source doctrine in New Mexico

2026This includes (1) “an examination of the source of the error and the emphasis placed upon the error,” (2) “evidence of a defendant’s guilt separate from the error,” (3) “the importance of the erroneously admitted evidence in the prosecution’s case,” and (4) “whether the error was cumulative or instead introduced new facts.” Id. (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “[The d]efendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that [they were] prejudiced by the error.” Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, ¶ 43 . {4} At trial, the State sought admission of the underwear during its direc

2025More specifically, it is evidentiary error that is at issue, which requires “a case-by-case examination” where “courts . . . evaluate all circumstances surrounding the error.” Id. ¶ 24; see also State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 44 , 275 P.3d 110 (“When assessing two cases that are factually analogous, with similar errors, the reviewing court thus may find the impact of the error harmful in one case and harmless in the other.”). {43} “To judge the ‘probable’ effect of an evidentiary error,” courts examine the following factors: “the error itself, including the source of the error and the emp

2024In doing so, we examine “the source of the error, the emphasis placed on [it], evidence of the defendant’s guilt apart from the error, the importance of the erroneously admitted [or excluded] evidence to the prosecution’s case, and whether the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative.” State v. Serna, 2013-NMSC-033, ¶ 23 , 305 P.3d 936 .

2024In doing so, we examine “the source of the error, the emphasis placed on [it], evidence of the defendant’s guilt apart from the error, the importance of the erroneously admitted [or excluded] evidence to the prosecution’s case, and whether the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative.” Serna, 2013-NMSC-033, ¶ 23 .

2011See State v. Monteleone, 2005-NMCA-129, ¶ 17 , 138 N.M. 544 , 8 123 P.3d 777 . 9 The independent source doctrine provides that not all evidence is categorized 10 as the “‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but 11 for the illegal actions of the police.” State v. Wagoner, 2001-NMCA-014, ¶ 22 , 130 12 N.M. 274 , 24 P.3d 306 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2011See State v. Monteleone, 2005-NMCA-129, ¶ 17 , 138 N.M. 544 , 8 123 P.3d 777 . 9 The independent source doctrine provides that not all evidence is categorized 10 as the “‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but 11 for the illegal actions of the police.” State v. Wagoner, 2001-NMCA-014, ¶ 22 , 130 12 N.M. 274 , 24 P.3d 306 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2007The Court expressly stated that, due to the applicability of the independent source doctrine, the legality of the initial entry in that case was “wholly irrelevant,” id., and that the Court had “no reason to question the [Second Circuit’s] holding that that search was illegal.” Id. at 798 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 .

2007The Court expressly stated that, due to the applicability of the independent source doctrine, the legality of the initial entry in that case was “wholly irrelevant,” id., and that the Court had “no reason to question the [Second Circuit’s] holding that that search was illegal.” Id. at 798 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 .

2020However, these cases, Garrett argues, rely on “inapposite” Fourth Amendment precedent applying the independent source exception to evidence collected as a result of an illegal search or seizure, Garrett, supra, at 483; see Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (relying on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272-73 (same), and “now ostensibly only appl[y] to Sixth Amendment violations of the right to counsel at postindictment lineups.” Garrett, supra, at 483. {75} The second line of cases consists of the Fourteenth Amendment due-process cases arising from Manson, 432 U.S.

2020However, these cases, Garrett argues, rely on “inapposite” Fourth Amendment precedent applying the independent source exception to evidence collected as a result of an illegal search or seizure, Garrett, supra, at 483; see Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (relying on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272-73 (same), and “now ostensibly only appl[y] to Sixth Amendment violations of the right to counsel at postindictment lineups.” Garrett, supra, at 483. {75} The second line of cases consists of the Fourteenth Amendment due-process cases arising from Manson, 432 U.S.

2014See State v. Gutierrez, 2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 18 , 142 N.M. 1 , 162 P.3d 156 . {16} To determine whether an error in admission of evidence is harmless, this Court reviews “the error itself, including the source of the error and the emphasis placed on the error at trial.

2014See State v. Gutierrez, 2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 18 , 142 N.M. 1 , 162 P.3d 156 . {16} To determine whether an error in admission of evidence is harmless, this Court reviews “the error itself, including the source of the error and the emphasis placed on the error at trial.

