establishment clause in Maryland

2003Finally, the Supreme Court has instructed, in one of its leading Establishment Clause cases, that "if a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to the [Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 , 237 (1997).

2003Mitchell v. Helms: Use of the Pervasively Sectarian Standard as Part of Establishment Clause Analysis is Questioned in the Supreme Court The continuing vitality of the "pervasively sectarian" criterion as part of Establishment Clause analysis was recently discussed at some length in a plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), a case that did not involve conduit financing, but rather direct aid to religiously-affiliated schools.

2003The plurality opinion clearly rejected that criterion as a part of Establishment Clause analysis, stating that "[t]his doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now." 530 U.S. at 829 .

2003The court found that the program satisfied the two prongs of a modified Lemon test, noting that the proceeds of the bonds did not support religious aspects of the school. 241 F.3d at 512 -14 .

2003The court found that the program satisfied the two prongs of a modified Lemon test, noting that the proceeds of the bonds did not support religious aspects of the school. 241 F.3d at 512 -14 .

2003In Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit found no Establishment Clause violation in state funding for halfway houses that operated from a religious perspective as well as for secular houses, where the choice of the house to use was left up to the individual.

2002Appellate courts, far from the action of resolving disputed credibilities or choosing among contradictory versions of events, frequently engage in the de novo process of weighing the significance of predicate facts found by others and then deciding for themselves the ultimate, conclusory fact, such as probable cause, the voluntariness of consent, the voluntariness of a confession, etc. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).

2002Appellate courts, far from the action of resolving disputed credibilities or choosing among contradictory versions of events, frequently engage in the de novo process of weighing the significance of predicate facts found by others and then deciding for themselves the ultimate, conclusory fact, such as probable cause, the voluntariness of consent, the voluntariness of a confession, etc. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).

2001In 1952 we held in Wilson v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 200 Md. 652 , 89 A. 2d 227 , that a trial court has no power to strike out or reduce a sentence *434 imposed upon a convicted defendant after it has become enrolled.

2001In 1952 we held in Wilson v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 200 Md. 652 , 89 A. 2d 227 , that a trial court has no power to strike out or reduce a sentence *434 imposed upon a convicted defendant after it has become enrolled.

2001In emphasizing the importance of the doctrine in that case, Judge Seabury forcefully stated: “Bearing in mind that the witnesses to crimes of violence are often of a low and degraded character and that after they have given their testimony they are sometimes influenced by bribery and other improper considerations, it is evident that the establishment of a rule which left the power to grant a new trial to a defendant to depend upon recantation by such witnesses would be subversive of the proper administration of justice.” We held in 1950 in Czaplinski v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 196 Md.

2001In emphasizing the importance of the doctrine in that case, Judge Seabury forcefully stated: “Bearing in mind that the witnesses to crimes of violence are often of a low and degraded character and that after they have given their testimony they are sometimes influenced by bribery and other improper considerations, it is evident that the establishment of a rule which left the power to grant a new trial to a defendant to depend upon recantation by such witnesses would be subversive of the proper administration of justice.” We held in 1950 in Czaplinski v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 196 Md.

1997In Hawley v. City of Cleveland , 24 F.3d 814 (6th Cir. 1994) the federal appellate court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the lease of municipal airport space to the Catholic Diocese of Cleveland for a chapel.

1997In Hawley v. City of Cleveland , 24 F.3d 814 (6th Cir. 1994) the federal appellate court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the lease of municipal airport space to the Catholic Diocese of Cleveland for a chapel.

1992We recognize that the establishment clause of the First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 , 67 S.Ct. 504 , 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947), but the ultimate determination of whether the ordinance in question violates the establishment clause of the United States Constitution is for the federal courts.

1992We recognize that the establishment clause of the First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 , 67 S.Ct. 504 , 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947), but the ultimate determination of whether the ordinance in question violates the establishment clause of the United States Constitution is for the federal courts.

