source exception in Ohio

2025No. 23AP-739 9 State v. Carter, 1994-Ohio-343 , 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 67 , citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). {¶ 38} An exception to the exclusionary rule is the independent source doctrine which allows the admission of evidence discovered by means entirely independent of any constitutional violation.

2018"Warrantless searches and seizures are not illegal, however, if one of the several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is demonstrated." Id. {¶ 75} The first exception appellee applies is the independent source rule, which provides that "evidence observed by police during an illegal entry need not be excluded if the evidence is later discovered during the execution of a valid search warrant issued on information wholly unconnected to the prior entry." Carter , 69 Ohio St.3d at 68 , 630 N.E.2d 355 .

2002"The independent source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation." Nix v. Williams (1984), 467 U.S. 431 , 444 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 2509 .

2002"The independent source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation." Nix v. Williams (1984), 467 U.S. 431 , 444 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 2509 .

2025No. 23AP-739 9 State v. Carter, 1994-Ohio-343 , 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 67 , citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). {¶ 38} An exception to the exclusionary rule is the independent source doctrine which allows the admission of evidence discovered by means entirely independent of any constitutional violation.

2000They are the independent source doctrine, see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), 251 U.S. 385 ; the inevitable discovery doctrine, see Nix v. Williams (1984), 467 U.S. 431 ; and the attenuation doctrine, see Nardone v. United States (1939), 308 U.S. 338 .

2006Id. {¶ 12} "When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." State v. Murrell (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 489 , 764 N.E.2d 986 , 2002-Ohio-1483 , syllabus. {¶ 13} "The doctrine of inevitable discovery is a corollary of the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule which holds that evidence will not be suppressed if the state learns of the questioned evidence from a source separate and distinct from an illegal source." Wong Sun v. U

2003At the suppression hearing, the state successfully argued that the warrantless search of the truck was excepted from the exclusionary rule because it was incident to appellant's arrest or, alternatively, would have been inevitably discovered when the police conducted a routine inventory search of the truck prior to impounding it. {¶ 70} "When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." State v. Murrell , 94 Ohio St.3d 489 , 2002-Ohio-148

2006Id. {¶ 12} "When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." State v. Murrell (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 489 , 764 N.E.2d 986 , 2002-Ohio-1483 , syllabus. {¶ 13} "The doctrine of inevitable discovery is a corollary of the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule which holds that evidence will not be suppressed if the state learns of the questioned evidence from a source separate and distinct from an illegal source." Wong Sun v. U

2006Id. {¶ 12} "When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." State v. Murrell (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 489 , 764 N.E.2d 986 , 2002-Ohio-1483 , syllabus. {¶ 13} "The doctrine of inevitable discovery is a corollary of the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule which holds that evidence will not be suppressed if the state learns of the questioned evidence from a source separate and distinct from an illegal source." Wong Sun v. U

2006Id. {¶ 12} "When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." State v. Murrell (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 489 , 764 N.E.2d 986 , 2002-Ohio-1483 , syllabus. {¶ 13} "The doctrine of inevitable discovery is a corollary of the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule which holds that evidence will not be suppressed if the state learns of the questioned evidence from a source separate and distinct from an illegal source." Wong Sun v. U

2006Id. {¶ 12} "When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." State v. Murrell (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 489 , 764 N.E.2d 986 , 2002-Ohio-1483 , syllabus. {¶ 13} "The doctrine of inevitable discovery is a corollary of the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule which holds that evidence will not be suppressed if the state learns of the questioned evidence from a source separate and distinct from an illegal source." Wong Sun v. U

2025Appellant also argues that the independent source doctrine does not apply to the second warrant. {¶ 35} “The review of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Diaw, 2025-Ohio-2323, ¶ 8 .

2025No. 23AP-739 9 State v. Carter, 1994-Ohio-343 , 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 67 , citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). {¶ 38} An exception to the exclusionary rule is the independent source doctrine which allows the admission of evidence discovered by means entirely independent of any constitutional violation.

2018"Warrantless searches and seizures are not illegal, however, if one of the several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is demonstrated." Id. {¶ 75} The first exception appellee applies is the independent source rule, which provides that "evidence observed by police during an illegal entry need not be excluded if the evidence is later discovered during the execution of a valid search warrant issued on information wholly unconnected to the prior entry." Carter , 69 Ohio St.3d at 68 , 630 N.E.2d 355 .