2025More specifically, it is evidentiary error that is at issue, which requires “a case-by-case examination” where “courts . . . evaluate all circumstances surrounding the error.” Id. ¶ 24; see also State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 44 , 275 P.3d 110 (“When assessing two cases that are factually analogous, with similar errors, the reviewing court thus may find the impact of the error harmful in one case and harmless in the other.”). {43} “To judge the ‘probable’ effect of an evidentiary error,” courts examine the following factors: “the error itself, including the source of the error and the emp

2025This requires an examination of the error itself, which [may] . . . include an examination of the source of the error and the emphasis placed upon the error.” Id. ¶ 43; see also State v. Leyba, 2012-NMSC-037, ¶ 24 , 289 P.3d 1215 (“To put the error in context, we often look at the other, non[]objectionable evidence of guilt, not for a sufficiency-of-the- evidence analysis, but to evaluate what role the error played at trial.”). {12} Here, Mr. Leland’s statements—which included identification of both Defendant and the location of the incident—were cumulative of other evidence and corroborated b

2007This exception to the exclusionary rule, known as the independent source doctrine, is based on a policy that, “while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988). {40} We have previously held that, under the New Mexico Constitution, “a search conducted pursuant to a warrant based partially on tainted information gathered during a prior illegal search is not an independent source of the evidence seized and the

2007This exception to the exclusionary rule, known as the independent source doctrine, is based on a policy that, “while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988). {40} We have previously held that, under the New Mexico Constitution, “a search conducted pursuant to a warrant based partially on tainted information gathered during a prior illegal search is not an independent source of the evidence seized and the

2012See Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 53 , 146 N.M. 301 , 210 P.3d 198 . [5] The United States Supreme Court's decision in Schneble is the source of the principle that "overwhelming" evidence of guilt may help establish harmless error, although Schneble retained Chapman's requirement that harmlessness be "clear beyond a reasonable doubt." 405 U.S. at 430 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 .

2012See Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 53 , 146 N.M. 301 , 210 P.3d 198 . [5] The United States Supreme Court's decision in Schneble is the source of the principle that "overwhelming" evidence of guilt may help establish harmless error, although Schneble retained Chapman's requirement that harmlessness be "clear beyond a reasonable doubt." 405 U.S. at 430 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 .

2025See State v. Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 11, 39 , 136 N.M. 348 , 98 P.3d 998 (examining the cumulative versus corroborative nature of improperly-admitted evidence and providing that “[t]he probative force—and therefore the possible prejudicial effect—of a particular piece of evidence tends to decrease the more redundant that evidence is in the context of other similar evidence”); see also State v. Arguello, 2024-NMCA-074 , ¶ 7, 557 P.3d 1018 , (concluding that even if the district court erred in admitting a witness’s out-of-court statements, any such error was harmless because the statements “w

2025See State v. Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 11, 39 , 136 N.M. 348 , 98 P.3d 998 (examining the cumulative versus corroborative nature of improperly-admitted evidence and providing that “[t]he probative force—and therefore the possible prejudicial effect—of a particular piece of evidence tends to decrease the more redundant that evidence is in the context of other similar evidence”); see also State v. Arguello, 2024-NMCA-074 , ¶ 7, 557 P.3d 1018 , (concluding that even if the district court erred in admitting a witness’s out-of-court statements, any such error was harmless because the statements “w

2024See State v. Duran, 2015-NMCA-015, ¶ 20 , 343 P.3d 207 . {7} In the present case, the jury was shown the video evidence of the incident and Defendant’s actions. [BIC 1, 8] It also heard testimony about the need for corrections officers to be respected, and the importance of maintaining a safe environment and control of the inmates in order to keep the peace in the jail, in which the corrections officers were far outnumbered. [BIC 2-3, 8] The evidence showed Defendant acting aggressively and threateningly toward the two officers who were trying to de-escalate the situation, including Lieutenant

2022See State v. Patterson, 2017-NMCA-045, ¶ 19 , 395 P.3d 543 (observing that the state bears the burden to prove that an evidentiary error is harmless, and that, in the absence of an argument why the error was harmless, this Court will not guess at what that argument might be); see also State v. Serna, 2013-NMSC-033, ¶ 32 , 305 P.3d 936 (concluding that a nonconstitutional error was harmless where “the [s]tate satisfies [the appellate court] that there is no reasonable probability that [the improperly admitted evidence] affected th[e] verdict and contributed to [the d]efendant’s convictions” (in

2020See State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 57, 60 , 147 N.M. 542 , 226 P.3d 641 (stating that pursuant to the independent source doctrine “the issue is whether the witness is identifying the defendant solely on the basis of his memory of events at the time of the crime, or whether he is merely remembering the person he picked out in a pretrial procedure” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Johnson, 2004- NMCA-058, ¶ 27, 135 N.M. 567 , 92 P.3d 13 (same); see also Garrett, supra, at 476-88 (construing the independent source doctrine through analysis of federal case law).

