39 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Yonkus v. McKaygreen2 sentences1978The Opinions are merely, or purely, advisory, or, as the courts have alternatively declared, merely evidentiary, and all or part of an expert’s opinion may generally be accepted or rejected as it appeals to the judgment and conscience of the trier of the facts.” See, Yonkus v McKay, 186 Mich 203, 211 ; 152 NW 1031 (1915): "The administration of justice does not require the establishment of a rule which compels the jury to accept as absolute verity every uncontradicted statement a witness may make.” Commentary on effect of expert testimony: 11 MLP, § 268, p 498. 1978The Opinions are merely, or purely, advisory, or, as the courts have alternatively declared, merely evidentiary, and all or part of an expert’s opinion may generally be accepted or rejected as it appeals to the judgment and conscience of the trier of the facts.” See, Yonkus v McKay, 186 Mich 203, 211 ; 152 NW 1031 (1915): "The administration of justice does not require the establishment of a rule which compels the jury to accept as absolute verity every uncontradicted statement a witness may make.” Commentary on effect of expert testimony: 11 MLP, § 268, p 498. | 3 | 5 |
Arndt v. Grayewskigreen2 sentences2019See also Arndt v Grayewski, 279 Mich 224, 231 ; 271 NW 740 (1937) (holding that eyewitness testimony “is not conclusive upon the court or a jury if the facts and circumstances of the case are such as irresistibly lead the mind to a different conclusion”). 2019See also Arndt v Grayewski, 279 Mich 224, 231 ; 271 NW 740 (1937) (holding that eyewitness testimony “is not conclusive upon the court or a jury if the facts and circumstances of the case are such as irresistibly lead the mind to a different conclusion”). | 1 | 1 |
Attorney General ex rel. Rich v. Jochimgreen1 sentence2016See also Jochim, 99 Mich at 368, 370 (“One of the constitutional conditions upon which the respondent took his office was that he would be subject to removal by the Governor . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
Van Orden v. Perrygreen2 sentences2009See Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677 ; 125 S Ct 2854 ; 162 L Ed 2d 607 (2005) (Texas resident commenced § 1983 action against the governor and other state officials, seeking declaratory relief and an injunction that would require the removal of the Ten Commandments from the capitol on the basis of an Establishment Clause violation). 2009See Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677 ; 125 S Ct 2854 ; 162 L Ed 2d 607 (2005) (Texas resident commenced § 1983 action against the governor and other state officials, seeking declaratory relief and an injunction that would require the removal of the Ten Commandments from the capitol on the basis of an Establishment Clause violation). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Maui Countygreen1 sentence2006Indeed, in United States v Maui Co, 298 F Supp 2d 1010, 1014 (D Hawaii, 2003), the district court listed several cases that found no Establishment Clause violation with regard to § 3 of the RLUIPA. | 1 | 1 |
Richard H. Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21 Of Wheeling Townshipgreen1 sentence2005Sherman, supra at 1164. | 1 | 1 |
Tilton v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2002In Tilton v Richardson, supra at 685, the United States Supreme Court addressed an Establishment Clause challenge and noted that in contrast to students in elementary and secondary church-related schools, college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination, and that “by their very nature, college and postgraduate courses tend to limit the opportunities for sectarian influences by virtue of their own internal disciplines. 2002In Tilton v Richardson, supra at 685, the United States Supreme Court addressed an Establishment Clause challenge and noted that in contrast to students in elementary and secondary church-related schools, college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination, and that “by their very nature, college and postgraduate courses tend to limit the opportunities for sectarian influences by virtue of their own internal disciplines. | 1 | 1 |
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ballred2 sentences1986OBJECTION TO CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE In Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 612 ; 91 S Ct 2105 ; 29 L Ed 2d 745 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that in order to survive an Establishment Clause challenge, a statute must meet a three-part test: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion.” [Citations omitted.] See also Grand Rapids School Dist v Ball, 473 US 3 1986OBJECTION TO CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE In Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 612 ; 91 S Ct 2105 ; 29 L Ed 2d 745 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that in order to survive an Establishment Clause challenge, a statute must meet a three-part test: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion.” [Citations omitted.] See also Grand Rapids School Dist v Ball, 473 US 3 | 1 | 1 |
