13 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1942–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nix v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2024“The independent source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984); see also State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011). 1998The rationale of the inevitable discovery exception, like that of the so-called independent source doctrine, is that exclusion of evidence that would inevitably have been discovered would put the prosecution in a worse position “because the police would have obtained the evidence if no misconduct had taken place.” Id. at 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 . | 2 | 3 |
Murray v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024So long as “that later acquisition was not the result of the earlier [constitutional violation], there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 541 (1988). 2024As there is “no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply,” we hold that the district court did not err in denying Carbo’s motion to suppress information gathered from the genetic analysis of his garbage. 5 Id. 5 Carbo’s claim that the State forfeited its independent source argument lacks merit. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Diedegreen1 sentence2024“The independent source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984); see also State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Lund v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen1 sentence2015Chapter 645 is titled “Interpretation of Statutes and Rules,” and section 645.27 is located in the subsection “Construction of Laws.” And although we stated in Lund v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 783 N.W.2d 142, 143 (Minn. 2010), that Minn. Stat. § 645.27 “codified . . . common-law immunity,” we did not suggest that section 645.27 is a source of immunity. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Green v. Crapo
green
2 sentences1945J., in Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55 , 58 , 62 N.E. 956 , 957 ). 1945J., in Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55 , 58 , 62 N.E. 956 , 957 ). | 2 | 1945–1945 |
Purdy v. . Lynch
green
2 sentences1945(Matter of Weston, 91 N.Y. 502 , 511 ; Costello v. Costello, 209 N.Y. 252 , 261 , 103 N.E. 148 .) In determining whether the acts of a trustee have been prudent, within the meaning of the rule, we must 'look at the facts as they exist at the time of their occurrence, not aided or enlightened by those which subsequently take place' (per Peckham, J., in Purdy v. Lynch, 145 N.Y. 462 , 475 , 40 N.E. 232 , 236 ); for it is an obvious truth that 'a wisdom developed after an event and having it and its consequences as a source is a standard no man should be judged by' (per Collin, J., in Costello v. 1945(Matter of Weston, 91 N.Y. 502 , 511 ; Costello v. Costello, 209 N.Y. 252 , 261 , 103 N.E. 148 .) In determining whether the acts of a trustee have been prudent, within the meaning of the rule, we must 'look at the facts as they exist at the time of their occurrence, not aided or enlightened by those which subsequently take place' (per Peckham, J., in Purdy v. Lynch, 145 N.Y. 462 , 475 , 40 N.E. 232 , 236 ); for it is an obvious truth that 'a wisdom developed after an event and having it and its consequences as a source is a standard no man should be judged by' (per Collin, J., in Costello v. | 2 | 1945–1945 |
Costello v. . Costello
green
2 sentences1945(Matter of Weston, 91 N.Y. 502 , 511 ; Costello v. Costello, 209 N.Y. 252 , 261 , 103 N.E. 148 .) In determining whether the acts of a trustee have been prudent, within the meaning of the rule, we must 'look at the facts as they exist at the time of their occurrence, not aided or enlightened by those which subsequently take place' (per Peckham, J., in Purdy v. Lynch, 145 N.Y. 462 , 475 , 40 N.E. 232 , 236 ); for it is an obvious truth that 'a wisdom developed after an event and having it and its consequences as a source is a standard no man should be judged by' (per Collin, J., in Costello v. 1945(Matter of Weston, 91 N.Y. 502 , 511 ; Costello v. Costello, 209 N.Y. 252 , 261 , 103 N.E. 148 .) In determining whether the acts of a trustee have been prudent, within the meaning of the rule, we must 'look at the facts as they exist at the time of their occurrence, not aided or enlightened by those which subsequently take place' (per Peckham, J., in Purdy v. Lynch, 145 N.Y. 462 , 475 , 40 N.E. 232 , 236 ); for it is an obvious truth that 'a wisdom developed after an event and having it and its consequences as a source is a standard no man should be judged by' (per Collin, J., in Costello v. | 2 | 1945–1945 |
In the Matter, Etc., of Estate of Weston
green
2 sentences1945(Matter of Weston, 91 N. Y. 502, 511 ; Costello v. Costello, 209 N. Y. 252, 261 , 103 N. E. 148 .) In determining whether the acts of a trustee have been prudent, within the meaning of the rule, we must ‘look at the facts as they exist at the time of their occurrence, not aided or enlightened by those which subsequently take place’ (per Peckham, J., in Purdy v. Lynch, 145 N. Y. 462, 475 , 40 N. E. 232, 236 ); for it is an obvious truth that ‘a wisdom developed after an event and having it and its consequences as a source is a standard no man should be judged by’ (per Collin, J., in Costello v. 1945(Matter of Weston, 91 N.Y. 502 , 511 ; Costello v. Costello, 209 N.Y. 252 , 261 , 103 N.E. 148 .) In determining whether the acts of a trustee have been prudent, within the meaning of the rule, we must 'look at the facts as they exist at the time of their occurrence, not aided or enlightened by those which subsequently take place' (per Peckham, J., in Purdy v. Lynch, 145 N.Y. 462 , 475 , 40 N.E. 232 , 236 ); for it is an obvious truth that 'a wisdom developed after an event and having it and its consequences as a source is a standard no man should be judged by' (per Collin, J., in Costello v. | 2 | 1945–1945 |
