23 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1976–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. D.K. Johnsongreen2 sentences1997In the case of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, “[t]he two elements that must be satisfied to allow admission [under the independent source doctrine] are: (1) the warrant must be supported by probable cause derived from sources independent of the illegal entry; and (2) the decision to seek the warrant may not be prompted by information gleaned from the illegal conduct.” United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 987 (2d Cir. 1993); Murray v. United States, supra, 487 U.S. 542 . 1997In the case of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, [t]he two elements that must be satisfied to allow admission [under the independent source doctrine] are: (1) the warrant must be supported by probable cause derived from sources independent of the illegal entry; and (2) the decision to seek the warrant may not be prompted by information gleaned from the illegal conduct. 8 United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 987 (2d Cir. 1993); Murray v. United States, supra, [542].” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vivo, supra, 672-73 . | 4 | 4 |
Murray v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996In Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 537 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), the Court reaffirmed its holding in Segura and extended the scope of the independent source doctrine "to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality." The court noted that "while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied." Id., 542 . 1996In Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 537 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), the Court reaffirmed its holding in Segura and extended the scope of the independent source doctrine "to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality." The court noted that "while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied." Id., 542 . | 2 | 5 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2018See State v. Sulewski , 98 Conn. App. 762 , 764 n.2, 912 A.2d 485 (2006) (concluding that this court need not address trial court's alternative ruling that evidence was admissible pursuant to independent source doctrine in light of conclusion that stop was lawful under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [1968] ). 2006We need not address the court’s ruling regarding the independent source doctrine because we conclude that the stop was valid under Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Brocugliogreen2 sentences2018See State v. Brocuglio , 264 Conn. 778 , 786-87, 826 A.2d 145 (2003) ("As a general principle, the exclusionary rule bars the government from introducing at trial evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution.... 2018See State v. Brocuglio , 264 Conn. 778 , 786-87, 826 A.2d 145 (2003) ("As a general principle, the exclusionary rule bars the government from introducing at trial evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution.... | 2 | 2 |
State v. Sulewskigreen2 sentences2018See State v. Sulewski , 98 Conn. App. 762 , 764 n.2, 912 A.2d 485 (2006) (concluding that this court need not address trial court's alternative ruling that evidence was admissible pursuant to independent source doctrine in light of conclusion that stop was lawful under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [1968] ). 2018See State v. Sulewski , 98 Conn. App. 762 , 764 n.2, 912 A.2d 485 (2006) (concluding that this court need not address trial court's alternative ruling that evidence was admissible pursuant to independent source doctrine in light of conclusion that stop was lawful under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [1968] ). | 2 | 2 |
Nix v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1997Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” (Emphasis added.) The independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine are recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule and are “closely related.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 , 104 S. Ct. 2501 , 81 L. 1997Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” (Emphasis added.) The independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine are recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule and are “closely related.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 , 104 S. Ct. 2501 , 81 L. | 1 | 3 |
Schilling v. Gre Insurance Co.green2 sentences2021See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 987 (2d Cir.) (to determine applicability of independent source doctrine, court ‘‘must consider whether the agents would have applied for a warrant had they not [engaged in the unlawful search] beforehand’’), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 , 114 S. Ct. 418 , 126 L. 1999United, States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 987 [(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 , 114 S. Ct. 418 , 126 L. | 1 | 2 |
Mothershed v. Gregg, Ante, P. 868green2 sentences2021See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 987 (2d Cir.) (to determine applicability of independent source doctrine, court ‘‘must consider whether the agents would have applied for a warrant had they not [engaged in the unlawful search] beforehand’’), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 , 114 S. Ct. 418 , 126 L. 1999United, States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 987 [(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 , 114 S. Ct. 418 , 126 L. | 1 | 2 |