2017Id.

2016Id.

2016Id.

2012In this respect, the amendment overrules United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F.Supp. 1110 (D.Md.1987), in which the court refused to shift to the source the burden of proving compliance after EPA established that the source was in violation of the Act.

2012In this respect, the amendment overrules United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F.Supp. 1110 (D.Md.1987), in which the court refused to shift to the source the burden of proving compliance after EPA established that the source was in violation of the Act.

2012State v. Perkins, 18 Ohio St.3d 193 , 480 N.E.2d 763 (1985); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). {¶29} We decline to find the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule in this case.

2012State v. Perkins, 18 Ohio St.3d 193 , 480 N.E.2d 763 (1985); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). {¶29} We decline to find the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule in this case.

2012Assn., 28 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 , 502 N.E.2d 599 (1986) (“the sole responsibility of a defendant who has effectively contested the claimant’s allegations by pleading is to refute the claimant’s case after the latter has established a prima facie case by proper evidence” [emphasis sic]). {¶ 51} Even under 42 U.S.C. 7413(e)(2), the section of the Clean Air Act that sets forth the standard for federal enforcement actions, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the conduct or events giving rise to the violation are likely to have continued or recurred after the defendant has been notifie

2012Assn., 28 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 , 502 N.E.2d 599 (1986) (“the sole responsibility of a defendant who has effectively contested the claimant’s allegations by pleading is to refute the claimant’s case after the latter has established a prima facie case by proper evidence” [emphasis sic]). {¶ 51} Even under 42 U.S.C. 7413(e)(2), the section of the Clean Air Act that sets forth the standard for federal enforcement actions, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the conduct or events giving rise to the violation are likely to have continued or recurred after the defendant has been notifie

2011Detective Kappa only sought the search warrant after he received Officer Rebraca’s first hand account of the illegal search. {¶ 25} Even if we found that Detective Kappa was not prompted to seek the warrant by Officer Rebraca’s information, and we further examined the warrant affidavit with the facts obtained from the lawless search removed pursuant to the Sixth Circuit’s methodology in U.S. v. Jenkins (2005), 396 F.3d 751 , 757 -759 (holding that if the application for a warrant “contains probable cause apart from the improper information, then the warrant is lawful and the independent source

2006Id. {¶ 12} "When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." State v. Murrell (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 489 , 764 N.E.2d 986 , 2002-Ohio-1483 , syllabus. {¶ 13} "The doctrine of inevitable discovery is a corollary of the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule which holds that evidence will not be suppressed if the state learns of the questioned evidence from a source separate and distinct from an illegal source." Wong Sun v. U

2000They are the independent source doctrine, see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), 251 U.S. 385 ; the inevitable discovery doctrine, see Nix v. Williams (1984), 467 U.S. 431 ; and the attenuation doctrine, see Nardone v. United States (1939), 308 U.S. 338 .

2000Murray , Segura , and Carter , supra .; State v. Miller (1991) 77 Ohio App.3d 305 , 602 N.E.2d 296 .

2000Murray , Segura , and Carter , supra .; State v. Miller (1991) 77 Ohio App.3d 305 , 602 N.E.2d 296 .

1989The Supreme Court of Ohio in King v. Williams (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 137, 140 , 5 OBR 269, 272, 449 N.E.2d 452, 455 , stated that “a statute may provide immunity from liability.. * * * ” In this case, R.C. 2744.01 et seq., not the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity, specifically provides that the city is not liable to Farra.

1989The Supreme Court of Ohio in King v. Williams (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 137, 140 , 5 OBR 269, 272, 449 N.E.2d 452, 455 , stated that “a statute may provide immunity from liability.. * * * ” In this case, R.C. 2744.01 et seq., not the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity, specifically provides that the city is not liable to Farra.

1967Co., 110 Ohio St. 376 , one of the early “zone of employment” cases, although that phrase was not given expression until Industrial Commission v. Barber, 117 Ohio St. 373 .

1967Co., 110 Ohio St. 376 , one of the early “zone of employment” cases, although that phrase was not given expression until Industrial Commission v. Barber, 117 Ohio St. 373 .