source doctrine in California

2025Inevitable Discovery Our Supreme Court has explained: “ ‘Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally seized evidence may be used where it would have been discovered by the police through lawful means. . . . [T]he doctrine “is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.” (Murray v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 533, 539 .)’ . . . [¶] The inevitable discovery rule ‘applies only to evidence obtained as

2021(See Murray v. U.S. (1988) 487 U.S. 533, 542 [warrant fails independent source rule if the illegally obtained information prompted the agent’s decision to seek the warrant or affected the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant].) The facts amply support the trial court’s finding that the police would have sought and obtained the warrant even without obtaining Tousant’s telephone number or driver’s license information.6 (See id. at pp. 543-544 [remand required where trial court makes no finding about whether illegal conduct was irrelevant to later securing warrant].) Both prongs of the inde

2026(See Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 443 ; People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1081 ; People v. Tousant (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 804 , 818.) “The independent source doctrine teaches us that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. [Citations.] When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put

2026(See Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 443 ; People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1081 ; People v. Tousant (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 804 , 818.) “The independent source doctrine teaches us that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. [Citations.] When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put

2016Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally seized evidence is admissible if “it would have been discovered by the police through lawful means.” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800 ; People v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1021 .) The doctrine is “ ‘an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.’ [Citation.] The purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to prevent the setting as

2016Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally seized evidence is admissible if “it would have been discovered by the police through lawful means.” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800 ; People v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1021 .) The doctrine is “ ‘an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.’ [Citation.] The purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to prevent the setting as

2026(See Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 443 ; People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1081 ; People v. Tousant (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 804 , 818.) “The independent source doctrine teaches us that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. [Citations.] When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put

2021(People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1081 (Weiss).) Where, as here, “a criminal investigation involved some illegal conduct, courts will admit evidence derived from an ‘independent source’ ”—evidence “ ‘that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.’ ” (Weiss, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1077 .) For search warrant affidavits containing “both information obtained by unlawful conduct as well as untainted information, a two prong-test applies to justify application of the independent source doctrine.” (People v. Robinson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 241 .) “F

2004As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine ‘is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.’ [Citation.] The purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to prevent the setting aside of convictions that would have been obtained without police misconduct. [Citation.] The burden of establishing that illegally seized evidence is admissible under the rule rests upon the government.” (Id. at p

2004As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine ‘is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.’ [Citation.] The purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to prevent the setting aside of convictions that would have been obtained without police misconduct. [Citation.] The burden of establishing that illegally seized evidence is admissible under the rule rests upon the government.” (Id. at p

2011(Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 443-144 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 377 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 ]; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 62 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710 , 96 P.3d 30 ]; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800-801 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914 , 3 P.3d 311 ].) “As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine ‘is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Robles, supra

2011(Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 443-144 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 377 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 ]; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 62 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710 , 96 P.3d 30 ]; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800-801 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914 , 3 P.3d 311 ].) “As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine ‘is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Robles, supra

2016Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally seized evidence is admissible if “it would have been discovered by the police through lawful means.” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800 ; People v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1021 .) The doctrine is “ ‘an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.’ [Citation.] The purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to prevent the setting as

2014As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine ‘is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact 9 discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.’” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800-801 .) To establish inevitable discovery, the prosecution “must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that, due to a separate line of investigation, application of routine police procedures, or some other circumstance, the [challenged evide

2003The United States Supreme Court has explained that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to deter law enforcement misconduct by prohibiting the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. ( Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U!S. 1, 10, 115 S.Ct. 1185 , 131 L.Ed.2d 34 .) The purpose of the rule is not to cure the constitutional violation, which is already fully accomplished by the illegal search itself, but instead to effectuate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches or seizures by deterring future unlawful police conduct. ( Ibi

2003The United States Supreme Court has explained that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to deter law enforcement misconduct by prohibiting the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. ( Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U!S. 1, 10, 115 S.Ct. 1185 , 131 L.Ed.2d 34 .) The purpose of the rule is not to cure the constitutional violation, which is already fully accomplished by the illegal search itself, but instead to effectuate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches or seizures by deterring future unlawful police conduct. ( Ibi