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.green2 sentences1985Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that the presence of the Twenty-first Amendment did not operate to alter its customary analysis under either the due process clause, Wisconsin v Constantineau, 400 US 433 ; 91 S Ct 507 ; 27 L Ed 2d *308 515 (1971), the equal protection clause, Craig, supra, or, most recently, the establishment clause, Larkin v Grendel’s Den, Inc, 459 US 116, 122, fn 5 ; 103 S Ct 505 ; 74 L Ed 2d 297 (1982) ("The State may not exercise its power under the Twenty-first Amendment in a way which impinges upon the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”) See also Califo 1985Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that the presence of the Twenty-first Amendment did not operate to alter its customary analysis under either the due process clause, Wisconsin v Constantineau, 400 US 433 ; 91 S Ct 507 ; 27 L Ed 2d *308 515 (1971), the equal protection clause, Craig, supra, or, most recently, the establishment clause, Larkin v Grendel’s Den, Inc, 459 US 116, 122, fn 5 ; 103 S Ct 505 ; 74 L Ed 2d 297 (1982) ("The State may not exercise its power under the Twenty-first Amendment in a way which impinges upon the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”) See also Califo | 1 | 1 |
| Sonnentheil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cebulak v. Lewisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Montague v. Dougangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Woodin v. Durfee
green
2 sentences1965“Eeferring to the case last cited, Chief Justice Brooke, speaking for the court in Yonkus v. McKay, 186 Mich 203 , [211] (Ann Cas 1917E, 458) said: “ ‘The administration of justice does not require the establishment of a rule which compels the jury to accept as absolute verity every uncontradicted statement a witness may make.’ “In Brand v. Johnrowe, 60 Mich 210 , referring to Woodin v. Durfee, supra, this Court held that the testimony of a certain witness was for the judgment of the jury, as they had the right to disbelieve *438 the positive evidence given by him, and find from circumstances 1960“Referring- to the case last cited, Chief Justice Brooke, speaking for the court in Yonkus v. McKay, 186 Mich 203, 211 (Ann Cas 1917E, 458), said: “ ‘The administration of justice does not require the establishment of a rule which compels the jury to accept as absolute verity every uncontradicted statement a witness may make.’ “In Brand v. Johnrowe, 60 Mich 210 , referring to Woodin v. Durfee, supra, this Court held that the testimony of a certain witness was for the judgment of the jury, as they had the right to disbelieve the positive evidence given by him, and find from circumstances outsid | 6 | 1915–1965 |
Ricketts v. Froehlich
green
2 sentences1948The administration of justice does not require the establishment of a rule Which compels the jury to accept as absolute verity every uncontradicted statement a witness may make. ” In Ricketts v. Froehlich, 218 Mich 459 , in reversing the trial court where a verdict for the defendant had been directed, this Court said: “Plaintiff’s evidence of the identity of the tort feasor responsible for this fatal accident was necessarily circumstantial. 1944The administration of justice does not require the establishment of a rule which compels the jury to accept as absolute verity every uncontradicted statement a witness may make. ’ “In Ricketts v. Froehlich, 218 Mich. 459, 461 , it was said: “ ‘ Circumstantial evidence in support of or against a proposition is equally competent with direct. | 4 | 1940–1958 |
Bigelow v. Walraven
green
2 sentences1982In addition to the deterrent value of such penalties, this Court has noted the positive effect on the efficient administration of justice, in that default procedures "keep the dockets current” and "expedite the disposal of causes, thereby preventing a dilatory or procrastinating defendant from impeding the plaintiff in the establishment of his claim”. *581 Bigelow v Walraven, 392 Mich 566, 576 ; 221 NW2d 328 (1974). 1982In addition to the deterrent value of such penalties, this Court has noted the positive effect on the efficient administration of justice, in that default procedures "keep the dockets current” and "expedite the disposal of causes, thereby preventing a dilatory or procrastinating defendant from impeding the plaintiff in the establishment of his claim”. *581 Bigelow v Walraven, 392 Mich 566, 576 ; 221 NW2d 328 (1974). | 3 | 1982–1988 |
Brand v. Johnrowe
green
