source doctrine in Utah

2004The State charged Krukowski with operation of a clandestine lab and unlawful possession of a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute, both first degree felonies. ¶ 7 Krukowski moved to suppress the evidence gathered in the search, arguing that, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the warrant was invalid because McNaughton had knowingly or recklessly omitted from the warrant affidavit the material fact of his pri- or entry. 1 Although the State admitted that the initial warrantless entry was unlawful, it argued that the sub

2004The State charged Krukowski with operation of a clandestine lab and unlawful possession of a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute, both first degree felonies. ¶ 7 Krukowski moved to suppress the evidence gathered in the search, arguing that, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the warrant was invalid because McNaughton had knowingly or recklessly omitted from the warrant affidavit the material fact of his pri- or entry. 1 Although the State admitted that the initial warrantless entry was unlawful, it argued that the sub

2012In such a case, the exclusionary rule is deemed inapplicable because "[the causal chain between the illegality and the discovered evidence [would have been] broken [by] the evidence [being] ... discovered through independent and lawful activity-in other words through an independent source." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 43 , 164 P.3d 397 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the inevitable discovery exception is a corollary of the independent source doctrine that requires

2012In such a case, the exclusionary rule is deemed inapplicable because “[t]he causal chain between the illegality and the discovered evidence [would have been] broken [by] the evidence [being] . . . discovered through independent and lawful activity—in other words through an independent source.” State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 43 , 164 P.3d 397 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the inevitable discovery exception is a corollary of the independent source doctrine that requires a “hypothetical finding” that

2015United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1113 (11th Cir.1990). 120 Under the independent source doctrine, the "taint" that is otherwise-at *539 tached to the fruit of police misconduct is removed when the same féuit is derived from lawful police activity.

2012Under the independent source doctrine, challenged evidence is admissible despite the constitutional violation “if it derived from a lawful source independent of the illegal conduct.” Id.

2015See State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, ¶ 51 , 283 P.3d 488 (Lee, J., dissenting) (recognizing the "obvious and intended efficiencies" of employing legal aid associations "as the exclusive source for the defense of indigents" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1456 (10th Cir.1995) (explaining that the "sounder and more efficient use of the state's resources" constituted a rational basis for limiting the number and distribution of state-staffed investigators available to indigent defendants), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. United States, 2

2015See State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, ¶ 51 , 283 P.3d 488 (Lee, J., dissenting) (recognizing the "obvious and intended efficiencies" of employing legal aid associations "as the exclusive source for the defense of indigents" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1456 (10th Cir.1995) (explaining that the "sounder and more efficient use of the state's resources" constituted a rational basis for limiting the number and distribution of state-staffed investigators available to indigent defendants), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. United States, 2

2015See State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, ¶ 51 , 283 P.3d 488 (Lee, J., dissenting) (recognizing the "obvious and intended efficiencies" of employing legal aid associations "as the exclusive source for the defense of indigents" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1456 (10th Cir.1995) (explaining that the "sounder and more efficient use of the state's resources" constituted a rational basis for limiting the number and distribution of state-staffed investigators available to indigent defendants), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. United States, 2

2015See State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, ¶ 51 , 283 P.3d 488 (Lee, J., dissenting) (recognizing the "obvious and intended efficiencies" of employing legal aid associations "as the exclusive source for the defense of indigents" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1456 (10th Cir.1995) (explaining that the "sounder and more efficient use of the state's resources" constituted a rational basis for limiting the number and distribution of state-staffed investigators available to indigent defendants), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. United States, 2

2014See, e.g., Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n v. Uno, 932 P.2d 589, 589-90 (Utah 1997). {16 Moreover, the plain language of amended rule 26(b)(1) clearly states the Legislature's intent to create an evidentiary privilege.

2013See United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (3d Cir1992) ("[The fact that an application for a warrant contains information obtained through an unlawful entry does not per force indicate that the improper information 'affected' the justice's decision to issue the warrant and thereby vitiate the applicability of the independent source doctrine.").

2003We review “[t]he factual findings underlying a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence ... under the deferential elearly-erroneous standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge’s application of the legal standard to the facts.” State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994)).

2003See, e.g., United States v. Lamas, 930 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Hernandez-Cano, 808 F.2d 779, 783-84 (11th Cir.1987).

2003See, e.g., United States v. Lamas, 930 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Hernandez-Cano, 808 F.2d 779, 783-84 (11th Cir.1987).

2003However, the issue of whether the independent source rule applied to the case was not specifically decided because “[a] case should not be reversed on appeal on a ground not raised in the district court or in this court.” Id. at 1219 . ¶ 14 Furthermore, the independent source doctrine does not render the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment meaningless as the State must demonstrate “no information gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officers’ decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate’s deci sion to grant it.” Murray, 487 U.S. at 540 , 108 S.Ct. at 2534 .

2003However, the issue of whether the independent source rule applied to the case was not specifically decided because “[a] case should not be reversed on appeal on a ground not raised in the district court or in this court.” Id. at 1219 . ¶ 14 Furthermore, the independent source doctrine does not render the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment meaningless as the State must demonstrate “no information gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officers’ decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate’s deci sion to grant it.” Murray, 487 U.S. at 540 , 108 S.Ct. at 2534 .

2003Accordingly, when the illegal entry and the information gained from it do not affect either the State’s decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate’s decision to grant one, “then the evidence need not be suppressed despite the fact that it was initially unlawfully obtained.” United States v. May, 214 F.3d 900, 906 (7th Cir.2000). ¶ 9 In the present case, the trial court never found that the State failed to meet the requirements of the independent source doctrine.

2003Accordingly, when the illegal entry and the information gained from it do not affect either the State’s decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate’s decision to grant one, “then the evidence need not be suppressed despite the fact that it was initially unlawfully obtained.” United States v. May, 214 F.3d 900, 906 (7th Cir.2000). ¶ 9 In the present case, the trial court never found that the State failed to meet the requirements of the independent source doctrine.

2003The knock-and-announce protections and interests are limited, however, because “ ‘in some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by the rule’s deterrent purposes.’ ” State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2264 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). ¶ 13 The trial court cited to no eases that explicitly reject the application of the independent source doctrine to knock-and-announce violations.

2003We review “[t]he factual findings underlying a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence ... under the deferential elearly-erroneous standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge’s application of the legal standard to the facts.” State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994)).

1997Defendant cites State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994), as the source of defense counsel’s duty to request this particular instruction at trial.

1997See id. at 141 (stating that expert testimony describing relationship between “certain behavioral symptoms” and sexual abuse, “subject to appropriate limitations and instructions to the jury,” may assist the jury in giving proper weight to the evidence (emphasis added)).