Munez v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 987 (2d Cir.) (to determine applicability of independent source doctrine, court ‘‘must consider whether the agents would have applied for a warrant had they not [engaged in the unlawful search] beforehand’’), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 , 114 S. Ct. 418 , 126 L. 1999United, States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 987 [(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 , 114 S. Ct. 418 , 126 L. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2026First, the New Mexico Supreme Court has abandoned the independent source doctrine in cases involving “disputed eyewitness identifications,” except “[when] the eyewitness . . . is personally familiar with State v. Rohena the perpetrator of the crime.” State v. Martinez, 478 P.3d 880, 905 (N.M. 2020). 2026First, the New Mexico Supreme Court has abandoned the independent source doctrine in cases involving “disputed eyewitness identifications,” except “[when] the eyewitness . . . is personally familiar with State v. Rohena the perpetrator of the crime.” State v. Martinez, 478 P.3d 880, 905 (N.M. 2020). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wadegreen2 sentences2026Specifically, the so infiltrate the identification today that it should be withheld from the jury.” State v. Rohena defendant asks this court to adopt a more restrictive version of the independent source doctrine; see, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240–42, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. 2026Specifically, the so infiltrate the identification today that it should be withheld from the jury.” State v. Rohena defendant asks this court to adopt a more restrictive version of the independent source doctrine; see, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240–42, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nawrockigreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., People v. Wall, Docket No. 21CA0796, 2023 WL 12052104, *5 (Colo. App. 2023), cert. denied, Colorado Supreme Court, Docket No. 24SC77, 2024 WL 3052328 (June 17, 2024); Patrick v. United States, supra, 343 A.3d 583–84; State v. Shelvin, 424 So. 3d 616, 616 (La. 2025); People v. Williams, supra, 41 N.Y.3d 556–57; Wright v. State, Docket No. 14-23-00744-CR, 2025 WL 970432, *2 (Tex. App. 2025); State v. Nawrocki, 308 Wis. 2d 227, 247, 746 N.W.2d 509 (App.), review denied, 310 Wis. 2d 706, 754 N.W.2d 850 (2008). 2026See, e.g., People v. Wall, Docket No. 21CA0796, 2023 WL 12052104, *5 (Colo. App. 2023), cert. denied, Colorado Supreme Court, Docket No. 24SC77, 2024 WL 3052328 (June 17, 2024); Patrick v. United States, supra, 343 A.3d 583–84; State v. Shelvin, 424 So. 3d 616, 616 (La. 2025); People v. Williams, supra, 41 N.Y.3d 556–57; Wright v. State, Docket No. 14-23-00744-CR, 2025 WL 970432, *2 (Tex. App. 2025); State v. Nawrocki, 308 Wis. 2d 227, 247, 746 N.W.2d 509 (App.), review denied, 310 Wis. 2d 706, 754 N.W.2d 850 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Al Farekhgreen2 sentences2026He also acknowledges that the current approach of federal courts, which remain bound to follow the independent source doctrine; see, e.g., United States v. Al-Farekh, 956 F.3d 99 , 110–11 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1108 , 208 L. 2026He also acknowledges that the current approach of federal courts, which remain bound to follow the independent source doctrine; see, e.g., United States v. Al-Farekh, 956 F.3d 99, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1108, 208 L. | 1 | 1 |
Bloomfield Health Care Center of Connecticut, LLC v. Doyongreen1 sentence2021See State v. Correa, supra, 185 Conn. App. 340 n.23 . 15 Ordinarily, under Golding, we address the adequacy of the record before considering the merits of the unpreserved constitutional claim. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kelvin Baezgreen1 sentence2021In light of our determination affording the state the opportunity to adduce additional evidence in connection with its claims under both doctrines, and because the distinction between the two doctrines is not always a ‘‘sharp’’ one; United States v. Baez, 983 F.3d 1029, 1037 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 2744 , 210 L. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Antoine Johnsongreen1 sentence2021Ed. 2d 896 (2021); see also United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, 1014 (7th Cir. 2004); for present purposes, we need not express a view as to the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine separate and apart from the independent source doctrine. 37 With respect to the requirement that the state must prove by a preponder- ance of the evidence that the tainted evidence inevitably would have been discovered irrespective of the unlawful search, the Second Circuit has ‘‘acknowledged that using the [preponderance of the evidence] standard to prove inevitability creates a problem of proba | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mulhollandgreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, supra, 994 F.2d 987 (observing that courts apply independent source doctrine in cases in which police discover evidence ‘‘while engaging in an unlawful search or entry, but where there was an independent basis apart from the illegal entry to allow a warrant to issue’’); see also United States v. Mulholland, 628 Fed. