source doctrine in New Jersey

1978The tentative draft comment states: This rule makes minor changes in the source rule, adding the statutory right of appellant to demand trial by jury, cf. N.J.S.A. 9:17 20, and making clear the obligation of the lower court to transmit the notice of appeal and its record to the appellate court. [Emphasis supplied] Had the Supreme Court intended to directly contradict the statutory grant of a jury trial to either party, which “was conceived by the Legislature to be an important attribute,” Sarte, supra, 129 N.J.Super. at 408 , it presumably would not have referred to it as a “minor language cha

1978The tentative draft comment states: This rule makes minor changes in the source rule, adding the statutory right of appellant to demand trial by jury, cf. N.J.S.A. 9:17 20, and making clear the obligation of the lower court to transmit the notice of appeal and its record to the appellate court. [Emphasis supplied] Had the Supreme Court intended to directly contradict the statutory grant of a jury trial to either party, which “was conceived by the Legislature to be an important attribute,” Sarte, supra, 129 N.J.Super. at 408 , it presumably would not have referred to it as a “minor language cha

1975Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd 51 N.J. 230 (1968), the court determined that under R.R. 4:8-3, the source rule of R. 4:5-4, the defense of qualified immunity of a municipality had to be specifically pleaded in order to avoid surprise, which purpose it identified as "the spirit of the rule." However, it went on to qualify this pleading requirement where *255 public policy compelled having the defense before the court and the other party was not prejudiced, citing Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270 (1961), as authority. [at 106] In the instant case the court perceives no basis for denying t

1975Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd. 51 N.J. 230 (1968), the court determined that under R.R. 4:8-3, the source rule of R. 4:5-4, the defense of qualified immunity of a municipality had to be specifically pleaded in order to avoid surprise, which purpose it identified as "the spirit of the rule." However, it went on to qualify this pleading requirement where public policy compelled having the defense before the court and the other party was not prejudiced, citing Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270 (1961), as authority.

1975Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd 51 N.J. 230 (1968), the court determined that under R.R. 4:8-3, the source rule of R. 4:5-4, the defense of qualified immunity of a municipality had to be specifically pleaded in order to avoid surprise, which purpose it identified as "the spirit of the rule." However, it went on to qualify this pleading requirement where *255 public policy compelled having the defense before the court and the other party was not prejudiced, citing Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270 (1961), as authority. [at 106] In the instant case the court perceives no basis for denying t

1975Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd. 51 N.J. 230 (1968), the court determined that under R.R. 4:8-3, the source rule of R. 4:5-4, the defense of qualified immunity of a municipality had to be specifically pleaded in order to avoid surprise, which purpose it identified as "the spirit of the rule." However, it went on to qualify this pleading requirement where public policy compelled having the defense before the court and the other party was not prejudiced, citing Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270 (1961), as authority.

2021The court also rejected defendant's request for a Franks3 hearing, which defendant requested as part of his motion to suppress. 3 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

2019The source of this test is the common law, which “recognized that coerced confessions are inherently untrustworthy.” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433 (citing King v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng.

2019A-5276-16T4 9 See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338 , 349–50 (1989) (holding that "lawfully obtained information in . . . affidavits upon which . . . warrants were based justified their issuance" notwithstanding that the affidavits also contained information from unlawfully obtained telephone toll records).

2017Our analysis in Williams was guided by "'the source rule of N.J.R.E. 410,' namely the Federal Rule." Id. at 611 (citing State v. Malik-Ismail, 292 N.J.

2013The landlords’ terse argument fails to establish an abuse of discretion by the trial court, see Miller v. Reis, 189 N.J.Super. 437, 445 , 460 A.2d 210 (App.Div.1983) (noting that “an argument employing this economy of words and authority does little to persuade us of the righteousness of the claim”), and therefore we discern no reason to disturb the result.

2013The landlords’ terse argument fails to establish an abuse of discretion by the trial court, see Miller v. Reis, 189 N.J.Super. 437, 445 , 460 A.2d 210 (App.Div.1983) (noting that “an argument employing this economy of words and authority does little to persuade us of the righteousness of the claim”), and therefore we discern no reason to disturb the result.

2012A. The leading case in New Jersey on the inevitable discovery doctrine is State v. Sugar, 108 N.J. 151 , 527 A.2d 1377 (1987).

2012A. The leading case in New Jersey on the inevitable discovery doctrine is State v. Sugar, 108 N.J. 151 , 527 A.2d 1377 (1987).

2012After this case was orally argued, we requested briefing on two additional questions: (1) whether, in the event we concluded that the phone records were inadmissible under either the inevitable discovery doctrine or the independent source rule, what remaining evidence would have been admissible at trial under United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 , 98 S.Ct. 1054 , 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), and (2) could admission of the telephone records be deemed harmless error.

2012After this case was orally argued, we requested briefing on two additional questions: (1) whether, in the event we concluded that the phone records were inadmissible under either the inevitable discovery doctrine or the independent source rule, what remaining evidence would have been admissible at trial under United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 , 98 S.Ct. 1054 , 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), and (2) could admission of the telephone records be deemed harmless error.

2008The source of this test for facial uneonstitu tionality is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).

2008There, then Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” Id. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. at 2100 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 707 .

2008The source of this test for facial uneonstitu tionality is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).

2008The source of this test for facial uneonstitu tionality is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).

2003Under these circumstances, the threat that the subsequent search was tainted by the illegal search is too great to allow for the application of the independent source exception. [Id at 548-49, 108 S.Ct at 2539 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 487-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted),] Complicating the analysis is a line of pre- and post-Murray decisions by federal and State courts holding that if an affidavit submitted in support of an application for a search warrant contains lawfully obtained information which establishes the probable cause required for a

2003Under these circumstances, the threat that the subsequent search was tainted by the illegal search is too great to allow for the application of the independent source exception. [Id at 548-49, 108 S.Ct at 2539 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 487-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted),] Complicating the analysis is a line of pre- and post-Murray decisions by federal and State courts holding that if an affidavit submitted in support of an application for a search warrant contains lawfully obtained information which establishes the probable cause required for a

2002Ante at 647, 790 A. 2d at 912 .

1999In addition, we find no other post- Murray circuit cases concerning the independent source doctrine that have interpreted Murray as refuting their pre- Murray holdings that inclusion of illegally-acquired information on a warrant affidavit does not invalidate the warrant if the affidavit's other averments set forth probable cause. [ 966 F. 2d at 969-70 .] We are in complete agreement with this analysis.

1997In applying the independent source doctrine, the trial court apparently relied on Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 212 (1972).

1997In applying the independent source doctrine, the trial court apparently relied on Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 212 (1972).