2 sentences1965“Eeferring to the case last cited, Chief Justice Brooke, speaking for the court in Yonkus v. McKay, 186 Mich 203 , [211] (Ann Cas 1917E, 458) said: “ ‘The administration of justice does not require the establishment of a rule which compels the jury to accept as absolute verity every uncontradicted statement a witness may make.’ “In Brand v. Johnrowe, 60 Mich 210 , referring to Woodin v. Durfee, supra, this Court held that the testimony of a certain witness was for the judgment of the jury, as they had the right to disbelieve *438 the positive evidence given by him, and find from circumstances 1960“Referring- to the case last cited, Chief Justice Brooke, speaking for the court in Yonkus v. McKay, 186 Mich 203, 211 (Ann Cas 1917E, 458), said: “ ‘The administration of justice does not require the establishment of a rule which compels the jury to accept as absolute verity every uncontradicted statement a witness may make.’ “In Brand v. Johnrowe, 60 Mich 210 , referring to Woodin v. Durfee, supra, this Court held that the testimony of a certain witness was for the judgment of the jury, as they had the right to disbelieve the positive evidence given by him, and find from circumstances outsid | 3 | 1919–1965 |
Cuttle v. Concordia Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2020In Cuttle v Concordia Mut Fire Ins Co, 295 Mich 514, 519 ; 295 NW 246 (1940), the Supreme Court again acknowledged that “[u]ncontradicted testimony may be disentitled to conclusiveness because, from lapse of time or other circumstances, it may be inferred that the memory of the witness is imperfect as to the facts to which he testified, or that he recollects what he professes to have forgotten.” Id. 2020In Cuttle v Concordia Mut Fire Ins Co, 295 Mich 514, 519 ; 295 NW 246 (1940), the Supreme Court again acknowledged that “[u]ncontradicted testimony may be disentitled to conclusiveness because, from lapse of time or other circumstances, it may be inferred that the memory of the witness is imperfect as to the facts to which he testified, or that he recollects what he professes to have forgotten.” Id. | 2 | 2009–2020 |
Lemon v. Kurtzman
red
2 sentences2005Thus, our Establishment Clause analysis, like the federal analysis, is governed by Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602 ; 91 S Ct 2105 ; 29 L Ed 2d 745 (1971), in which the Supreme Court developed a three-pronged test to determine whether state action violated the prohibition on the establishment of religion: “First, the [state action] must have a secular .. . purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the [state action] *12 must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Id. at 612-613 (citations omitted). 2005Thus, our Establishment Clause analysis, like the federal analysis, is governed by Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602 ; 91 S Ct 2105 ; 29 L Ed 2d 745 (1971), in which the Supreme Court developed a three-pronged test to determine whether state action violated the prohibition on the establishment of religion: “First, the [state action] must have a secular .. . purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the [state action] *12 must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Id. at 612-613 (citations omitted). | 2 | 1986–2005 |
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
green
2 sentences2020However, that argument is clearly foreclosed by Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639, 658 ; 122 S Ct 2460 ; 153 L Ed 2d 604 (2002), in which the Court stated that “[t]he constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school.” It is true that Zelman dealt with an Establishment Clause challenge rather than a Free Exercise Clause challenge. 2020However, that argument is clearly foreclosed by Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639, 658 ; 122 S Ct 2460 ; 153 L Ed 2d 604 (2002), in which the Court stated that “[t]he constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school.” It is true that Zelman dealt with an Establishment Clause challenge rather than a Free Exercise Clause challenge. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Sprister v. City of Sturgis
green
2 sentences2016The establishment of such a principle would arrest necessarily every thing like progress or improvement in government; or if changes should be ventured upon, the government would have to become one great pension establishment on which to quarter a host of sinecures. [Id. at 416 (emphasis added).] *720 Given the reality that public offices may be abolished as provided by law, an individual who accepts a public office takes that position “subject to the contingency that it may be abolished lawfully.” Sprister v Sturgis, 242 Mich 68, 72 ; 218 NW 96 (1928). 2016The establishment of such a principle would arrest necessarily every thing like progress or improvement in government; or if changes should be ventured upon, the government would have to become one great pension establishment on which to quarter a host of sinecures. [Id. at 416 (emphasis added).] *720 Given the reality that public offices may be abolished as provided by law, an individual who accepts a public office takes that position “subject to the contingency that it may be abolished lawfully.” Sprister v Sturgis, 242 Mich 68, 72 ; 218 NW 96 (1928). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re Erickson Estate
green