2020See State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 57, 60 , 147 N.M. 542 , 226 P.3d 641 (stating that pursuant to the independent source doctrine “the issue is whether the witness is identifying the defendant solely on the basis of his memory of events at the time of the crime, or whether he is merely remembering the person he picked out in a pretrial procedure” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Johnson, 2004- NMCA-058, ¶ 27, 135 N.M. 567 , 92 P.3d 13 (same); see also Garrett, supra, at 476-88 (construing the independent source doctrine through analysis of federal case law).

2020See 2018-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 30-32 , 409 P.3d 902 . 6Besides Massachusetts and New York, only Wisconsin had at one time adopted a constitutionally based rule of exclusion with respect to unnecessarily suggestive eyewitness identifications, a rule limited in scope to the suppression of unnecessary out-of-court showups.

2020See, e.g., State v. Aragon, 1993- NMCA-076, ¶ 24, 116 N.M. 291 , 861 P.2d 972 (holding that a detective’s inadvertent mention of a homicide investigation did not require a mistrial because the remark was brief and inadvertent, and “the jury knew that the only charge was aggravated battery and had been told during voir dire that the victim’s death had nothing to do with the circumstances of this case”), overruled on other grounds by Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 37 n.6.

2020See, e.g., State v. Aragon, 1993- NMCA-076, ¶ 24, 116 N.M. 291 , 861 P.2d 972 (holding that a detective’s inadvertent mention of a homicide investigation did not require a mistrial because the remark was brief and inadvertent, and “the jury knew that the only charge was aggravated battery and had been told during voir dire that the victim’s death had nothing to do with the circumstances of this case”), overruled on other grounds by Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 37 n.6.

2020However, these cases, Garrett argues, rely on “inapposite” Fourth Amendment precedent applying the independent source exception to evidence collected as a result of an illegal search or seizure, Garrett, supra, at 483; see Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (relying on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272-73 (same), and “now ostensibly only appl[y] to Sixth Amendment violations of the right to counsel at postindictment lineups.” Garrett, supra, at 483. {75} The second line of cases consists of the Fourteenth Amendment due-process cases arising from Manson, 432 U.S.

2020However, these cases, Garrett argues, rely on “inapposite” Fourth Amendment precedent applying the independent source exception to evidence collected as a result of an illegal search or seizure, Garrett, supra, at 483; see Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (relying on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272-73 (same), and “now ostensibly only appl[y] to Sixth Amendment violations of the right to counsel at postindictment lineups.” Garrett, supra, at 483. {75} The second line of cases consists of the Fourteenth Amendment due-process cases arising from Manson, 432 U.S.

2020However, these cases, Garrett argues, rely on “inapposite” Fourth Amendment precedent applying the independent source exception to evidence collected as a result of an illegal search or seizure, Garrett, supra, at 483; see Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (relying on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272-73 (same), and “now ostensibly only appl[y] to Sixth Amendment violations of the right to counsel at postindictment lineups.” Garrett, supra, at 483. {75} The second line of cases consists of the Fourteenth Amendment due-process cases arising from Manson, 432 U.S.

2020However, these cases, Garrett argues, rely on “inapposite” Fourth Amendment precedent applying the independent source exception to evidence collected as a result of an illegal search or seizure, Garrett, supra, at 483; see Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (relying on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272-73 (same), and “now ostensibly only appl[y] to Sixth Amendment violations of the right to counsel at postindictment lineups.” Garrett, supra, at 483. {75} The second line of cases consists of the Fourteenth Amendment due-process cases arising from Manson, 432 U.S.

2020However, these cases, Garrett argues, rely on “inapposite” Fourth Amendment precedent applying the independent source exception to evidence collected as a result of an illegal search or seizure, Garrett, supra, at 483; see Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (relying on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272-73 (same), and “now ostensibly only appl[y] to Sixth Amendment violations of the right to counsel at postindictment lineups.” Garrett, supra, at 483. {75} The second line of cases consists of the Fourteenth Amendment due-process cases arising from Manson, 432 U.S.

2020However, these cases, Garrett argues, rely on “inapposite” Fourth Amendment precedent applying the independent source exception to evidence collected as a result of an illegal search or seizure, Garrett, supra, at 483; see Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (relying on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272-73 (same), and “now ostensibly only appl[y] to Sixth Amendment violations of the right to counsel at postindictment lineups.” Garrett, supra, at 483. {75} The second line of cases consists of the Fourteenth Amendment due-process cases arising from Manson, 432 U.S.

2020See Foster, 1998-NMCA-163, ¶ 24 (“[T]he district court acted well within the bounds of its discretion in determining that the evidence did not so taint the trial as to require a mistrial.”). {13} Moreover, Defendant was the source of the error, though unintentionally.