9 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1899–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
The St. Luke Hospitals, Inc. v. Kopowskigreen2 sentences2020Luke Hospital., Inc. v. Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Ky. 2005)). 8 Mallory’s conversations with Defense counsel because no trial strategy had been revealed. 2020Luke Hospital., Inc. v. Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Ky. 2005)). 8 Mallory’s conversations with Defense counsel because no trial strategy had been revealed. | 2 | 2 |
Tabor v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2020Additionally, the trial court found—in addition to her finding of waiver— no prejudice resulted from the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office hearing 17 Tabor v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 571, 572 (1981) (“Four fundamental conditions are recognized as necessary to the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of communications [including that] the communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed . . . . ”) (citing St. 2020Additionally, the trial court found—in addition to her finding of waiver— no prejudice resulted from the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office hearing 17 Tabor v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 571, 572 (1981) (“Four fundamental conditions are recognized as necessary to the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of communications [including that] the communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed ....”) (citing St. | 2 | 2 |
Harris v. McRaegreen2 sentences2023The United States Supreme Court has clearly rejected an establishment challenge to federal regulations prohibiting the funding of abortion because 139 such regulations were “as much a reflection of ‘traditionalist’ values towards abortion, as it is an embodiment of the views of any particular religion.” Harris, 448 U.S. at 319. 2023The Supreme Court reasoned, “it does not follow that a statute violates the Establishment Clause because it ‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.’” Id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Beacon Liquors v. Martin
green
2 sentences1984In Beacon Liquors v. Martin, 279 Ky. 468 , 131 S.W.2d 446 (1939), we stated: Appellant next contends that the Act by permitting churches, schools, and hospitals to give their written consent for a liquor outlet to be established on the same street, or avenue, and with 200 feet of such institutions, amounts to a delegation of power given them by the Legislature. 1984In Beacon Liquors v. Martin, 279 Ky. 468 , 131 S.W.2d 446 (1939), we stated: Appellant next contends that the Act by permitting churches, schools, and hospitals to give their written consent for a liquor outlet to be established on the same street, or avenue, and with 200 feet of such institutions, amounts to a delegation of power given them by the Legislature. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.
green
2 sentences1984If this were so, it would then be a simple task to ignore the holding of Larkin since our holding in Beacon Liquors that a statute similar to 16C was not an unlawful delegation of power. 1 Unfortunately the United States Supreme Court in Larkin does not leave us with this simple solution since they go on at great length to make an independent analysis as to whether a statute of this import (either Sec. 16C of Chapter 138 of the Massachusetts General Laws or KRS 243.220(2) violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment and in furtherance of this discussion, states 459 U.S. at page 122 1984If this were so, it would then be a simple task to ignore the holding of Larkin since our holding in Beacon Liquors that a statute similar to 16C was not an unlawful delegation of power. 1 Unfortunately the United States Supreme Court in Larkin does not leave us with this simple solution since they go on at great length to make an independent analysis as to whether a statute of this import (either Sec. 16C of Chapter 138 of the Massachusetts General Laws or KRS 243.220(2) violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment and in furtherance of this discussion, states 459 U.S. at page 122 | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Lawrence v. Board of Councilmen of Frankfort
neutral
2 sentences1966The importance of the “intentions” of the parties was more clearly emphasized years later in Lawrence v. Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort, 162 Ky. 528 , 172 S.W. 953 . 1966The importance of the “intentions” of the parties was more clearly emphasized years later in Lawrence v. Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort, 162 Ky. 528 , 172 S.W. 953 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Hammons
green
2 sentences1950Although the claimant, under the Workmen’s Compen-' sation Act, has the burden of proving by competent- evidence all facts necessary to the establishment of his claim, Kentucky Utilities Company v. Hammons, 284 Ky. 437 , 145 S. W. 2d 67 , yet we think the evidence here was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction by the Board. 1950Although the claimant, under the Workmen’s Compen-' sation Act, has the burden of proving by competent- evidence all facts necessary to the establishment of his claim, Kentucky Utilities Company v. Hammons, 284 Ky. 437 , 145 S. W. 2d 67 , yet we think the evidence here was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction by the Board. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Rowan's Ex'rs v. Town of Portland
neutral
2 sentences1943The principle of equitable servitude was recognized and applied by this court in January, 1848, in the case of Rowan’s Executors v. Town of Portland,, 47 Ky. 232 , 8 B. 1943The principle of equitable servitude was recognized and applied by this court in January, 1848, in the case of Rowan’s Executors v. Town of Portland,, 47 Ky. 232 , 8 B. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Leach v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1921Leach v. Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 497 , 112 S. W. 495 . | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Dawson v. Vickery
neutral
2 sentences1899(Humphreys v. Butler, 51 Ark., 351, [ 11 S. W., 479 ]; Dawson v. Vickery, 150 Ill., 398 , [ 37 N. E., 910 ].) But, without undertaking to pass upon these questions, it seems manifest that, when lapse of time does not operate as a statutory bar, it can be applied only by raising a presumption of assent to the existing status, under such circumstances as to prevent substantial justice being done between the parties, in which event the courts will declare the relief sought inequitable, or in cases where, on account of the gross neglect and laches in bringing the suit, the disturbance resulting fr 1899(Humphreys v. Butler, 51 Ark., 351, [ 11 S. W., 479 ]; Dawson v. Vickery, 150 Ill., 398 , [ 37 N. E., 910 ].) But, without undertaking to pass upon these questions, it seems manifest that, when lapse of time does not operate as a statutory bar, it can be applied only by raising a presumption of assent to the existing status, under such circumstances as to prevent substantial justice being done between the parties, in which event the courts will declare the relief sought inequitable, or in cases where, on account of the gross neglect and laches in bringing the suit, the disturbance resulting fr | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.