2 sentences2015However, as previously discussed, in certain circumstances, undue influence is presumed: A presumption of undue influence arises upon the introduction of evidence that would establish (1) the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the grantor and a fiduciary, (2) the fiduciary, or an interest represented by the fiduciary, benefits from a transaction, and (3) the fiduciary had an opportunity to influence the grantor’s decision in that transaction. [In re Erickson Estate, 202 Mich App 329, 331 ; 508 NW2d 181 (1993).] As this Court has further explained: The establishment o 2015However, as previously discussed, in certain circumstances, undue influence is presumed: A presumption of undue influence arises upon the introduction of evidence that would establish (1) the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the grantor and a fiduciary, (2) the fiduciary, or an interest represented by the fiduciary, benefits from a transaction, and (3) the fiduciary had an opportunity to influence the grantor’s decision in that transaction. [In re Erickson Estate, 202 Mich App 329, 331 ; 508 NW2d 181 (1993).] As this Court has further explained: The establishment o | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Dawe v. Dr Reuven Bar-Levav & Associates, Pc
green
1 sentence2015MCL 330.1946 creates a duty under certain circumstances for mental health professionals to warn or protect third persons with respect to dangerous patients, see Dawe, 485 Mich at 27-28 ; it does not pertain to the establishment of a privilege. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wiles v. Liquor Control Commission
neutral
2 sentences1993Wiles v Liquor Control Comm, 59 Mich App 321 ; 229 NW2d 434 (1975). 1993Wiles v Liquor Control Comm, 59 Mich App 321 ; 229 NW2d 434 (1975). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Mason v. Marsa
neutral
2 sentences1988Bigelow v Walraven, 392 Mich 566, 576 ; 221 NW2d 328 (1974). [Mason v Marsa, 141 Mich App 38, 41 ; 366 NW2d 74 (1985), lv den 423 Mich 860 (1985).] Like the Court in Mason, "we are not prepared to say that the showing of a meritorious defense by itself is sufficient in all cases to warrant setting aside a default.” Id. at 41-42. 1988Bigelow v Walraven, 392 Mich 566, 576 ; 221 NW2d 328 (1974). [Mason v Marsa, 141 Mich App 38, 41 ; 366 NW2d 74 (1985), lv den 423 Mich 860 (1985).] Like the Court in Mason, "we are not prepared to say that the showing of a meritorious defense by itself is sufficient in all cases to warrant setting aside a default.” Id. at 41-42. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Citizens to Advance Public Education v. State Superintendent of Public Instruction
green
2 sentences1986Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v Nyquist, 413 US 756, 772-773 ; 93 S Ct 2955 ; 37 L Ed 2d 948 (1973), *274 adopted in Michigan in Citizens to Advance Public Education v State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 65 Mich App 168 ; 237 NW2d 232 (1975), lv den 397 Mich 854 (1976). 1986Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v Nyquist, 413 US 756, 772-773 ; 93 S Ct 2955 ; 37 L Ed 2d 948 (1973), *274 adopted in Michigan in Citizens to Advance Public Education v State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 65 Mich App 168 ; 237 NW2d 232 (1975), lv den 397 Mich 854 (1976). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing
green
2 sentences1986Children are given Bible instruction with the remainder of time devoted to integrating Biblical principles with the rest of the program. 7 Even had we found Rule 106 to burden the church’s free exercise of religion, the state’s compelling interest in protecting the emotional well-being of pre-school-age children who receive out-of-home care overrides any minimal intrusion on defendants’ free exercise of religion. 8 The establishment clause was applied to the states in Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15-16 ; 67 S Ct 504 ; 91 L Ed 711 (1947), reh den 330 US 855 ; 67 S Ct 962 ; 91 L Ed 12 1986Children are given Bible instruction with the remainder of time devoted to integrating Biblical principles with the rest of the program. 7 Even had we found Rule 106 to burden the church’s free exercise of religion, the state’s compelling interest in protecting the emotional well-being of pre-school-age children who receive out-of-home care overrides any minimal intrusion on defendants’ free exercise of religion. 8 The establishment clause was applied to the states in Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15-16 ; 67 S Ct 504 ; 91 L Ed 711 (1947), reh den 330 US 855 ; 67 S Ct 962 ; 91 L Ed 12 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist
green
2 sentences1986Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v Nyquist, 413 US 756, 772-773 ; 93 S Ct 2955 ; 37 L Ed 2d 948 (1973), *274 adopted in Michigan in Citizens to Advance Public Education v State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 65 Mich App 168 ; 237 NW2d 232 (1975), lv den 397 Mich 854 (1976). 1986Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v Nyquist, 413 US 756, 772-773 ; 93 S Ct 2955 ; 37 L Ed 2d 948 (1973), *274 adopted in Michigan in Citizens to Advance Public Education v State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 65 Mich App 168 ; 237 NW2d 232 (1975), lv den 397 Mich 854 (1976). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York
