to make this argument or present the evidence to support it during the suppression hearing. [3] Whiting v. State, 595 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Mosby v. State, 575 So.2d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Reed v. State, 577 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Mosby v. State
green
1 sentence1993We agree only because the state failed to make this argument or present the evidence to support it during the suppression hearing. [3] Whiting v. State, 595 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Mosby v. State, 575 So.2d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Reed v. State, 577 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
ACCENT REALTY v. Crudele
green
1 sentence1989See Murray, Execution Lien Creditors Versus Bona Fide Purchasers, fenders and Other Execution Lien Creditors: Charles II and the Uniform Commercial Code, 85 Comm.L.J. 485, 486-88 (1980); Accent Realty, 496 So. 2d at 162 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Fritz v. Fritz green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Burdack v. Burdack green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
United States v. Donald Bienvenue
green
1 sentence1986The independent source rule was applied with similar results in United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910 (1st Cir.1980). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Deatherage v. Deatherage
green
1 sentence1986The following statement of the law applicable where modification of a contractual right to child support is sought first appeared in Burdack v. Burdack, 371 So.2d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), is repeated in Deatherage v. Deatherage, 395 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 5th DCA), appeal dismissed, 402 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1981), and is quoted with approval in Fritz, 485 So.2d at 489 : A fundamental prerequisite to modification of child support payments is a showing of substantial change of circumstances, including financial circumstances of one or both of the parties. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| United States v. Martin Willard Houltin and Kenneth B. Phillips green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Houltin v. United States neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Meyer yellow | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Orosz v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Toogood green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Goodley green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Pike green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Pike v. United States green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Keiley v. Hinkson green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Vicknair v. United States green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.