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Vilargreen1 sentence2021Ed. 2d 896 (2021); see also United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, 1014 (7th Cir. 2004); for present purposes, we need not express a view as to the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine separate and apart from the independent source doctrine. 37 With respect to the requirement that the state must prove by a preponder- ance of the evidence that the tainted evidence inevitably would have been discovered irrespective of the unlawful search, the Second Circuit has ‘‘acknowledged that using the [preponderance of the evidence] standard to prove inevitability creates a problem of proba | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Turnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ortega v. Enforcementgreen | 1 | 1 |
| D'Antoni v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cobbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sentner v. Board of Trustees of Regional Community Collegesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ostroskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kellygreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 495463green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Evans
green
2 sentences2018Specifically, the state argues that ‘‘[b]ecause the defendant did not challenge the dog sniff below, both the state and the trial court were temporally focused on Broems’ opening of the door,’’ and, therefore, ‘‘the state will be unable to show that despite the alleged illegality of the canine sniff, the evidence was nevertheless admissible under the independent source doctrine.’’ Because we do not reach the issue of whether the independent source doctrine applies in this case; see footnote 20 of this opinion; we need not decide the adequacy of the record with respect to that issue. 10 The def 2018Specifically, the state argues that ‘‘[b]ecause the defendant did not challenge the dog sniff below, both the state and the trial court were temporally focused on Broems’ opening of the door,’’ and, therefore, ‘‘the state will be unable to show that despite the alleged illegality of the canine sniff, the evidence was nevertheless admissible under the independent source doctrine.’’ Because we do not reach the issue of whether the independent source doctrine applies in this case; see footnote 20 of this opinion; we need not decide the adequacy of the record with respect to that issue. 10 The def | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Kono
green
2 sentences2018Specifically, the state argues that ‘‘[b]ecause the defendant did not challenge the dog sniff below, both the state and the trial court were temporally focused on Broems’ opening of the door,’’ and, therefore, ‘‘the state will be unable to show that despite the alleged illegality of the canine sniff, the evidence was nevertheless admissible under the independent source doctrine.’’ Because we do not reach the issue of whether the independent source doctrine applies in this case; see footnote 20 of this opinion; we need not decide the adequacy of the record with respect to that issue. 10 The def 2018Specifically, the state argues that ‘‘[b]ecause the defendant did not challenge the dog sniff below, both the state and the trial court were temporally focused on Broems’ opening of the door,’’ and, therefore, ‘‘the state will be unable to show that despite the alleged illegality of the canine sniff, the evidence was nevertheless admissible under the independent source doctrine.’’ Because we do not reach the issue of whether the independent source doctrine applies in this case; see footnote 20 of this opinion; we need not decide the adequacy of the record with respect to that issue. 10 The def | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Joyce
green
2 sentences2016In the case of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, [t]he two ele- ments that must be satisfied to allow admission [under the independent source doctrine] are: (1) the warrant must be supported by probable cause derived from sources independent of the illegal entry; and (2) the decision to seek the warrant may not be prompted by information gleaned from the illegal conduct.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Joyce, 243 Conn. 282 , 289–290, 705 A.2d 181 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 , 118 S. Ct. 1523 , 140 L. 2016In the case of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, [t]he two ele- ments that must be satisfied to allow admission [under the independent source doctrine] are: (1) the warrant must be supported by probable cause derived from sources independent of the illegal entry; and (2) the decision to seek the warrant may not be prompted by information gleaned from the illegal conduct.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Joyce, 243 Conn. 282 , 289–290, 705 A.2d 181 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 , 118 S. Ct. 1523 , 140 L. | 2 | 2008–2016 |
Yadav v. West Windsor Township
green
