establishment clause in Maine

2006Eulitt v. State of Maine Department of Education [¶ 39] The parents in Eulitt , argued that the State’s asserted interest in maintaining the sectarian school exclusion in order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation was no longer valid after Zelman , undermining the First Circuit’s decision in Strout. 386 F.3d at 348-49 . [¶ 40] Because it concluded that the Free Exercise Clause “defines the scope of the fundamental right to religion incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee,” id. at 353 , the Eulitt court assessed whether section 2951(2) comports with the Free

2006Eulitt v. State of Maine Department of Education [¶ 39] The parents in Eulitt , argued that the State’s asserted interest in maintaining the sectarian school exclusion in order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation was no longer valid after Zelman , undermining the First Circuit’s decision in Strout. 386 F.3d at 348-49 . [¶ 40] Because it concluded that the Free Exercise Clause “defines the scope of the fundamental right to religion incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee,” id. at 353 , the Eulitt court assessed whether section 2951(2) comports with the Free

2006Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶32 , 728 A.2d at 138 .

2006Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶32 , 728 A.2d at 138 .

1999Although the school is chosen by parents, not the State, choice alone cannot overcome the fact that the tuition program would directly pay religious schools for programs that include and advance religion. [¶ 61] None of the Supreme Court's decisions to date have ever intimated that such direct subsidies of religious schools could survive an Establishment Clause challenge. [31] *145 Indeed, in the case relied on most heavily by the parents, Agostini , the Court found it important that "No Title I funds ever reach the coffers of religious schools." Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 (dis

1999Although the school is chosen by parents, not the State, choice alone cannot overcome the fact that the tuition program would directly pay religious schools for programs that include and advance religion. [¶ 61] None of the Supreme Court's decisions to date have ever intimated that such direct subsidies of religious schools could survive an Establishment Clause challenge. [31] *145 Indeed, in the case relied on most heavily by the parents, Agostini , the Court found it important that "No Title I funds ever reach the coffers of religious schools." Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 (dis

1999Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 657-59 , 100 S.Ct. 840 , 63 L.Ed.2d 94 (1980)).

1999Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 657-59 , 100 S.Ct. 840 , 63 L.Ed.2d 94 (1980)).

1999REV. 7 (1993). [40] There is no indication in equal protection jurisprudence that the strict scrutiny analysis for religious-based classifications differs from the analysis of race-based classifications. [41] See also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 , 107 S.Ct. 1053 , 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (considering "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies" when determining whether a classification was narrowly tailored). [42] In his dissent in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 , 105 S.Ct. 3232 , 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985), a case since overruled in Agostini v. Felton, 52

1999REV. 7 (1993). [40] There is no indication in equal protection jurisprudence that the strict scrutiny analysis for religious-based classifications differs from the analysis of race-based classifications. [41] See also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 , 107 S.Ct. 1053 , 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (considering "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies" when determining whether a classification was narrowly tailored). [42] In his dissent in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 , 105 S.Ct. 3232 , 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985), a case since overruled in Agostini v. Felton, 52

1999REV. 7 (1993). [40] There is no indication in equal protection jurisprudence that the strict scrutiny analysis for religious-based classifications differs from the analysis of race-based classifications. [41] See also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 , 107 S.Ct. 1053 , 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (considering "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies" when determining whether a classification was narrowly tailored). [42] In his dissent in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 , 105 S.Ct. 3232 , 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985), a case since overruled in Agostini v. Felton, 52

1999REV. 7 (1993). [40] There is no indication in equal protection jurisprudence that the strict scrutiny analysis for religious-based classifications differs from the analysis of race-based classifications. [41] See also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 , 107 S.Ct. 1053 , 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (considering "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies" when determining whether a classification was narrowly tailored). [42] In his dissent in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 , 105 S.Ct. 3232 , 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985), a case since overruled in Agostini v. Felton, 52

1999In Jackson v. Benson , for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found no Establishment Clause violation in a tuition voucher program that provided substantial monetary aid to religious schools without restriction on how the aid was used because the program: selects its beneficiaries based on random, *150 nonreligious criteria; provides an "opt-out" provision that prevents private schools from requiring students to participate in religious activities; sends the economic aid to the religious school in the form of checks that must be endorsed by the parents; and limits the amount of tuition subsi

1999In Jackson v. Benson, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found no Establishment Clause violation in a tuition voucher program that provided substantial monetary aid to religious schools without restriction on how the aid was used because the program: selects its beneficiaries based on random, nonreligious criteria; provides an “opt-out” provision that prevents private schools from requiring students to participate in religious activities; sends the economic aid to the religious school in the form of checks that must be endorsed by the parents; and limits the amount of tuition subsidy to

1978Although two federal circuit courts have rejected this contention, Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra ; Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court per curiam, 429 U.S. 65 , 97 S.Ct. 342 , 50 L.Ed.2d 223 (1976), a federal district court believed otherwise.

1978Although two federal circuit courts have rejected this contention, Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra; Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff’d by an equally divided Court per curiam, 429 U.S. 65 , 97 S.Ct. 342 , 50 L.Ed.2d 223 (1976), a federal district court believed otherwise.

1978Although two federal circuit courts have rejected this contention, Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra ; Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court per curiam, 429 U.S. 65 , 97 S.Ct. 342 , 50 L.Ed.2d 223 (1976), a federal district court believed otherwise.

1978Although two federal circuit courts have rejected this contention, Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra ; Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court per curiam, 429 U.S. 65 , 97 S.Ct. 342 , 50 L.Ed.2d 223 (1976), a federal district court believed otherwise.

1978Although two federal circuit courts have rejected this contention, Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra ; Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court per curiam, 429 U.S. 65 , 97 S.Ct. 342 , 50 L.Ed.2d 223 (1976), a federal district court believed otherwise.

1978Although two federal circuit courts have rejected this contention, Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra; Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff’d by an equally divided Court per curiam, 429 U.S. 65 , 97 S.Ct. 342 , 50 L.Ed.2d 223 (1976), a federal district court believed otherwise.

1952In Dennett v. Dow, supra, the establishment of the exception applicable to subscribing witnesses was protested in a dissent on the ground that it was unwise as having: “a tendency to unsettle the law of evidence by preferring the particular benefit to the general good.” The rule applicable to surprise is well stated in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Stevens, supra, but a limitation on it is expressed very forcibly in Bank of the Northern Liberties v. Davis, supra. Therein the court, recognizing that the authority was discretionary and that a party had the right to protect himself from the trea

1844In Whitwell & al. v. Johnson, 17 Mass. R. 449 , Mr. C.