green
2 sentences1986Walz v Tax Comm, 397 US 664, 668 ; 90 S Ct 1409 ; 25 L Ed 2d 697 (1970). 1986Walz v Tax Comm, 397 US 664, 668 ; 90 S Ct 1409 ; 25 L Ed 2d 697 (1970). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Wallace v. Jaffree
green
2 sentences1986Establishment clause cases refer to allegations of aid to or sponsorship of religion, either through the granting of public aid to religious schools, Citizens to Advance Public Education, supra, the granting of tax-exempt status to religious organizations, Walz, supra, or the allowing of religious practices such as prayer to take place in public locations, Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US —; 105 S Ct 2479 ; 86 L Ed 2d 29 (1985). 1986Establishment clause cases refer to allegations of aid to or sponsorship of religion, either through the granting of public aid to religious schools, Citizens to Advance Public Education, supra, the granting of tax-exempt status to religious organizations, Walz, supra, or the allowing of religious practices such as prayer to take place in public locations, Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US —; 105 S Ct 2479 ; 86 L Ed 2d 29 (1985). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Aluia v. Harrison Community Hospital
green
1 sentence1986Id. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Cartner v. New York
neutral
1 sentence1986Children are given Bible instruction with the remainder of time devoted to integrating Biblical principles with the rest of the program. 7 Even had we found Rule 106 to burden the church’s free exercise of religion, the state’s compelling interest in protecting the emotional well-being of pre-school-age children who receive out-of-home care overrides any minimal intrusion on defendants’ free exercise of religion. 8 The establishment clause was applied to the states in Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15-16 ; 67 S Ct 504 ; 91 L Ed 711 (1947), reh den 330 US 855 ; 67 S Ct 962 ; 91 L Ed 12 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Everson v. Board of Education
neutral
1 sentence1986Children are given Bible instruction with the remainder of time devoted to integrating Biblical principles with the rest of the program. 7 Even had we found Rule 106 to burden the church’s free exercise of religion, the state’s compelling interest in protecting the emotional well-being of pre-school-age children who receive out-of-home care overrides any minimal intrusion on defendants’ free exercise of religion. 8 The establishment clause was applied to the states in Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15-16 ; 67 S Ct 504 ; 91 L Ed 711 (1947), reh den 330 US 855 ; 67 S Ct 962 ; 91 L Ed 12 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Federal Power Commission v. Arkansas Power & Light Co.
green
1 sentence1986Children are given Bible instruction with the remainder of time devoted to integrating Biblical principles with the rest of the program. 7 Even had we found Rule 106 to burden the church’s free exercise of religion, the state’s compelling interest in protecting the emotional well-being of pre-school-age children who receive out-of-home care overrides any minimal intrusion on defendants’ free exercise of religion. 8 The establishment clause was applied to the states in Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15-16 ; 67 S Ct 504 ; 91 L Ed 711 (1947), reh den 330 US 855 ; 67 S Ct 962 ; 91 L Ed 12 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Wisconsin v. Constantineau green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Craig v. Boren green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Advisory Opinion Re Constitutionality of Pa 1970, No 100 green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Branyan v. Alpena Flying Service, Inc. green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Day v. Backus neutral | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Littleton v. Grand Trunk Railway Co. green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Maki v. S. J. Groves & Sons neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Johnson v. Bergland Lumber Co. neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Ames v. Lake Independence Lumber Co. green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Hunt v. Burdick neutral | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Lapham v. Oakland Circuit Judge green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Ashman v. Flint & Pere Marquette Railroad neutral | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Kendrick v. Beard green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Sadowski v. Michigan Car Co. green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Becker v. Detroit Citizens' Street Railway Co. green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.