2 sentences2016In the case of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, [t]he two ele- ments that must be satisfied to allow admission [under the independent source doctrine] are: (1) the warrant must be supported by probable cause derived from sources independent of the illegal entry; and (2) the decision to seek the warrant may not be prompted by information gleaned from the illegal conduct.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Joyce, 243 Conn. 282 , 289–290, 705 A.2d 181 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 , 118 S. Ct. 1523 , 140 L. 2008In the case of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, [t]he two elements that must be satisfied to allow admission [under the independent source doctrine] are: (1) the warrant must be supported by probable cause derived from sources independent of the illegal entry; and (2) the decision to seek the warrant may not be prompted by information gleaned from the illegal conduct.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Joyce, 243 Conn. 282, 289-90 , 705 A.2d 181 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 , 118 S. Ct. 1523 , 140 L. | 2 | 2008–2016 |
Case Farms of North Carolina, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences2016In the case of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, [t]he two ele- ments that must be satisfied to allow admission [under the independent source doctrine] are: (1) the warrant must be supported by probable cause derived from sources independent of the illegal entry; and (2) the decision to seek the warrant may not be prompted by information gleaned from the illegal conduct.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Joyce, 243 Conn. 282 , 289–290, 705 A.2d 181 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 , 118 S. Ct. 1523 , 140 L. 2008In the case of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, [t]he two elements that must be satisfied to allow admission [under the independent source doctrine] are: (1) the warrant must be supported by probable cause derived from sources independent of the illegal entry; and (2) the decision to seek the warrant may not be prompted by information gleaned from the illegal conduct.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Joyce, 243 Conn. 282, 289-90 , 705 A.2d 181 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 , 118 S. Ct. 1523 , 140 L. | 2 | 2008–2016 |
Cornish v. Court of Appeals of Maryland
green
2 sentences2016In the case of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, [t]he two ele- ments that must be satisfied to allow admission [under the independent source doctrine] are: (1) the warrant must be supported by probable cause derived from sources independent of the illegal entry; and (2) the decision to seek the warrant may not be prompted by information gleaned from the illegal conduct.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Joyce, 243 Conn. 282 , 289–290, 705 A.2d 181 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 , 118 S. Ct. 1523 , 140 L. 2008In the case of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, [t]he two elements that must be satisfied to allow admission [under the independent source doctrine] are: (1) the warrant must be supported by probable cause derived from sources independent of the illegal entry; and (2) the decision to seek the warrant may not be prompted by information gleaned from the illegal conduct.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Joyce, 243 Conn. 282, 289-90 , 705 A.2d 181 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 , 118 S. Ct. 1523 , 140 L. | 2 | 2008–2016 |
State v. MOSEBY
neutral
2 sentences2026See, e.g., People v. Wall, Docket No. 21CA0796, 2023 WL 12052104 , *5 (Colo. App. 2023), cert. denied, Docket No. 24SC77, 2024 WL 3052328 (Colo. June 17, 2024); Patrick v. United States, supra, 343 A.3d 583–84; State v. Shelvin, 424 So. 3d 616 , 616 (La. 2025); People v. Williams, supra, 41 N.Y.3d 556–57; Wright v. State, Docket No. 14-23- 00744-CR, 2025 WL 970432 , *2 (Tex. App. 2025); State v. Nawrocki, 308 Wis. 2d 227, 247 , 746 N.W.2d 509 (App.), review denied, 310 Wis. 2d 706 , 754 N.W.2d 850 (2008). 2026See, e.g., People v. Wall, Docket No. 21CA0796, 2023 WL 12052104, *5 (Colo. App. 2023), cert. denied, Colorado Supreme Court, Docket No. 24SC77, 2024 WL 3052328 (June 17, 2024); Patrick v. United States, supra, 343 A.3d 583–84; State v. Shelvin, 424 So. 3d 616, 616 (La. 2025); People v. Williams, supra, 41 N.Y.3d 556–57; Wright v. State, Docket No. 14-23-00744-CR, 2025 WL 970432, *2 (Tex. App. 2025); State v. Nawrocki, 308 Wis. 2d 227, 247, 746 N.W.2d 509 (App.), review denied, 310 Wis. 2d 706, 754 N.W.2d 850 (2008). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Hughes
neutral
2 sentences2026See, e.g., People v. Wall, Docket No. 21CA0796, 2023 WL 12052104 , *5 (Colo. App. 2023), cert. denied, Docket No. 24SC77, 2024 WL 3052328 (Colo. June 17, 2024); Patrick v. United States, supra, 343 A.3d 583–84; State v. Shelvin, 424 So. 3d 616 , 616 (La. 2025); People v. Williams, supra, 41 N.Y.3d 556–57; Wright v. State, Docket No. 14-23- 00744-CR, 2025 WL 970432 , *2 (Tex. App. 2025); State v. Nawrocki, 308 Wis. 2d 227, 247 , 746 N.W.2d 509 (App.), review denied, 310 Wis. 2d 706 , 754 N.W.2d 850 (2008). 2026See, e.g., People v. Wall, Docket No. 21CA0796, 2023 WL 12052104, *5 (Colo. App. 2023), cert. denied, Colorado Supreme Court, Docket No. 24SC77, 2024 WL 3052328 (June 17, 2024); Patrick v. United States, supra, 343 A.3d 583–84; State v. Shelvin, 424 So. 3d 616, 616 (La. 2025); People v. Williams, supra, 41 N.Y.3d 556–57; Wright v. State, Docket No. 14-23-00744-CR, 2025 WL 970432, *2 (Tex. App. 2025); State v. Nawrocki, 308 Wis. 2d 227, 247, 746 N.W.2d 509 (App.), review denied, 310 Wis. 2d 706, 754 N.W.2d 850 (2008). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Golding green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Holley
green