1988Under Swain , the significance of a defendant’s fourteenth amendment equal protection claim and the apparent perversion of the purposes of the peremptory challenge might be shown only “when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, ...” 380 U.S. at 223 , 85 S.Ct. at 837 , 13 L.Ed.2d

1988Under Swain , the significance of a defendant’s fourteenth amendment equal protection claim and the apparent perversion of the purposes of the peremptory challenge might be shown only “when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, ...” 380 U.S. at 223 , 85 S.Ct. at 837 , 13 L.Ed.2d

1985Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 , 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111 , 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971).

1985Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 , 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111 , 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971).

1982Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Welsh v. United States, supra, 398 U.S. at 361 , dealing with the religious conscientious objector exemption in the Selective Service Act, reiterated the importance of evenhanded treatment: "To conform with the requirements of the First Amendment’s religious clauses as reflected in the mainstream of American history, legislation must, at the very least, be neutral.” Later, with respect to the same exemption, the Supreme Court stated: "when government activities touch on the religious sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, a

1982Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Welsh v. United States, supra, 398 U.S. at 361 , dealing with the religious conscientious objector exemption in the Selective Service Act, reiterated the importance of evenhanded treatment: "To conform with the requirements of the First Amendment’s religious clauses as reflected in the mainstream of American history, legislation must, at the very least, be neutral.” Later, with respect to the same exemption, the Supreme Court stated: "when government activities touch on the religious sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, a

1970The oldest of those is Maenner v. Carroll, supra. In that case there was a specific argument by counsel: “[I]t is * * * clear [a licensor] has no right to render the way dangerous, without notice to the licensee.

1968Since the establishment of the doctrine of third party beneficiaries in the landmark decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859), substantially all state courts of last resort, including this Court, have adopted and applied the doctrine.

1966In deciding Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 , 10 L.Ed.2d 844 , which held that the reading, without comment, at the opening of each school day, of verses from the Bible and recitation in unison of the Lord's prayer, violated the establishment clause, the Court, in the traditional way of courts, did not acknowledge error and adhered to its views but was particularly careful in its opinion to in effect answer criticism by specifying just what had been held before and was being held then, and to say, with words chosen even more carefully than usual, just what the law was.

1966In deciding Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 , 10 L.Ed.2d 844 , which held that the reading, without comment, at the opening of each school day, of verses from the Bible and recitation in unison of the Lord's prayer, violated the establishment clause, the Court, in the traditional way of courts, did not acknowledge error and adhered to its views but was particularly careful in its opinion to in effect answer criticism by specifying just what had been held before and was being held then, and to say, with words chosen even more carefully than usual, just what the law was.

1966VII The Establishment of Religion Clause In Murray, supra, 241 Md. at 398 , the Court set forth the guide lines which we found in the decisions of the Supreme Court in respect of the establishment clause of the First Amendment, now beyond question made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth.

1966VII The Establishment of Religion Clause In Murray, supra, 241 Md. at 398 , the Court set forth the guide lines which we found in the decisions of the Supreme Court in respect of the establishment clause of the First Amendment, now beyond question made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth.

1962Engel v. Vitale, supra , cert. granted 368 U.S. 924 , was argued on April 3, 1962, and is now awaiting determination by the Supreme Court.

1962Engel v. Vitale, supra, cert. granted 368 U. S. 924 , was argued on April 3, 1962, and is now awaiting determination by the Supreme Court.

1956Judge Hammond went on to point out that the early cases *76 which led to the establishment of the exception to the general rule of non-liability of the lessor either involved, or were closely analogous to, nuisances on streets or public ways, that the exception has been applied most often to places of amusement and hotels, that there has been much division of opinion as to its further extension, and that this Court refused to extend it to a rooming house in Smith, v. State, Use of Walsh, 92 Md. 518 , 48 A. 92 .

1956Judge Hammond went on to point out that the early cases *76 which led to the establishment of the exception to the general rule of non-liability of the lessor either involved, or were closely analogous to, nuisances on streets or public ways, that the exception has been applied most often to places of amusement and hotels, that there has been much division of opinion as to its further extension, and that this Court refused to extend it to a rooming house in Smith, v. State, Use of Walsh, 92 Md. 518 , 48 A. 92 .