In re the Estate of Adriance
neutral
2 sentences1942R. 346) “for it is an obvious truth that ‘a wisdom developed after an event and having it and its consequences as a source is a standard no man should be judged by’ * * * and it is impossible to say that trustees are wanting in sound discretion ‘simply because their judgment turned out wrong.’ ” Helpful, too, is the language of the court in In re Estate of Advance, 145 Misc. 345, 352 , 260 N. Y. 1942This is necessarily so ( 200 Minn. 379 , 274 N.W. 530 , 112 A.L.R. 346 ) "for it is an obvious truth that 'a wisdom developed after an event and having it and its consequences as a source is a standard no man should be judged by' * * * and it is impossible to say that trustees are wanting in sound discretion 'simply because their judgment turned out wrong.' " Helpful, too, is the language of the court in In re Estate of Adriance, 145 Misc. 345 , 352 , 260 N Y S. 173 , 181 : "It is entirely true that many financial authorities advocate wide diversity of investment. | 2 | 1942–1942 |
State v. Lieberg
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Richards
green
2 sentences1998The independent source doctrine permits the admission of evidence obtained during an unlawful search if the police could have retrieved the evidence “on the basis of information- obtained independent of their illegal activity.” State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197 , 203-04 n. 2 (Minn.1996). 1998The inevitable discovery doctrine permits the inclusion of evidence otherwise excluded under the exclusionary rule “if the police would have inevitably discovered the evidence, absent their illegal search.” Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Strand v. Special School District No. 1
green
2 sentences1987The test for position is thus the source of the rule of realignment: where "practical and reasonable, a school district is required to reassign teaching duties in a manner designed to continue the employment of senior teachers." Id. at 886 . [2] Recognizing the potential difficulties the transferred senior teacher might face because of the rule, the supreme court stated [t]he holder of multiple licenses enjoys better likelihood of continued employment in the event of reductions in the teaching staff and also receives additional compensation based on the multiple licenses; however, at the same 1987The test for position is thus the source of the rule of realignment: where “practical and reasonable, a school district is required to reassign teaching duties in a manner designed to continue the employment of senior teachers.” Id. at 886 . 2 Recognizing the potential difficulties the transferred senior teacher might face because of the rule, the supreme court stated [t]he holder of multiple licenses enjoys better likelihood of continued employment in the event of reductions in the teaching staff and also receives additional compensation based on the multiple licenses; however, at the same ti | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Northwestern Bell Telephone Company v. State
green
2 sentences1983Peoples cites Northwestern Bell Telephone Company v. State, 299 Minn. 1 , 216 N.W.2d 841 (1974), as the source of this requirement. 1983Peoples cites Northwestern Bell Telephone Company v. State, 299 Minn. 1 , 216 N.W.2d 841 (1974), as the source of this requirement. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People's Ice Co. v. Schlenker
green
2 sentences1965In the leading and early case of People's Ice Co. v. Schlenker, 50 Minn. 1, 2 , 52 N.W. 219 , Mr. Justice Mitchell declared: "That an order vacating a judgment is appealable as `an order involving the merits of the action' is no longer an open question in this court. 1965In the leading and early case of People’s Ice Co. v. Schlenker, 50 Minn. 1, 2 , 52 N. W. 219 , Mr. Justice Mitchell declared: “That an order vacating a judgment is appealable as ‘an order involving the merits of the action’ is no longer an open question in this court. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Anderson v. Liljengren
green
2 sentences1965In the leading and early case of People's Ice Co. v. Schlenker, 50 Minn. 1, 2 , 52 N.W. 219 , Mr. Justice Mitchell declared: "That an order vacating a judgment is appealable as `an order involving the merits of the action' is no longer an open question in this court. 1965In the leading and early case of People’s Ice Co. v. Schlenker, 50 Minn. 1, 2 , 52 N. W. 219 , Mr. Justice Mitchell declared: “That an order vacating a judgment is appealable as ‘an order involving the merits of the action’ is no longer an open question in this court. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Fortune v. First Trust Co.
green
1 sentence1942This is necessarily so ( 200 Minn. 379 , 274 N.W. 530 , 112 A.L.R. 346 ) "for it is an obvious truth that 'a wisdom developed after an event and having it and its consequences as a source is a standard no man should be judged by' * * * and it is impossible to say that trustees are wanting in sound discretion 'simply because their judgment turned out wrong.' " Helpful, too, is the language of the court in In re Estate of Adriance, 145 Misc. 345 , 352 , 260 N Y S. 173 , 181 : "It is entirely true that many financial authorities advocate wide diversity of investment. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.