2 sentences2021As we explain more fully hereinafter, if the record is inadequate for review of the state’s independent source claim, it would be unfair to address the defendant’s claim on that record because to do so would effectively foreclose the state from establishing its claim of an independent source. 29 In light of our determination that the current record is inadequate for our resolution of the state’s independent source claim, the state cannot prevail on its alternative contention that the record, if deemed adequate, is ambiguous as to whether the police would have sought a warrant irrespective of t 2021As we explain more fully hereinafter, if the record is inadequate for review of the state’s independent source claim, it would be unfair to address the defendant’s claim on that record because to do so would effectively foreclose the state from establishing its claim of an independent source. 29 In light of our determination that the current record is inadequate for our resolution of the state’s independent source claim, the state cannot prevail on its alternative contention that the record, if deemed adequate, is ambiguous as to whether the police would have sought a warrant irrespective of t | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Okla. v. E.P.A.
neutral
1 sentence2021Ed. 2d 896 (2021); see also United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, 1014 (7th Cir. 2004); for present purposes, we need not express a view as to the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine separate and apart from the independent source doctrine. 37 With respect to the requirement that the state must prove by a preponder- ance of the evidence that the tainted evidence inevitably would have been discovered irrespective of the unlawful search, the Second Circuit has ‘‘acknowledged that using the [preponderance of the evidence] standard to prove inevitability creates a problem of proba | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Oklahoma v. Envtl. Prot. Agency
green
1 sentence2021Ed. 2d 896 (2021); see also United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, 1014 (7th Cir. 2004); for present purposes, we need not express a view as to the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine separate and apart from the independent source doctrine. 37 With respect to the requirement that the state must prove by a preponder- ance of the evidence that the tainted evidence inevitably would have been discovered irrespective of the unlawful search, the Second Circuit has ‘‘acknowledged that using the [preponderance of the evidence] standard to prove inevitability creates a problem of proba | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Jose Manuel De La Torre-Ventura v. United States
green
1 sentence2021Ed. 2d 896 (2021); see also United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, 1014 (7th Cir. 2004); for present purposes, we need not express a view as to the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine separate and apart from the independent source doctrine. 37 With respect to the requirement that the state must prove by a preponder- ance of the evidence that the tainted evidence inevitably would have been discovered irrespective of the unlawful search, the Second Circuit has ‘‘acknowledged that using the [preponderance of the evidence] standard to prove inevitability creates a problem of proba | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Sawyer green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Johnson v. Garcia neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Harrell v. State green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| United States v. Russell Kelner green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Truck Drivers, Oil Drivers, Filling Station & Platform Workers Union, Local No. 705 v. National Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Wisconsin Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Wilkins green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Lees v. Middlesex Insurance green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Badgett green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Brown v. North Carolina green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Miller green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Joyce green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Segura v. United States green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Horton v. Meskill green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Johns green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Connecticut Ass'n of Boards of Education, Inc. v. Shedd green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Arpin green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| United States v. Calixto Agapito, Martha Calderon and Horacio Rueda green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| United States v. James Curry, United States v. Frederick R. Silvestri, Sr., United States v. Frederick Silvestri, Jr. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Beeler v. United States green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Fultz v. United States green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Union Camp Corp. v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Dotson v. Warden green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Carbone v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Hartford green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.