2013An inconsistency may show no more than jury lenity, compromise, or mistake, none of which undermines the validity of a verdict." (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656 ; see also United States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57, 65 [inconsistency of verdicts necessarily entails error, but not of federal constitutional dimension, on the part of the jury in question, and the source of such error may be found in mistake, compromise, or nullification].) Section 954 specifies that "[a]n acquittal of one or more counts shall not be deemed an acquittal of any other count," and courts have upheld convi

2001It is "`error,' in the sense that the *21 jury has not followed the court's instructions" and its own oath. ( United States v. Powell, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 65 , 105 S.Ct. 471 ; see Dunn v. United States, supra, 284 U.S. at p. 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 .) The source of such error by a jury may evidently be found in mistake, compromise, or nullification.

2003The source of the presumption is the ‘general consensus that notice or warning of the rule should be given in advance of the actions whose effects are to be judged.’ [Citation.] Application ... is retroactive only when it gives a different and potentially unfair legal effect to actions taken in reliance on the preenactment law.” (California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 609 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 184 ], italics added (California Trout)) The Legislature intended that all applicants and recipients be imaged to prevent fraud.

2003The source of the presumption is the ‘general consensus that notice or warning of the rule should be given in advance of the actions whose effects are to be judged.’ [Citation.] Application ... is retroactive only when it gives a different and potentially unfair legal effect to actions taken in reliance on the preenactment law.” (California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 609 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 184 ], italics added (California Trout)) The Legislature intended that all applicants and recipients be imaged to prevent fraud.

2025Inevitable Discovery Our Supreme Court has explained: “ ‘Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally seized evidence may be used where it would have been discovered by the police through lawful means. . . . [T]he doctrine “is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.” (Murray v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 533, 539 .)’ . . . [¶] The inevitable discovery rule ‘applies only to evidence obtained as

2022(See People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147 , 183–184 [inevitable discovery doctrine “ ‘ “is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered” ’ ”].) Thomas contests that analysis, relying on United States v. Dixon (9th Cir. 2020) 984 F.3d 814 .

2015"It has long been established that even if a criminal investigation involved some illegal conduct, courts will admit evidence derived from an 'independent source.' " (People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1077 (Weiss), quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920) 251 U.S. 385, 392 .) "In a case involving the inevitable discovery rule, a close relative of the independent source doctrine, the United States Supreme Court 15 explained the basis for admitting evidence derived from a source independent of illegal conduct. 'The core rationale consistently advanced by this Court for exten

1999Relying on Murray v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 533 [ 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 ] (Murray) and People v. Koch, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d 770 , defendant argues that the reviewing court is additionally “required to make a factual determination that the magistrate issuing the search warrant was not affected by illegally obtained information contained in the affidavit in support of the warrant.” It has long been established that even if a criminal investigation involved some illegal conduct, courts will admit evidence derived from an “independent source.” (Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United

2008O’Leary, J., and Moore, J., concurred. 1 See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ]. 2 See Penal Code sections 4573.8, 4573.9 and 4574. 3 The “doctrine of ‘inevitable discovery [pivots on the fact that] ‘there is no nexus [to the illegality] sufficient to provide a taint.’ [Citation.]” (Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 136-137 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 186 , 707 P.2d 248 ], citations omitted, quoting Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 448 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 377 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 ].) “[T]he doctrine ‘is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doc

2008O’Leary, J., and Moore, J., concurred. 1 See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ]. 2 See Penal Code sections 4573.8, 4573.9 and 4574. 3 The “doctrine of ‘inevitable discovery [pivots on the fact that] ‘there is no nexus [to the illegality] sufficient to provide a taint.’ [Citation.]” (Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 136-137 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 186 , 707 P.2d 248 ], citations omitted, quoting Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 448 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 377 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 ].) “[T]he doctrine ‘is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doc

2017Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 487-488 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 ] (Wong Sun); see also *682 Nix at pp. 441 —442.) Therefore, if knowledge of the facts in question “is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others (Silverthome, at p. 392.) This independent sou

2017Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 487-488 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 ] (Wong Sun); see also *682 Nix at pp. 441 —442.) Therefore, if knowledge of the facts in question “is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others (Silverthome, at p. 392.) This independent sou

2002The discussion the Attorney General cites from those cases relates not to whether a defendant has offered evidence to identify the source of the error, but to whether the record contains evidence that the identified source of the error is inclined to subvert or ignore the Fourth Amendment. ( Evans, supra, 514 U. S. at pp. 14-15, 115 S.Ct. 1185 [defendant "offers no evidence that court employees are [so] inclined"]; Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 351 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 ["There is no evidence suggesting," and "we are given no basis for believing that legislators are [so] inclined"]; Leon, supra, 468

2002The discussion the Attorney General cites from those cases relates not to whether a defendant has offered evidence to identify the source of the error, but to whether the record contains evidence that the identified source of the error is inclined to subvert or ignore the Fourth Amendment. ( Evans, supra, 514 U. S. at pp. 14-15, 115 S.Ct. 1185 [defendant "offers no evidence that court employees are [so] inclined"]; Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 351 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 ["There is no evidence suggesting," and "we are given no basis for believing that legislators are [so] inclined"]; Leon, supra, 468

2015“The prosecution has the burden of proving a justification for a warrantless search or seizure, not merely refuting the defendant’s arguments for why its justification is inadequate.” ( Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 136-137.) In a case in which law enforcement records are erroneous, the prosecution had the burden of “[e]stablishing that the source of the error acted objectively reasonably. . . .” (Willis, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 37 .) Respondent contends that Tidwell failed adequately to frame the issue below.

2015(See also Willis, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 36-37 [“Establishing that the source of the error acted objectively reasonably is part of [the] burden” of proving that exclusion is not necessary].) Placing this burden on the prosecution is appropriate because “[l]aw enforcement personnel, not defendants, are in the best position to know what justification, if any, they had for proceeding without a warrant.” (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 136 .) In the suppression hearing here, it appeared that the prosecution was aware of a law enforcement witness who might have shed light on the error that ens

2002(See Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 360, fn. 17 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 [whether exclusionary rule applies "in a particular context depends significantly upon the actors who are making the relevant decision that the rule is designed to influence"].) As to the source of the error here, the Attorney General states that the "sparse record" leaves "the precise duties and responsibilities of the person or persons responsible" for the error "unknown." However, he argues the evidence "strongly suggests that the source of the erroneous information was the Department of Corrections." In his initial briefing in

2002(See Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 360, fn. 17 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 [whether exclusionary rule applies "in a particular context depends significantly upon the actors who are making the relevant decision that the rule is designed to influence"].) As to the source of the error here, the Attorney General states that the "sparse record" leaves "the precise duties and responsibilities of the person or persons responsible" for the error "unknown." However, he argues the evidence "strongly suggests that the source of the erroneous information was the Department of Corrections." In his initial briefing in

2001(Cf. Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 784 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 [finding it appropriate for tenants who benefited from unconstitutionally low rents to bear the burden of the remedy].) Unless we place the burden of the remedy on Clovis, we create no disincentive to prevent the sort of regulatory abuse that occurred here.

2001(Cf. Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 784 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 [finding it appropriate for tenants who benefited from unconstitutionally low rents to bear the burden of the remedy].) Unless we place the burden of the remedy on Clovis, we create no disincentive to prevent the sort of regulatory abuse that occurred here.

2025(See People v. Elliott (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 984, 989 [“Defendant asserts that he was denied the constitutional right of representation by counsel on the theory that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel”]; People v. Melton (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d Supp. 901, 905 [cost of jury trial cannot be considered “by the trial court in exercising its discretion to deny a motion for withdrawal of a waiver of jury, for the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial is in no way conditioned upon the fact that the State must bear the cost of supplying the jury in criminal cases”].) 12 There

2025(See People v. Elliott (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 984, 989 [“Defendant asserts that he was denied the constitutional right of representation by counsel on the theory that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel”]; People v. Melton (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d Supp. 901, 905 [cost of jury trial cannot be considered “by the trial court in exercising its discretion to deny a motion for withdrawal of a waiver of jury, for the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial is in no way conditioned upon the fact that the State must bear the cost of supplying the jury in criminal cases”].) 12 There